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THESIS SUMMARY: DAVID SIMPSON. 
TITLE: PRAGMATICS AND THE POLITICS OF DISCOURSE. 
This thesis is a study of pragmatics as it has developed 
within analytic philosophy of language and Anglo-American 
linguistics. The discussion of philosophical pragmatics 
concentrates on Austin's notions of the performative and the 
illocutionary act, Grice's explication of meaning in terms of 
intentions, and Searle 's theories of speech acts and intention-
ality. Within linguistic pragmatics I examine discourse analysis, 
concentrating on Labov & Fanshel's analysis of therapeutic 
discourse, and conversation analysis, as it has developed 
from Garfinkel's ethnomethodology and as a critical response 
to discourse analysis and speech act theory. The central arg-
ument put foward here is that, through their exploration of 
the relation between language and the users of language, these 
approaches to pragmatics open as a field of study what can be 
called the 'politics of discourse', the operation through 
discourse of the political relations of an interactive comm-
unity . However, this field is simultaneously closed, and it is 
argued that this closure is tied to the introduction of concepts, 
centrally that of the foundational linguistic subject, which 
ultimately undermine the validity of these approaches. 
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SUMMARY 
This thesis is a study of pr-agmatics as it has de vel oped 
within analytic philosophy of language and Anglo-Amer-ican l in -
guistics. The discussion of philosophical pr-agmatics concentrates 
on Austin's notions of the per-for-mati ve and t he i llocut ionary 
act, Grice's explication of meaning in terms of intention s, and 
Searle's theor-ies of speech acts and intentionality . Within lin-
guistic pragmatics I examine discourse analysis, concentrating on 
Labov & Fanshel's analysis of therapeutic discourse, and conver--
sation anal ysis, as it has developed from Garfinkel's e thnometh-
odology and as a critical r-esponse to discour-se analysis and 
speech act theo r-y. The centr-al argument put foward here is that, 
through their- exploration of the relati on between language a nd 
the users of language, these approaches to p ragmatic s open as a 
field of study what can be cal led the 'politics of discourse', 
t hat is, the oper-ation through discourse o f the political r-elat-
i ons of an interacti ve community. However-, t h is field is sim ul-
taneously closed, and I a r gue that this closure is tied to the 
introduction of concepts, centrally that o f the f oundational 
linguistic sub j ect, which ultimately under-mine the theoretical 
va lidity of these approaches. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Pragmatics is a field of study whic h has developed relati ve-
l y recently, and because of this it both requires and resists 
definition. J ust as someone coming upon the term may find its 
me a ning unclear-, so within the field there is as yet no se t t l ed 
r-ange of questions oc phenomena covered by 'pragmatics'. Nonethe-
less, it is possible to offer- a b road and p r- ovisional categor-i z -
ation, and through this to note some o f the issues arising in the 
discussion which follows. 
An initial step is t o see pragmatics ( following Morris, 
1938 ) as fallin g within a tripartite di v ision of linguistic o r 
(more generally ) semio tic study, along with syntax and semantics. 
Here, while syntax deals with the relation between signs, and 
semantics the relation of signs to objects, pragmatics studies 
the relation o f signs to the users of a language. It st ud ies 
those features of language (o r other sign systems ) whose exp l an-
ation r-equires reference to language users. 
Study of the relation between a language and its u ser-s 
involves interest in the context of language use, the context in 
which, foe example, a given sentence may have different meanings 
on different occasions of use. Because of this, a partial further 
definition of p ragmatics is t hat it studies those aspects o f 
meaning which are not captured by semantics, or that it st ud ies 
those relations between language and context t hat are basic t o an 
account of understanding, or, further, that it studies the abil-
ity to pair sentences with context.l 
Such definitions give a useful initial idea of the field o f 
pragmatics, and I will allow their details to arise in what 
follows, rather than fill them out further here. But it s hould b e 
noted that such definitions give a sense of 'pragmatics' which is 
usually thought of as 'analytic', and specific to Anglo-American 
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philosophy and linguistics. This sense sees p ragmati c s as con -
stituting o ne pa rt of a general linguistics ~ or the philos ophy of 
language ) , and as not including within its scope areas such as 
s oc i o linguistics and psycho linguisti~s. 
There is alternatively a wider, 'Continental' definition of 
pragmatics, which doe s include sociolingui stics and psycholin-
gulstic s within its scope, and which appears to regard pragmatics 
as a different way of doing linguistics, rather tha n j u st as an 
approach to b e added to lingu istics. Th1s di stinction should n o t 
b e taken as hard and fast,2 but it 1s within this theoretical 
distinct ion that the present study concentrates almost e xclus-
l vely o n (part of) the Anglo-American tradition in pragmatics. 
Aside from the above definitions, there are certain charact-
e ris tics of pragmatics which give rise to the major theoretical 
issues to be dealt with in what follows. The first characteristic 
is that the emphasis o n the users of language and the context o f 
utterance invol ves concentration on language as what ha s various-
ly been called performance o r parole, that is, on the ac t ual 
product ion of speech or writing, rather than on language as an 
abstract calculus. 3 This ha s a number of consequences. It leads 
to a n interest in supra-sentential feat ures, in the relations 
between sentences, rather than those within sentences (as in 
traditional linguistics ), and on rules relating context and lang-
uage which account for linguistic organization at this supra-
sentential level. It also leads to t he utterance replacing the 
sentence as the central unit of analy sis, since these organ iz-
ational factors do not seem t o operate on the gramma tical sen-
tence as such, but rather on units which are construct ed (as well 
as organized) according to rules other than those which constit-
ute a sentence in the traditional, s yntact ic sense . 
These utterances are taken as the realizations of speech 
act s, o r moves,4 and as this indicates, they are both identifi-
able linguistic units and acts performed by the users of l an-
guage. Just how these acts are to be characterized is a question 
which will be dealt with later, but the important point to note 
h ere is that with the emphasis on context, on the produc ti o n or 
perfo rmance of utterances by language users, on the relation 
between utterances, and o n language as action, a c entral feature 
of pragmatics is that it deals with interact i on . The context 
relevant to prag mati c s is the interactive context existing and 
ar1sing between linguistic subjects engaged in va rious discursive 
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pract ices, and t he acts t hese subjects perform gain their si gni f -
i canc e from being acts in interacti ve pr ac~ices. 
A furt her consequenc e is that _the analysis in t erms of 
interaction, which is, in e ffect, a functional anal y sis ( see 
Le vi nson, 1981: 7 ) leads to an em phasis in some aspects o f prag-
matics o n the subjectiv e meaning, o r the meaning for those en-
ga g e d in discourse, o f lingu istic acts or phen om ena. Th e ai m of 
p rag mati c analysi s becomes he re that of gi v ing an account o f t he 
actual enga gement of linguistic sub j ects 1n discourse, and so the 
s ubj e c t is g i ven a theoreti cal status denied to i t (e xplici t ly at 
least ) by f o rmalist or structural approaches to la ng ua ge. 
Within linguistics , pragmat ics is generall y seen as one 
reaction to the Chomskian paradigm, but t he opposition which I 
want to emphasize here is that bet ween p ragmati c s and positi v ism. 
Within philosophical pragmatics this o pposition arises most im -
portantl y with Au stin's criticism of l og ical empiricis m in t he 
phi l osop hy of language,S but this p hilosophical anti - positiv ism 
both parallels and influences part of a genera l anti-positi vi s m 
within t he social sciences.6 Within p hil osophy , t h is anti - posit -
i v ist trend can b e seen to c entre on three positions. F irst, 
there is a re j ection of the theoretical p rimac y o f the descrip-
tion as the paradigm or ideal linguisti c phenomenon. Second, it 
is claimed that language usage is an institutional fact , requir-
ing descript1on in terms of constitutive rules, and ne ver being 
adequately described in t erms o f ' brute facts' which supposedly 
prec ede and avoid interpretation. And thirdly, there is the 
notion, connected to the first two, tha t language does not simply 
describe phenomena, but imposes significance o n them , and (at 
least) in the area of social pheno mena, is importantly constit-
utive of them. 
Within the social sciences there tends, al on g with the 
influence o f these ideas, to b e an emphasis o n the necessit y of 
interpretation o f data, and with this a confrontation of issues 
which arise regarding the role of the a nal yst. This in turn 
involves the attempt, noted above, to study the sub j ective me an-
ing for participants of their interactive practices, and their 
relation to the construction o f social reality through these 
practices. 
There is a further charac teristic of pragmatics which is 
rarely , if ever, explicitly acknowledged within t hat tradition, 
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but which will be emphasi z ed in this study: throug h its interest 
in la nguage as interaction, pragmatics is involved in the anal-
ysis of political phenomena. There are two aspects to t h is. 
First, the interactive (and more specifically, discursi v e ) relat-
ions which are confronted by pragmatics involve ( in, for e xa mp le, 
the implicit and e xplicit evaluation of the validit y of utter-
ances, and in their effectivity or otherwise - in t he degrees t o 
which utterances are felicitous) the operation of social roles 
and relations which are in an important respect relations o f 
power (be these relations of oppression or relations o f s olid-
arity) . They are, that is, political relations. Further, discurs -
i ve interact ion is a site of the contestation of concepts, or a 
site at which the concepts wh1ch go to make up an ideational or 
ideological framework are expressed, emphasized, opposed and 
changed. A central aspect of this involves the assignment of 
those social roles which in turn take effect in the operation of 
di scourse; and these factors are comb1ned in the constit u tion of 
those sub j ectivities which arise as discursive sub j ects. Thus, in 
confronting discourse, pragmatics is confronting the politics of 
di scourse. 
Secondly, in as much as it confronts discourse, pragmatics, 
as a meta-discourse, is itself invol ved in discursi v e practice. 
It is invol ved 1n the assignment of significance and at a site of 
the contestation of concepts. For pragmatics this focuses on such 
issues as the definition of a linguistic subject and the relation 
of a linguistic subject to discursive practice, and crucially, in 
this context, it focuses on the definition of the political. 
Because it is involved in a political relation to its object, and 
in relations of relative dominance and support with var iou s 
social subjects and institutions, the question of whether these 
r elations exists (whether abstractly for philosophy or at a more 
applied level for social science ) are crucial in an analysis of 
pragmatics. Within pragmatics, these relations are generally 
ignored, but it will be argued {as ma y be clear from the preced-
ing comments) that pragmatics in fact, and to some extent despite 
itself, exposes the politics of discourse while refusing to 
confront it. 
This refusal is not arbitrary, however, but is tied to 
several aspects of prag matics which undermine it theoretically 
and contradict those anti-positivist elements noted above. Im-
portantly, it involves the adoption of the concept of a foundat-
ional linguistic subject which is taken to arise outside discurs-
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ive ~ e lations , and in which the dete~mination of meaning is 
assum e d to be located. 
In the following chapte~s the ~evelopment of p~agmatics in 
analytic philos ophy is t~aced mainly through the wo~ k of J . L. 
Austin , H.P.G~ ice and J .R.Sea~ le, and then ~e sponse s to and 
d e vel opments of this wo~k a~e examined in discou~se analysis and 
conve~sa t i on analysis. It should b e noted at this po int t ha t it 
would b e impossible in a wo~k such a s this to adequatel y cove ~ 
the entire spect~um of wo~k and issues which a~ ise in Anglo-
Ame~ican pragmat ics. Consequently, I have concentrated ins t ead on 
that wo~k and those issues which I conside~ to b e cent~al to 
p~ag matics and which enable the most inte~esting aspects of 
p~agmatics to be b~ought out. 
That aspect of Austin's work wh i ch is impo~tant fo~ p~ag ­
matics ca n be divided into two pa~t s. In the first pa~t ( see 
Chapt e~ One below), Austin develops the notion of the pe~f o~m ­
at i ve. This is an u tteranc e which has the fo~m o f a statement, 
but which appears not to b e t~ue o~ false. Instead, ~athe~ than 
describing a state of affai~s, a pe~ fo~mati ve (such as 'I find 
you gui lty ' ) brings about a state of affai~s, and seems to b e 
mo~e than just sayin g something. I~ o~de~ for a pe~formative to 
be effective, however, it must satisfy va~ious 'felicity ' condit-
ions: it must, for example, be said by the co~rect perso n, in the 
corre ct ci~cum stances, and the~e must above all be a ~ecognizable 
proc edu~e to be invoked by the pe~fo~mative. It tu~ns o ut, how-
ever, that performatives cannot be formally distinguished from 
standa~d descriptive statements, a nd this leads to the claim that 
'perfo ~mativeness' is a charac teristi c of utterances in general. 
Two important aspects of this app~oach, if it is successful, are 
that it undermines the n otion of the paradigmatic linguistic ~ole 
of the statement, which simply ~epresents states o f affai~s as 
the expressio n of a subject ' s ~elation to reality, and that it 
in troduces , with t he idea of felicity conditions, the role of 
prag mati c facto~s in the ope~ation of language . 
The analysis of pe~formatives leads on to the notion of 
s peech acts (C hapter Two), invo l v ing three levels o f act: locut-
i onary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. The illocutionary 
act , and the con c ept of illocut i o nary force connected with it, 
have beco me c entral concepts within pragmatics. Austin's analysis 
has b een cr iticized from a number of points ( s ome involving 
misunde~standings and misreadings), and o ne of the more interest-
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ing o f these criticisms follows from Derr1da's claim that despite 
h is anal ysis Austin appears to rel y o n the un~ccounted use of 
c oncepts o f an originating subject and of o rdinary lang uage , both 
o f whi c h a re problematic. 
Gric e's explication of meaning in terms o f 1ntentio ns is a 
departure from the type of approach developed by Austin, but in 
the later pragmatic tradi tion it has been very influential. Grice 
focuses the anal ysis of meaning explicitl y on what he calls 
speaker's occasion meaning, and takes this as the central c ase, 
according to which other meaning, including con ventional meaning, 
is t o b e analyzed. I criticize this a pproach as giving no account 
of how com municati on is possible, and a s making use of an inv a l id 
equivocation with 'meaning' (between 'mean ing-intending' and the 
linguistic meanin g which is supposedly being explicated ). 
Searle de velops his theory of speech acts (Chapter Four) 
through critic i zing and adapting the work of Austin and Grice. I 
argue that this theory is largely inadequate, as it fails t o 
o vercome the major problems of Grice's account, and comes up 
against difficulties in giv ing a non-circular pragmatic account 
of speech acts and in dealing with the relation between speech 
act categories and their realizations. Searle also develops a 
theory of intentionality, aimed at supplying a naturalistic basis 
for the earlier theory. I argue that this has pro blems in explic-
ating the relation between an essentially isolated originating 
subject and discourse as interaction. 
Discou rse analysis (Chapter Five), even as d e veloped in the 
relatively independent program of Labov , shares several of the 
basic concepts and approaches of speech act theo r y. This approach 
ana l ysis adds to speech act theory a more d etail ed use of inter-
active data and, especially in Labov's ca se, more sophisticated 
discourse rul es. However, this linguistic work does not o vercome 
the general theoretical problems confronting ph il osophical prag -
mati c s, and furthermore, the problems of the use of a foundation-
al and orig1nating subject, and of the problematic relation 
b etween the interpreting analyst and discursive subjects, are 
highlighted. 
Conversation analysis (Chapt er Six ) , constitutes a radical 
departure from the preceding approaches to pragmatics . This work, 
informed more by phenomenol ogy than by analytic philosophy, re-
j ects the notion of a speech act and replaces the deductive 
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theocizing of discourse analysis with inductive generaliza t i on . 
Perhap s the most significant aspect of conversatio n analysis is 
that it purports to make no at tem pt to analyze the de p t h of 
discourse, eit her in terms o f speak~r's intentions or in terms of 
abstract speech act categories. Instead, it exam1nes the prac-
tical reasoning in which conversational1sts themselves, through 
the process of conversation, express and construct their linguis-
tic and social categ o ries. While th is work does confront inter-
action much more directly, it is limited by an unsatisfactory 
e mpiricism in its account of the relation between anal yst a~d 
data, and by the p r obl em that unless it applies ling uisti c and 
soc1al c ategories t o conversatio nal interacti on (as it in fact 
does ) it would be unable to say anything at all about conver-
sation. Furthermore, because the relations between conversation-
allsts are supposed to be only relevant in as much a s the y are 
expressed, conversation analysis g ives an essentially conserv -
ative account of the politics of discou rse, which is unable to 
confro nt underlying relations and assumptions of interacti o n. 
Attempt s have been made to synthesize discourse analysis and 
conversation analysis, however, these do not appear t o ove rcome 
the major problems with either approach. 
The conclusion which arises from this work is that the 
polit i cs of discourse is central to pragma ti cs , and that is c an 
in fact be seen operating through its denial by the mainstream 
p ragmatics discussed here. This conclusion in turn leads to the 
possibility of a prag matic s which takes note o f the theoretical 
problems affecting this work, and through that directly confronts 
the political aspects of discourse which a p ragmati c approac h 
exposes. 
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INTRODUCTION. 
CHAPTER ONE 
AUSTIN ON PERFORMATIVES 
Within that form of pragmatics which is now dominant in 
Anglo-American philosophy and linguistics, J.L.Austin's How To Do 
Things With Words (1962) is generally taken as the seminal text. 
Austin is regarded as having announced there ·a move away from 
truth-conditional semantics, and an opening of the possibility of 
studying language as communication within a context o f rules and 
conventions, rather than as a c alculus abstracted from the actu-
ality and complexity of interaction. The general position of 
commentators within this tradition seems to be that Austin's 
basic insight is in need of development and expansion, and that 
his articulation of it is at times confused and in certain as-
pects mistaken, but that ultimately his conception of the relat-
ion between language, communication and intentionality offers a 
launch-pad and a reference point for pragmatics as a discipline. 
In this chapter I want to ma k e three basic claims. The first 
is that rather than a clear conception which is occasionally 
clouded-over we should see in Austin's text a series of unresolv-
ed tensions between radically different approaches to questions 
of semantics and communication.l Secondly, readings which seek 
to ignore these tensions, and discov~r instead an underl y ing 
seamless and coherent intention, do so at the expense of what 
should be in their own terms quite outrageously selective and 
distorted representations and constructions of the text. Finally, 
I want to claim that if we allow oursel ves to listen for the 
tensions which exist in Austin's text we can find there an alter-
native approach which has a value of its own, and which itself 
offers the possibility of a reappraisal of that tradition which 
has descended from Austin. 
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At the same time, and just because there are tensi on s in 
Austin 's text, we find in operation there cartain presuppositions 
which are central to the tradition he attacks and which see m 
invalidated by hi s own general posi~ion. These presuppositions 
focus on the notion of a transparent intending consciousness at 
the core of communication, and it will be necessary to gaug e the 
effect of their role in Austin's own model of communication. 
Austin's argument has two parts. The first, the analysis of 
'performatives', being var i o usly taken to collapse into or lead 
onto the theory of 'illocutionary force', which is generally 
r egarded as the most significant part of Austin's l e gacy . The 
material discussed here is to be found in How To Do Things ~ith 
Words, but the first part of the argument ( the part discussed in 
this chapter) also occurs usefully in 'Performative Utterances' 
( 1956) as well as in 'Performati ve - Constative' ( 1958 ). 
SECTION 1: AUSTIN'S ANALYSIS OF PERFORMATIVES. 
Austin places his discussion within a tradition he sees as 
or iginating with Kant, which has recognized that not only are not 
all sentenc es statements, but that certain forms of apparent 
statements themselves need to be examined more closely. He sa y s 
that first of all we have the identification by verificationists 
of pseudo-statements, some of which have been analy z ed as gramm-
atically unexceptional but nonsense, while others have been seen 
as not being intended (at least solel y) to impart information 
about facts. 
He then refers to the later perception, by what he calls in 
'Performative Utterances' (Austin, 1956: 234) the ' u se of lang-
uage movement' (bu t which he also places in the Kantian tradition 
- see 1962: 3) that ethical 'statements' involve emotive and 
prescriptive intent, and that many words within apparently des-
criptive statements serve to indicate, but not report, the cir-
cumstances of the making of the statement, or reservations to 
which it is subject, or the way in which it is to be taken. They 
thus cannot be sensibly taken as bearing on truth or falsity. To 
overlook these possibilities, Austin says, is to commit the 
descriptiv~ fallacy. He says that these perceptions and the 
subsequent avoidance of the descriptive fallacy have led to a 
'revolution in philosophy' whereby many traditional philosophical 
perplexities have been overcome. Austin sets up his project as an 
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attem p t t o gi ve c oherence to these later perceptio ns. (Austin, 
1962 : 1- 3) 
What f ol lows falls, as I h a ve said, into tw o main parts. I n 
the first part Austin takes and anal yzes a type of utterance 
which he calls ' per-f o rmati ve', which has the form o f a statement 
o r constati ve, but which is not true or false, and invol ves in 
its uttera nce the performance o f an a c t beyond j us t sa y ing s o me-
t h ing . He t hen puts forward various ways of f o rmall y charac-
teri z ing the peculiarity of performati ves. Howe ver, each attempt 
is r e j e c ted, and o nl y ser ves t o c lear new gr o und o n whi ch per-
fo rmatives and c onstatives wil l turn o ut not t o be distinc t . Wi th 
eac h step, however (and this, it should be noted, is not some-
thi n g emphasized in all readings), it is not that performatives 
t urn out to be merel y a t y pe o f constati ve; rather, constati ves 
a re g radually subsumed ( in an aspect of their utterance) within 
perfo rmatives. So after beginning with the positi o n that some 
a pparent statements (or constatives) are really performati ves, 
Austin reaches the position that all statements are per-fo rm a tive 
in as much as they all involve more than j ust p r oducing meaning-
f u l a nd grammati c al sentences. Thus, a fter setting himsel f u p a s 
c larify ing the perceptions of a tradition which seeks to identify 
a nd d i s tinguish uttera n c es whi c h do not fall into the trad i t ional 
v iew of statements, Austin ends b y claiming to sho w that state-
ments per se are n o t what they h ave been traditionally thought t o 
b e. It is not c lear that this has been generally rec ognized by 
all o f Austin's c omment a tors. In t he second part o f the argument 
Austin develops his theory of 'illocutionary f o r c es', where all 
utteranc es (n o t just statements and 'ap parent' statements) are 
anal yzed f irst along a vertical a x is into locutio nary, illocut-
i on a r y a nd perlocutionary acts, and then along a ho rizontal a xis 
into d ifferent illocutio nary acts. 
Al r eady , of course, I have begged s o me interpreti ve quest-
ions, questio n whi c h c ann o t be full y addressed until we consider 
s o me standard readings o f Austin's arg ument, and s o I wa nt at 
this stage to suggest just a very general outline o f the struc-
ture of that argument. 
In 'Perfo rmative Utteranc es•, Austin says o f perf o rmatives 
t hat they are a t y pe o f utteranc e which, 'looks li ke a statement 
and grammatically, I suppose, would be classed as a statement, 
which is not nonsensi c al, a nd yet is not true o r false' (1956: 
23 5, and c f.l 9 62: 12) . He say s that as wel l as n o t describing 
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anything, these utterances appear to be, or be a part of, the 
doing of an action 'which would not normally~e described a s, or 
as 11 just 11 , say i n g some t h in g ' ( 19 6 2 : 5 ) • Ex a m p 1 e s of pe r for m a t i v e s 
wh ich he suggests are, 
'I do ( sc. take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife )', u ttered 
in a marriage c eremony , 
'I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth', uttered in a ship-naming 
ceremony, 
'I give and bequeath my watch to my brother', occurring in a 
will, and 
'I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow'. 
Austin says of these examples that, 
to utter the sentence (i n, of course, the appropriate Cir-
cumstances) is not to describe my doing of what I should b e 
said in so uttering to be doing or to state that I am doi ng 
it: it is to do it. None of the utterances cited is ei the c 
true or false: I assert this as obviou s and do not argue it. 
It needs argument no more than that 'damn' is not true or 
false: it may be that the utterance 'serves to inform you' -
but that is qui te different. To name the ship is to say ( in 
the appropriate circumstances ) the words 'I name, & c.'. 
When I say, before the registrar or altar, & c., 'I do', I 
am not reporting on a marriage: I am indulging in i t . ( Aus-
tin, 1962: 6 ) 
On a note on the same page, Austin says that 'to issue a con-
stative utterance ..• is to make a statement. To issue a perform -
a ti v e utterance is, for example, to make a bet' ( 1962: 6, n. 2 ) . 
Austin rejects the idea that performatives are descriptions 
in the sense that they are 'the outward and visible sign, for 
convenience or qther record of information, of an inward and 
spiritual act' (1962: 9). He says that the way performatives 
operate is that if they are uttered (in the appropriate circum-
stances ) , then the act is performed; and, importantly, the utter-
er is taken to have performed the act, to have promised, or bet, 
or whatever. Accordingly, if, for example, we promise in bad 
faith, the utterance, while insincere, is not a lie or a mis-
statement. 
At most we might make out a case for saying that it implies 
o r insinuates a falsehood or a misstatement (to the effect 
that [the promiser] does intend to do something): but that 
is a very different matter. Moreover, we do not speak of a 
false bet or a false christening; and that we do speak of a 
false promise need commit us to no more than the fact that 
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we speak of a false move. ' Fa lse' is not necessar-ily used of 
statements onl y . (Austin, 1962: 11 ) 
Per-for-mat i ves do go wr-ong, n ot because they ar-e fa l se des-
cr-i pt ions, but because they are 'infe lic itous'. They can be 
misfir-es, which ar-e either- misinvocations, wher-e the act is 
disallowed because we invok e a pr-ocedur-e wh i ch does not e xis t o r-
be cause we misapply the pr-ocedur-e, o r misexecutions, wher-e t he 
a c t is v itiated by a flaw or- hitch in the conduct o f the c er-e m-
o ny. Per-for-matives can also be abuses when the act has been 
successfully per-for-med, b ut when ce r-tai n thoughts, feelings o r-
intentions r-equir-ed by c ertain ac ts ar-e mi ssing (when t he y ar-e 
ins incere), or- when the subsequent actions r-equir-ed by som e of 
these ac ts ar-e not fulfilled. (See 1962: 14-18 ) 
These c lassifications are subject to some comments and qual -
ifi ca tions. First, Austin s ays tha t infelicity is an ill t o which 
al l conventional acts (ac ts wh i ch ha ve the gener-al char-acter- of 
r-itual or- cer-emony) ar-e heir-, although ever-y r-itual is not liable 
t o ever-y f o r-m o f infelicity. He also makes the po int - the rel-
evance of which we shall see later - that an actual statement, if 
it r-efer-s to something which does not exist (e.g., t he pr-esent 
king of Fr-ance), appears to be not so much false as vo id, and he 
says, 
the more we consider- a statement not as a sentenc e (or prop -
osition ) but as an act o f speech (out of which the others 
are logical construct ions) t he mor-e we are s tudyi ng the 
whole thing as an act. Or- again, there a ce o bv ious si milar-
ities between a lie and a false pr omise. (Austin, 1962: 20 ) 
A further po int is that since in uttering performati ves we 
a re pe r-for-ming actions, then, as actions, these will be subject 
t o certain whole dimensions of unsatisfactor-iness to which all 
act i ons are subject but which are distinguishable from t he infel-
icities which have been discussed. That is, actions may be done 
under du r-ess, by accident, owing to mistakes, or otherwise unin-
tentionally (1962: 21). As well, as utterances, perfor-matives ar-e 
also heir- to problems which can infect all utterances. For- exam-
ple, an utter-ance will be in some way hollow or- void if sai d by 
an actor, or- introduced in a poem, or spoken in soliloquy. In 
such c ir-cumstances, ~us tin c laims, language is used no t ser-ious-
ly, but in ways par-asitic upon its nor-mal use. Another- type of 
infelicity ca n ar- i~e fr-om misunder-standing, when a pr-omise, for-
e xample, is not hear-d, or is not under-stood as a p r-omise. Final-
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ly, according to Austin performatives can go wrong i n more than 
on e way at o n ce, and the ways they can go wrong overlap and ar e 
more or less arbitrarily divided. ( l962: 22-4) 
The converse of the various infelicities to which perfo r m-
ati ves are susceptible are a set of general conditions for a 
successful perfo rmati ve . These can b e summarized as follows . 
A. i. There must b e a conventional (at least partly verbal ) 
procedure hav ing a conventional effect. 
ii. The persons and c ircu mstances must be appropciat e for the 
procedure invoked. 
B. The procedure must b e executed by all participants ( i ) corr -
ectly and ( ii ) completely. 
C. In c ertain ca ses the persons must have thought s, feelings and 
intentions appropriate to the procedure, and must carry out 
subsequent conduct if that is specified. (See 1962: 14- 1 5 & 
26-39). 
From this point on, Austin starts to seriously attac k the 
performative-constative distinction. He repeats a point made 
earlier when he comments that the statement 'the cat is o n th e 
mat' implies that the utterer bel ieves the cat is o n t he mat, and 
that if the utterer does not so believe it appe ars to b e insin-
cer e in a way para llel to the way promising but not intendin g is 
insincere ( 1962: 50). He says that the statement 'John's children 
are all bald' presupposes that John has children, but if John has 
no ch ildren it is not false, and not meaningless in a normal 
sense. It is rather that it is void, since, as with performatives 
going wrong in the first two ways noted above, conditions wh ich 
are presupposed by the happy performance of the act are not 
present. Furthermore, the way that 'I promise' entails 'I ought' 
is paral lel to the way one proposition entails another, s o that 
' I p r om i se b u t I o u g h t n o t ' i s p a r a 11 e 1 t o ' i t i s and i t i s n o t ' 
(1962 : 51-2). Austin says that if we consider 'the total situat-
ion in which the utterance is issued- the total speech-act', we 
find a parallel between statements ( i.e., constatives ) and per-
formative utterances, and the ways each can go wrong. 
So the total speech act in the t o tal speech situation is 
emerging from logic piecemeal as important in special cases: 
and thus we are assimilating the supposed constative utter-
ance to the performative. (Austin, 1962: 52 ) 
Given that consta tives and performatives bear a similar rel-
ation to presupposition, implication and entailment, Austin re-
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considers the idea that the r~lation to truth and falsity offers 
a distinguishing c riterio n. The first arg u m~nt he sugges t s here 
is that connected with the constati ve ' John is running ' is the 
statement 'I am stating that John is running', and that 'this ma y 
depend for its truth on the happiness of "John 1s running", just 
as the truth of "I am apolog i zing" depends o n thoa happ iness o f " I 
apologize"' (1962: 55) . Secondly, he argues that perf o rmati ves 
~ be subject t o truth a nd falsity, because if, f or exam ple, I 
utter the performative 'I warn you that the b ull is about t o 
cha rge', but the b u l l does not in fact c harge, then while I may 
have succeeded in warning you, and done so sincerel y ( t he warn-
ing, that is to say, is felicitous), it seems open to cdt i c ism. 
We should not in this case say the warning was void - i.e. 
that he did n ot warn but only went through a f o rm of warning 
- nor that it was insincere: we should feel much more 
inclined to say the warning was false or (better ) mistaken, 
as with a statement. (Austin, 1962: 55 ) 
'So', he goes on to say, ' .•. considerations of the happiness and 
unhappiness type may infect statements (or some statements ) and 
considerations of the t y pe o f truth and falsit y may infect per-
formatives (or some performatives)' ( 1962: 55) . 
Aus tin next considers the possibility o f distingu ishing 
perfo rmatives and constati ves grammatically, f o r it has seemed 
that performatives are in the first person singular present 
indica ti ve active; however, he now finds many problems with this. 
Fi rst, the singular has to go , as there can be performatives such 
a s 'We promise ' and so on. But there are also performative in the 
second and third person and with the verb in the passive voice: 
consider 'You are hereby authorized to pay .•• ', a nd 'Passengers 
are warned to cross the track by the bridge only ' . Or the verb 
can be passive impersonal, as in 'Notic e is hereby g iven that 
trespassers will be prosecuted'. Austin suggests that mood c an 
not b e retained, because rather than 'I order you to turn right' 
I may say 'Turn right'; a nd we l o se tense on c e we realize that I 
may say , for exa mple, 'You were offside', rather than 'I cal l you 
offside ', or ' You did it' rather than 'I find you gu ilty'. When 
we come t o truncated sentences, says Austi n, such as ' Done' in 
accepting a bet, or 'Guilty', the problem becomes even more 
acute. (1962 : 58) 
The possibility of a lexical criterion for the distinction, 
in which performatives would be marked by 'performative' wo rds, 
is also rejected . First, performatives can occur without oper-
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ative words, for example, 'Bull' rather than 'Dangerous bull', 
' You will' rather than 'You are ordered to' ; or 'I shall' rat her 
than 'I promise'. Secondly, we may get the operative word without 
the utterance being per-formative. FoJ e xample, I may say ' you 
were guilty', or 'you were offside' without having the right to 
pronounce you guilty or offside, and in locutions such as 'you 
prom1sed' and 'you authorize' the operative occurs in a non-
per-f orma tive use. 
Austin suggests that what was convincing about the grammat-
ical criterion was that it made explicit that in a per-formative 
there is something which is at the moment of uttering being done 
by the person uttering, and he says that where the utterer is not 
cefer-red to i.r1 the verbal formula reference will b e made, in 
s peech, by that person being the utterer ( 'what we may call the 
utterance-o rigin' ) , or in written utterances by the utterer-'s 
signature being appended. So, he suggests, ther-e is a temptation 
to say that a per-formative should be r-educible, or ex pandable, or-
analyzable into, or- r-eproducible in this gr-ammatical f o rm. Thus, 
for example, we would say that 'Out' is equi va lent to , for exa m-
ple, 'I declare you out', or that 'Guilty' might be e quivalent to 
'I pronounce you guilty'. ( 1962: 60-2 ) 
Further support for the grammatical criterion can be found 
in the fa c t that ther-e is a systematic asymmetry between the 
fir-st person singular present ifldicdtive active form of a verb 
and other persons and tenses of the very same verb. For exa mp le, 
when I utter the words 'I bet .•• ' I do not state that I bet, I 
bet; but if I say 'He bets .•. ' I state that he uttered the 
words, and do not perform the act myself. This asymmetry is not 
found in verbs not used as explicit performatives, for example, 
in 'I run' and 'He runs'. (1962: 63) 
Austin has doubts whether this is any longer a grammatical 
distinction, but in any case he finally rejects this sort of 
approach. He offers several reasons, but ultimately what they 
amount to is that for an utterance to have, or to be analyzable 
into, a given verbal form, is not enough to decide how it is 
bei ng used in a given context. Thus, I may say 'I promise only 
when I intend to keep my word', which is to describe my habitual 
behaviour; or I may say 'on page 49 I protest against the ver-
dict', which is to describe the 'historic present'; and some 
verbs may simultaneously be a per-formative and a description of 
naturally consequent performance, as in 'I call inflation too 
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much money chasing too few goods'. Also, this criterion would 
allow formulas we might not want to allow as ~ performatives, s uch 
as 'I state that .•. ', 'j'adoube' said when giving check ( which 
might be more appropriatel y c alled 'marking the action by the 
word ' ) , and expressions having the correct form, but which do not 
operate as performative formulas, such as 'I insult you'. Finally 
Austi n suggests that bringing an expression bac k to its normal 
performative form may often be to lose something of the original 
form . For example, 'I shall' can be meant in different ways othe r 
than promising; 'I am sorry' does not seem equi valent to the 
ex pl icit 'I apologize'; and 'I approve' may give approval, or- i t 
may have the descriptive meaning 'I favor this'. (See 1962: 64 -
67 ) 
Given that a grammatical criterion cannot work, the next 
move which Austin makes is to develop the already implied dist-
inction between explicit and 'primary' performatives. He argues 
initially that to make expli c it is not to describe or to state, 
so that an exp licit rendering of a primary performative ( 'I 
promise ..• ' as against 'I shall .•• ', e.g.) is not a true or 
false descripti o n of what was previously implicit; and he also 
claims that the ' that-' clauses, following 'I promise', 'I find', 
'I pronounce' and so-on are not the 'that-' clauses of indirect 
s peech, which operate when reporting something ( in this case 
o ne' s own speech ) ( 19 6 2 : 6 9- 71 ) . 
He then suggests that the explicit performative (e.g. 'I 
promise that I will') is a later development in the evolution of 
language than certain primary utterances (e.g. 'I will' ) , which 
are often implicit performatives. He suggests that in pr imitive 
languages it would not be possible to distinguish what we were in 
fact doing with an utterance. So ' Bull ' or 'Thunder' in a prim -
itive language of one-word utterances could be a warning, inform-
ation, a prediction and so-on, and the ability to distinguish the 
d ifferent 'forces' that these utterances migh t have would be 'a 
later achievement of language'. Austin says that primitive or 
pr imary forms of utterance will preserve the 'ambiguity' or 
' vagueness' of primitive language, and they will not make expl-
icit the precise force of the utterance ( 1962: 71-2 ). He recog-
nizes that this can be useful, but says that sophistication and 
development of social forms demands c larification. 
It is important to note that the clarification which arises 
with social change is not seen by Austin as necessarily express-
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1ng implicit distinctions. He says of this c la~ification that it 
is, 
as much a creative act as a discovery or descci p tion! It lS 
as muc h a matter of making clear:. distinction as of making 
a lready existent distinctions clear. (Austin, 1962: 72 ) 
He sa y s also that we should not assume that the primaqr o ~ pr i m-
itive use of sentences must be statemental or constative, and 
that we know as little whether this was the case as we do whet he~ 
they were initially impe~atives or swear-words, and he s uggest s 
that the statement, like precision, may be a goal of the g radual 
de velopment of science. 
Language as such and in its pr imitive states LS ~ot prec i se, 
and it is also not, in our sense, explicit: p~ecision in 
language ma ke s it clearer what is being said - its meaning: 
explicitness, in ou~ sense, ma~es clearer the force of t he 
u t t e ran c e, o ~ ' how ' ( in one s e n se .•• ) i t i s to be t a k e n. 
( Austin, 1962: 73) 
The explicit performative, Austin suggests, is me~ely the 
last and 'most successful' speech-device for making the fo~ce of 
an utterance clea~. Other devices include lexical items express-
ive of mood, making the same utterance a command or an exhort-
ation ; tone of voice, cadence and emphasis, by which the same 
verbal string can be made a warning, a question and so-on; ad-
verbs and adverbial phrases, which qualify the force of an utter -
ance (compare 'I shall probably do it' and 'I shall do it without 
fail' ) ; and different connecting partic les, such as 'still', 
'therefore', 'whereas', 'hereby ' and 'moreover', which have a 
great effect on the force of an utterance. Apart from what we sa y 
and the manner of speaking, force may be put across by accompany-
ing an utterance with gestures and ceremonial non-verbal actions, 
and sometimes these need be accompanied by no words. Finally, the 
circumstances of an utterance a~e very important in determining 
the way it is to be taken (w ho says it, where they say it, what 
has preceded it, and so-on ). (1962: 73-6) 
While Austin thinks that explicit pe~formatives a~e superior 
to these devices, he says that there a~e problems with ·~xplici t 
performatives. They ca~ be mistaken for descriptives (this, he 
says, is a ph il osopher's problem ) ; they do not p~eserve the o ften 
congenial equivocation of primary utt~rances; and there may b e 
cases where it is doubtful whether the expression is dn e xpl icit 
pe~formative or not, and cases very similar to perfo~matives but 
not performatives. He also claims (~epeating what was an object-
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i o n to a grammatical distinction) that there 'seem to be clear 
cases where the very same formula seems some-times to b e an ex-
plicit performativ e and sometimes to be a descri p ti ve, and may 
even trade on the ambivalence', and b e suggests the ca se cited 
abov e oE 'I approve', whi ch may have the perfoc ~nati v e foc c e of 
giv ing ap p coval or it ~ay have the descriptive meaning, 'I f3vour 
th is'. (19 62: 77-8) 
This last point leads to the idea that we can have a g cadual 
slide from explicit performatives t o descriptions of emotiona l 
states. Some of the examples which Austin o ffecs t o demonstrate 
this are 'I thank' (performative), 'I am grateful' (h alf descrip-
tive), and 'I feel grateful' (descriptive); 'I apologize', 'I am 
sorry ' and ' I repent' ; ' I approve' , ' I approve of ' and ' I fee 1 
approval'. The middle terms here, and others such as 'I blame', 
' I welcome', and 'I am glad about', do not pass fouc tests Austin 
suggests for distinguishing whether a 'behabitive' ( an uttera nce 
connected with feelings and at titudes) is an explicit pecfocmat-
ive or not, yet he feels that they do exhibit chacacteristics of 
pecformatives as well as those of descriptives, depending pechap s 
o n their context of utterance (1962: 79-80). 
The four tests are: (1) , whether it makes sense to ask 'But 
does he really? (if it does make sense, then we are dealing with 
a description - Austin says that this is not a very good test); 
(2) , to ask whether the speaker could be doing the action without 
uttering the performative (a s in feeling sorry as distinct from 
apologizing); (3) to ask whether someone could say that they 
deliberately performed the act (compare 'I deliberately apolo-
gized' and 'I was deliberately sorry'); and ( 4) to ask whether 
what is said could be false o c instead insincere. (See 1962: 79-
80 & 83- 4) 
He finds the same sects of cases with expositives (compare 
'I conclude' and ' I assume'), and verdictives, 
hold that' is a pure pecfo rmative when said by 
to be a descriptive outside official contexts 
within whi ch 'I 
a judge, but seems 
(1962: 85-9). 
The point which is taken from these cases, where it is 
unclear whether an apparent or suggested explicit performative 
verb itself operates, or operates sometimes or in part, as a 
description, true or false, of feelings, states of mind, frames 
of mind, etc., is that they suggest again for Austin the wider 
phenomenon, 
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where the whole utterance seems essentially meant to be true 
o r false desp1te its performative characteristics . Even if 
we ta ke such half-way houses as, say , ' I hold t hat ... ' ?.S 
sai d by a non-ju rym an, or 
?.bsurd to suppose that all 
they do this when they do, 
'I e ~pect t h at .•• ', it see ms 
they describe o r state, so far as 
is something about the speaker's 
beliefs or expectations .••• And when we come to pur e ex-
plicit performatives such as 'state' or 'maintain', s u rel y 
the whole thing is true or false even thoug h the uttering o f 
it is the performing of the action of stating or main -
taining. And we have repeatedly pointed out that s om e things 
that are quite clearly classic performatives like 'Over' 
bear a very close relation to describ ing facts , even if 
others like 'Play' do not. ( Austin, 1962: 8 9-90 ) 
One way ou t of some of th.ase problems would be to di s ti n -
guish the perfor-m ative part from the true or false pa rt of a;1 
utter?.nce. But Austin rejects this because there a r e many cases 
which we c an not split into two parts like this, even though the 
utterance seems to have an explicit performative in i t; utter-
ances like' I liken x toy' or 'I analyze x as y ', where the 
perfo rmative verb both p lac es the utterance and determines the 
relation of the elements constated ( 1962: 90). 
Looking back on the argument so far we can see t hat the 
performati ves wit h which Austin begins involve the explicit (at 
least in most cases), and more or less ritualized constitution o f 
various social facts, b e these facts a p romise, a bet, a bequest, 
the (institutionalised) name o f someone or thing, or a marriage. 
These performati ves, he says, are not subject to truth o r fals-
ity, as are constatives; they are subject to feli c Lty, in as much 
a s they can misfire or be abused. But it turns out that constat-
i ves also can misfire and be uttered insincerel y , and further-
more , that certain performatives can be in a sense false. It 
seems that pe rforma ti ves display a peculi a r grammatical stcuc t-
ure, and that they are marked by performative verbs; but perform-
ative s can occur without this structure o r the mark ing verb , and 
utterances having these character istics are not always perform-
atives. What is more, some utterances may swing between perform-
ati ve and constative. The final possibility is to analyze exam-
ples which upset t h is classification as being implicit o r pr. imary 
for-ms of explic it performatives, but we find tha t man y cases 
which we can expand into explicit performatives must at t he same 
time be all owed as constat ives. So, Austin says, we must adopt 
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instead a diffece~t a pp roach to the analysis of these issues . 
SECTION 2: WAYS OF READING AUSTIN ON PERFORMATIVES. 
Austin's analysis of pecfocmatives is generally ta ken as 
much less important than the theory of illocutionary fo r ces . I f 
it is mentioned at all it is usually in passing, and there are 
relatively few commentaries which deal in any detail with t he 
~ a terial I have summarized. 
The main readings I want to look at ace those of Ucmson 
( 1979), Grah am ( 1977: Ch . 3 ) , Black (1963) and War-nock (1 973 ). All 
t h ink (although their reasons vary) t hat Austin misidentified the 
true nature of the o riginal examples o E perfo r~a t ves, a n d that he 
makes an unjustified shift in the course of h is argume nt t o c ases 
which d o not share the crucial characteristics of pe r f o r:-ma t i ves. 
SECTION 2a. 
Foe Ur:-mson, the shift is from utterances which ace governed 
by c onventions, which make them the doing of something more t han 
saying something, to 'self-labeling' utterances which indicate 
linguistically how they are to be taken. He refers to t he orig-
inal cases as formulas used as part of a ritual, and quotes 
Austin ( 1962: 5) as saying that they are, or are a part of the 
doing of an action which 'would not normally be described as 
saying something' (see Urmson,l979: 263). The later cases, he 
says (orders, questions , warnings, statements ) , do n o t have this 
ritual character, and 'are just the sort of things which would 
"normally be described as saying something"' (1979: 263) . He also 
says that because the original cases have the form of state ments 
we should not be looking t o divide constatives from all non-
constatives, but only from performatives; and he thinks that 
because none of these later cases ace performative and most are 
not constative they cannot be used to break down a dichotomy 
between constatives and performatives (1979: 263). 
Urmson thinks that Austin made the mistake of thinking that 
performatives and constatives are different t y pes of speech acts, 
whereas performatives are in fact not speech ~cts, not acts which 
would 'normally be described as saying something', at all. He 
says that pecformatives, like speech acts, are 'wholly convent-
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ional acts', acts which can o nly be performed following some 
rul e, pri n c i ple or convention that the pe rEQc~ance of some arb it-
rary natural act is the perfo rmance of that conventional act ( see 
1979 : 263-4 ) ; but h e says that p ecf o r ma ti ves a ce a s ubse t of 
these act s in which 't he relevant conventions a re not at all, o r 
ace not primarily o r e xclu sivel y , linguistic conventions' (1 97 9 : 
26 4 ) . He e xpresses this difference by saying that if h e ware in 
Tu r key he may ask 'H ow do I say "the cat is o n t h e mat" in 
Turki sh?', but t ha t he would not ask 'How do I get ~arri ed in 
Tu r k ish? ': rather, he s ays , he wou ld a s k 'Ho w do I g e t married in 
Turke y?' . This may in part r e q u ire h im learning how to say ce r -
tain things in Turkish, bu t it ~eed not, a nd if i t does the 
ling uistic c on ventions opera ting there occur within the mor e 
general non-linguistic conventions governing how o ne marr ies in 
Tu r key. 
Ormso n suggests that perf o rmati ve u tterances are a type of 
perfo cmative act; and h e says that 
performative utterances are tha t su bset of wholly convent-
ional acts which is consti t uted by n on-linguisti c conve n t-
ions but where these n on-l i nguistic c onventio ns r e qu ire o ne 
to act in accordance wi th specif ied linguistic conventions. 
( Ormson,l979: 265) 
He concludes from this tha t the attempt to erect a p erformative-
constative dichotomy is v i ciou s, bec au se the constati v e is merely 
o ne variety of speech act (acts governed p rimaril y b y linguistic 
convention ) whereas the pe rfo r ma tive is a var iety of conventional 
a c t pr i mar ily governed by n on-linguistic convention. He say s that 
Aust i n made the dichotomy plausible by assimilating self-ann o unc-
ing speech ac ts ( warning, asking, declaring ) t o the comm on per-
formative i n the first person singular, and because he relaxed 
the requir~~n~nts f o r perfocmatives t o the extent where 'I order 
you to shut the door' is a perfo rmati ve simpl y becau se it is the 
act o f ordering a nd it is not true or false. He comment s that 'it 
would b e odd t o say that "I order you to shut the door" is the 
utterance o f a ritual formula or an act wh ich wo uld not norm a lly 
b e counted a s saying something' ( 1979: 267). 
Ormson does not see all this as effecting t h e theory of 
illocut i onary acts. He just thinks that perfo c matives should not 
be c lassed as speech acts. But we sho uld take no te o f what f o r 
Ormson are the rudiments of the unaffected theory o f 'locut i onary 
and illocutio nary f o rce', (as he puts it ). He says ( 1979: 262 ) 
that Austin's conclusion was that the original d i c hotomy of two 
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t y pes of speech act (performati ve dnd constative) needed to be 
supplanted by a distinctio ~ be t ween two dist~guishable but in-
separable levels within any speech act. At the first level, he 
say s, we have the locutionary act, whjch just involves sense and 
reference, and 'at that level we can already consider t h e truth 
and falsity of the utterance'. He says that this is l i ke t he 
logician's propositio~ ~ nd is an abstraction from the t otal act, 
and not a speci d l constati ve speech act. This may have, at t he 
sac ond level, the illoc utionary force of a warning, predi c tion, 
o r whatever. Urmson says that Austin thinks the conf u sio n lea ding 
to the o ri g inal attempted distinction acises because 'in diff-
ere~t speech-acts one or othec f o cce, the locutionary or the 
illocutionary, is more important' (1979: 262). 
This summary is presented before Urmson develops his crit-
icism of the original attempted dichotomy , but we can see that 
the notion of a performative plays no role i~ it. Urmson thinks 
that for Austin the value of the original attempt was that it 
showed that we were looking at things in the wrong wa y , a nd 
should subsume the theory of pecfo cmatives within the l a ter 
theory ( see 1979: 267). His difference with Austin is t hat for 
him performatives should not be seen as speech acts at all, 
because th~y ace c onstituted by non-linguistic conventions. 
Graham also thinks that Austin misidentifies the crucial 
characteristics of the examples with which he begins and thus 
allows counter-examples which are not true performatives. How-
ever, he says that the only true performatives are those cases 
where the act is specified in the utterance itself (the 'exp l -
icit' or 'self-labeling' performatives); thus cases like 'turn 
right' are not performatives, even thoug h they fulfill the crit-
erion of being c ases where there is something which is at the 
moment of uttering being done by the person uttering and which 
d re 1 o t tcue or false. 
Accord ing to Graham, Austin originally defined performatives 
as being cases which do not describe oc c-apoct oc constate anyth-
ing and are not true or false, ~nd where, 
the uttering of the sentence is, or is part of, the doing of 
an action, which again would not normally be described as 
saying something. (Austin, 1962: 5, as quoted in Graham, 
1977: 55) 
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His major di ffe rence with Au stin, as he sees it, i s t ha t 
Au sti n wa s mistaken to s ay that just because~ performati ves are 
not true or false descriptions of inner states they are ~ot true 
o r f alse at all. Graham says that pe£formatives fall betwee n 
log ically self-confirming statements li ke 'I am say ing somethi ng ' 
and causally self-confirming st atements li ke 'The price of gold 
wil l fall t omocr.ow' (said by an influen tial ma r ket analyst and 
caus in g t he price to fall ) . 
Graham s ays t ha t be c ause Austin assume s that tcuth and 
fal sity are ascribed t o statement-acts ( rather than t o sta temen t -
contents ) he (Austin ) thinks that as there is no radically diff -
erent stat e of affairs corresponding to the act 'I pr0fllise .•. ', 
f o r example, then perfo rmati ves cannot be true or fa l se. Howe ve r , 
Graham says, what we should say is that cases whece the statement 
guarantees its ow n truth (a s with ' I am say ing something' ) are 
cases where the sta tement-act guarantees, or is sufficien t for, 
the truth of the statement- con tent which it exp resses, a nd t h i s, 
he sa ys,is the ca se with pe r formatives . Performa tives a re differ-
ent from these l og i c al ly sP-lf. - c01E irming utterances, how .~ ve c , 
b e cause on the o ne hand the y must b e uttere d i n f eli citou s c i r -
cums t ances, unlike these c ases , and on the o ther hand, not only 
are they su ff icient f oe the truth o f their statement - content, 
they non-redundantly guarantee i t . Tha t is, the statement-content 
would no t b e true unless the sta tement-act were performed, where-
a s ' I a m say ing something' would be true as long a s I say anyth-
ing. So, given a background of appropriate conventions and the 
fulfillment of felicity conditions, the statement 'I bet .•. ' is 
suffi c ien t for the truth of its content. Given i t s felicitous, 
conventionally appropriate uttera nc e, it is true that the utterer 
bets. 
Ho wever, while a performative is not logical l y suffici Mnt 
for i ts truth, it does n o t cau s a l ly bring about a substantially 
separate state oE affa i rs , as does ' The price of gold will fall 
tomorrow '. Ra t her, 
It c onventionally brings about its own truth in the 
fo llo win g sense: the content expressed by the ut te c :WC t~ 
becomes true when the statement-ac t is performed because 
people regard !! ~ being ~ as a consequence o f the act of 
utterance. To put it t h i s way is to em p hasi ze t hat the 
existence of performatives rests no t o nly o n utterance but 
also on soci aJ dtt itudes. (Graham, 1977: 75) 
This is why i t is possible to imagine a culture where 'I pr om ise' 
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would get the same response ?.S ' I insult you' gets in our own -
' How? ', perhaps - if in t hat culture a promise requiced t:. ' 1 • ~ 
perfo r~ance of , s~y, soma e xtra-linguistic act. It is also why i 
statement cannot be a performative, b~cause it refers t 8 ?. st~te 
of affairs totally independent of its utteranc e and of ~ k ind 
which social conventio n could not determine. Si~i larl y, 'turn 
right ' is not a per-formative becau se unli ke ' I order you to turn 
r ight' it does not become true as a result o f being uttered. The 
midway ca ses like 'I am sorry' are not performati ves because they 
do not create on t hei r utterance the truth of their content, as 
does 'I apologize', for e xa mple. Those ca ses which vary between 
beiny pa rformati ve and not do not worry Gr~ham , be c ?.u se ha says 
that it is t o be expe cted th~t variation of people and cir cu m-
stanc es effects what is taken to be a performative. Grah am says 
that it is true that the truth of 'I state that p' does follow 
from its being uttered, but that this is like 'I am saying some-
thing', a nd its truth does not follow from its being uttered as a 
consequence o f social convention. 
Graham says that this mediation of social convention is 
different from the way convention might be said to enter into~ 
use o f l~nguage as a collection of symbols with conventional 
meanings, but does n ot, unfortunately, make this clearer. He says 
that Austin shou ld have confined the use of the term 'perform-
ative' to the sorts of examples with which he b egan, and use 
'illocution' for the similar ity be·tween these ?. :ld :)t hee •llOre 
normal statements. He say s that it is important to retain the 
initial ter~, as it shows that the way people conceive the world 
(e.g. taking 'I promise ..• ' to constitu te the making of a prom-
ise) has an im po rtant role in constituting the social world, and 
that it shows that a sharp distinction between acting in the 
world and merely conceiving of it in a particular way is unten-
able. 
Something we should notice about Graham's argument here is 
that if it works, then while there may be a difference between 
performatives and other utterances, performatives are, nonethe-
less, constatives - albeit a peculiar type of constative. For 
although Graham does not himself say as much, the fact that a 
performative, according to his analysis, truly ~ falsely des-
cribes~ state of affairs makes it as good a candidate for a 
constative as any. That is, the performative ' I promise ••• ' is a 
much a constative as 'You promise ..• ', except that the felic-
itous utterance of the performative is necessary and sufficient 
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for its truth. Furthermore, all self-labeling utte r~nces, whether 
performative or not on Graham's anal ysis, wquld, according to his 
approach, be constative. 
Black expresses the difference b etween the original and 
later pe r fo rmatives as being between a sense in which an utter-
ance counts as a case of 'the speaker's doing someth ing other 
than, or something more than, saying something true o r false' 
(Black, 1963: 212), and in which all non-performati ves are c on-
s t a t i v e s , a n d a s e n s e i n w h i c h t he r e i s so m e f o c :n d l m a r k e r o f t he 
character o f the utterance, where simp ly the self-labeling form 
'I X [ such and such] ' counts as a case of the speaker thereby X-
ing. 
He says that the first sense derives from Austin's c laim 
(1962 : 6-7) that a performative is the doing of an action which 
is 'not normally thought of as just saying -something' (as quoted 
by Black , 1963: 211). He says that it is crucial that we take 
Austin's 'saying something' as 'saying something true or false': 
a man who makes a promise is certainly 'usually thou ght o f 
as saying something', v i z ., the very words that he pro-
nounces ..• : the point is that what he is saying is not 
rightly taken to have a truth-value. Similarly, 'action', as 
it occurs in Austin's explanation, must be understood to 
mean at least 'doing something other than saying something 
true £E false', f o r it is certainly not wrong to think of a 
man who makes an a sserti on as doing something, viz., assert-
ing; the point is that he is not doing something other than 
making a truth-claim (Black, 1963: 212). 
It is not enough for the first type of performative that the 
utterance should in fact be a case of something other than or 
more than makin g a truth-claim. There must, Blac k says, be a 
convention o r rule making it wrong not to recognize that thi s is 
s o (thus 'The bu ll is loose' may in fa c t be a warning, but it L ::; 
not a performative). He says also thdt by 'someth ing o ther than, 
or more than, saying something true or false' he means that the 
speaker must be doing something more than making a truth-claim or 
more than making one in a special way that is indicated by the 
utterance (Black, 1963: 213). Black thinks that performatives (of 
the original 'more interesting' type ) might not necessarily be in · 
the statement form, and so would include cases like 'Hello', but 
he is willing to place these in a subclass (1963: 215 ). The dis-
tinction in the original form, Black says, is between 
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a for:m of words used t o make a tr:uth-claim only and one t h ~ t 
co nventionally counts ~s be ing u sed to do somet hing othe~ 
than or more than this. (Black , 1963: 213 ) 
Black sa y s that Austin never: mai<8s i t clear just what he 
means when he says t :,at 9ecfor:mati ves are ' conventional' :Jr 
'ritual' or 'ceremonial'. He suggests, however, that we n ig ht s ay 
that a conventional act is one which is rule-governed , which (if 
performed according to these rules ) is self-validati ng , whic h 
b rings about certain s oc ial consequences (expectations and under-
taki ng s ) , and which ha s a certain non-natural meaning or signif-
i canc e (described by its being a bet, marriage or whatever ). He 
says that these criteria can vary independent l y, and do no t g ive 
a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. 
Black's fi r st objection to a notion of vecbal per:formatives 
based on this definition is that~correct us8 o f wo rds may b e 
held to be conventiona l in this sense. He says that it sometimes 
seems that Austin is t h inking of a sub-class 0e c0nven tional dct s 
that are analogous to ritual o r ceremonial acts in a na r:row 
sense; ho wever, he avoids making a special class of these more 
rituali zed utterances (which would p lace him vecy close to Urm-
son ) , because he thinks that this analogy can be pushed t o o fac, 
as we can promise, for example, in many ways that do n ot involve 
using a set formula . The main weakness which Black finds is in 
mixed utterances, which serve both to make a truth-claim and to 
do som ething more . He accepts that an e xp licit war:ning is a 
performative , and says that a case like 'I warn you that the bull 
is l oose', as well as doing something more than ma k ing a truth-
claim, seems to imply, or contextually imply , a truth-claim to 
the effect that the bull is l oose. He says that even in the 
paradigm c ase of ' I promi se that I shall be there ' it begins t o 
look as if there is at least an implied a sser:tion, 'I shall be 
there ' (1963: 216-7) . He says that once we start to see these 
weaknesses in the attem p t to characteri ze perfor:matives, 
One might then be led to think of the ' performative'-
' constative' contrast as dealing with aspects of utterances, 
rather than with mutually exclusive classes of utterances. 
(Black, 1963: 217) 
G.J.Warnock says that we c an find in Austin three diffe cant 
senses of perfo rmative. He says that the first sense arises out 
of the basi c tho ~1ght that sometimes to say somethin g is t o do 
something. In this sense, he sa ys , the term was meant t o pick o ut 
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a subclass of utterances con t r asted with non-perfo r mati ves. War-
n oc k suggests that in this basic t hought t here is no part i c u lar 
r e st r i c tion on the kinds o f doings t hat saying s s o meti mes are. In 
partic ular, t hese doings do not have t o be linguistic acts o r 
wha t became kno wn as 'speech acts'. This is because, on t he one 
hand, if we were to sa y here that every utterance is t he perf orm -
ing of a speech act, then we could not be dealing a t t h is stage 
with a sub-class of uttera nces wh i ch are the doing o c p.e r:-~ o c . n i 11g 
oE s omet hing , a nd bec ause, in an y case, in the ear l y e xamples o c 
pecf o rmati ves Austin d oes no t s eem to be think ing pa rt i cu la ~ l y , 
or even at all, of linguisti c acts. Wac~oc k sa ys tha t the quest-
ion w h i c h t h i s e a r 1 y no t ion r a i se s i s t h a t o E h o w i t i s t h a t 
someone who issues an utterance thereby does somet h ing , over and 
a bove whatever it rna y be that is done in merel y sa y ing what is 
said, and he says that Austin's answer is that it is in v ir t ue o f 
c onventions t o the effect that to say these things c oun ts a s, oc 
constitutes, doing whatever it may be. (Warnock, 197 3 : 69-71 ) 
Warnock says that there seems to be nothing esse·ntially 
wrong with this idea as such, whatever Austin and others may ha ve 
come to t h ink ; however, he says that the notion of c onventi on 
u sed here has to b e made clear, importantly so that we c an r ope 
o ff the non-linguistic c onventio ns ( which nonet he l~ ss i~vo l ve 
utterance) we a re con cerned wit h a t this stage, and whi ch govern 
this subclass o f utterances, from those we may c hoose to say 
ente r into all linguisti c utterances. He says that the discussion 
of infelicity is thus quite reasonable as an examination of t he 
wa y s the conventi on that to say X constitutes doing Y can g o 
wrong , oc as an examination of the non-linguistic conventions 
governing performatives. A further point is that when we utter a 
performati ve in this sense we do not commonly state that we are 
doing what we are, and he gi ves the examples of bidding in b ridge 
a nd appealing i n c r i c k8 t. Finally here, Warnock says that if 
there is at th is point no particular restric tion on the k ind o f 
d o ings t hat s ay ings sometimes a re, the~ there c an 'oe n o restr i c t-
i on on the kind o f say ings that c an be doings. He says t hat 
s ay ings of any linguistic form or sort could take the role of 
being that which constitutes doing something; they need not be 
sentences or e ven otherwise meaningful words, but if they are 
sentences, they can be indicative, interrogative, o r whatever. 
Thus, even though Austin at times denies it, 
A saying which, by convention, counts as doing something 
could perfectly well be the saying of something true or 
false (though indeed, in such a case, truth or falsehood 
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might n o t b e the point mainly a t issue ) - so the happy-
unhappy distin c tion does not in any wa~ exc lude t he true-
false distinction ( though of course it d iffe r s from i t ) ; 
(Warnoc k , 1973 : 73 ) 
He says tha t there is also n o r e ason- why perfo rmatives shou l d be 
of the form ' I X', be cau se the d istingui sh i n g fe atures o f per-
formatives are the e xtra-l i nguistic conventio ns which gove rn 
them, not their f o r m. Wa rnock makes the further com ment that 
perf o rmati ves of this so rt a re n ot onl y a subcla ss of utterances, 
but a lso o f what might be called conventionally signif icant 
doings, many o f which will not involve utterance ( 1973: 71 - 4 ) . He 
also says t ha t thi s sense of per-fo r mat i ve, where the d istinctio n 
rests on t he p resenc e o r absence of c o nve nt i o ns by v irtue o f 
whi c h certain ut terance s count as do ing something , does n o t b r~ ~~ 
dow n ~ ,d8r tha i~ E8c tion o f t ruth a nd falsity ( 19 73 : 75 & n.6 ) . 
Warnoc k says that we should be wary (and more wary than 
Austin) of t h inking that the way performati ves in th is sense are 
constituted by convention can be car r ied across int o speech acts 
in ge neral , which involve the second se nsa of performati ve, in 
which to say something is alw~ to do so mething. He sa ys that we 
may say that conventions assign sense to our utterances, b11t that 
in general t he r e are no conventions which make 'The train lea ves 
at three' have the illocutionary f o rce of warning, say, in the 
wa y that ~onventions make the or iginal performative utterances 
the doi ng of somet h ing. That is, il_l_,)C:: Iltiona r y fo ;:-c es, according 
to Warnock , a r e not in gener a l (w e s hall see the e xc e p tio n to 
this later) convention-cons titut ed acts; and he say s that this is 
why, for most ut te rances any way , i l locutionary f orces should be 
distinguished from meaning s . A further point is that this se cond 
sense oe per-formative does not exclude, and will often be, the 
saying of something t rue o r fal se. (19 75: 76- 7) 
This second sense of performatives is tied by Warnock t o the 
third gr ou p, the e xp li cit or self-labeling cases, where 'the 
speaker e xplic itly indicates something that he is doing in speak-
in g by incorporating the word for what he is doing in what he 
says• ( 1973 : 78). He says that ·if we treat these as the same a s 
t he or i g inal performatives the sketch of the whole tex t which 
would follow from th is is t ha t a f ter starting o ut with the idea 
that to say something is sometimes to do someth ing, Austin came 
to realize that to say is alwa y s to do s omet h ing, and so saw that 
what was pe culiar about the original performat ives was that in 
them it was made e xp licit what the speaker is doing . This, War-
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nock says, is quite mistaken. He says that the examples with 
which Austin begins ace not all expli c it pecfocmati ves, and that 
thece is nothing about what Austin says at that stage which 
suggests that they should be e xp licit. 
The idect o f saying something which, by convention, counts as 
doing such-and-such, and t he idea oE s~yi ng someth i ng in 
which the wocds make explicit in a pacticulac way what one 
is doing, ace ceally completely diffecent ideas; 
(Wacnoc K, 1973 : 79) 
Wacnock comments that Austin hinself seems not to have bee ~ clade 
about this, and suggests that this is why he thoug h t that t h8 
gcammatical cci te c i o n was at least ~octh examining. 
Wacnock claims that the latec explicit pecfocmati ves should 
be seen as a pacticulac type of ocdinacy uttecance and s hould be 
constcued as the autob iogcaphical statements which theic focm 
s u g g e s t s, and t h a t i f we do t h i s i t become s o-b v i o u s t h a t b e c au s e 
we make it explicitly cleac what we ace doing in these uttecances 
we ace saying tculy or falsely that we do. (1973: 80-1 ) 
With e xplici t pecfocmatives, he says, we ace dealing with 
things people do in saying t h ings, but things which ace not 
independent of what is said. It is just because t o p romise is 
e sse n t i a 11 y to ~ some t h in g t h a t i t i s t o say t h a t one p com i se s; 
as with a notice which ceads 'Customecs ace warned n ot to lea v e 
valuables in the cloak-room', which does just what it says. What 
is special is that the fact that the notice says it makes it 
tcue: saying customecs ace warned is wacning customecs ( 1973: 82 -
3). He says that the way the self-labeling pecfocmatives ace tcue 
is like the way statements such as 'I exist' or 'I am alive' are 
tcue, but that they diffec because a perfocmative such as 'I 
pcomise', ~be false if it is uttered in unhappy ciccum stances 
whece it would not be true that I p comise (1973 : 84 -5 ). He ac k-
~~wledges that explicit pecformatives ace therefo~e a special 
case, bu t thinks that this doe s no t mean that these utterances 
are not s ta temen ts. 
One can quite well concede, as clearly one must, that 
explicit pecfocmative uttecances ace a cathec peculiar lot 
in this way, without holding that they are peculiac in not 
having truth-values at all ..•• (Wacnock, 1973: 85 ) 
Most of these explicit or self-labeling perfocmati ve utter-
ances ace not pecfocmatives in the original sense, because, 
Warnock says, with most exp licit perfo~matives what makes it the 
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case that, for example, in saying 'I promise', I promise, is not 
a convention which constitutes this as prom ising, but simply the 
meaning of t he words that I utter. To understand these e xp licit 
' perfor-n?.ti v(~s', he says, is simply tQ understand Englis h , where-
dS to understand an original performative one must understand t he 
rules and conventions governing the acti vity to which it relates, 
because what a h appily uttered original performative does is not 
done simply in virtue of what it means. ( 1973: 86 ) 
The qualification to this i s that some conventio n-constit-
uted activities ma y require, by convention, an utterance in t he 
form of the explicit performatives. The example which Warnoc k 
gives is the possibility that the closure of an innings in crick-
et requires the captain of the batt ing team to say 'I declare the 
innings closed'. If this were the case, he says, t hen the utter-
ance would both mean that the innings is declared closed ?.:1d be 
conventionally operative in so doing ( 1973: 87) . Presumably War-
nock also means to include here those cases of the original 
performatives which are in the explicit form. 
Warnock says that the difference between conventionally 
operative utterances and explicit performative utterances tends 
to be obscured because these sub-classes are introduced sim u l-
taneously, without Austin being explicit, nor perhaps being 
aware, that they are different, and because when Austin moves on 
from t he special sub-classes of performative to the sense where 
all utterances can be called performative he gi ves, and may have 
had, the mistaken impression that the old ways of being perform-
ative had turned out to be somehow illusory. (1973 : 89) 
It may be worthwhile briefly recapping these four commentar-
ies. Urmson says that true performati ves a~e ~itual or formulaic 
utterances, having the form of statements but being governed 
primarily by non-linguistic conventions, which 'would not norm-
ally be described as saying something', and so are not linguistic 
acts. He says that what Austin thought he did was to show that 
rather than make a distinction between constative and perform -
ative speech acts we should make a distinction within speech acts 
of a proposition (the 'locutionary force' - sic ) and that which 
the utterance is being used to do (the illocutionary force). 
Urm son thinks that as long as we do not subsume performatives 
within speech acts this conclusion is valid - the lesson about 
the correct axis of distinction being learnt (one gathers) from 
the case of self-labeling speech acts.2 
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Graham al s o p ic ks out se lf-labeling s~ech-act s a s spe c i al . 
He thinks, h0 wever, t hat the onl y true pe rfor~atives ~ those 
self-labeling speech ~ct s which are _m ade true by their ut ter~nc~ 
being ta ken as the doing o f the act t he y e xpces s . The c h-:1::--i :.:: t ~r: 
of pecfo rmati veness is thus not something which can be ca rried 
across into speech acts in general. Performativeness is doing 
something, wherea s s peech act s as such are saying something.3 
Black t hinks that tcu~ re r for~at ives a re not true or false 
in the way Wa rnoc k and Graham c lai m. He sa ys t hat th e original 
pe r fo rmati ves are characterized by being the doing of s omethi ng 
'no re than saying something true or false, and s om eth ing governed 
by non-linguistic conventions. He says that Austin wa s mistaken 
to th ink that self-labeling utterances as s uch were perfo rmat i ~e 
i n the same way, because an ut terance of the f o rm 'I X' i s not by 
that the doing of something more than saying somet h ing true or 
false. It must b e governed b y conventions whic h ma ~ e it t he do i ng 
o f something more. Black thinks the constative-performati ve dis-
tinction ( in the strongest sense) brea ks down becau se true per-
formatives c an also involve implicatio n, and thus be true o r 
false, and he thinks that t hi s means that the origina l d istinct-
i on has to b e e xchanged (as he says Austin does ) f o r one be tween 
different a s pe c ts o f utterances. 4 
Warnock a lso thinks that original performatives need to be 
distinguished from self-labeling utterances and s peech ac t s in 
general, be cause t hey are subject to d iffe r ent types of convent-
ions. He says that the original perfo rma t i ves do not hav e to ha ve 
the form of a statement, but that when they do, in as much as 
they are saying something they will b e true or false (and, one 
assumes, in as much as they are more than this t he y will be 
performative). The sense in which performatives are the doing o f 
something which is constituted by non-linguistic conventions 
should not be carried ove r into the analysis of i llocut ionary 
acts. The self-labeling utterance (al though they ~ be used as 
well i :1 t. h (:: ut terance o f a performati ve ) are taken as statements 
which bring about thei r o wn truth and which make explicit 
(through the meaning o f the words, and n o t through non-linguistic 
conventions) the illocutio na r y act which is being performed. 
Warnock thinks that s o me species of s peech act are constit uted by 
extra-linguistic conventions, but that this is only in as much a s 
they are used as performatives. 5 
31 
There is certainly a diversity to these analyses, but be h ind 
this diversity we can see a remarkably sim ~lac position regarding 
t he analysis of linguistic acts. They all think t hat whether or 
not the notion of a pecfocmative can be made v iable (and Blac k 
thinks not), it does not, in its characterizatio n of certain 
species of action, take hold of elements which can b e applied to 
the analysis of utterances in general, of what became known as 
speech acts. These latter are seen as being constit uted by t he 
meanings of the words of which they are made u p , and as not being 
sub j ect to conventions which might gi ve meaning to certain whole 
ac ts, such as pecfocmati ves. All four think t hat Au stin di d n ot 
recognize this difference. 
All seem to think that the general lesson validly learnt 
(despite Austin's confusion ) from the discussion of pecformati ves 
was that utterances cannot simply be divided into different 
species; they must first be divided into different aspects of a 
speech act. Urmson, Graham and Black think that Austin rightl y 
took this to mean that we should analyze speech acts first along 
a vertical ~ x is into different aspects of speech acts and then 
along a horizontal axis into different illocutionacy acts, of 
which perfocmatives will not be one - although foe Urmson and 
Graham speech acts may be used in pecformatives. Warnock, how-
ever, thinks that Austin wrongly thought that illocutionary acts 
should be analyzed in the same terms a s performatives were anal-
y zed, and he argues that the later theory should have b een dev-
eloped along the lines that the other three think it was in fact 
developed. Urmson and Black think that in the later theory we 
find the locutionary act, involving the utterance o f a constative 
or a proposition (something assessable in terms of truth and 
falsity), and an illocutionary act, which involves the more or 
less explicit expression of the force of the utterance. Neither 
Graham nor Warnock address this issue, however they bo t h see 
self-labeling uttera nces ( whether simply expressive o E force or, 
a s Graham allows for some ca ses, pecformative ) as constative. 
SECTION 2b. 
I find a number of problems with these approaches. I think 
that the analysis of speech acts which they involve is untenable, 
and I want to challenge this analysis by using a reading of 
Austin's discussion of performatives which is not only altern-
ative to theirs, but which we can see actively suppressed in 
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their treatment of Austin's text. This suppression occurs at 
tim es through a simple misrepresentation, artti at o t her times 
through a refusal to read or acknowledge large poctions of the 
text. Of course, I am not speaking here of conscious mi srepre-
sentation or suppression, but neither am I spe~king simply of 
mistakes. For these misrepresentations and suppressions are nec-
essary, both for the construction of a certain reading of Aus-
tin's text, by which it is made to support a specific approach to 
language and communication, and for the avo idance of a reading 
which challenges this approach. 
In order to address this issue we should first remind our-
selves of the part of How To Do Things ~ith Words where Austin 
be g ins the a nalysis of performatives. On page 5 he describes the 
original examples of performatives in the following way: He sa y s 
that these examples have the grammatical form of a statement, are 
not nonsense, do not use problematic terms li ke 'good', 'all', 
'ought' or 'can', and have verbs in the first person singular 
present indicati ve active, but that, 
A. they do not 'describe' or 'report' or constate anything at 
all, are not 'true or false'; and 
B. the uttering of the sentence is, or is a part of , the 
doing of an action, which again would not normally 
be described as, or as 'just', saying somet hi ng. ( Austin, 
1962: 5 ) 
In 'Performative Utteranc es' he says that they are grammatically 
statements, but that they are not true o r false, and that if a 
person makes an utterance of this sort we should say that 'he is 
doing something rather than merely saying something' (Austin, 
1956: 235). And again, on pages 6-7 of How To Do Things With 
Words, he says that the term 'performative' indicates that the 
issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action, and that 
'it is not normally thought of as just saying something ' (Austin, 
1962: 6-7 ) . 
When Urmso n refer-s to the material on page 5 (h e does not 
discuss the other two passages), his quotation is: 'the uttering 
of the sentence is, or is a part of, the doing of an action, which 
again would not normally b e described a s saying something'. That 
is, he leaves out the emphasis of 'normally' and the clause 'or 
as 11 just 11 '. 
Graham quotes the A. and B. passages on page 5, and not the 
other two. He reproduces A. as I have, but gives B. as: 
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the uttering of the sentenc e is, or is part of, the doing of 
an action, which again would not norm~lly b e described as 
saying s o mething. (G raham, 19 77: 55) 
That is, he cha nges 'is a p art of' -to 'is part of' ( a mi:1 or 
po int, p erhaps ) and leaves out ' or as "just"'. 
We should noti c e that these two take Austin to b e talking 
about a type of utterance which looks li k e a statement b u t is not 
true o r false, and which is n o t a case of say ing something, in 
the sense of a speech act. They thus see Austin as initially 
'realizing' that speech acts and performatives are a d i fferent 
c lass of u tterance, but later confusing the two. While this 
reading may be possible without the peculiarity of their quotat-
i o ns, it certainly seems helped by not having to interpret d 
statement that a performative is the doing of an actio n which 
would not normally be described as just saying s ometh ing , or as 
merely saying something ( I have varied Austin's emphasis here) -
which, to say the least, gi ves the strong i mplica tion that a 
performative is also the action of say ing somethin g . 
Black q uotes only the passage o n pages 6-7 (but refers the 
reader to those on page 5), and reproduces the second part of 
t hat later sentence as, 'it is n o t usually thought of as just 
say ing something' (Black, 1963 : 211). I do not wish t o make 
anything o f the swapping of 'usual ly' for 'normally ', but what we 
should n o t Lc e is that when he rest d te s th is quotation a s a part 
of his dcg~me nt fi ve lines on, he gives i t as 'usually thought of 
as saying something', and retains this form, with 'just' deleted, 
throughout his argument. Now Black does think that uttering a 
performative is 'usually though t of as saying something', so he 
say s that what Austin must me a n is that uttering a performati ve 
is not usually thought o f as say ing something true or false 
(B lack, 1963: 212). He presents Austin's distinction as being 
between an utterance used t o make a truth-claim only and one that 
conventionally counts as being used to do something o t her thdn o c 
more than this; and he says that this distinction between types 
of utterances is changed t o a distinc tion between asp~cts o f 
utterances. It seems from this that if he had addressed the two 
clauses (A. and B.) on page 5 he would have taken the second one 
as merely a restatement o f the first ( thd t a performative is not 
a constative). So while the effect of Black's peculiar quotation 
is different, it also assists his reading. It helps the idea that 
Austin is just distinguishing perfo rmatives fr om say ing somet h ing 
true or false, whereas taking him as saying that the y are n o t 
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tt:"ue Ot:' false and that they are more than just saying something 
in gene t:' a 1 , s e em s to i m p 1 y t h a t t he p t:' og t:' am- i s to 1 o o k d t t n e 
ways perfot:'matives t:'elate to othet:' (gt:'ammatical) state ments which 
sa y something tt:'ue Ot:' false and at t.he way they t:'elate to just 
saying something. Black is intet:'esting because he almost says 
this at times; but he insists on adding 'tt:'ue or false' to 'say-
ing something', and thinks that the original pet:'fOt:'matives do not 
have to have the fot:'m of statements. 
With Wat:'nock the issue is slightly different again. He, as 
wg have seen, thinks that Austin's mistake was to n o t diffet:'ent-
i ~ te uttet:'ing a pet:'fot:'mative ( in the ot:'iginal sense ) and say ing 
so•n,::!thing. Howevet:', he thinks that the origin~l pet:'fot:'matives can 
have any gt:'ammatical form, and specifically do no t have to look 
like statements. Furthermot:'e, he s ays that if they at:'e in a 
statement form, then it is quite consistent with Au stin's ot:'ig-
inal definition oE pet:'fot:'matives f o t:' them t o be tt:'ue Ot:' false. He 
says, for example, that, 
If out:' idea is, as I think it clear that Austin's idea 
originally was, that of sayings which, in vit:' tue of 
conventions, constitute doings, it should be pet:'fectly cleat:' 
that sayings of any linguisti c f ot:'m Ot:' sort at all could 
figut:'e in this t:'ole; .••• (Warnock, 1973: 73 ) 
And in a note to the claim that if they at:'e statements the y can 
be true a~ ~~l se, he makes the following qualification : 
Austin says at fit:"st that performative utteca~ces at:'e ·~at 
true or false' ••• , and even seems at times t o take that as 
a partial criterion of performativeness. He qualifies this 
later- ••• (on p.55] - not, howe vet:', ••• for anything li k e 
the t:'eason I have in mind het:'e. (Warnock, 1973: 73,n.4 ) 
He thus chooses to ignore the way Austin sets up the pt:'ogram as 
being an analysis of a type of utterance which is specifically in 
the statement form bu t which is not tt:'ue Ot:' false ( see, at least, 
Austin,l962: 1-5, & 1956: 233-5). He, unlike the o thet:' three, 
thinks that Austin was intentionally tcying t o ca t:'t:' y an analysis 
of pet:'formati ves, as acts which are both doing something moce and 
saying something, ovet:' to the analysis of speech acts in genet:'al 
(but like t hem he thinks that it was untenable ) ; how evet:', because 
he lat:'gely ignores the first pages of the text he is able to 
avoid the possibility that Austin is c hallenging the idea that 
the statement fot:'m of an utterance means that it is saying some-
thing tt:'ue Ot:' f a lse. And again we find that the crucial point of 
Austin's analysis, the d•~ '1 L rt 1 :)E the possibility of a semantic or 
gt:'ammatical distinction, is ignored. 
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I want to ma k e one fina l point about the-wa y these four 
approaches set the agenda for wha t will and will not b e discussed 
in the la ter theory. There is a si gn ~ficant part of the analysis 
o f performati ves, which was menti oned in t he summary , where 
Au s t in discusses the role of expl icitness in language, which is 
c ompletely ign ored.[6) He says things there which contradict both 
the d irectio n imputed to Austin's text and the general app roaches 
to language and communicat i o n t o which the four commentato rs at 
whom we have loo ked seem t o subscribe. As with t he mo re specif1c 
ca ses d ealt with above, it is q uite possib le that the readin g s we 
h ave seen would be maintained in the face of a direct appr oac h to 
this mater ial; however, I want now to attempt a re-reading of 
Austin on performatives , taking ac c ount of this materia l and 
those passages mentioned above, and I wa nt to s how that Austin 
can be read differently. 
SECTION 3: AN ALTERNATIVE READING. 
To restate a point made earlier: the reading I want to 
sug gest of Austin's discussion of performatives is not one which 
seek s to bring out an underlying coherent and unified authorial 
in tention. It is one which inste a d seeks to allow for the ten-
sions, ambi valences and possibilities l y ing in the text itself. 
We hav e seen four (albeit similar) possibilities in t he last 
section, and here I want to concentrate on a different possib-
ility, one which, as I have said, remains largely and interest-
ingly suppressed, which is in part s contradict ed by some o f the 
material which supports the sorts of readings we have been look-
ing a t, but which itself contradicts and challenges those read-
ings. This can b e done briefly, a s I have already b rought most o f 
the relevant material f o rward. 
SECTION 3a. 
The general strategic stanc e of this approach would be 
roughly as follows: The prog ram is set up as an e xamination of a 
t ype o f utterance which looks like a constative, but which on the 
one hand appears not to describe anything o r be true or false, 
and on the other hand seems to in volve more than just the action 
of saying something. It seems to involve the invoca tion, b y the 
production o f an utterance, of certain con ventions governing or 
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constituting social procedures and relations; and thus t he u tter-
ance is a social, as well as linguistic, act. 
We then g o on to show tw o thing_s. We show on t h e o ne hand 
that it is impossible to formall y characterize t he difference 
between performatives and constatives; that an anal ysis of t he 
linguistic act itself ( the form of anal ysis standardly adopted by 
the tradition within which the discussion is nominally placed ) 
will give us no distin c tion, and that no statement for-m is pec-
uliar- to perfor::-mati ves. On the ot her hand, we s ho w t h at o n c e we 
t a k e account of that w h i c h i s n e c e s sa r y to pick o u t a pe c f o r m-
ative, i.e., 'the total situation in which the utterance is 
issued - the total speech-act' (Austin,l962: 52 ) , we find t hat 
pecformatives are not as uniq ue as we thought. 
This occurs in two ways. First, we show that constati ves 
themselves are subject to the very sorts of conventions wh ich 
constitute performatives as acts which ace more than just sa y ing 
something; so we find that constatives cannot be described as 
just saying something. And secondly we show that pecfocmatives 
can involve truth claims; so that a relation to truth and falsit y 
is not unique to constatives, it is just set ~ in a special way: 
the constative 'It is round' just places the u tterer in a diff-
erent communicative/ social relationship than does the warnin g or 
promise or bet 'It is round'. What this means is that constatives 
are performatives; not that the performative is ceally constat-
i ve, but that 'we are assimilating the supposed constative uttec-
ance to the performative' (Austin,l962: 52 ). 
We thus begin to find that the total speech act in the total 
speech situation emerges from logic piecemeal as important in 
special cases (1962: 52), and this becomes more and more 
general. We find that, 
the more we consider a statement not as a sentence (or 
proposition) but as an act of speech (out of which the 
others are logical constructions ) the more we are studying 
the whole thing as an act. (Austin,l962: 20 ) 
So once we take in the whole speech act we find that the 
cases which were originally put forward were not so much a pecul-
iar type of utterance as a type of speech act which brought to 
the fore a hitherto unrecognized aspect of all speech acts. All 
speech acts are at one level the act of saying something and at 
another level the act of invoking certain conventions by which 
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wh at is said is ta k en as having a certain force and by which the 
s pea ke r is tied into communicative relatio~s. 
Wh ile this readin g takes the t ~ xt to be doin g q uite dif f-
erent things to tho se which our commentators take it t o be doing, 
s o me aspects of the prog ram it sets up are perhaps challenged by 
their responses to the te x t as they see it . First, there is the 
comp laint against the intr oduction of cases which seem n ot to 
share the ritual character of the early e xamples. The response to 
this is that these later case, be they warning , ordering, apolog -
i z in g o r stating , sim ply~ li k e the or i g in al cases o n c e we read 
t he or i g inal c ases in our way. For like them the later act s are 
onl y operati ve as such if they successfully invok e the con vent-
ions w h ich c onstitute them as the acts the y a re, if they ar e 
recognized as warnings o r o rders o r statements o r whate ver. Thus 
when Urmson says that 'it would be odd t o say t hat "I order you 
to shut the door" is the utterance of a ritual formula o r an act 
which would n o t normally be counted as sayi ng something ' (1 979: 
267) , one would respond that the ut terance is c ertainly , like all 
speech ac ts and (t hus ) li ke the earl y exam p les of perfo rmati ves, 
the sayi n g of something. And we would say that it is also, when 
i t is uttered as an o r der (a nd it may not be), the invocation of 
certain contingen t con ventions by which it is constituted a s an 
order, con ventio ns which might not e x ist, which are not operable 
in all situations, a nd whi c h are necessary for an o rder t o ha ve 
been issued. Further, it could have been the case that ' I order 
yo u .•• ' is as in operable a s 'I d i vor c e you', or ' I insult yo u', 
which of course are not meaningless, but are sim p l y not e xpli c it-
ly performati ve: they are, rather, descriptions ( in primary o r 
inexplicit f o rm ) o f our insulting or divo rcing of someone, a s ' I 
kiss you' and ' o n page 48 I p r o mise' are p rimary statements. 
These later c ases b ring to mind another assumption we have 
seen made, that e xp licit utterances are true o r false descript-
ions of the speech act they are. I f this assumptio n is f ol l owed 
thr ough we have the positio n where speech act s are constituted by 
the s peaker describing the act he o r she is performing when they 
are r endered explic itly (and perhaps one could say that a pr imary 
utterance ca rries a n implied descri p tio n); speech act s are thus 
seen as being constit uted purely linguistically. A good initi a l 
response to this is t o q uo te ·an argument g iven b y Black. He say s 
that 'it is hardly plausible to suppo se that a p r o mise-maker is 
tellin g his hearer that he is uttering the very words that he is 
uttering - for what would be the point of that?'. 
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The po1nt of the promise, its whole raison d'etre, 1s not to 
1nform the hearer about i t se lf, or about -anything e lse , but 
to serve primarily a s a way of b inding the spea ke r to a 
subsequen t performanc e . ... Of co~rse, the promise se rves 
al so to 'i nform the hearer' (Austin's phrase ) , as moving a 
pawn in forms the oppo nent that it has bee n mov ed, but it 
would be impossible for that to happen un l ess t here was 
somet hing to be informed about, viz ., that the speake r wa s 
promi sing : p r omising is constituted by , not descr i be d by, 
the utterance o f the promise-fo rmula. ( Black,l963 : 211 ) 
The last part of this is not q uite right . Pr omi sing is constlt-
ut e d by conve nt i ons, which are invoked by t he utte rance o f the 
prom i se- f o rm u 1 a . 
I t is al s o worth consi dering the Islam ic ' I divorce yo u', ' I 
divor c e you ', 'I d i vorce you' . Gi ven that divorc e only comes 
about on t he t hird utterance (and each sentenc e can apparentl y be 
said ye ars apart), it is not at all clear how one could tak e 
these sentences as true o r fal se descriptions. The poi n t which 
this case br 1ngs home to us is that the act is constituted , not 
by the u tterance, but by conventions which it invokes, and which 
it (the utterance ) logically pre c edes and therefore could not 
describe. 
Th is is the point at which we need to take not i c e of Au s-
tin's com men ts on ex plici tness in language. We need to n o te his 
co mment that the way an u tte rance is bein g used can be mad e plain 
by a number o f devices other than performative ve rbs (see Austin, 
1962 : 73-6, or 1956: 244 ). None of these o ther devices, e ven when 
they are 'verbal', are descriptive, yet they play the same role 
as expl ic itly performati ve e xpressions. These e xpressions ar e 
s ometimes clearer than the other devic es, but they do suffer the 
phi l osophical drawback of looking descriptive. Also , these e x-
pressions are not overridi ng or excl usi ve, and p resu mably this is 
o ne of the rea s o ns we co uld see thr ough the poss ib i l it y o f a 
grammat i cal distinc ti on: conte xt or s o me other device may make it 
plain that the expression is being use d in a way o ther than that 
made expli c it. 
This point also g i ves us a counter t o another of Gra ham's 
arguments. His objecti on t hat inexplicit utterances are not per-
f orma tive arises in part fr om a failure t o realize t hat once we 
recognize (v ia whatever device) the way an uttera nc e is bei ng 
used, then it is per-formatively operati ve as that speech act. The 
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utt e ranc e b e com es the act it is here used as 
promi se, or whatever. 
a state ment, a 
The d istinctions between d i ffere~t forces are (as Au stin 
puts it - 1962 : 72) 'created' rather than described by perform -
ative expressio ns; and what this means is that ' I shall do X' may 
b e used as (have the force of) a prom ise, prediction, warning, 
expressio n of 1ntention, or whatever, on different occasions of 
use, and we might on occasion make this force clear, bu t that ' I 
s hall do X' is not implicitly any speech act in particular. And 
neither is 'the cat is o n the mat'. 
In particular, unclear or primary or primitive utterances 
are not implicitly statemental. Au stin e ven suggests, a s we ha ve 
seen ( 1962: 73), that the statement may b e a relatively la te 
de velopment in the uses o f utterances , linked to the growt h of 
science; and this brings us back again to the earlier poi nt. 
All speech acts, including constatives, are acts be yond the 
ac t of sa yi ng something, and the comm unicati ve acts they are, 
beyond being meaningful but 'useless' utterances, is g i ven by 
this second level of per-formativeness. Of course, there could 
never b e a merely meaningful and useless utterance in the sense 
just used. Every utterance act is in a 'contex t of utte rance' 
which constitutes it as the act it is, and every utterance is, by 
that, made communicat i vel y operative, constituting a certain 
r e lat ion a mon gs t speakers. We have here a view where o n the o ne 
hand speech acts are constituted by the com munica tive relations 
o f a speech co mmunit y , and where o n the ot her hand these th us 
constituted speech acts then take effect or are operativ e in 
constitut i n g the relations o f that. community . 
SECTION 3b. 
This reading of Austin hopefully offers a useful antidote to 
more standard interp retations. However, the approach brought ou t 
by such a reading does itself seem to involve c ertain tensio ns. 
These tensi o ns appear to arise thro ugh the invocation by Austin 
of a series of moves which are l ocated in the tradition he seems 
to be rejecting, and the y seem to weaken a good deal of the pow e r 
of his approach . The sorts o f problems I am indicating here can 
be usefully noted by considering Derrida's reading of How To Do 
Things With Words. 
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Der-rida is in many ways sympathetic to Austin's program. He 
suggests, following a readin g which generally accords with that 
offered above, that Austin's approach _acts as a counter to that 
approach to communication which sees it as essentially the 
transport of preconstituted truths via a medium. 
It could appear that Austin has ex ploded the concept of 
communicatio n as a purely semiotic, linguistic, or s ymbo lic 
concept. The performative is a ' communica tion• which does 
n o t essentially limit itself t o transporting an already 
constituted semantic content guarded by its ow n aiming at 
truth (truth as an unveiling of that which is in its Being, 
or as an adequation between a judicative statement and the 
thing itself ). (Derrida, 1971: 187) 
Yet Derrida points to a number of aspects within Austin's 
approach which, he feels, act in contradiction to this general 
direction. These aspects, forms o f which arise as problems in the 
work to be discussed in the following chapters, seem t o centre on 
the notion of a unifying and transparent consciousness as the 
presupposed element of communication. 
A claim which has a crucial place in Austin's analysis is 
that the total context o f an utterance is c entral to an under-
standing and to the operation of that utterance as an act of 
speech. Thus, the discussion of infelicities involves an analysis 
of the appropriateness of the 'circumstances in which the words 
are uttered' (Austin, 1962: 8), and it has been noted in the 
discussion so far that it is through this emphasis on context 
that Austin is later able to break down the initial distinction 
between constatives and performatives, showing that constati ves 
also are operative within a context of utterance. 
But Derrida argues that this context has consciousness as 
its c entral element, as the focal point o f the context, and that 
this constitutes a return to the foundations of the approach 
which he is attempting to overcome. 
The long list of 'infelicities' of variable type which might 
affect the event of the performative always returns to an 
element of what Austin calls the total context. One of these 
essential elements - and not one among others - classically 
remains consciousness, the conscious presence of the intent-
ion of the speaking subject for the totality of his locutory 
act. Thereby, performative communication once more becomes 
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the com municat i o n of an intentional meaning, even if this 
meanin g has no referent in the form of a .. prior or exteri o r 
t hi n g or s t a t e o f t h in g s. ( De r r ida , l 9 71 : 18 7 ) 
-Derrida argues that in the construction of a felicitous 
perfo rmati ve offered by Austin ( in Ch. 2) the values of conve nt-
i onality, co rrectness and completeness which govern a perfo rm-
ative constitute a demand for an e xhausti vely definable context, 
a free consciousness p resent for the totality of the operation, 
and an absolu tel y full meaning that is 'master o f itself'. He 
descri bes this triple demand as 'the teleological j urisdic ti on of 
a t o tal field whose intention remains the organizing center' 
(1971: 188). That is, a performative must avoid the infelicities, 
and such avoidance requires an exhaustively determined context, 
and this is only possible given a communicative consciousness 
(both of speaker and audience) which has a total grasp o f the 
u tterance and context. Thus an implicit intentionality , seen as 
the locus of meaning, seems to occur in the midst of Austin's 
rejection o f such a notion. 
It mi g ht be argued that co ntext is used by Austin as a 
possible field within which the act is meaningful, no t as a 
determinate field contained through some sort of intentional 
grasp of the total utterance. Such a reading certainly seems 
defensible; however, it must be gran ted t o Derrida that the 
characteristic s which Austin goes on to app ly to a felicitous 
pe rformati ve do seem to presuppose such an intentionality as a 
l ocu s. 
Austin's procedure is described by Derrida as that of recog-
ni z in g the possibility of the negative as a structural possibil-
ity , or recogni z ing that failure is an essential poss i b ility in 
the operations under consideration, and then, 'with an almost 
immediately simultaneous gesture made in the name of a kind of 
ideal regulation', excluding this risk as an accidental, e xterior 
one that teaches us n othing about the language phenomenon under 
consideration ( 1971: 188 ). 
In demonstrating this, Derrida clai ms that Austin points out 
that all conventional acts are heir to, or liable to, infelic ity 
(1962: 18-19), but considers only the conventionality that forms 
the circumstance of the utterance. He ignores what Derrida calls 
'a certain conventionality intrinsic to what constitutes the 
speech act itself, all that mi ght be summari zed rapidly under the 
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problematical rubric of "the arbitrary nature of the sign"• 
( 19 71 : 1 8 9 ) • T h a t i s, t he u t t e ran c e f o r Au s t ip seem s not i t se l f 
to b e conventional, but simply the context or circumstances of 
the act, and thus the utterance (or 1 locution•, to use Austin•s 
later terminology ) is spared the risks of infelicity. Such a 
claim seems unjustified, for while Austin does not go into the 
characteristics of the utterance-object at this stage of the arg-
ument, we will see 1n the following chapter that the locution is 
treated as conventional. 
A more telling point, however, is Derrida•s comment that 
Au stin does not examine the possibility of failure as •a n essent-
ial predicate or law •. 
Austin does not ponder the consequences issuing from the 
fact that a possibility - a possible risk - is alway s poss-
ible, and is in some sense a necessary possibility. Nor 
whether - once such a necessary possibility of infelicity is 
recognized - infelicity still constitutes an accident. What 
is a success when the possibility of infelicity [failure?] 
continues to constitute its structure? (Derrida, 19 71 : 189 ) 
For Derrida, this has the effect of rendering the opposition 
of the success/ failure of an utterance insufficient or deriv-
ative. Such an opposition, he says, presupposes a general and 
systematic elaboration of the structure of locution which avoids 
the endless alternation of essence and accident; however, Austin, 
while acknowledging the possibility of such a theory, avoids 
bringing it in as part of his account. 
At one point, it may be recalled, while discussing the 
general possibility of failure to which conventional acts are 
exposed, Austin says that while a very general high-level doc-
trine might embrace both what have been called infelicities and 
those other •unhappy• features of the doing of actions in a 
single doctrine, he is not including this kind of unhappiness in 
his theory. He then goes on: 
We must just remember, though, that features of this sort 
can and do constantly obtrude into any case we are discuss-
ing. Features of this sort would normally come under the 
heading of •extenuating circumstances• or of •factors reduc-
ing or abrogating the agent•s responsibility•, and so on. 
(Austin, 196 2 : 21 ) 
Thus duress or accident or other unintentional features effecting 
actions (in this case utterances), and in fact constantly obtrud-
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ing into them, ar.e excluded from the discussion of performatives. 
Intentionality is retained as the governing- c baracteristic of 
performatives, and this even though, as we have seen, perf orm -
atives can be operati ve when unintentional. 
This e xc lusio n involves problems facing performatives as 
actions, but the second ex clusion, and the one whi ch Derrida 
fi nds most interesting, involves ills to which performatives are 
heir which infect all utterances. Austin says t ha t these are 
cases where a performative utterance will, for e xample, 'be in ~ 
p e c u 1 i a r ~~ h o 11 o w or v o i d i f sa i d by a n a c tor o n t he s t age , o r 
if introduced in a poem, o r spoken in soliloquy'. 
This applies in a similar manner to any and every utterance 
- a sea-change in special circumstances. Language in such 
circumstance is in special wa ys - intelligibly - used not 
se riously, but in ways parasitic upon its normal use - ways 
whi c h fall under the doctrine o f the etiolations o f lang-
uage. All this we are ex cludin g from consideration . Our 
performative uttera nces, felicitous or not, are to be under-
stood a s issued in ordi nary circumstances. (Au stin, 1962 : 
22) 
Derrida desc ribes this 'ill' as the possibility t hat e very 
performative utterance (o r any utterance ) may be 'cited'. He sa ys 
that Austin's response involves regarding the possibility as 
abnormal and as constituting a kind of extenuation, an ' agonized 
succumbing of language that we should strenuously distance our-
selves from and resolutely ignore' (19 71: 190). Derrida comments 
further that the concept of the 'ordinary', and t herefore of 
'o rdinary language', to which Austin has recourse, is in fact 
marked by this exclusion of possibilities to which every utter-
ance is o pen. 
In a r eply to Derrida, Searle has argued that Austin simpl y 
saw here that it 'is necessary to hold in abeyance one set of 
questions, about parasitic discourse, until one has answered a 
logical ly prior set of questions about "serious" discourse' 
(Searle, 1977: 205). Searle also says that Austin's idea was that 
we should not start our investigation with promises made on stage 
or in a novel, 'because in a fairly obvious way such utterances 
are not standard cases of promises and statements' ( 1977: 204 ). 
Derrida's response to this objection is that 'what is at stake is 
above all the structural impossibility and illegitimacy of such 
an "idealization", even one which is methodological and provis-
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ional' (Derrida, 1977: 206 ). That is, t he ' obvi ou sness' o f t hese 
ca ses being non-standard already presup poses- major claim s regard-
ing the nature of language. As Culler points ou t, s uch an e xclus -
ion (the assumption t hat ordinary lavguage involves essentially 
the ma k ing o f true or false statements, and the e xclu si on of all 
othe r u ses a s parasitical ) is just what Austin obj e cted to 1n h is 
predecessors and a ttempts t o overcome (Culler, 1983: 11 8 ) . 
Sea rl e defends Austin's exclusion by saying that a pretended 
s peec h act is dependent on the possibility o f the nonpretende d 
s peech act: 'there could not , for exampl e, be prom ises made by 
a c to r s i n a p 1 a y i f the r e w e r e no t t he p o s s i b i 1 i t y o f prom i se s 
made in real life' (1977 : 205). This, however, is jus t what 
Derrida challenges. The conventional procedure described by Au s-
tin operates as a repeatable formula, a nd this 'cita tionality ' 
t hu s seems to be central t o a performative. That is, a performat-
ive utterance must repeat a ' coded' or iterable utterance, it 
must be identifiable as conforming with an iterable model, and so 
it must be in some sense a citation. Searle also argues t hat 
pa rasitism involves 'use' whereas citation involves 'mention', 
and that Derrida does not understand this distinction. Howe ver, 
thi s follows the same style of h ierachical opposition, governed 
by the general op positi on of intention/ absence, seen above. And 
i n a s i m i 1 a r r e s p on se o ne c an say t h a t to ~ an e x p re s s i o n a s 
co nforming to a formula it is necessary to menti o n o r cite i t as 
a n e xample of that formu•la. (Cf . Culler, 1983: 119, n.5 ) 
Thus, rather than being something external to lang uage, a 
trap into which it might fal l , and from which language remains 
'sheltered by its essence or telos', this cita tionality o r iter-
ability should be seen as the 'internal and positive condition of 
possibility' of language. In this case 'o rdinary ' language can no 
longer be defined by this exclusion, and the 'ordinariness' of 
its charac teristi c s bec o me highly problematic. 
In excluding the general theory of this structural parasit-
ism, does not Austin, who nevertheless claims to describe 
the facts and events o f ordi~ary language, pass off as 
ordinary an ethical and teleological determination (the 
univocity of the utterance - that he acknowledges elsewhere 
remains a philosophical 'ideal' -, the presence to self of a 
t o tal context, the transparency of intentions, the p resence 
of meaning to the absolutely singular uniqueness o f a speech 
act, etc. )? (Derrida, 1971: 191) 
Thus, just as the demand for an exhaustively determinable context 
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p resupposes a consciou s intention, which is totall y present and 
actually transparent for itself and o thers, as- t he focal point of 
the context, so the concept of the ' o rdinary' seems to presup pose 
this consciou sness as the origin of me~ning. And this is the very 
conc e p t which Austin is attempting to sup p lant. 
Derrida's point here is that what Austin describes as anomalous 
(citat ion on the stage, in a poem, or in a soliloquy ) is in 
fact the 'determined modification' of a general citationality or 
iterability without which there could n ot be a 'successful ' 
performative. And this means that a successful performative must 
be 'impure'. The c itation invol ved here is a different type of 
c itation from that in a play, or a philosophical reference, or 1n 
a recitation of a poem, and thus there is a relati v e specificity 
or purity of performatives. 
But this relative purity does not emerge in opposit1on to 
c itationality or iterability, but in opposition to other 
kinds of iteration within a general iterability which con-
stitutes a violation of the allegedly rigorous pur ity of 
every event of discourse or every speech act. Rather than 
oppose citation or iteration to the non-iteration of an 
event, one ought t o construct a differential typology of 
forms of iteration, assuming tha t such a project is tenable 
and can result in an exhaustive program, 
1971: 192) 
(Derrida , 
Derrida says that the category of intention would occur in 
such a typology, but that it would not have a place from which it 
governs the entire scene and the entire system of utterances. He 
says that one would be then concerned with 'different types of 
marks or chains of iterable marks, and not with an opposition 
between citational statements on the one hand, and singular and 
original statement-events on the other'. 
Gi ven that structure of iteration, the intentio n animating 
the utterance will never b e through and through present to 
itself and to its content. The iteration s truc turing it ~ 
priori introduces into it a dehiscence and a cleft [ demar-
ca tion?] which are essential . The 'non-serious', the oratio 
obliqua will n o longer be able to be excluded, as Austin 
wished, from ' ordinary' l a nguage. (Derrida, 1971 : 192) 
He sug gests that when it is alleged that ordinary language 
ex c ludes general iterability, this 'ordinariness' harbours 'the 
teleological lure of consc iousness whose motivations, indest ruct -
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ible necessity, and systematic effects ~emain to be analyzed'. 
Thus the conce pt of the ' o~d ina~y ' invokes t~e same p~esupposit ­
ion as the demand for an exhaustively dete~minable context, a 
conscious intention which must b e totally p~esent and t~anspa~ent 
for itself and othe~s, since it is a ~ete~mining focal point fo~ 
the context. ( 1971: 192) 
The point he~e is not to deny t he effects of consciousness, 
presence, intention, speech, o~dina~y language, and so on. 
Rathe~, the point is that the effects of these featu~es p~e­
suppose and are made poss ible by featu~es gene~all y opposed to 
them and excluded f~om an essenc e of language, and that these 
featu~es cannot be set up in a se~ies of hierachical oppositions 
as essential features of language. (1971 : 193)7 
CONCLUSION. 
It seems that we are left in a ~ather ambivalent position 
~ega~ding Austin's analysis of pe~formatives. On the one hand, 
there a~e a number of ~eadings of Austin o n pe~fo~matives (poss-
i ble ~eadings, pe~haps, but ce~tainly not necessary ) which var -
iously seek to tame his chal lenge to a posit ivist tradition in 
the philosophy of language. Austin's wo~k ca n b e salvaged f~om 
these ~eadings, and can as a ~esult be seen as a powerful denial 
of an app~oach which t~eats language and communica tion as essent-
ially a system of descriptive utte~ances (wh ich 'code' the ~elat­
ion of pregiven subjects to the wo~ld, and transport meaning 
between subjects) and which t~eats all othe~ aspects of language 
as pa~asitic and de~ived f~om this cent~al nature. 
On the othe~ hand, it seems that according to a fu~ther 
~eading of Austin, which takes his p~oject se~iously and applies 
it to his own text, one ca n uncove~ a se~ies of p~esuppositions 
which are typical of , a nd cen t~al to, that very t~adition which 
Austin ~ejects. Thus, Austin's treatment of context as appa~ently 
necessa~ily dete~minable seems t o presuppose a communicative 
consciousness which has a total gra sp of the speech event and 
which acts as an intentional locus of its meaning. And his ex-
clusion of non-se~ious utterances both explicitly repeats the 
habit of p~eemptive hierachi za tion in favou~ of presumed essent-
ial featu~es of language and seems also to presuppose that utter-
ances which can be seen as located in an intending , 'se~i ous' 
consciousness fo~m the co~e of linguistic phenomena, f~om which 
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othec phen omena ace decived. 
A point wocth ma k in g h e ce is that g i ven t h is ceading we can 
ceappcaise the di ffecen c e between the eacly and latec e xamples o f 
pecf o cmati ves. It seems now that the d i ffecence is t hat in s om e 
pecfocmatives t hece is a high degcee of itecation - oc a h i gh 
degree of citual - and in ot hecs itecation is cela t i vely l e ss 
e xpl icit. Pcobably in no ca se could we have an e xact citation of 
a citual, a nd al s o (and this is an impoctant point ) no pecfocm -
ati ve (and, g i ven the ovecall acgument, no u tte canc e ) can a vo i d 
itecation ( this c itatio n making it recognizable a s the act it 
is ) . 
It may well be the case, as Culler ( 1983: 118 , n.4 ) quotes 
Felman as suggesting, that Austin cecognized al l this, and is i n 
f act parody ing the habits o f positiv ism - and s he places e mph-
asis, for e xam ple, on Au stin's use o f scace quotes acound ' ser-
ious'. In this light, it might also be r emembeced t hat he does 
seem to initiall y set up what is in fact and 'attack on po s itivi st 
ph il osophy o f language as f o llowing in that tradition, and the 
focm o f the pcoject itself is one in which he 'tries' to hive o ff 
perfocmati ves from constatives (a positivist move ) and ends up 
changi ng ou r pecc e p tio n of constati ves. 
In fact, it is not important whether oc not Austin was awace 
of what happens in the te x t (and why, indeed, should hi s con-
sciou s presence t o the text be a factor in our intecpcetatio n of 
it ?) . Foe what we get in Austin's analysis of performatives is in 
eithec case a text which shows that a model o f language wh i ch 
presumes an intentional subject at the co ce of meaning and which 
treats communication as essentially the transpoct of trut h s orig-
inating in this subject as its celati o n t o the world is u ltim-
ately untenable. And this ccitique makes use of catego cies and 
mo ves found in the the model it attack s (as Decri da wou l d say , it 
' d ec on stcucts' that model ). 
What is impoctant, howevec, is the extent to wh ic h the 
positive model which Austin develops in the rest of Ho~ To Do 
Things With Wocds is itself undecmined by some o f the features 
identified in the previous sec tion, and the extent to which t hese 
features inform the traditio n which f o llows fr om Au stin. One ta sk 
of the f ol l owi n g chapters will be to ta ke note of the possi b le 
consequences o f this influence. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
AUSTIN ON ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS 
INTRODUCTION. 
In the se cond par-t o f How To Do Things With Wor-ds Austin 
de velops what is usually know n as the theor-y of illocutionar-y 
for-ce, or- illocutionar-y acts. As influential as the appr-oach 
which he is taken to have developed has been, a number- o f aspects 
of this later- for-mulation have been str-ongly cr-iticized and 
modified. Thus, as with the discussion of per-for-matives, if we 
want to take account of Austin's place in a tr-adition we need t o 
give as much emphasis to the r- esponses he evo kes as to hi s text 
itself. 
I n this discussion, two major- issues ar-ise. The fir-st is the 
validity of the r-ole given by Austin to extra-linguistic convent-
ions in the operation of illocutionary acts, and the second is 
the q uestion of whether we are, or should be, dealing with utter-
ance-acts or utterance-ob j ects when applying Austin's theory. I 
intend to defend Austin's treatment of extra-lingui stic convent-
ions, and will argue that emphasis should be placed on utterance-
acts - in accordance with the reading offered of the discussion 
of performatives. However, it will also be important to take 
account of the carry-over of certain pr-esuppositions noted in the 
pr-evious chapter, and to gauge their- effect on the later theo r- y. 
SECTION 1 : THINGS WE DO IN UTTERANCES. 
The fresh start initiated in Lecture VI I of How To Do Things 
With Words invo lves the re-examination of what it is that we do 
when we issue an utterance, and Austin suggests that this can 
invo lve three acts. The first of these acts is called the 'locut-
ionary act•, itself involving three further acts, which 'together 
add up to "saying" something, in the full sense of "say'" (1962 : 
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92). There is always, he says, the phonetic act of uttering 
c ertain noises, as a 'phone'. There is alw ays the phatic act, 
of uttering certain vocables or words, i.e. noises of cer-
tain types belonging to and ~ belonging to a certain vocab-
ulary, in a certain construction, i.e. conforming to and as 
conforming to a certain grammar, with a certain intonation, 
&c. [as a 'pheme']. 
Finally, to issue an utterance is generally to perform a rhetic 
act, 
of using that pheme or its constituents with a certain more 
or less definite 'sense' and a more or less definite 'ref-
erence' (which together are equivalent to 'meaning'). 
( Au s tin , 19 6 2 : 9 3 ) 
The utterance produced in a rhetic act is a 'rheme' (see 1962: 
92-3). Austin comments that 'the pheme is a unit of language: 
its typical fault is to be nonsense - meaningless. But the rheme 
is a unit of speech; its typical fault is to be vague or void o r 
obscure, &c.' (1962: 98). He says that he takes 'sense' and 
'reference' here on the strength of 'current views', and he also 
comments that if the locutionary act which these three acts go to 
make up were to be discussed for its own sake many further re-
finements would be needed (1962: 95). 
The second sense of 'doing something' which Austin finds in 
the issuing of an utterance he calls the 'i11ocutionary act'. He 
says that he wants to concentrate on this act as it throws light 
on the constative-performative distinction, which the locutionary 
act does not do. 
To perform a locutionary act is in general, we may say, also 
and eo ipso to perform an illocutionary act .... Thus in 
performing a locutionary act we shall also be performing 
such an act as: 
asking or answering a question, 
giving some information or an assurance or a warning, 
announcing a verdict or an intention, .••. (Austin, 1962: 
98) 
Austin claims that there is nothing mysterious about the 'eo 
ipso' in the definition of the illocutionary act, but says that 
there is a problem in making clear what is meant by saying we are 
using an utterance in a certain way. It makes a great difference 
with what sense we were using an utterance on a particular occ-
asion, but also whether we were advising, suggesting or ordering, 
or whether we were promising or announcing a vague intention. In 
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this second sense we want to know what force a locution has or 
should be taken as having. He says that 'it may be perfectl y 
clear what I mean by "It is going to charge" or "Sh u t the door", 
but not clear whether it is meant as-a statement or warning, & 
c.' ( 1962: 98). 
An illocutionary act is taken as the performance o f an act 
in saying something, whereas a locutionary act is the perfo r man c e 
of an act of saying something. ( 1962: 99-100 ) 
The descriptive fallacy, Austin suggests, arises fr om treat-
ing philosophical problems of illocutionary usage as p roblems of 
locutionary usage. He says that this has been avoided with t he 
realization that the occasion of an utterance matters seriously , 
and that the words used are to some extent to be 'explained' by 
t he 'context' in which they are designed to be or have act ually 
been spoken in a linguistic interchange~ however, he says, peop le 
tend to give these explanations in terms of 'the meaning of 
words'. He says that we can use 'meaning' with reference to 
illocutionary force (e.g., 'He meant it as an order' ) , but that 
he wants to distinguish force and meaning in t he sense in wh ich 
meaning is equivalent to sense and reference, just as it h as 
become essential to distinguish sense and reference. ( 1962: 100 ) 
Austin also criticizes the use of 'use' instead of 'mean-
ing'. He says that 'use' can be just as ambiguous and wide as 
'meaning', and that we may clear up the 'use of a sentence' on a 
particular occasion, in the sense of the locutionary act, without 
touching upon its use in the sense of an illocutionary act. 
( 1962: 100-1) 
The perlocutionary act is now introduced, which is performed 
when the speaker intentionally, by saying something, produces 
certain consequential effects upon the feelings, t houghts or 
actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of o ther persons. 
( 1962: 101) 
Some examples of (reports of) locutions, illocutions and 
perlocutions are: 
E.l 
Act (A ) or Locution. 
He said to me 'Shoot her!' meaning by 'shoot' shoot and 
referring by 'her' to her. 
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Act (B) o r Illocution. 
He urged (o r advised , ordered , & c . ) me to shoot her . 
Act (Ca ) or Perlocution. 
He persuade d me t o shoot he r . -
Act (Cb) . 
He go t me to (o r made me, & c . ) shoo t h e r. 
E. 2 
Act (A ) or Locu tion. 
He said t o me ' You ca n't do that•. 
Act (B) or I llocutio n. 
He p rotested agains t my doing it. 
Ac t (Ca ) or Perlocution. 
He pulled me up , checked me. 
Act (C b ) . 
He stopped me, he b r ough t me to my senses, & c . 
He annoyed me.(Austin, 1962: 10 1-2 ) 
Austin notes that the consequential effects in Ca and Cb do not 
i nclude those achieved, f o r e xample, by way o f committing the 
spe ake r as in p r o mising , which come into the illocutio nary act 
(1962 : 102 - 3) . 
Austin wants to concentrate on t he illocutionary act a nd 
keep it distinct, a nd he n o tes a t enden cy in philosophy t o elide 
it in f avo r o f o ne o f the other s . J ust as •meaning • and ' use of 
sentence• ca n b l ur the distinction between l o cutio nary a nd i lloc-
utionary acts , so to speak of the 'use• of language can li kewise 
blur the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary 
ac ts. He s ay s that s peak ing o f the •use of "language " for arg uing 
or warning• l oo ks just like speaking of 'the use of "lang u ag e" 
for persuading, r ousing , ala rming '; 
yet the former may, for rough contrast, b e said t o be con-
ventional, in the s ense that at least it could b e made 
ex p lic it by the performative f o rmula; bu t t he latter could 
n o t. Thus we can s ay • I argu e tha t' or • I warn yo u that' but 
we ca nn o t say • I con vi n ce yo u that ', or • I alarm yo u that'. 
Furthermore we may be entirely clear whether someone was 
arguing or n ot without t o uchin g o n the questio n whethe r he 
was convi ncin g a n yone o r not.(Austin, 1962 : 1 03-4 ) 
Austin also warns tha t we of ten s pe ak of the •use of lang-
uage' for something - for example, for joking - and that we may 
u se 'in' differently from the illocutionary 'in', a s when we say 
'in say in g 11 p 11 I wa s joki n g ' or •act ing a par t' o r •writing 
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poetry'. These references to 'use of language' have nothing to do 
with the illocutionary act. If I say 'Go an~ catch a falling 
star', the meaning and force may be clear, but which of t hese 
o ther things (joking, acting, . •• ) may not be. Further, there are 
aetiolations, parasitic uses, etc., various 'not serious' and 
'not full normal' uses, and the normal conditions o f reference 
may be suspended, or no attempt made at a standard perlocutio nary 
act, no attempt to make you do anything ( 1962: 1 0 4 ) . The effect 
of Austin's reintroduction of the 'serious' / 'non-serious' dis-
t inction at this point will be discussed later. 
There may also be some things we 'do' in some c onnection wit h 
saying something which do not seem to fall, intuitively at least, 
exactly into these roughl y defined classes, or fall into more 
than one, yet are not li k e joking or poetry. For e xample, insin-
uating seems to involve conventions, like illocutionary acts, 
'but we cannot~ "I insinuate .•• ", and it seems like impl ying 
to be a clever effect rather than a mere act'. Or we may evince 
emotion in or by issuing an utterance, as when we swear, but it 
does not fit the performative formulas and the other devices o f 
illocutionary acts. We might say, he says, that we use swearing 
for relieving our feelings. 'We must notice that the illocution-
ary act is a conventional act: and act done as conforming to a 
convention'. (1962: 104-5) 
As we are dealing with three kinds of acts we need to dist-
inguish between 'the act of doing x' and 'the act of attempting 
to do x'. With illocutions there is a distinction between att-
empting or purporting to perform a certain illocutionary act and 
the act of bringing off such an act. For example, we may try to 
thank somebody, but fail because we are not heard, or are taken 
as being ironical, or that person was not responsible for what-
ever it was, and so-on. With locutionary acts failures will not 
be unhappiness, but failure to get the words out, to express 
ourselves clearly, etc. ( 1962: 105-6 ) 
Because the acts are acts there also needs to be a distinct-
ion between intended and unintended effects. We may attempt 
something at which we fail (attempt and achievement distinction ) , 
and we may produce something we do not intend to produce or 
intend not to produce. This occurs, he says, with all three acts, 
but mainly with perlocutions. As actions they may be things 'we 
do not exactly do', in that we may do them under duress, or in 
joking or acting a part, and we may perhaps do them by mistake or 
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unintentionally. ( 1962: 106-7 ) 
The final task Austin sets himself here is t o ma k e the 
not ion o f an act clearer. He says th~t we have the idea o f an act 
a s a fixed p h ysical thing that we do a s distinguished from con -
vention s and from consequences, but (a) the illocutionar y a ct and 
e ven t he locutionary ac t do involve conventi ons, so, f o r example, 
obe isan c e is done as co n ventional (and he notes the distinction 
between kicking a wall and k icking a goal), and (b) the perloc-
utionary act always includes some consequences, as when we say 
' By doing xI wa s do in g y '. Austin n otes that we bri n g i n a 
varying stretch of 'consequences', some perhaps 'unintent ional' -
and this is c harac teristic of all action. We can range fr om at 
l east ' He shot the donkey' to 'He moved his trigger fin ger'. 
( 1962 : 107- 8) 
Austin say s that the illocutionary-perlocutionary distinct-
ion seems the most problem, distinguishing, for e xample, 'in 
say ing it I was warning him' from 'by say ing it I got him t o 
stop'. He say s that the perlocutionary sense of 'doing a n action' 
is irrelevant t o the sense in which an utterance, if the issuing 
of i t is the 'd o ing of an action', is a per-formative, 'at least 
if that is to be distinct from a constative', because almost any 
perlocutionary act is liable to be brought o ff by the issuing , 
with or without calculation, of any utterance, including a con-
stative (1962 : 110). 1 
He say s that we thus ha ve to draw the line between an action 
we do and its consequences. With physical action this is hard, 
because, as has been said, it seems possible to keep wor king back 
through what are 'only consequences' to a minimum physical act. 
However, with acts of saying something we have o n the on~ hand 
nomenclature, wherein the names f o r illocutions seem to mark a 
break between the act (of say ing something) and its consequences 
( wh ile we nam e p hysica l actions normally not in terms of a min-
imum physical act, but in terms which emb race its conseq uences ) . 
On the other hand, while with physical actions the minimum phys-
ical action is of the same kind as many of its immediate and 
natural consequences (in pari material with them), 'with say ing 
something, the immediate and natural consequences are not norm-
ally further acts of saying something, on the speaker's part o r 
others'. ( 1962: 111-3 ) 
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The problem with this is that it seems that the consequences 
imported with the nomenclature of perlocutions are really conse-
quences of locutions. As has b een said, to perfo rm an illocution-
ary act we must perform a locutiona q act, so there seems a 
connect ion between physical actions and saying something. However, 
Austin sa ys , while this may be important 'in some connexion s and 
context s', it does not stop us drawing a line between the com -
pletion of the illocutionary act and all consequences thereafter; 
and we must avoid the im p licatio n that the illocutio nary act is a 
consequence of the locutionary act, or that what is imported by 
the nomenclature o f illocutions is an additional referen c e to 
some of t he consequences of t he locutions. 
The uttering of noises may be a consequence (physical ) of 
the movement of the vocal organs, the breath, & c.: but the 
u t t e r in g of a word i s not a con seq u e n c e o f t he u t t e r i n g o f a 
noise whether physical or o therwise. Nor is the uttering of 
words with a certain meaning a consequence of uttering the 
words, whether physical or otherwise. For t hat matter, even 
the phat i c ••• and rhetic ... acts are not consequences, 
let a lone physical con sequen ces, o f p honetic acts .•.• 
(Austin, 1962: 115 ) 
Austin says that what we do import by the use of the nomen cla ture 
of illocut i o n is a reference, n o t to the consequen c es (at least 
in any ordinary sense) of the locution, but to the conventions of 
illocutionary force as bearing on the special circumstances o f 
the occasion of the issuing of the uttera nce. He also rejects the 
primacy of the locution given that we can know the locution 
without knowing the illocution, because the opposite can also be 
true. (See 1962: 113-5) 
The illocutionary act is, however, c onnec ted with the pro-
duction o f effects in certain senses. First, unless a certa in 
effect is achieved, the illocutionary act will not have been 
happily (successfully) performed. This is not to say that the 
illocutio nary act is the ach ieving of a c ertain effect, but 
rather that the performance of an illocutionary act involves the 
securing of uptake. Second, the illocutionary act 'takes effect' 
in certain ways, distinguished from producing consequences in the 
sense of bringing about states of affairs. Thus 'I name this ship 
the Queen Elizabeth' has the effect of naming or christening the 
ship. Third, many illocutionary acts inv ite by convention a 
response o r sequel. Thus an order invites the response of obed-
ience and a promise that of fulfillment. We must, however, dis-
tinguish ' I ordered him and he obeyed' from 'I got him to obey', 
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which is peLlocutionary. Austin says that the geneLal implicatio n 
o f the latter is that additional means weLe employed t o p Loduce 
t h is c onsequence. Thus, securing uptake, taking effect, and in-
v iting a Lesponse, aLe wa ys in which ~lloc utionary acts aLe b ound 
up with effects, 'and these aLe all distinct from the pLoducing 
of effects which is chaLac te r istic of t he perlocutionaLy act'. 
(1962: 116-8 ) 
Austin says that the perlocutionary act may be ei t heL t he 
achievement of a peLlocutiona Ly object (convince, peLsuade ) OL 
the pLoduction of a peLl ocutionaLy sequel. He says t hat it is 
chaLacteListic of perlocutionaLy acts that the Lesponse ach ie ved, 
or the sequel, can be achieved additionally OL entiLely by non-
locutionary means; but that this is not enough to distinguish 
illocutionary acts, since we can, for example, warn OL ordeL OL 
appoint etc. ( illocutionary acts ) by non-verbal means. ( 1962: 
1 18-9 ) 
What is peLhaps moLe significant is that we can achieve 
t hese perlocutiona Ly sequels by non-conventional means - means 
t hat are not c onventional at all or not f o r that puLpose. Au stin 
say s that stLi c tly speaking theLe cannot be an illocutionary act 
unless the means employed aLe conventional, whether the means aLe 
veLbal or non-verbal. However, he acknowledges that it is diff-
icult to say where conventions begin and end. I may peLsuade by 
swinging a big stick, but I may also warn by swinging a stic k , in 
which case swinging the stick is a warning, something meaningful. 
Similar difficulties arise over tacit consent, OL tacit promis-
ing, or voting by a show of hands. But the fact Lemains, he says, 
that many illocutionary acts cannot be peLfo rmed except by say ing 
something. (1962: 119-20) 
In Lecture X Austin considers the possibility of using 'in' 
and 'by' to distinguish illocutions and perlocutions (e.g. , 'In 
saying xI was y'ing', as against 'By saying xI was y 'ing'). He 
Lejects the possibility, as each form can often be used with 
LegaLd to the other act; however the significance of this lect ure 
is that it constitutes a ciLcle in the couLse of How To Do Things 
With Words, and in Lecture XI the performative-constative dis-
tinction is taken up again. Before moving on to that mateLial we 
need to pause and evaluate these later distinctions. 
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SECTION 2: SOME RESPONSES. 
In saying something, then, we perform a locutionary act, 
'which is roughly equivalent to uttering a certain sentence with 
a certain sense and reference, which is roughly equivalent to 
"meaning" in the traditional sense'~ we also perform illocution-
a ry acts, 'utterances which have a certain (conventional ) force'~ 
and we ~also perform perlocutionary acts, 'what we bring about 
or achieve by saying something' (1962: 109). 
Austin ha s relatively little to say about the l o cutionary 
act and its distinction fr o m the illocutionary act, and feels 
much more concern, as has been noted, over the illocutionary-
perlocutionary distinction; however, it is this initial distinct-
ion which has been most subject to criticism and modification, 
and it is to some of these criticisms that we can n ow turn. 
SECTION 2a. 
Cohen's ( 1964 ) criticism essentially invo lves rejecting 
Austin's separation of meaning and force. He argues that the 
performative clause o f an e xp licit utterance must be taken as 
meaningful, only distinguished by the fact that it does not 
describe anything, but rather makes expli c it how the utterance is 
intended to be taken: its meaning 'must be of a performative 
ki nd' (Cohen, 1964: 426). Thus, he cla ims, in an utterance such 
as 'I protest that I have not been allowed to speak ' the perform-
ative clause (with its performative meaning) and the subordinate 
clau se together give the meaning of the whole utterance, and this 
meaning does n ot have to be supplemented by any notion of force. 
Turning to inexplicit utterances, Cohen argues that if 'Your 
haystack is on fire' is rendered explicit by 'I warn you that 
your haystack is o n fire', a nd if the warning is part of the 
meaning of the later utterance, then 'it is hardly unreasonable 
to suppose that the warning is also part of the former utter-
ance's meaning, though inexplicitly so' ( 1964: 4i6). Further, 
with utterances such as 'Is it raining?', even without being made 
e xplicit by 'I ask whether is is raining', it seems impossible to 
separate illocutionary for c e from meaning. 'What on earth could 
be the meaning of your locutionary act other than to ask whether 
it is raining?' (1964: 427). 
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Cohen says that Au stin seems to hold that th e var ious de-
v i c es for clar if y ing what we are doing with ~n utteranc e clarify 
illocutionary f orce, and not meaning. However, he says that o n 
th is v iew t here can be no d ifferenc e _in meani n g between ' It mu st 
have rained, because the streets are wet' and 'It must h a ve 
rai ned, therefore the streets are wet', since the connect i ng 
particles can o nly vary the force, and not the meaning of the 
sentence. He say s t hat it is not that we use 'therefo re' wi t h t he 
force of 'I conclude that', as Austin thinks, but t ha t we u se ' I 
conclude that' with the meaning of 'therefore'. In sho rt, s a y s 
Cohen, 
what Austin calls the illocutionary f orce o f an utterance i s 
that aspect of its meaning which is either conveyed by its 
explicitly per-formative prefix, if it ha s one , o r might have 
been s o con ve yed by the use of an e xpressio n. (Cohe n , 1964 : 
4 29 ) 
Cohen does not restrict meaning to the bare u tterance. He 
sees it as being g iven also b y factors such as intona tion (this 
will include mak ing a given word-string a questio n or a state-
ment) and contextual considerations ( which, he say s, effect both 
wh at Au stin called the locution and the illocutionary f o rce ). He 
say s t h a t when a sen ten c e h a s a me an i n g w h i c h i s a t v a r i an c e w i t h 
that which we would normally associate with its form, in, for 
e xa mple, instituti onal o r technical usage, o r with c ases li ke ' I 
wish you good afternoon', this meaning is an a l t ernati ve, not an 
addition to some basic meanin g . This implies t hat a g i ven verbal 
form has many potential meanings, not a basic meaning with many 
potential forces. ( 1964: 430-1 ) 
A further po int made by Cohen is that a reason why Austin's 
theory may seem plausible arises fr o m the percep tion that the 
who le of the communication achieved by say ing 'I promise t o go ' 
can also be achieved, in the ri ght context, by ' I shall go '. It 
then seems, he say s, that if the first u tterance is to be called 
performative in v irtue of t he promise it makes, s o to must t he 
latter, and so all utterances are either explicitly or inex-
plicitly performative. However, if all no rmal utterances are 
performative, then, 'the descripti ve value o f the term ha s been 
eroded by a t yp ically p hilosophical inflation' (196 4: 438 ). This, 
he say s, leads to the need for a new term. 
If all utterances turn out to be performative, then instead 
of distinguishing some utterances from others it looks as 
though we have to distinguish one aspect of every utterance 
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from another .••• But all this phil osophical inflati on , and 
con sequen t ial coining o f new technical terms, can b e avoided 
if we keep ' performati ve' as a term applicable t o ve rbs, 
verb - u ses, pa rticles, adverb s, Rhrases o r meanings rathe r 
than to sentences or who le utterances. (Cohen, 19 64 : 439 ) 
Cohen comments that it may seem th a t the o nl y real diffar -
enc e b etween him and Austi n is that Au stin uses the word ' me an -
ing' in a narrower sense, 'so that force stood out as s omet hing 
co- ord inate with meaning, rather than as one s pe cial form or 
a spect of it' ( 1964: 440) . How e ver, he says that by doing th is 
Au stin has the paradox where e ven e xpl i c itly performati ve ut te r -
ances have distinct locuti0nary and i llocutiona ry aspects. Also, 
this tends to obs cure the continuity and similarity between 
certain k inds o f conte xt -dependence in linguistic u sage, on the 
o ne hand, and the fact that pe rformati veness is just a s muc h tied 
as is referenc e to particular parts of s peech, particu lar k inds 
of idiom a nd pa rticular feat ures of grammar, o n the other. More-
over, he says, Austin's approach wrongly suggests tha t the dis-
similarity between reference and sense is someho w l ess than that 
between force and sense. In fact, 'whereas the r eference o f many 
sentences, like "He met her there yes t erday " changes on a l most 
e very occasion o f its utterance, the range o f forces a sentence 
may have is much more stab l e'. 
In this r-e spect 'force' is much more li ke 'sense' than 
'reference' is, if we accept any of the familiar definitions 
o f 'sense' that mak e it a contributory element with in the 
whole meaning o f an utterance rather than just identical 
with tha t meaning. (Cohen, 1964: 440 ) 
The central element in Cohen's approach here is the idea 
that force can be dealt with within the bounds of mean ing as long 
as meaning is taken in an adequately wide sense. He seems to 
think that Au stin's mistake was to tr y to separate parts of 
meaning and treat t hem a s conceptually different, rat her than 
simply devel op a more sophistica ted account of meaning. I do not 
want to deny that what Cohen says is an adequate response t o a 
certain reading of Austin. Given that he takes for-ce f o r Austin 
to be 'something co-ordinate with meaning' , then a d ispute over 
whether we should adopt a narrow or wide a pproach t o meaning has 
va lidity as a dispute over how we should conceptualize d iffe r en t 
aspects o f say ing something. If , however, we hold Cohen's app-
roach up against the sort of reading which I suggested in the 
first chapter, we find that it misses the interesting po int of 
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what can be found in Austin's text. 
I n the s o rt of reading I have been emp hasi z ing, anal y sis 
de a ls with the total speech act in the total s peech situa t i o n. 
This is to emphasize that a speech act involves more t h an "'just" 
say ing something', and here t he analysis does n o t invol ve abstr-
ac ting different aspects of saying something, but diffe~ent as-
pects o f the total speech act. 
If we think bac k to Chapter One, Austin p i ck ed out p e~fo~m­
ati ves as utterances whic h were distinguished by n o t being true 
o ~ false and by involving the action of more than jus t sa y ing 
something. It turned out, at least on my ~eading, tha t they cou l d 
be subject to truth and falsity, and that constatives as well 
seemed to involve more than just saying something . In t he ligh t 
o f this, the way I want to take the se cond half of the argum en t 
is that the locutionary act is the act of 'just' saying something 
and the illocutionary act is the act of doing mo~e t han 'just' 
saying something - so we are not talking about diffe~ent aspects 
of saying something. Neither a~e we talking about locutionary and 
illocutionary aspects of the utterance-object; we are tal king 
about aspects of the utterance-act construed as the t o tal s peech 
act. 
Now what Cohen claims to show is that an adequate analysis 
of the locution, as long as it is wide enough and takes in all 
those features which constitute the meaning of what we say , wi l l 
include a representation of the way the utterance (object ) is to 
be taken. If we read Austin as I have been suggesting, howe ver, 
on the one hand, this is beside the point of the central issue, 
and on the other hand it involves an inadequate anal ysis of the 
total speech act. 
Certainly the locutionary act is crucial t o the speech act, 
in a s much as it is by it and all its featu~es t h at our act is 
~ecognized; but to say something which has the features of a 
warning that there is a bull in the paddock, for example, and to 
wa~n someone that there is a bull in the paddock, are different 
aspects of a speech act. To perform the second act we may perform 
the first act, issuing an utterance as confo rming to ce~tain 
linguistic conventions , even saying 'I warn you that there is a 
bull in the paddock '; but to perform the fi~st act is not thereby 
to perform the second, the second is not a conse quence of the 
first (Austin , 1962: 114-5); rather , the first is a means of 
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performing the second. To perform the second act, the illocution-
ary act, is to act in accordance with certai~ conventions (car-
tain illocutionary conventions), and these require, in part, that 
we perform a locutionary act, but the_ illocutionary act does not 
arise out of ( is not constituted by ) the locutionary act: it is 
c onstituted by issuing the locution in accordance with certain 
illocutionary conventions. In the same way, the locutionary act 
is constituted by uttering words in accordance with certain 
locutionary conventions (1962: 115 ). As was quoted earlier, 
What we do import by the use of the nomenclature of illoc-
utio n is a reference, not to the consequences (at least in 
any ordinary sense) of the locution, but to the conventions 
of illocutionary force as bearing on the special circum-
stances of the occasion of the issuing of the utterance. 
(Austin,l962: 115) 
Cohen says that 'Your haystack is on fire' may give a warn-
ing that may be rendered explicit by 'I warn you that your hay-
stack is on fire', and that the warning is part of the meaning of 
the latter sentence (Cohen, 1964: 426), but the warning is not in 
either of these sentences, either implicitly or explicitly. The 
warning is the act (the illocutionary act) performed by uttering 
one of these sentences according to the conventions of warning. 
I n the same way, the locution 'Is it raining?' is grammatically a 
question, but when we are concerned with its utterance as a 
question we are concerned with it being uttered as an illocution-
ary act, as conforming to those conventions concerning the exist-
ence of the act, the relation of speaker and audience presupposed 
by the act, and obligations and expectations arising from the 
act. 
These conventions come into play concurrently with the per-
formance of the locutionary act, but they and the conventions 
which constitute the locutionary act relate to conceptually diff-
erent aspects of the total speech act. Issuing the utterance 'Is 
it raining?' and asking whether or not it is raining may well be 
the same event, but, if we remain sensitive to the different 
aspects of communication as an interactive, social event, then we 
can abstract from that event the locutionary and the illocution-
ary acts as distinct. 
I would suggest that this enables us to understand why 
Cohen's formulations, 'The warning is ••• part of the .•• utter-
ance's meaning', and especially 'What on earth could be the 
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meaning of your:- locutionary act o ther:- than to ask whether it is 
rai ning? ' are so awkwa r:-d. He is trying to t r~at acts (wa rning and 
a s king whether it is r:-a ining) a s meaning , and s om e how constr:-ue 
these acts as being constituted through the utterance-object. 
In Cohen's paper:- we find a refusal to confront the illocut -
i onary act t heoretically. He writes standardly o f the illocution-
ar:-y force o f an utteran ce, trea t ing this as a n aspec t of the 
utter:-ance as obje ct, whic h is t o treat it already as an aspec t of 
the locution and of the act wh i ch is don e a s confo r ming t o l ocut-
ionar:-y conve ntions. Per:-haps it i s phil osophi cal inf lation to use 
' performative' to refer:- to a n aspect of every utter:-ance (ob j ect) , 
but this is not what Austin does. The sto ry in the discussion of 
perfo rm at i ves is that when we t ry t o distinguish per:-for:-m ati ves we 
do get what might be called ' i nflat i on', bu t we do not discovec 
that all utterances as objects ha ve performative and 'o ther' 
a spects: we find that a n aspect of all utterances as acts is 
performative, or t hat from the t otal s pee ch act in the total 
speech situation we c an abstrac t an illocutionary as well as a 
l ocut iona r:-y act. 2 
SECTION 2b. 
Anot her type of r:-esponse is that made initially by Str:-awson 
(1964) . He accepts a distinction be tween locutionar:-y a nd illocut-
ionary acts, and he allows that a notion o f illocutionary f o r:-ces 
as pr:-oposed by Austin has som e worth, in a s much as he thinks 
that some illocutionary acts ar:-e c onstituted as such by convent -
ions beyond the lingu istic convention s which constit ut e locution-
ary meaning. 
Strawson thinks , however:-, tha t it i s a mist ak e t o tr:-eat a ll 
illocutiona r:-y acts a s convention al . He says that cases like a 
ver:-di c t i n a cour:-t o f law , g i v ing some o ne out in c ricket o r 
introducing s ome one a r:-e acts perfo r:-med as confo r:-m ing t o a con-
vention. But he says that 'The ice over there is ve ry thin' c ould 
be uttered as a warning 'wi thout its bein g the ca se that there is 
any statab le conve n tion at a ll (o ther than those whic h be ar on 
the na tu r e o f the l ocutionary act), such that the speaker's ac t 
can be said to be an act done as conforming to that conventio n' 
( 1 9 6 4 : 3 8 4 ) • H e a 1 s o g i v e s t .he e x a m p 1 e o f a n en t r e a t y ' Do n ' t g o ' , 
which c an be done 'c onve ntionally ' on bended knee, etc ., but does 
not have to be co nvention a l. ' What makes X' s words to Y an en-
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treaty not to go is something ... relating to X's situation, 
attitude t o Y, manner, and current intention •.•. ' 
But t o suppose that there is always and necessaril y a 
convention c onformed to would b a like supposing that there 
cou ld be no love affairs which did n o t proceed on lines laid 
down in the Rom~ de laRose or that every dispute b etween 
men must follow the pattern specified in Touchstone's speech 
about the countercheck quarrelsome and the lie direct. 
(S trawson, 1964: 385) 
So f o r S trawson the force o f an utteranc e can be constituted 
by con ventions, but also and instead by factors such as situat i o n 
or context and the intentions of the speaker. He thus repeats 
s o mething like a distinction we s aw made earlier within perfo rm-
at i ves, between 'ritual' and 'non-ritual' acts. Unlike the posit-
ion Cohen would presumably adopt, he does allow that genuine 
performatives exist, that is, that speech acts can invo lve more 
than just saying something, but like the four commentators dis-
c ussed in Chapter One he restricts them to a relatively narrow 
group of utterances. Just as Urmson thinks that an order, say , 
need be constituted by no conventions outside linguistic convent-
ions, so Strawson thin k s that a warning or an entreaty need not 
be conventional in any e xtra-linguistic sense. 
The next stage of Strawson's response is to take up Austin's 
po int that an illocutionary act should secure uptake, and his 
comment that the illocutionary a ct is conventional in the sense 
that it could at least be made e xplic it by the performative 
formula. He says that this can be construed as saying that the 
speaker can make the intended for c e o f the utterance clear t o the 
audience by rendering it in an ex p licitly performative form, 
which is to make use of linguistic conventions. So he is saying 
that the illocutionary act is conventional in as much as it can 
b e rendered conventionally (1964: 386). But what this also means 
is that illocutionary force is c onstrued as essentiall y intent-
ional, because what are made explicit are the speaker's commun-
icative intentions. 
This is done by taking the aim of a c hieving uptake as a 
standard element in the performance of an illocutionary act, and 
then tying this t o (a modification of) Grice's explication of 
meaning in terms of speaker's intentions. I will be discussing 
Grice's work in detail in the next chapter, and so for now I will 
merely summarize Strawson's version of this e xplication: This 
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asse~t s that in communicatio n a speake~ mu st have t he intentions 
o f, 
i ) p~ oducing by an utte~an ce a ce~tain ~esponse in an aud ience, 
ii ) getting t he audience to ~ecognize the fi~st intention ( i ) , 
iii )hav ing the aud ience's r e ason fo~ respo nding t o b e at l east 
partly ba sed on the ~ecognition in (ii) , and 
iv ) getting the audien c e to ~ec ogni z e t he i n ten t i o n ( ii ) to ge t 
the audience t o ~ecognize the f irst intention ( i ) . 
The perfo~mative formula is then t aken as a conve ntio nal me an s o f 
mak ing ones c ommun icative intentions overt. (See St~awson , 1964 : 
39 0 - 2 ) 
St ~awson now says that there is a scale of illocutiona~y 
act s. At one end o f the scale a~e cases where the i l locutionary 
act is not a n act do ne as co n fo~m in g to a co n vention , b ut whic h 
' may be li ngui stically conventionali z e d ~ight up to the poin t at 
which illocutiona~y fo~ce is e xh austed by meaning ( in Au s tin's 
sense)' (1964 : 386) . At the othe~ e nd of t h e scale a~e ca ses li ke 
ma~rying, giving a ve~dict and giving out in cr i c ket, which a~e 
done a s confo rming t o a convention, and wh ich ' could have no 
e x istence out side t he ~ule- or convention-governed p~actices and 
p r ocedures of wh ich they essentially f o rm parts' ( 1964 , p.39 7) . 
Als o , there may be no intended response (belief &c. ) b eyond 
securing uptake ( 1964: 393-4). 
He sa y s t h a t t he way t he c a se s a t each end o f t h e s c a 1 e a ~ e 
similar is that the utte~ance in a convention-governed p ractice 
is overtly intended to be ope~ative in the practice. He ac k n ow -
ledges that we may pe~fo~m acts uninten t i onally , when the fo~m of 
words takes c harge in the absence of appropriate in t ention, b u t 
when it does, he says, 'the case is essentially de viant o r non-
standa~d' ( 1964: 397). The diffe~ence between the two e xtremes is 
that with an act that is not essentiall y conventional the aud-
ienc e ~esponse may not b e forthcoming, yet t he act is perfo ~med 
a s l o ng a s up take is secu~ed. With c onventio n-gove rned acts , 
howe ver, if the ~esponse ( o r the furt he~ing of the p r ocedu re in 
some way) is not achieved then there has been a breach i n the 
conventions which govern the act (1964: 398). 
With convention-g overned illocutionary acts, then, there are 
extra factors wh ich come into play, but Strawson concludes that 
'the illocutiona~y fo ~c e o f an utteranc e is essentially something 
that is intended to be unde~stood'. 
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And the understanding of the force of an utterance in all 
cases involves recognizing what may be c alled b road ly an 
audience-directed intention and recognizing it as wholly 
overt, as intended to be recogn~zed. (S trawson, 1964: 399 ) 
The first issue which needs to be considered here is the 
question of extra-linguistic conventions. Stra wson, as we have 
seen, argues that wh ile highly ritualized illocutionary acts 
involve e x tra-linguistic conventions, many illocutionary acts do 
not, and are recogni z able by linguistic conventions, plus the 
s peakers situation, attitude to the audience, manner and current 
intention. I will return t o the question of intention, however, 
we can perhaps see what is missing from Strawson's account by 
remembering part o f the discussion of performatives. 
Strawson builds an account of how warnings, entreaties and 
so on can operate, but fails to consider how they can go wrong, 
the infelicities to which they are subject. Thus, an entreaty for 
Strawson can be ritualized (on bended knee, etc, 'according to 
the book' - conventionalized), o r simply in accordance with lin-
guistic conventions. However, the infelicities c an effect both 
sorts of act. 
Mainly here, a 'simple' entreaty (as well as a 'ritual' o ne ) 
may not invoke a suitable relation between speaker and audience 
whereby it is operative. In fact, I have especially latched onto 
Strawson's example here because it is not at all clear that an 
~ntreaty would be operative today (being likely, I suspect, to 
simply give rise to embarrassment). But whatever the c ase, the 
example points to the fact that, beyond the entreaty being pro-
duced as correct according to linguistic (locutionary) convent-
ions, it must be, on the one hand, something that people do, and 
on the other hand, something that can be done between the people 
involved. And its being 'something that people do' means in this 
case that there is an accepted conventional p rocedure. 
Now as a ma'tter of fact we do, at least in the linguistic 
community within which this discussi o n is taking place, warn, 
state, predict, and so on - there are illocutionary acts for 
doing these things. But we might not. Predi c tion, for example, 
might be 'say-able', but not 'do-able'. It could be that our 
cognative relation to future events simpl y precluded prediction -
perhaps because they were considered so arbitrary - and this 
might also mean that warnings did not make 'sense'. Or it might 
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b e that we can warn, or- inform, or let people know our ex p e ct-
at i o ns, but that we can only do this as a consequence o f other 
illocutionar-y acts . They might , t hat is t o say , b e per-locutionary 
a c ts, as insulting is, but has n ot al~ys been in all linguistic 
commun ities. The point is that the fact that these illocutionary 
acts are oper-ative is not a necessary consequence of t he locut-
ionary acts which accompany · them being poss i ble. 
At t h is point Austin would no doubt work thr-ou gh the r-est o f 
the possible infelicities (as we s hall see he does ) , bu t this is 
not necessa ry here, and as I have raised pr-oble ms regar-ding these 
fur-ther conditions gover-ning illocutionary acts I wi l l leave t hem 
aside. The main point is that a pr-ocedure by which t he per- fo r-
m an c e 0 f a c e r t a in act 0 f saying s 0 me thing i s under s t 0 0 d as I 0 L 
r-ecognizable as, a communicative act, an act of mor-e than ju st 
saying somet hing, is n ot a necessary consequence of a g i ven 
locution being possible. 3 
It is because these acts are not necessar-y, s pecifically, 
n o t necessary con sequences of locutionary acts, that we can say 
that they are constituted by conventions, or recognizable pro-
c edures, b e yo nd those which constitute locutionary acts.4 To 
pu t this in terms of one of Str-awson's analogies, it may well b e 
the case that we no longer have affair-s according to the rules 
laid down in the Roman de la Rose, but we do have ' affa irs', and 
this is not a necessary consequence of sexual ity, bu t an arbit-
rary fact about the nature of some sexual relations ( those which 
are r-ecognizable a s being 'affairs' ) . 
The second question which needs to be addressed is that of 
intentionality. For Strawson, warning, stating and so on exist as 
acts outside conventional practices. They do not have to conform 
to conventions and they are not constituted by conventions. They 
are recognized through linguistic conventions and context ual 
factors , but their actual existence as acts is dete rmined and 
constituted by the speaker's intentions. Thus, t o warn is essent-
ially and constitutively to intend to warn, and warning (as well 
as stating and questioning and promising) has meaning as an act 
pr-ior to any interactive relations. This is an initially inter-
esting suggestio n, because it can be argued that the fact that 
something is arbitrar-y does not make it conventional ( see Da v id-
son, 1984: 3ff. ), and intentio ns offer an alternative constitut-
i ve factor. 
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The p~oblem here, however, is that an act conceived in such 
te~ms seems unable t o p la y an y ~ole in the thin g s peopl e do with 
language . We are t o ld that an act o f this so~t is recogni z ed 
through its being linguisticall y con~entionalized, so that ou~ 
comm unicative intentions a~e made overt through lang uage. How-
ever, the language we use, we are told, is understood v i a an 
understanding of our communicative intentio ns - an utte~ance is 
understood a s a warning because we ~ecogni ze it as being uttered 
with the intention of wa~ning. 
But this means that we are left with a vic ious ci~ c le i n 
which the~e could be no communication. Fo~ in order to ~ecogni ze 
that a gi v en utterance is a warning we must ~eason fr o m the 
appropriate Gricean intentions to t h is effect. But in orde~ to 
~ecognize these intentions - as intentions t o warn- it seems 
(unless we a~e to posit some mystical, pre-linguistic meeting o f 
minds) that we must reason from the utterance. But again, t he 
performative formula cannot be a way o f making ou~ com municati ve 
intentions overt, as Strawson claims, since the illocutiona~y act 
wh ich a locution (explicit or not) is actually performing must b e 
gauged from the speake r 's illocutionary intentions. Thus, we seem 
left with a circle, to which there is no access, and with which 
communication can never get going. 
In contrast, what Austin's anal y sis appears to offe~ is a 
way of a voiding such a ci~cle by insisting that a s p eech act 
operates both as an act c onstituted by publicly recognized ling-
uistic (i.e., locutionary) conventions and as an interactive 
procedure constituted by illocutionary conventions. Thus, we ~ec­
ogni z e a warning as a warning because it accords with the sort of 
practice we understand wa~ning to be, not because we somehow 
first intuit an intention to warn. And we may recogni z e a warning 
without understanding the locution by which it is done, and we 
may understand a locution without ~ecognizing what illocutionary 
act it is- without k n o win g how t o take it. 
These issues will be dealt with in more detail in the foll-
owing two chapters, however, it may be worthwhile noting Graham's 
~esponse to this pa~t of Austin's wor k in the light of Cohen's 
and Strawson's approach.S 
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SECTION 2c. 
Graham ( 1977: Ch .4 ) rejects Cohe n's 'wide' theory of mean-
ing. He says that there is t heoretical simplicity in aiming to 
give j ust one sense to a given ve rbal form rather t h an post ulat -
ing a cha n ge in t h e meaning of a gi v en f o rm whene ver there is a 
change in any of a large number of fa ctor s govern ing i ts total 
import ( 1977: 98). He also cla ims that a narrow theory has great -
er e xp lanato ry power, since it can postulate o ne sense t o a 
sentence like 'He knows what time that train l eaves', and t he n 
show how it is applied in many different situations. 
In contrast, if the meaning o f sentences like these is 
constantly changing according to c i rcum stances, then it 
b ecomes more of a mystery how we can u se them and b e 
understood at all. We do not, after all, h ave to learn a new 
meaning each time such a sentence is uttered, as a wide 
theory seems to imp l y . (Graham, 19 77: 99 ) 
Graham acknowledges t ha t we cann o t always postulat e one 
sense for each verbal f o rm, but say s t hat we s hould only post ul -
at e more than one as a last r esort. He also say s that knowing the 
sense of an utterance is often not enough t o fully understand it. 
He says here that rather than taking f urt her factors as determin-
ates of the meaning of an utterance, we should take Strawson's 
po int that there is more than one level of meaning ( see Section 1 
of S trawson, 1973 ). This invo l ves, for Graham, not following 
Austin in taking reference as part of the meanin g of an utter-
ance, because this gives up the attempt to expla in the move from 
language to the world. 'It is the meaning o f an utterance (to-
gether with the identity of the s peaker, the si tuation in which 
it is issued, etc.) which leads us to its reference, not v ice 
versa' ( 1977: 1 0 1). 
We will see, in fa ct , that this is a n issue which Au stin 
recognizes. The point needs t o be emphasi zed again that Au s tin , 
a s I am taking him, sets o ut the locution in a summary manner so 
a s to take care of 'sayin g something', making, c e rta inly , strat-. 
egically directed assumptions, but not c laiming to give a com-
pletely adequate account o f the locution. In any case, Graham 
say s that what we can learn from this is that we need to di stin-
guish firmly between sentence-meaning and statement-meaning , and 
that sentence-meaning is a level of meaning, complete in itsel f , 
wh ich ought not to be ignored. 
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The aim of a narro w t heory , then, is to isolate t he core 
meaning o f an uttera nce, and then trace t he mo ves fr o m t h is 
to further levels of meaning. (Graham, 19 77: 101 ) 
Graham also rejects Cohen's arg ument that the sense o f 
e xp li c it performatives determines what illocutionary ac t is bei ng 
performed. He says that if he says 'I promise ••• ' i n infelicit -
ous c ircumsta nces, then, though his utterance has the same mean-
ing, it is not true that he has perfo rmed the illo c utionary ac t 
o f p r omising ( 1977: 102 ). He does not c omment o n Cohen's response 
t o t h i s so r t o f objec t i o n ( see Co hen , 19 6 4 : 4 3 3- 5 ) • 
He does, however , take from Cohen 's argument t he idea that 
when Austin gives reports o f locutions in forms such as 'He t old 
me to get out' and 'He asked whether it was in Oxfo rd o r Ca m-
bridge' (Austin, 1962: 95), these utterances, o r some feat ures o f 
them, seem to determine the illocutio nary act, since Austin sa y s 
that 'tell' and 'ask' are both names of illocutionary acts (Au s-
tin, 1962: 162 ). The idea, then, is that grammatical structure 
determines at least the broader and less specific illocutionary 
acts.6 The problem Graham finds with this, however, is that 
while we can postulate a conventional grammatical f o r m f o r as king 
and telling, on the one hand it is not so easy for warning, 
making an a p peal, and so on, and on the o ther hand an u tterance 
meant as an order, say, might be given in the form o f a request. 
(Graham, 1977: 102-3, & cf. Strawson, 1973: SSf. ) 
While this case leads Graham t o mentio n S t rawso n's idea that 
speaker's intention determines force, he says t hat t h is account 
cannot be generalized either, since we may perform illocutionary 
acts unintentionally (and he rejects Strawson 's claim that unin -
tended performance is essentially deviant). (Gra h am, 1977: 104) 
Graham also , however, denies that Austin's acc ount of illoc-
utionary force as being gi ven by context and conventio n can b e 
generalized. He says that a scrutiny of the con ventional bac k-
ground will be material in determining whether a particular 
utterance of the words ' You will go to prison for three years' 
constitutes the pronouncing of a sentence, but that this cannot 
decide whet her 'These measures will lead to unemployment' is a 
statement o r instead a warning or a protest. 
No accretion of facts about the conventional relations and 
background obtaining when I make the utterance will tell us 
which, if either, of these other acts I am performing. I can 
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warn whatever my conventional role and my conventional 
relations with my audience (unles s we are tal k ing of ••• a 
formal warning or p r otest ••• ) . (Graham, 1977: 105 ) 
Graham responds to this situation by saying that we need not 
settle on any one candidate, grammatical form, intention or 
convention, as a determinant of illocution, because 'the concep t 
of illocution is so broad that it cannot be dealt with in the 
way s we have been considering' (1977 : 107). He say s that the 
illocutionary acts which Au stin mentio ns are so diverse t hat we 
have no reason to suppose that they have anything in common 
beyond the initial minimal characterisation that they are a l l 
acts which we can perform in saying somet hing; 'what general 
conditions must obtain for me to perform such an act will de pend 
on which act is in question' (1 977: 107). 
Once we have recognized that 'illocution' is an umbrella 
term covering many different speech acts, it may b e more 
p rofitable to attempt a sub-categorisatio n and develop 
analyses in relation t o sub-categories of speech act. It is a 
cu rious fact that Austin and his commentators tend both to 
give verbal recognition t o the diversity of illocution and 
still to seek for a general account of it. (Graham, 1977: 
108) 
What we see here is consistent with Graham's approach to the 
discussion of performatives, and shares the crucial feature of 
Strawson's and Cohen's approach. Again it invol ves a refusal to 
confront a notion of communication as centrally located and 
constructed within social relations. Instead it involves an att-
empt to represent communication as somehow originating as pure 
meaning in the communicative subject, and as being made up of 
acts which are constituted outside interaction. Whether we say, 
with Strawson and Graham, that illocutionary acts are distinct 
from locutionary acts, o r that they are just a part of meaning, 
is not really important, for in both cases they are elided back 
into the meaning of the subject. And in both cases the step from 
this subjective meaning to communication is made magical, for as 
so conceived this meaning has no structural conditions or relat-
ions by which it can exist as a practice. It just exists, as pure 
meaning. 
The decision as to whether we should adopt speaker's intent-
ion or grammatical form as determinate of illocution is also 
irrelevant. Behind both positions lies the assumption that the 
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act is constituted outside the comm unicati ve relations in wh i ch 
it is applied, and for both i t s role is o f a pure message trans-
mitted by language. Graham says tha t he can warn whatever his 
conventional r o le and his convention~l relations with h is audi-
ence, but to warn just is to situat e onesel f in a ca~tain con-
ve ntional role a nd relation with an audience. He can o n ly warn 
because it ' makes sense' t o warn, a nd that sense is g i ve n by a 
certain complex relation o f speaker and aud ience within recogniz-
able practices - that ' warning' makes sense does no t guarantee 
tha t it makes sense to warn. Without those conventional relat i o ns 
Graha m's intentio ns (given that it makes sense t o talk of i ntent-
ions in this way) drop out a s irrelevant. They are intentions to 
perform no identifiable act . Thus the po int of developing a 
' general account' of illocut ionary acts is that we wa nt t o de-
velop a n understanding of them as acts . Merely try ing to describe 
d ifferent types in different terms leaves aside the general 
problem of what it is we do when we interact communicativel y. 
It i s true that Strawson and Graham do allow for convent-
ional i llocut iona ry acts . But this is n ot to change their basic 
a ssumpt i o n, since these are acts which are governed by convent-
ions, n o t consti tuted by them. The sub jec t still consti tutes t he 
act , and merely must somehow pe rform i t within conventional 
constra ints. 7 
Graham at one po int says that the picture of linguistic 
communication which Austin's theory rightly condemns is that of 
'a speaker and audience respectively tra nsmitting and rec eiv ing a 
"pure" message which is unaffected by and does not affect their 
actual situation, s oc i a l relatio ns, etc .'. He says however, that 
it is important to be able to isolate such a ' pu re' message a s 
o ne compo nent in linguistic communicatio n, in the fo rm o f ' a 
relatively stable and re-app licable statement-conten t a s the core 
of an ac tual linguistic utterance' ( 1977 : 108) . The point is that 
this ' one component' restructures the who le theory of communicat-
ion whic h is developed, for t he very possib ility of such a p ure 
message depends upon the a ssumptio n o f a subject which exists 
self-sufficiently and prior t o interactio n. The statement-content 
becomes the core from which communication is derived. The full 
implications of such a view will be seen in Chap ter Four . 
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SECTION 3: AUSTIN1 S RE-EXAMINATION OF THE ORIGINAL DISTINCTION. 
Chapte~ XI o f How To Do Things With Words consti t u t es t he 
comple t i o n of the c i ~cle o f Au stin's- argument. Here he ~ econ­
side~s the pe~fo ~mati ve-constat i ve d istinc tion, a nd th is en abl e s 
u s t o t ie in s o me o f t he po ints made in t he p~ev i ou s se c tio n. I t 
is i nte ~esting that t h is pa~t o f the boo k is ~a ~el y emphasize d i n 
d e ta i l by commentato ~s, a nd t h is is a p ity , g i ven t h e l i gh t wh ic h 
it t hrows o n bo t h t he d iscuss ion o f i l locut iona ~y a c t s a nd the 
a nal y s is of pe~fo rmati ves. 
I n the o ~i ginally attem p ted dist i nc tio n a pe ~f o ~ma t i ve i s 
ta ken as doing something a s opposed t o j ust s ayi ng s omet hing , and 
is happy or unhappy as opposed to t~ue o~ f a lse. Th e firs t poi n t 
which Au st i n sees a s a ~isin g o ut of the p~ecedi ng d iscussio n is 
that , 
wheneve~ I 'say ' s o me t hing (exc e p t perhap s a me~e exclamat -
i o n like ' damn' or ' ou c h ' ) I sha l l be pe~fo~m in g bo t h locut-
i o nary and illocutiona~y acts, and t hese t wo k ind s o f ac ts 
seem t o b e t he ve~y t h in g s wh i c h we t ~ ie d t o u se, unde~ t he 
names of ' do ing ' and 'say ing', as a means o f d istingui s h ing 
pe~form ati ves fr o m constati ves . ( Austin, 1962 : 134 ) 
Looking at the distinctio n fr om the side o f c onstat i ves -
spec ifically s t atements - Austin a~gues that t o sta t e is every b i t 
a s much t o pe ~ f o ~m an i l l ocut i o nary act a s, sa y , t o w a ~n o~ t o 
p r o n o un c e, and that 'I state that he d id n o t d o it' is e x actl y 
o n a level wi t h 'I a~g ue t h at ••• ', 'I s ugges t t h at. •• ', 'I b et 
t ha t .•• ', & c . Austin also sa y s that although the u tte~anc e ' He 
d id n o t d o i t ' is o ften issued as a statement, a nd is then 
undoubtedl y true or false, 
it d oes n o t seem possib le t o say that it d i f fe~s fr o m ' I 
state tha t he did n o t d o it' in t h is ~espect. If some one 
say s 'I state that he did not do it', we investiga t e t he 
tru th o f h is sta t emen t in j ust t he sa me wa y as i f h e h a d 
said 'He d id not do i t ' simpliciter, •••• T hat is, t o s ay ' I 
state th a t he did n o t' is to ma k e the ver y s am e state men t a s 
to say 'He did not': it is not t o make a d iffe ~ent statement 
about what 'I' st a te •••• ( Austin, 19 6 2: 1 3 5 ) 
Th is leads Austin t o suggest that there is no ne c essary con fl i ct 
between our issuing the utterance being the d o i ng o f s ome thi n g 
a nd our u tterance being true o ~ false, a nd he say s tha t fo~ that 
matter 'I wa rn you that the bull is going t o c h a rge' is bot h a 
warning and t rue o r false. 
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Returning t o some of the argu ments seen in the prev i o us 
chapt:r (and r eaffirming poin ts made in the previous section ) , 
Au stin says that if we consider the -issue of happiness and un -
happiness we f ind that statements, for example , are liable to 
e very k i nd of infelicity t o which performatives a r e liable. The y 
ca n b e insincere, the speaker can b reach commitments arising from 
t he utterance, and they can be null and void. And j ust a s we may 
say that so meone does n o t have the right or is n ot in an approp -
r iate pos ition t o o rder someone else, so there are things you 
ca nn o t state, o r d o n o t have the r i gh t to state. I c annot without 
know ing state h ow many people are in the next room, and if I do I 
will be regarded as guessing . Austin notes that this is something 
about which I may in other circumstances be able t o stat ei 
but what about statements about other persons ' feelings or 
a bout the future? Is a forecast o r even a prediction about, 
say, persons' b ehavior really a statement? It is important 
to take the speech-situatio n as a who le. 
Just a s sometimes we c ann o t appoint bu t only confirm an 
appo intment a lready made, s o sometimes we cannot state but 
only confirm a statement already made.(Austin , 1962 : 1 38) 8 
As has al so been arg ued before, putative statements are also 
liab le to infelici ties ar ising from flaws and hitches, if we say 
what we do not really me a n, or use the wrong word , and Au stin 
comments that we will get confused about such utterances if we 
d iscuss them entirely in terms of meaning as e q ui va lent t o sense 
a nd reference. 
On c e we realize that what we have to study is not the 
sentence but the i ssuing of an utterance in a speech situat -
i o n, there c an hardly be any longer a possibility of n ot 
seeing that stating is performing a n act. Moreover, ••• it 
i s a n act t o which , just a s much as t o other illocutionary 
act s, it is essenti a l to ' secure uptake': the doubt about 
whether I stated something if it was not heard o r understood 
is j ust t he same as the doubt about whether I warned sotto 
~ or p r o tested if someone did not take it as a p r o test, 
&c . And stat ements do ' take effect ' ju st as much as 'nam-
ings', say : if I have s tated something , then that commits me 
to ot her statements: other s tatements made by me will be in 
orde t" o r ou t o f order. (Austin, 1962: 1 39) 
While there is a perlocutionary object specifically a ssoc-
i a ted with acts such as informing or ar g uing , there is not with 
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stating, a nd Austin say s that t h is comparative purity ~ ~y be o ne 
reaso n why we give 'statements' a certain s~cial position; but 
he says t hat this wou ld not j ustif y giving descriptions, for 
example, if properly u sed, a si milar_ priority, and that it is in 
any ca se true of ma ny i llocu tionary acts. He does not says which. 
(1962 : 1 39 -4 0) 
He sa y s, however, that if we look at the problem from the 
side o f performat i ves, we may still feel t hat they lack something 
which statemen t s have, even if it is true that the converse is 
not s o . It seems that performatives are n ot essentiall y true or 
false as statements are, and there is here a dimensi o n in which 
we jud ge, a ssess, or appraise the constative utterance (given 
t hat it is felicitous) wh ich does not arise with non-constati ve 
o r per-formative utterances. Austin's response is that o n the o ne 
hand it seems that just such a similar objective assessment o f 
the accomplished utterance arises, a t least in many ca ses, with 
o ther u ttera nces which seem typically per-formative, and that on 
the other hand the account of statements assumed here is over-
simplified. First, he say s, with verdictives, for example, there 
is a slide towards truth o r falsity, in as mu ch as we can esti-
mate rightly or wrongly , find correctly or incorrectly or pr o-
nounce correctly or incorrectly , and 'right', 'wrong', 'correct' 
and 'incorrect' are also used with statements, eve n though 'true' 
and 'false' are not used with verdicti ves. There is also, he 
suggests, a pa rallel between inferring and arguing soundly or 
va lidly and stating truly , and warning and adv ising ma y be done 
correctly or incorr ectl y or well or badly. (1962: 140-41) 
Austin say s that it is not clear that stating trul y is a 
different c lass of assessment from arguing soundly, advising 
well, judging fairly, and blaming justifiably, because these seem 
to have something to do in complicated ways with facts, as do 
e xercitives such a s naming, appointing, bequeathing and betting. 
'Facts come in as well as our knowledge or opinion about facts.' 
(1962 : 142) 
The objection that neither the soundness of arguments (w hich 
are not 'valid' deductive arguments) nor the meritedness of blame 
are objective matters, and that we should distinguish the 'state-
ment' that the bull is about to charge from the warning itself, 
is countered by asking whether the question of t ru th o r falsity 
is so very objective. Austin notes that we speak of a 'fair' 
statement, and asks whether the good reasons and good evidence 
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for stating and saying are so vecy different from the good reas-
o ns and evidence for per-formative acts like arguing, warning, and 
judgin g . He says that when a constative is confronted wit h t he 
facts we in fact appraise it in ways- involving the employ ment o r 
a vast array of terms which overlap with th o se that we use in the 
appraisal of performatives. 'In real life, as opposed t o the 
simple situations envisaged in logical theory, o ne c a nnot alway s 
answer in a simple manner whether it is true or false.' ( 1962: 
143 ) 
Austin says that rather than say whether the statement 
'France is hexagonal' is true or false we would be inclined to 
say that it is simply a rough description. He says that in the 
case of stating truly or falsely, just as much as in the case o f 
advising well or badly, the intents and purposes of the utterance 
and its context are important, and that 'what is judged true in a 
school book may not be so judged in a work of historical re-
search'. He also comments that in statements such as 'All swans 
are white' reference is limited to the known. He says that we 
cannot quite make the simple statement that the truth of state-
ments d8 pends on facts as distinct from knowledge of the facts, 
a nd that reference depends o n knowledge at the time of utterance 
( 1962: 143-4 ) . 
The truth or falsity of statements is affected by what they 
leave out o r put in and by their being misleading, and so on. 
Austin says that it is essential to realize that 'true' and 
'false', like 'free' and 'unfree', d o not stand for anything 
simple at all, but only for a general dimension of being a right 
or proper thing to say as opposed to a wrong thing, in these 
circumstances, to this audience, for these purposes and with 
these intentions. ( 1962: 144-5) 
In general we may say this: with both statements (and, 
for example, descriptions) and warnings, & c., the question 
can arise, granting that you had the right to warn and did 
warn, did state, or did advise, whether you were right to 
state or warn or advise- not in the sense of whether it was 
opportune or expedient, but whether, on the facts and your 
knowledge of the facts and the purposes for which you were 
speaking, and so on, this was the proper thing to say. 
This doctrine is quite different from much that the 
pragmatists have said, to the effect that the true is what 
works, & c. The truth or falsity of a statement depends not 
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merely on the meanings of words but o n what act you were 
performin g in what circumstances.(1962: 145) 
Au stin say s that we end up with- two conclusions regarding 
the performative-constati ve distinction . Firstly , with constat-
ives we abstract from the illocutionary (and perlocutionary) 
aspects of the speech act, and we concentca t e on the locutionary , 
and that we u se a simplified notion of correspondence with t he 
facts, one wh i ch ignores that correspondence brings in the ill o c -
utionary aspect. He say s that this is the ideal of what would b e 
righ t to say in all ci c c um stances, for any purpose, to any audi -
ence, & c., and that 'perhaps it is sometimes realized' . Second-
ly, with pecforrnatives we attend as much as possibl.a t o the 
illocutionary force of the utterance, and abstract from the 
dimension of corresponden c e with facts. He say s that there may be 
cases, such as the extreme examples given in the early lectures 
( ' I apologize ' and 'The ca t is on the mat', said for no reaso n ) 
where the distinction holds, however he says that the ceal con-
clusion must be that we need to distinguish between l oc utionary 
and illocutionary acts, and to establish with respect to each 
ki nd of illocutionary act what, if any, is the specific way in 
which they are intended, first to be in order or not in order, 
and second, to be 'c ight' o r ' wrong '; what terms o r appraisal and 
disappraisal are used for each and what they mean. This, he say s, 
will not distinguish statements from other il locutionary 
acts . ( 1962: 145-7) 
Finally, Austin says that in general the locutionary act as 
much as the i llocut ionary is an abstraction only, because every 
genuine speech act is both; but he says, t yp i cal l y we distinguish 
different abstracted 'acts' by means of 'the possible slips 
between cup and lip', in this case the different types of non-
sense which may be engendered in performing them. He notes that 
we should compare this point with what was said in the opening 
lecture about the classification of ki nds of nonsense. (1962 : 147 ) 
At the b eginning of the final lecture Austin says that he 
has found that for all utterances (except, perhaps, for swearing ) 
that there is (1) a happiness/unhappiness dimension, ( la) an 
illocutionary force, (2) a truth/ falsehood dimension (2a) a loc-
utionary meaning (sense and reference). He says that the perform-
ativejconstative distinction stands to the doctrine of locut -
ionary and illocutionary acts in the total speech act as the 
special theory to the general theory, and that the need for the 
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general theory arises because the traditional 'statement' is an 
abstraction, and an ideal, and so is its traaitional truth or 
falsity. He then suggests five morals leading from this . 
First, that the t o tal speech act in ~he t o tal s peech si tuat i on is 
the only actual phenomenon which, in the last resort , we are 
engaged in elucidating. 
Second , that stating, describing, & c. have no unique position 
among illocutionary acts. 
Third, that these acts have no unique position in particular 
regarding truth and falsity , because these terms (e xcept for 
artificial abstraction leg itimate for certain purposes ) are not 
names for relations, quantities, & c ., but for a dimension of 
assessme nt. 
Fourth, that at the same time, the familiar dichotomy, 'normati ve 
o r e valuative' as opposed to the factual, needs to b e dropped . 
Fifth, that the theory of 'meaning' as equivalent to 'sense and 
referen ce' will require 'weeding - out and reformulation' in terms 
of the locutionary-illocu tionary distinction (if these notions 
are sound). Austin says that he has taken the old 'sense and ref-
erence ' on the strength of current views, but, he says, we s hould 
consider again the statement which he has called ' void ' for 
breakdown of reference - f o r example, the statement ' John 's 
children are all bald' if made when John has no children. (l962 : 
148-9 )9 
Austin says that in the light of the general theory we need 
a list, not of explicit performative verbs, but of i llocut ionary 
forces of an utterance. He says that the sorts of tests suggested 
for the explicit performative verbs ( 't o say ... is to ••• ', & 
c. ) will still do, and in fact be better, for sorting out t hose 
verbs which make explicit the illocutionary force of an utter-
ance. He says, howeve r, that what will not survive, except pe r -
haps as a marginal limiting case, is the notion of the pu rity of 
performatives. He says that this was essentially based upon a 
belief in the dichotomy of performatives and constatives , which 
has been abandoned in fa vor of more general families of related 
and overlap ping speech acts. ( 1962: 149-50) 
He suggests, loosely, that we will find between one and ten 
thousand different acts and he suggests five very general class-
es. These are verdict i ve s, exe rc i ti ve s, commissive s, be habi ti ves 
and expositives ( 1962: 15lff , & cf. 163 for definitions). He says 
that he does not offer these as definitive, be cause at this stage 
he is merely suggesting poss ible further work. 
77 
The o verall p rogra m of How To Do Things- With Wor d s seems to 
b e an a t t a c k o n a n a pp ro a c h w h i c h t a k e s t he s t a t •:! me n t a s the 
c entral ob j e c t of an analysis of language. In this approac h the 
analysis o f an abstrac t statement and the e xam inatio n of the 
tru th condit i o ns wh i ch apply t o it is taken to suppl y the coce to 
a theory of language. From this coce the vacious phenomena of 
la nguage may be derived, but always as some how parasi tic on the 
workings o f language as exem plif ied in this repcesentation of the 
statement. The assumptions of this positivi st and formalist ~hil­
o sophy of language c an b e take ~ , then, a s the stalk ing-horse of 
Aus tin's text. 
In response to this approach Austin claims to sho w that if 
we are to examine language as an interacti ve practice this as-
sumed primacy of the abstracted statement must b e discarded. He 
argues t ha t under anal ysis the statement s how s itself to b e an 
act , not an essentially objective link with facts which is app-
lied in commun ication, b ut a communicative act first and fo re-
most. The statement-obj ect which logically precedes communicat i on 
is seen as a n abstraction fr om co mmun i cat i o n, and no t a s an 
underlying condition o f communication. L i kewise, the truth and 
falsity which are taken to b e attached to this statement-object 
a s some absolute cr iteria of 'correspondence with the f act s' are 
treated by Austin as an abstraction from the varied form s of 
judgement whic h are applied t o the things we say in commun i cat-
ion. They are treated not a s exemplars oE a ssessment, b ut as 
abstractions from assessment. 
Austin does say that the notion of the abstrac ted s tatement 
may be valid for s o me uses, b ut hi s point is to disallow its 
p lace at the core of analysis. He says that what h ad been tai< :~ : 1 
as this core was in fact that a spect of the t otal s p eec h act i1 
which the things we say are tied into the phatic , grammatical and 
semantic conventions of language - the locution. This aspect o f 
t he speech act has, as such, n o communicative function, and it 
cannot be characterized as a statement or any o ther t yp e of 
utterance. Its form, of course , may well be that o f a s ta teme n t 
or a question or whatever, but at this level of abstraction it 
does not exist or operate as a statement or question. At this 
level o f abstraction it is not identifiable as any t ype o f utter-
ance. 
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Ut terances are i den t ifiable as suc h a t the level of actual 
inte raction, with the illocutionary act. Here we are dealing with 
conven tio ns surrounding communicati ve interaction; not those 
which are operati ve i~ the construct~on of our utterances, but 
conventions which constitute and govern the acts which we perform 
in communication. Without these conventions the acts which they 
consti tu te would not exist. These acts are by t h is analysis 
d istinguis he d from 'say ing somet h ing' and from t he non-con ven t -
ional ' perlocut ionary ' consequences wh i ch may follow from them. 
CONCLUSION. 
This much is more or less c lear about How To Do Th ings ~ it h 
Words. But I have tried t o show, by taking account o f several 
readings of Austin from within the tradition for which he is 
taken t o have offered a significant founda tion, that the lessons 
wh ich can b e taken fr o m his work are n o t at all clear. I have 
tried to show that the ways Austin is read from within t h is 
tradition (wh ich we can call 'philosophical p r agmat i c s' ) , while 
c ertainl y diverse, tend to invol ve approachin g his wo ck dcco rding 
to a paradigm g r ou nded in the metaphysical a ssumpt ions o f the 
tradition wh i ch he is a ttacking. I have n ot denied that t hese 
r eadings are pos sible, or in fact that we at points find i n 
Austin's text a repetition o f these same a ssumptions. But I have 
cla imed that the construction of these r eading s a s consistent can 
require a certain 'blindness' towards parts o f the te x t, and that 
the approaches developed in these readings can be forcibly 
attacked by an al ternati ve r eading o f the text which looks, not 
for a consistent text, necessaril y , but f o r a consistent attac k 
o n certain programs and assumptions within an aspect of Western 
philosophy. 
Partly, as I have said, we have a cr itique of and an altern-
ative to t he assum p tion by the positi v ist tradition of the prim-
acy of constated experience as a f oundation of k n ow ledge and 
meaning - in which truth and meaning arise in a linkage of con-
sciousness and reality. Austin histo ricizes and conventio nalizes 
this constative, treating it a s an illocutionary ac t among 
others, whose existence is both arbitrary and de pendent o n s ocial 
convention. But also, and importantly giveD s ome of the r eading s 
we have seen, we have a necessarily related b u t apparentl y not 
always appreciated critique of the notion of the subje ct required 
by positivism. 
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This subject is essentially and necess~ ril y pre-c onsti tut ed ; 
throu g h t hat pri ma r y and foundational percepti o~ of ~e ~li ty i~ 
which meaning is assumed t o arise. Lts constitution a s soc ialr 
interacti ve consciousness is e x~ce ssed a s a derivation f rom t his 
pci macy 1 as t he taking -up by c onsciousness of a plac e in the 
world. And i n teractio ~ itself i s rep resented as being grounded in 
the transmissio n 1 via the medium of language, of the pure con-
sci ousness o f this transce ndent subject. This is the sub j ect 
which is invo lved in v iews whi c h gro und c ommunication in intent-
i onality or in the pure messa ge. I n response to this we can ta ke 
from Austi n 's appr o ac h the realization that the conscio usness of 
an essentiall y pre- active subject such as this is emptyr and that 
c onsci ousness ca~ only a rise a s meaningful through its practice 
in interac tion. 
At the end of the first chapter I drew out some pr o blemati c 
aspects of Austin's approach 1 mak ing use of Derrida's respo~ se t o 
the anal ysis of perfo rmati ves 1 a~d I c ommented that we would ne~d 
to assess the possible role of the pro blems which ware ra ised 
there in Austin's later theory. The conclusion I want t o suggest 
is that his approach as developed in the theory 0 f illocu tionary 
force can be defended (as I have tried to do above) from attempts 
to reintroduce the statement and intentionality t o the core of 
language 1 but that at the same time such attempts ( as I ha v e 
already suggested ) are aided by certain features withi n Austin's 
discussion, and that these features also pose problems for a 
program of f o rmal categorization such as suggested at the end of 
his discussion. 
Thus, for e xample, Strawson's explication of illocution in 
terms of intention, while unworkable, seems to gain support from 
Austin's c ontinued insistence that illocutionary acts are norm-
ally intentional and serious (see 1962: 104 & 138). It is perhaps 
a small step from claiming that uni ntended, non-serious speech 
acts are deviant and parasitic, to arguing that intentionality is 
the c entral and constitutive feature of illocutionary acts. But 
the initi a l claim in any case avoids confronting that part of 
Austin's argument which presents all illocutionary acts as oper-
ative dependent on thei r c itation of conventionally recognized 
procedures, that is, as being operative dependent on their doing 
the sorts of thing whi c h are done in jokes, acting and poetic 
language. 
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Paraphrasing a comment of Austin 's regarding the notion of a 
'pure' statement, we might say that the notion of normal or 
serious or ordina ry language is an ideal , but one should ~dd that 
it is the ideal of a certain positivist conception of language, 
and tha t it could never b e realized as communication. lO 
What is important here is that this conception of ordinary 
language leaves a gap for the reintroduction of certain notions -
centrally , of the intentional, constitutive subject at the core 
of communication, and of a pur e statement at the core of meani ng 
- in the tradition ~ssociated with Austin. We hav e seen suc h 
notions at work in some of the commentaries mentioned in these 
first two chapters, and we will find that they have a significant 
role in the material to be discussed below. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
GRICE ON MEANING AND INTENTION 
INTRODUCTION. 
We have seen with Austin the beginnings of a program which 
attempts to move beyond a purely semantic account of language as 
it is used in communication, and in this chapter we will be 
dealing with an approach which is both an alternative to and a 
development of Austin's work. 
Grice's contributions to pragmatics have been his explic-
ation of meaning in terms of intentionality and his theory of 
conversational implicature. This work (especially the explication 
of meaning) has been extremely influential within pragmatics. 
Grice's explication of meaning has been taken as a way of treat-
ing semantic questions in terms of action, and he can thus be 
seen as offering a pragmatic account of Austin's locutionary act 
(or at least of the rhetic act), and his theory of conversational 
implicature has been seen as offering an account of pragmatic 
rules which avoids the problems of applying the model of formal 
linguistic rules to pragmatic features of communication. I will 
not be dealing with the theory of conversational implicature here 
(although some of the issues arising there will be dealt with in 
later chapters); instead, I will concentrate on the theory of 
non-natural meaning. This aspect of Grices work is, as I have 
said, the more influential, and it has a more specific interest 
here, because it brings into focus issues surrounding the notion 
of an intentional subject at the core of communication which have 
been raised in the previous chapters . 
In one sense, as I have said, Grice's work is a development 
of Austin's. Thus, it can be argued that Austi n's and Grice 's 
theories can be included within what Strawson (1970) calls 'comm-
unication-intention' theories (which roughly accord with what I 
have been calling philosophical pragmatics). Over the past twenty 
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years, these theor ies have been a signific ant alternative within 
Angl o-American philosophy of language to fo~ma l semantic s in the 
Fregian tradition, regard ing intention and rule-governed action 
as funda mental to the meaning o f an - expression, rather than 
treating the e xp ressions o f language, as far as possible, as 
having meaning independently of the communicative intentions and 
purposes of the users of l anguag e, as we find in form a l s.emant-
i cs .1 
Hence, Grice's work needs t o be treated as a development of 
Au stin's, bec ause with in p ragmatics (and within communication-
intention t he o ries ) it has been seen as filling-out c erta in gaps 
in Austin's theory . Broadly, this has involved ad ding Grice's 
intentional account of meaning t o Austin's theory o f illocutio n-
ary acts. 
However, Grice makes e xp licit use of intention as the defin-
ing and constituting not i on o f prag matic s. So in this sense there 
exists within so-called communication-intentio n theory the dis-
tinct i o n noted by Harrison. 
On t he one hand there are those [theories], such as Aus-
tin's and Searle's which l oca t e the distinguishing feature 
o f language as a species of intentional action in the fact 
that it is rule-governed, and proceed to try to elucidate 
the rules in question. 
On the other hand there are theories such as those of 
H.P.Grice, Jonathon Bennett or David Lewis, which endeavo r 
to avoid any reference to an unanalyzed notion of rule at a 
fundamental level by analyzing such notions as rule and 
convention in terms of speaker's and hearer's intentio ns and 
beliefs. (Harrison, 1979: 176 ) 2 
SECTION 1: A THEORY OF NON-NATURAL MEANING. 
In discussing Grice's theory o f meanin g I shall first pre-
sent its development from its original account through the two 
later revisi ons. I shall then consider the theory a s a whole. 
SECTION la. 
The original f o rmulation of Grice's theory occurs in his 
paper 'Meaning' ( 1957). In it, he firstl y draws a distinction 
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between what he calls 'natural' and 'non-natural' meaning ( 'mean-
ing-nn' ). Grice comments that he does not want t o ma intain t hat 
all our uses of ' mean ' fall easil y, obviou sly or tidil y into one 
of these two groups , but say s that he thin ks that ' in most cases 
we should a t least be fairly strongly inclined to a ss i milate a 
use o f "mean" to one group rather than the other' (Gr i ce, 1957 : 
3 7 9) • 
Examples Gr ice gives of ( reports of ) natural me an i ng are : 
'Those spots me an (meant ) measles', a nd ' The recent budget means 
that we shall have a hard year'. This ty pe of meaning is charact -
e r i z ed by t he fa c t t h a t : ( 1 ) I f I a s se r t t h a t x me an s t h a t p , I 
am committed t o p (I cannot, accord ing t o Grice, say ' Those spots 
mean measles, bu t you haven't got me a sles' ); (2) I canno t argue 
from ' x means that p' to a conclusion about what is me ant by x; 
( 3) I c ann o t a r gue from ' x means that p ' t o a conclusion that 
somebod y meant something by x ; ( 4) ' p ' can never be replac ed by a 
word or phrase in in verted commas, such as in 'T ho se spot s mean 
"measles"'; (5) We can resta te the assertions of natural me aning 
in the f o r m of 'The fact that he ha d those spots me a n t t hat he 
h ad m e a sl e s' • 
Exam ples o f reports o f me aning-nn are: ' Those t hr. ~ ta c i. :l :.J s O fl 
t he bell (of the b us ) me a n that the bus is full' and 'Tha t 
remark, "Smith can't get along without h is trouble a nd strife"; 
meant that Smith found his wi fe indispensab le'. The five paralle l 
characteristics o f meaning-nn are: ( 1 ) The assertion ' x means-nn 
that p' does not entail p, s o I can say 'Those three ring s mean 
that the bus is full, but in fact it isn't'; (2) I ca n argue f rom 
'x means-nn that p' t o 'what is meant' by x; (3) I can ar gu e fro m 
' x means-nn that p ' to the conclusion that somebody meant, or 
should have meant, p by x; ( 4 ) ' p ' can be substituted by a word 
or p hrase in inverted commas, as in 'Those three rings mean "t he 
bu s is full"'; (5) A sentence of the form 'The fact that the b ·~ l.l 
has b een rung three times means that t he bus is full' may b e 
true, bu t it is not a restatement o f the first sentenc e, a nd the 
two sentences 'do not have, even ap proximatel y , t he same meaning' 
( 1957: 37 8) . 
As a furt her statement o f the opposition, Grice says that he 
includes under natural meaning the meaning exemplified in senten-
ces o f the patter~ 'A means (meant ) t o do so-and-so (by x )', 
where A is a human agent, a nd under meaning-nn the meaning exemp-
lified in sentences of the patterns 'A means (meant) something by 
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x ' or ' A means (m eant ) by x that ••• '. He sa ys that t h is is an 
over rigid distinct ion, bu t it does seem t o a e monstrate what he 
wants t o c~ pture with the general distinction. 
On page 379, Grice suggests that the questio n about this 
distinction is what people are getting at wh en they spea k of a 
distinct i on between 'natura.l ' o:1nd ' c ~)rwentional' signs. Bu t he 
thin ks that his formulation is better, 
For some things which can mean-nn someth ing are n o t si gns 
(e.g., word s are n ot) , and some are not conven tional in ~~~ 
ord inary sense (e.g., certain gestures ) ; wh ile some things 
which mean naturally are not signs of what the y mean (c f. 
the recent budget e xample ) , (1957: 379) 
Th is im p lies that the disti~ction between nat u r al and non-
natural meaning is something like a distinction between non-
drbitrarily and arbitrarily meaningf u l 'things' ( in fact, Gr ice 
u sual ly does use 'sign' as a general term ). In any case, natural 
meaning is a g iven, something we learn fr om the 'nat ure of 
th ings ', whereas non-natural meaning is a function of the meani ng 
given to 'utterances' by speakers. It appears that natural mean-
ing is something we 'read o ff' or interpret from characteristics 
o f t hi ngs, events or behaviour in a judgement about what the 
thing, event or behavi our is a symptom of (certain spot s are a 
sym p tom of measles) or likely to result in (certain budgets are 
likely t o result in hard years ). In the third case ( ' A means t o 
do so-and-so by x'), it seems that we a re making a judgement 
about what A wants ( intends ) to bring about by x, and that we are 
judging A's intention o r desire to do so-and-so to b e the cause 
of x . We can perhaps say that natural meaning is a state of 
a ffairs which we judge to b e natural ly or causally related to t he 
state of affairs which we are interpreting. 
While I am suggesting tha t for Grice n~tural meaning in-
volves some sort of causal relation, he is c ritical of cau sal 
theories when applied directly to non-ndtu ral meaning , his arg-
ument being essentially that they cannot account f or non-standard 
meanings, which vary according to the pa rticula r occasio n of use. 
He refers t o the causal theory put forward by C.L.Stevenson, in 
wh ich it is claimed that, 
for x to mean-nn s o mething, x must have (roughly) a tendency 
to produce in an audience some attitude (cognitive or other-
wise) and a tendency, in the case of a speaker, to be pro-
duced ~ that attitude, these tendencies being dependent on 
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'an elabocate pr ocess of conditioning attending the use of 
the si gn in communication'. (Gcice,l 957: 379 ) 
The details of Gcice's cciticism neeQ not concecn us, but he says 
that with t h is t ype o f a ccount, 
we ace fucnished with an anal ysis onl y of statemen t s about 
the standacd meaning, oc the meaning in genecal, of a 
'sign'. No pc ovision is made foe dealing with statements 
about what a pacticulac speakec oc wcitec means b y a si gn 
o n a pacticulac occasion (which may well di vecge fc o m the 
standacd meaning o f the sign ) ; .••• (Gcice, 1957: 38 1 ) 
Latec in the same pacagcaph he say s: 
One mi g ht e ven go fucthec and say that the causal theoc y 
ignoces the fact that the meaning ( in genecal) of a sign 
needs to be e x p 1 a in e d i n t e c m s of w h a t u se c s o f t he s i g n s do 
(oc should) mean b y it on pacticulac occasions: and so the 
lattec notion, which is unexplained by the causal theocy , is 
in fact the fundamental one. I am sympathetic to this more 
cadical criticism, though I am awace that the point is con-
tcovecsi a l.( Gcice, 1957: 38 1 ) 
In fact, Gcice does believe that the lattec notion is fund-
ament a l. That it is so is the basis of the whole Gricean pcogcam 
dealing with meaning-nn. Gcice's non-natural meaning is something 
gi ven to a sign by an uttecer o c s peakec. Non-natucal meaning is 
somethin g we j udge an utterec to be tcying to produce, and Gcice 
takes it as dependent o n the communicative intentions behind 
indiv idual speakecs' occasion-meaning. 
As has been said, it is not easy to underst a nd just what 
Gcice is doing with the natucal / non-natucal distinction. On the 
one hand it is ha c d to dcaw out just what the celation in each 
case involves, and on the othec hand, it is not cleac whethec 
natucal meaning is taken a s ul timately fundamental in the explic-
ation of non-natural meaning, despite the criticism of ex p licitly 
causal theocies o f me a ning-nn. In the 1957 papec, aftec dis t in-
guishing natural and non-natucal meaning, Gcice ma kes the follow-
ing comment: 
The question which now acises is this: 'What mo re can be 
said about the distinction between cases whece we should say 
that the wocd is a pplied in a natural sense and cases w~e r: G 
we should say that the wocd is applied in a nonnat u t:"al 
sense?' Asking this q uestion will not o f c oucse pcohibit u s 
from tcying to give an explanation of 'meaning-no' in teems 
of one oc another natural sense of 'mean•. (Grice,l957: 379) 
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It is consistent with Grice 's style t hat this is say ing that he 
will proceed to explain non-natural in terms of natural meaning , 
although this is never made e xpl icit. Of cour se, it cou ld b e t ha t 
Gr i c e does not see natural meaning ~s involving a cau sal rel-
ation, bu t it is hard to see how else the naturall y me aning ful 
relations he describes could be taken. In any case, t3king the 
program in this way at least allows the following fairl y cons is-
tent picture to emerge: For Grice, all meaning is a function of a 
(c ausal ) relation between a 'thing' which is interp reted and 
another 'thing' which is its meaning. With natur~l meaning th is 
relation is (taken as) naturall y g iven, whereas with non - natural 
meaning it is a function of an utterer's intentionality , this 
b ein g filled o ut (as we will come to see) in terms of t h e o sten-
sive linking of a sign and its meaning. 
It is from the assumption of the primacy of spea ker's occ -
asion-me aning that the explication of meaning-no sets off. That 
is, Gr i ce wants to e xplicate ( la) 'x mean s-nn (ti meless ) s ome-
thing ( that so-and-so )', and (lb) ' U (utterer) means-nn ( time-
less) by x something (that so-a nd-so ) ', p lus 'means the s am e as ' , 
'understands', and 'entails ', by first elucidating t he meaning of 
(2a) ' x meant-nn something (on a particular occasion ) ', (2b) ' x 
meant-nn that so-and-so (o n a particular occasion)' , (3a) ' U 
meant-nn something by x (o n a particular occasion) ', and (3b ) ' U 
meant-nn by x that so-and-so (on a particular occasion)'; and 
(3a) and (3 b ) are taken as p rimary within the second grou p . 
We now arrive at the 'first shot', which is to suggest that 
'" x meant-nn something" would be true if x was intended by its 
utterer to induce a belief in s om e "audience" a nd tha t t o s~y 
what the belief was would b e t o say what x meant-nn' (1 957: 381) . 
This is the basic position. It has to be developed, but the i dea 
that meaning-nn is something we intend to p roduce o r induce in ~n 
audience is maintained right through the Gric ean p r ogram . 
The first development is that the audienc~ must b e intended 
to recogni z e the intention to produce the belief, for when th is 
does not happen, says Grice , the meaning is read as from a nat-
ural sign. However this does not yet isolate the essence of 
meaning-no, for even with this secondary intention it is still 
possible for the aud ience t o read the utterance a s natural (when 
'1ecod presents Sal o me with the head of Jo hn the Bap tist, he 
pce su mab l y has the required se condary intention, but if he just 
left the head lying around she would equally understand what it 
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meant). So it must b e intended to be £y means of the recognition 
o f the primary intenti o n t ha t belief is induced. For example, 'if 
I cu t someone in the street •.• I could not reasonabl y expect him 
to b e distressed .•• unless he t:"eco~nized my in t entions to effect 
h i 11  in t :1is WliY' (1957 : 384 ) . We can now f o llow Gric e's e xplic-
ation of type (1) meaning in terms of type ( 2 ) and type ( 3 ) 
me ani ng ( see 19 57 : 3 8 5) • 
( 3 ) "'[U] meant-nn something by x" is ( roughly ) e quivalent t o 
" [U ] i 1 ten ded the utterance of x to produce some effect in an 
audience by means o f the recognition of thi s intentio n"; and we 
m ay~dd that toask what (U ] meant is to ask for a specificatio n 
o E the intended effect ••. '. This requires no comment at the 
moment. 
( 2 ) '"x me an t-nn some thing" is (roughly) equi vale11 t to "Some-
body meant-nn something by x"'. Grice allows that there is a 
difficulty here. He says that when traffic lights ch ange to red, 
this means-nn that the traffic is to stop, but he says that 'i t 
would be very unnatural t o say, "Somebody (e.g. the Corporation ) 
meant-nn by the red-light change that the traffic was to stop'". 
' Nevertheless', he says, 'there seems t o be some sort o f refer-
ence to somebody's intentions'. I shall return to this issue in 
Sect ion 3. 
( 1) '"x means-nn (t imeless ) that so-and-so" might as a first 
shot be equated with some statement or disjunctio n o f statements 
about what "people" (vague ) intend (w ith qualifications about 
"recognition") to effect by x'. We shall see later that if this 
suggestion is filled-out in terms of convention it is at least 
possible that a coherent account can be developed. 
In the last part of the first paper, Grice says that he does 
not want to people all our talking life with 'armies of complic-
ated p sychological occurrences', and c laims that 'there are no 
special difficulties raised by my use of the word "intention" in 
c onnection with meaning' ( 1957: 386 ) . He says that the intentions 
wh i ch he refers to need not be regarded as explicitl y formulated 
linguistic (or quasi-linguistic) intentions, and that with most 
linguistic intentions 'we would seem to rely on very much the 
sarn e kinds of criteria as we do in t h e ca se of non-linguistic 
intentions where there is a general usage'. 
An utterer is held t o intend to c o •1" 8l' whlit is normall y 
conveyed (or normall y intended to be conveyed), and we 
require a good reason for accepting that a particular use 
diverges fr o m the general use (e.g., that he n ever knew, or 
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had focgotten the genecal usage). Similacly in non-ling-
uistic cases: we .:~.ce pr-esumed to intend "the normal con-
sequences of ouc actions.(Grice, 1957: 387 ) 
Where thece is doubt, he says, we tend to refer to the context 
(linguisti.c o r otherwise) of the utterance a. nd dS'.<. llhic!"' .) ( the 
altecnatives would be relevant in this context ( ' A ma n who calls 
for a "pump" at a fire would not ~ant a bicycle pum p ' ) : and with 
a non-linguistic case, relevance to an obvious end is ~ cciterio~ 
in settling why a man is running o.way f r.o'n a bull ( 1957: 387 ). 
Gr i c e's final statemen t is that 'to sho~ thdt t he criteria for 
judging linguistic intentions are very li ke the criter-ia foe 
judging non-linguisti c i1 t entions is to show that lingui stic 
intentions are vecy li ke non-linguistic intentions' ( 1957: 387-8 ). 
SECTION lb. 
In his papec ' Ut terer's Meaning, Sentence Meaning, and Wocd 
Meaning' (1968 ), Grice offecs only a minoc adjustment to what he 
cegacds as the fundamental notio n of meaning, but he does attempt 
to fill out in moce detail the move from this fundamental notion 
to t hose o f se n ten c e me an in g and word me an in g , and by w a y of t h is 
offers more support f o r the earlier move to 'x meant-nn some-
thing' and 'x means-nn (t imeless) that so-and-so'. I shall ignore 
the adjustment to the fundamental notion in this paper, as it is 
developed in deta il in the third paper. For the moment, we can 
use Grice's substitution o f 'M-intending' foe the communicative 
intentions involved in utterer's meaning. 
The first step in the 1968 paper in moving beyond utterer's 
meaning is the explication of timeless a nd applied timeless 
meaning for unstructured utterance-types. That is, Grice wants t o 
show how the m~aningfu lness - first for the uttecec ( estd.IJ lis h~d 
meaning ) and then for groups of indi viduals (convent i onal mean-
ing ) - of an unstructuced uttecance such as a hand- wave can be 
defined in terms of the fundamental notion (utterer's occasion 
meaning), then use this to fill-out the noti on of t he meaning o f 
structured utterance-types and the notion of applied timeless 
meaning. 
The initial attempt to relate the timel ess meaning for U to 
the occasion meaning of an unstructured uttecance-type is to 
suggest that if, say, a certain hand-wave (H-W) means for U 'I 
know the coute', then it is U's 'policy (pcactice, habit)' to 
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utter H-W if U is making an utterance by means of which ( for so me 
A) u M-intends to effect that A think s U t o t-h i-n k that U kno ws 
the route. Grice points out that only the notion o f si mpl e in-
t ention need be invoked here. 
I f U's policy (practice, habit ) is such t hat h is u se of H- W 
is tied to the presence of a simple intention to ef fe e t an 
audience in the way described, it will follow that when, on 
~ gi v~n occasion, he utters H-W, he will do so, o n that 
occasion , M-intending to effect his audience in that way . 
(Grice, 19 6 8 ~ 2 3 2 ) . 
'Simple intention' here is taken as syn onom ou s \'li th 1 '.¥ 3. n t ' , and 
what Grice is cl~i ·n i."I.<J i s t ha t to make an indicative utterance 
wanting someone to infer from that utterance that you believe Lt, 
is to M-in tend that they come t o believe that you believe it. So 
'intends (wants) ' is substituted for ' M-intends to effec t t hat' 
in the definition. 
Because 'policy (practice, habit)' does not a llow an u tter-
ance to have mo.re than one meaning (it im plies that H-W , say, 
will be utte.red only!.!_ U wants A to thi nk that U knows the 
route - .Y hereas H-W may well also me an for U ' I a m leaving' ) , a nd 
b e c ause H-W may be only one op t io n Eo-r:- getting A to believe t h at 
U thinks U knows the route ( while Grice thinks ' policy (practice, 
hab it)' implies the utterance will b e u .3@.d whe~ever its effect is 
intended) G.rice suggests the substitution of 'having a certain 
procedure in one's repertoire'. This means tha t the de Einition of 
'For U, utterance-type x means (has as one of its meanings ) "p '" 
becomes: 
U has in his 
if U intends 
that p. (See 
repertoire the procedure t o u tter a t o ken of x 
(wants) A to have the propositional attitude 
19 68: 2 3 2- 3) 3 
The way Grice ties this defi n i t i on to the notion of timeless 
meaning within a 'group of individuals' is to point out that i f A 
i s i: :) •Jnde rs tand the u tterance, unless .i. t is to be explained 
every time it is used , A's repe.rtoi.re must contain the same 
procedure. Thus he a ssu mes that for some group G each me mber 
will want his or he.r procedure with respect to a certain utt e r -
ance to conform to the gene.ral p r-~c ti c e of the group. Each mem-
ber, that is to say, wants to be party to the c onventional use (s ) 
o f the utterance. So 'for a group G, utterance-type x means "p '" 
i s defined by : 
At least some members of group G have in their repertoire 
the procedure of uttering a token of x if, for some A, they 
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want A to come t o t he pcopositional attitude that p; the 
r-e t ention of this pcoceduce being foc them conditional on 
the assum ption that at least some othec me mbecs of G ha ve, 
or have had, r~ hi s procedure in ,t.heic ceperto ires. (See 1968: 
233) 
Grice admits the obscurity of the notion of ' hav i ng d ~co­
c edure in one's cepectoice', which is crucial in these definit-
i o ns ( for it is by th is that he ~ants t~ link up t he, foc him, 
pci mary notion of meaning as produced by indi v iduals to the, for 
him , secondacy notion of meaning as opera t i ng ~1d s ha ced with i n ~ 
community). Howevec, he declines to expla in it in any deta i l, 
beyond saying that it cannot mean that the possessors o f pr oc ~ . l ­
ures necessarily u se them (I can understand an utterance whi~h I 
have never used), and that we have to distinguish between ~ ~ 
established procedure with cespect to an utterance-type x wh i ch 
is current for a group G, which is current only for U, and which 
i.s rt:.> t ~urr-ent at all but foc which U has d~vised a system of 
tK a<:: t ices which would invoke a r-eadiness to utter x in such-and-
such circumstances. I shall cetucn to the p coblem of the notion 
of havi ng a QCocedure in one's repertoice later. 
Following from the above definitions, applied timeless mean-
ing ('When U utter-ad x, x meant p') is defined by: 
U intended A to cecognize (and possibly, to cecognize that U 
ir"ltended A to cecognize) what U meant by uttet"in•J >< ( i.e., 
occasion meaning), on the basis of A's knowledge Ot"' assumpt-
ion that, for U, x has as one of its meanings "p". 
So, once Uand A know that they are both opecating within the 
same convention of uses of x, the communication oE appl i ed mean-
ing is grounded back in the pcimacy Gcicean mechanism (see 1968: 
2 3 4-5) • 
The f i n a 1 t a s k w h i c h G r i c e s e t s h i m s e 1 f in t h i s p a p e t" i s t h .a 
explication o f structured uttecance-types. This involves the 
introduction of two notions: that of a 'resultant pcocedure', and 
that of ' cot"r- e la tion'. 
A resultant proceduce, says Grice, is a procedure foc an 
utterance-type x which is, 
determined by (its existence is infecable fcom ) a knowledge 
of pcocedures (a) for particular uttecance-types which are 
elements in x, and {b) foc any sequence of utterance-types 
which exemplifies a particulac ordering of syntactical cat-
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egories (a particular syntactical form). (Grice: 1968: 235 ) 
(a ) here fol lows from his c1di~ that 'it is characteristic of 
sentences (a characteristic shared with phrases ) tha t their stan-
dard meaning is conseque:1tial upon t11.e meanin g of the elements 
( words , lexical items ) which enter into them' ( 1968: 235 ) ; so it 
seems that we can take a resultant proced•Jca to be the ability or-
kn owledge to construe semantic units out of semantic el e ments, 
and to do this according to a (correct or 'gr-a mmatical' ) syntac -
tic structu.t:'e. 
With this notion, Grice is able to define ti meless meaning 
of structured utterances in U's idio lect by adapting the defin-
itio n of timeless meaning of unstructured utterances in U's 
idiolect. Thus, 'For U, a at cuctured utterance-type Z (a sen-
tenc e ) means "p"', is defined by: 
U has a resultant p rocedure for Z, v iz. to utter Z if, for 
some A, U wants A to come to the pco[)osit i on1l attitude that 
p. 
He suggests that the definition of timeless meaning within a 
language fot:' unstructured utterances could b e adapted to deal 
with structured utterances (bu t declines to do so ) , and goes on 
to define applied timeless meaning of structured utterances (by 
adapting the definition of appli ed timeless meaning of unstruct-
ured utterances). 
Here, 'An utterance Y within a complete utterance Z meant 
II P II I I i S defined by: 
U meant by Z that "q", and U intended A to recognize that U 
meant by Z that "q" at least partly on the basis of A's 
thought that U has a resultant procedure to Y, viz. ( for 
su itable A') to utter Y if U wants A' to come t o the prop-
ositional attitude that p. (See 1968 : 23 5-6 ) 
At this point, Grice needs to start dealing with word mean-
ing, and, as it stands, the notion o f a resultant p rocedure seems 
inadequate to deal with the structuring of semantic units at a 
fundamental level (a structuring which he has felt able to leave 
unilluminated in the preceding definitions). Grice only attempts 
to deal with the structuring of the range o f 'affirmative categ-
orical (not necessarily indicative) sentences invol ving a noun 
(or definite description) and an adjective (o r adjectival 
phrase)' (1968: 236), as an e xa mple of the sort of general schema 
which would show the role of word-meaning in determ ining sen-
tence-meaning. The characterization of mood variations of these 
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sentences and of the var ious syntacti c va~iations of the predic-
ation of a n adjectival on a nominal ?. re lP-fl up to linguistics, 
and Grice concentrates on the notion of the 'correlation' of 
semantic units. Specifically, he re~ies on two sorts of correl-
ation -referential correlation (R-correlation), where we speak 
o f some particular object as an R-cor c alate of a nominal, and 
denotational correlation (D-correlation), where we speak of each 
member of some class as being a D-correlate of an adjectival. 
(1968 : 236) 
With this notion , Grice is able to say that if U has t he 
procedure t o set up a cor-relation between a mood (e. g., indic -
ative) and the infinitive version of a sentence, and the proced -
ure to utter a p~edication thus co~relat ed of the adjectival on 
the nominal if (using the example of the indicative) U wants an 
audience to think that U thinks a particular R-correlate of the 
nominal to be o ne of -::1 par ticular set of D-correlates of the 
adjectival, t he n this can be described as a resultant procedure 
(see 1968: 236-7 ) . 
The idea of 'correlation' is very unclear, and Grice tries 
to fill out this notion at the ~nd of the paper. He takes explic-
it correla ti on as a paradigm, a nd claims that this is, 
an act as a result of which a linguistic item and a non-
1 in g u i s tic it 8 m ( o c items) come to stand in a r e 1 at i o n in 
which they did not previously stand, and in which neither 
stands to non-correlates in the other real 1n. (Grice, 1968: 
238) 
If the correlation is b8t~e en, say, 'shaggy' and hairy-coated 
things, then ther-e is a relation R such that (a) by utter-ing a 
particular utter-ance V, U effected that 'shaggy' stood in R t o 
each hairy-coated thing, and only to hair-y-coated things and (b) 
U uttered V in order that (or- intending that) by uttering v this 
should be effected. Grice points out that he is forced to re-
introduce the not i on of intention here because, while a relation 
has been set up by 'shaggy' being uttered in 'conversational 
juxtaposition' with 'hairy-coated things', that same conversat-
ional juxtaposition has also set up a relati~n between 'shaggy' 
and the class oE non-hairy-coated things, the compliment of the 
c 1 a s s to w h i c h i t i s a s se r t e d to be 1 on g - a n d t h i s c an on 1 y be 
avoided if we assume an intention to avoid the second r-elation. 
He comments that 'it looks as if intensionality is embedded in 
the very foundations of language' (1968: 239). 
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A further implication of th e use of the noti on o f co r r e lat -
LO() is tha t while there are a n umber of way s-an act o f ex pl i c it 
correl a t ion may be effected, it will alway s be to mak e, 
an indefinite reference to a relation(ship ) which the act is 
intend~d to set up , and the s pe c ificatio n o f the r e la tion 
i nvolved 1dl l in turn alwa y s involve a furt her u se of the 
n otio n of correlation. (Gric e, 1968: 239-40 ) 
For example, if we speak of a set of ha iry-coat~d things , t here 
is an R-correlation between a set and ' hai ry- coated t h ings'. 
Gr i c e acknowledges that this seems to involve a r e gress, for 
't hough "c orre lat i on" is not used in definition of corre lati0 :1: 
it will be used in spec ification o f a n indefin i t 8 c afe ce() c~ 
Jccurring in the definition of correlation' ( 1968 : 240) , and he 
sugge sts that this may be avoided by br inging in the n o tion of 
' ostensive' correlation. His idea is that if, for e xample, we say 
that U ostends a secies of ha i cy- coated obje c ts, si multaneousl y 
ut tering 'shaggy ' a nd intending to ostend objec t s wh i ch (and only 
wh ich ) are ha iry-codt ed, then we can specif y t he relation wh i ch 
ho lds between 'shag gy ' a nd hairy-coated things wi thout r efercing 
to correlation ( 1968: 240). 
There is one final p r oblem wh i ch Gric e attemp ts t o deal 
with, and that i s that many co r r elat i ons are not expl ic i t l y made. 
His solution is t o say that a non-explicit coccelation consists 
in the fac t that the utterer would 'nake the cocrelat i on e xplic it-
ly if he or s he wanted to ma ke an e xp licit correlatio n wh ic h 
would generate relevant e xisting procedure s. This invol ves circ-
ularity, but Grice claims that it ( the circularity) may be a 
special case of a general phenomenon wh ich arises when it is 
noted that we act ~ l£ we accept and consciously follow linguis-
ti c: cules, and so it is a ssumed that in some sense wt~ imp licitly 
do accept the rules. Thus he suggests that the difficulty of 
explaini ng im pl i ci t correlati on is no d ifferent than the diffic-
ulty of e xp laini ng i mplicit acce ptance o f genera l linguistic 
r u 1 e s. ' I t se em s 1 ike a mystery which, for the t i me being a t 
least, we will have to swallow' ( 1968: 241). 
SECTION lc. 
Whereas in the 1968 paper Grice was mainl y conce rned to 
explicate timeless meaning and applied timeless meaning in terms 
of the notion of utterer's occasion-meaning, in ' Ut te r e r's Mean-
ing and Intentions' ( 1969) he concentrates on strengtheni~g this 
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fundam e ntal not i o n. BefoLe going on t o summaLize the development 
thi s ~otion .receive s in the 1969 papeL, it should be ~ot e d that I 
am not conce .rned about e va luating the s tLe ngth of th~ counteL-
examples which GLic e considers, a s my interest is in evaluati~g 
Gric e's appLoach at both a more f undame ntal and a more general 
level tha n this. Thus I shall take f or granted Grice's ow n eval -
uation of the counte r - examp les. It should al so be n oted t ha t in 
t h is paper, as in the 196 8 paper, Grice p~e se11t s h is def i nitions 
in a semi-formal manner, and , fo r clarity 's sake, my r ep Lod-
uct ions of these definitions shall invo l ve a cer tain amount of 
paLaphra se a ~d simpl ification. 
As we have seen wi th t he fic.s t two papers, GLice not only 
thinks that timeless meaning can be e xpl i ca ted in terms o f utt e r -
er' s nccasio~-meaning, but that this is e xp licable in t e rm s of 
utterer's intention, and further, that a n ade quate specification 
o f the utter~ c's intended effect of o r response to an utteran c e 
would provide the material for a specification of t he meani ng of 
that ut terance. It i s Gr i ce 's development of these two lat t er 
ideas wh i ch is of main interest in the 1969 paper. 
He starts o f with the following defin itio~ o f utte r.~c' s 
me aning: 
' U meant s omething by uttering x' i.>:> tcue iff ( if and only 
if ) , for some audience A, U uttere d x intending 
( 1) A to produce a pa r ticular respo nse r 
(2) A t o th i~ k (recogn i z e ) that U intends ( 1 ) 
( 3) A t o fulfill (1) on the basis of hi s fulfillment of (2) . 
The phrase 'o n the basis o f' occurs in th~ third clau se rather 
than ' as a r-esult of ', bec ause the fulfillment of ( 2) needs t o be 
seen a s a reason, rather tha n a cause f o r fulfilling ( 1 ) , in 
orde.r to eliminat e cases where U, for ex amp le, intends A to b e 
amused. Grice thinks that what U me a ns ( intends ) here (to amuse 
A) is not meaning- nn (1969 : 151- 2) . 
Gr i c e now conside Ls counter-examples which purport to s how 
that this definition is t oo weak, that it allows cases which -:tC:3 
not cases of meaning-nn. The first range of cases wit h in this 
group are c ases where A is supposed t o already know what Lesponse 
U desires, and where the 'request' for this alre ady- understood 
response takes the form of the p resentation of a n induce ment o r a 
threat. I t is the meaningful nature of t he 'request' wh ich is in 
question here. In the ma i~ case considered , some c aptors think 
their captive to pos sess i nforma tion the y want, and he knows they 
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wa nt h i m to give them this info rmation. If the capto rs t hen a pp l y 
thumbscre ws to the captive, t h is act fits i~to t ~~ definiti o~ of 
meaning-nn; fo r t hey perform the act with t he intentio f"l o f p r- o-
duc ing a cer-tain r-espo nse, t he y i n tend the capti ve to recognize 
this intentio n, and they intend h im to respond appropr-iately on 
the basis of thi s r-ec ognitio n; but the desi (~d re s ponse \vOuld no t 
be r ecognized f rom the utterance (the mere applicat ion o f thumb-
s cre ,..,s ) . What it means is, e.g., 't alk! ', not ' t el l u s what you 
know abou t s uch - and-such!' (which is what they mean - they do not 
ju st want h im to talk ). Gr i ce's response t o t hi s is to amend 
c l a use ( 2 ) in the defini t i o f"l to ' U intends •.. ( ~ ) A. t:') t::"ecog -
nize, at least in part from the utterance of ~' that U intends 
(1) ( 1969: 152-3 ) . 
The second range of counter-examples within this group are 
cases whe r:- e iJ in tends A, in the reflection process by wh ic h A is 
supposed t o r-each the desi r-ed r esponse, b oth t o r-e ly o n s om e 
'i~ fe ren ce element' ( some premise or infe r- e n tial step ) a nd also 
to t hin~ t hdt IJ i 1i:er1ds A not to r-ely on this in fe-renc e elern,:l :1t. 
An example within this -range is a case where U and A ace in a 
room and U wants to get -rid o E A., who is ~oto ri ously ava-r iciou s, 
but also proud. U's 'ut terance' is to t hr~w a Eive pou nd ~ ote out 
the window, wanting A to reason as f o llow s : ' U wan ts to get me to 
leave the roo m, thinking tha t I s ha ll r-un after the fi ve ~ound 
note. He also wants me t o know that he wa nts me to go ( so con-
1: 8 '~ 1 [) r.u ou s was his pe r:-formance). But I am not 'Joi ng t o de mean 
nyself by going after:- the ba nknote ; I shall go, but I shall go 
be cause he wants me to go.' In this case, U intends by throwing 
the bankn ote that A should leave the room, t hat A s hou ld recog-
nize, at least par tly on the basis o f the utte-rance, that U had 
this intention, and that A's leaving the -room be based on t h is 
-recognition; but Grice thinks that because the -reasoning of U and 
A is not shared (U remains 'one intentio r1 up' on A) cases li ke 
this are not genuine cases of meaning-nn. His initial response is 
to a dd clau ses to the effect that A shou l d th i nk that U h ad 
intentio~ ( 2) , and that A should think that U intended (what was) 
clause ( 3); howe ver, because it :nay be the case that more and 
more complex examples like this would require the inse r tion of 
more and more clauses demanding furt her cestc ictions o f the t ype, 
and because he wishes t o avoid such a regress, Grice inserts the 
following catch- all clause ( see 1969: 154-9 ) : 
There is no inference-element E su c h that U u t t ~ ced x inten-
ding both (1') that A's determination of r should r ely on E 
and ( 2') that A should think U to intend that ( 1' ) b e false. 
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The fin a l cange o f c ases within th is group ace those whece U 
ut t•.; r. s a sentence in a language '.Vhich U thin k s A does n o t know, 
i. =1t::F\dLng A to ceason fcom the u tterance :) E t he se ntence -:i nd fc om 
o thet:' fe atu t:'es o f the uttet:'ance that U wishes to elicit a cet:'tain 
t:' esponse L. The example of t h is (oc i. •Ji.n .~lly in Seat:'le, 1965 ) as 
developed by Gt:'ice goes as follows: An American soldiet:' is cap-
tured by Italians (t his is s upposed to be ir1 W.W. II ) a nd, while 
gesticulating and thu~ping his chest etc., shouts the only sen-
tence o f German he knows - ' Kennst du das Land, ~ die Zitronen 
bluhen• - intending the Italians to t hink he is a Ga c man off i cer, 
who thinks that they spea k Ge t:' ma n , who LS t ·~lling them that he is 
a Ge r man of f ice r. G r i c e say s t h a t he r e the Am e r i c a n d i d n o t me a n 
that he was a German officer, but rathet:' that he meant the It al -
ians to think that he was a ~c ·narl officer . He is not concet:'ned 
by the fact that the utterance is not cort:'elated conventio nally 
with the intended ce sponse, but thinks that it is disqual ified 
because the feature of the utterance whic h A at:'e intended t o 
r-ecogni ze and go by (its being a bit of Gecman, the chest-thump-
ing etc.) is not the feature A are intended to think they at:'e t o 
go by ( its being a particulac Gec miin sentence). Grice copes with 
this by insecting a clause which says that U intends A to think 
that x possesses feature f, and another which says that U intends 
A to think f is correlated in a certain way (e.g., iconic, assoc-
iative, conventional) with the utterance-type to which x belongs. 
That is, the feature of x A is intended t o interpret is the feat-
ur.e of x A is intended to think A is intended to interpret. A's 
thi.r1 king that U intends A to producer is now meant to be based 
on the fulfillment of these two intentions. 
Before dealing with the next group of counter-examples, 
Grice says that in the ca se o f imperati ves the intended response 
should be regarded, not as that A shoul d do suc h-and-such, but 
that A should have the intention to do such-and-such. Action is 
the ultimate objective, but Grice thinks that this is a better 
formulation as it makes the intended response with both indicat-
ives and imperatives a •propositional attitude', and as it catch-
es the point that impecatives always call foe intentional a c tion. 
The second gcoup of counter-examples involve c ases which 
purport to show that the original definition is too strong, that 
it excludes what should be regarded as genuine e xa mples of mean-
ing-nn. Specifically, in the cases Grice deals with, what is 
attacked is the idea that U wants to produce in A the belief that 
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so-and-so. In an examination, for e xample, when t he exam inee 
ans wer the q uestion, 'When was t he Battle of- Waterloo?', with , 
'1 815', he o r s he is not t cyi.n tJ to pcoduce the belief that the 
Battle o f Waterloo was fought in 1 8 1 ~ in t he e xaminer, but simp ly 
t rying t o te l l t he e xdm iner that 18 15 is when the exami nee thinks 
the ba ttle was fou gh t. I~ cases of confession, where, fo r e xam -
p le , a mo ther says 'It's no good denyi ng i t : you broke the wi n-
do w, d i dn' t you ?', when the ch ild says, ' Yes, I did', it is not 
trying to get its mother t o belie ve it b r ok e t h e window , as sh e 
obviously already knows. If someone is tcy i ng to remember a name , 
say , and says, 'Let me see, what was that g irls name? 1t's o n the 
tip of my tongue', and someone else says, ' Rose' ( the girls 
name), the reply, 'Rose' seems not t o b e i ntended to produce the 
belief that her name was Rose. When two people are revie wing ~ 
list of facts on which t h e y a n~ a l r eady agreed, the one who cedds 
ou t or recites the facts need not be seen as intending to pr odu ce 
a belief that the facts a re such-and-such. When U states the 
c onclusion of a n argument fr om already stated premises, U does 
not intend A to reach a belief that such-and-such on the basis of 
U's intention that A should reach it, but rather fr om the l og i c 
o f the argument. 
Gric e say s that cases within this group (abuse i s another 
,~-<dm!!le) c ause two problems. Firstly, 
There is some difficulty in supposi ng that the indicative 
form is conventionally tied to indicating that the speaker 
is M-intending to induce a c ectain belief in his audience, 
if there are quita norma l oc currences of the indicative mood 
for which the spe aker's intentions are different, in which 
he is not M-intending (nor woul d be taken to be M-intending ) 
to induce a belief (for e xample, in reminding) . (Grice, 
1969: 168) 
' Yet', he adds,' ••• it seems difficult t o suppose that the 
fun ct i on oE the indicative mood has nothin g ~ do with the in-
ducement o f belief'. The speaker's intention tha t the audience 
should intend to act is regarded a s by convention the fun ct i on of 
t he imperati ve mood, and Grice thinks that the functi on of the 
indicat i ve ought to be a na logous. He suggests tha t it might be 
possible t o mainta i n the c lai m that the indicative is convention-
ally tied to the speaker's intentions, but to say t ha t in some 
c ases t he speaker's meaning does not co incide with the meaning of 
the sentence, and to provide a mechanism for adapting these 
cases; how8ver:- , Gr- i c e thinks that even if this does work, t here 
is a second, more serious difficulty. 
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Even if we can preserve the idea that the indicative f o rm 
is tied by conve~ti on to t he indicati o~ of a speaker 's 
in tention to induce a belief, we should have t o allow that 
the soeaker's meaning wi l l be d i fferent for different occur-
" -
r e n c e s o f t he s ~ 'n e L n d L c ~ t i v e s e n t e n c e . • . • B u t i t i s n o t 
very plausible to say that if U says, 'The Battle o f Wa ter-
1 oo wa s fought in 18 1 5' : 
( 1) as a s choolmaste( ( i ntending t o induce a belief ) 
(2) as an examinee 
( 3) as a schoolmas t e r in revision class, 
U would mean something different by ~ttering t hi s sentence 
on the three occasions. (Grice, 1969: 169 ) 
G r i c ·~ • s E i r s t attempt to de a 1 w i t h t hi s pr o b 1 e m i s to s u g g-
est that the M-intended effect is not just a belief but an ' act-
i vated belief', however, he thin ks that if, for e xample, U says 
(reminding A) that Waterl oo was f ought in 1815 when the date was 
•on the ti p of A.'s tongue', 
u canno t e xpect (and so cannot intend) that A's acti vated 
belief will be produced via A's recognition that U i nte nds 
t o produce it. If A already believes . •• that Waterloo was 
fought in 1815, then the mention of this date will induce 
the ac tivated belief, regardless of U's intention to produce 
it. (Grice, 1969: 170) 
If we t hen tr y to cope with this by dropping the requirement that 
U would intend A.'s response to be based on 1\'s ·cecognition of U's 
intention that A should produce the response, we will not be able 
to cope with the cases (such as the 'Herod' e xa mple mentioned in 
connection with the 1957 paper) which caused this requirem~nt t o 
be introduced in the first place . 
After rejecting the possibility of retaini na the notion of 
ac ti vated belief but distinguishing the case o f reaching this 
response Er otn 'assurance defic iency' (because this cannot cope 
with the examinee or confession cases), Grice suggests that we 
should make the direct intended ef fe ct 'not that ~ should think 
that p, but that A should think that Q thinks that p'. In many 
cases U will also intend A to think that p, 'but such an affect 
is t o be thought of as indirec t (e ven though o f t e n o f prime 
interest)' (Grice, 1969 171). 
If, however, an imperative such as 'Do not cross the ba r r -
ier' is considered, Grice thinks t ha t it would be incomplete ly 
explicated unless it is stated that U intends A not merel y to 
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think that U intends that A s hall not cross the barrie r , but also 
to for m the intention not to cross. He cove~s this by distin-
guishing between 'purely exhibiti v~ ' utterances \utter~nces oy 
wh ich the utterer, u, intends to i mQ.art a belief that U has a 
c ertain propositional attitude), and utterances which are not 
onl y e xhibitive but also ' pr:otr eptic' (ut t 8canc es by wh ich U 
intends, via imparting the belief that U has a certain p roposit-
ional attitude, to induce a c orresponding attitude in the hear-
~c) . Thus, the following clause is added: u intends A, on the 
basis o f the fulfillment of (3 ) to come to a certain proposit-
ion a 1 a t t i tude ( to ~ ) t h a t p . 
Gri~ ~ ~o~ has to cover the following possibility: U wants A 
to leave, but considers A to be counter-suggestible and so asks A 
to stay. If we s ay of this case that U, who does not want A to 
stay, meant by the utterance that A was to stay, then, Grice 
says, the just-introduced clause needs to be amended to: U in-
tends A, on the basis of the fulfillment of (3) , to think ~ ! O 
intend A to ~ that p. If this last case is not interpreted in 
this way, then the amendment is omitted. 
In this paper Grice sets himself o ne last task; to cope \vith 
cases of uttere r ' s occas ion-meaning in the absence of a n aud-
ience. In these cases, U utters x (a) thinking it possible that 
there may be a future audience (e.g., a diary entry, a warning 
sign), (b) imagining that there is an audience (e.g., rehearsing 
a speech), (c) neither thinking it possible there will be an 
audience nor imagining an audience, but, 'talking to' him or 
herself, producing an utterance which would be appropriate were 
there an audience (Grice does not think that 'unframed' thou g hts 
mean anything). His solution is to say that x should be such that 
a nyone who was an audience, in a wide sense, would think that U 
had the appropriate intentions (1969: 174-5). 
So we have the following, final, definiti t) fl oE tltterer's 
occasion-meaning: 
Let*~ be a mood marker.* is a dummy mood-indicato r, 
which can be substituted by a specific mood-indicator like 
'+' (indicative) or'!' (impera tiv8). $indicates a pcop-
ositional attitude (e.g., intending to do such-and-such, be-
lieving so-and-so). Let 0 (and 0') range over properties o f 
persons (possible audiences). It could be substituted by, 
'is a passer-by', 'is a native English-speaker', 'is ident-
ical with Jones', and so-on. 
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Let f repr esent fe~tuc~ s of the utterance. 
Let c cepcesen t a mode of c orcela tion 1 - e.g. 1 iconic 1 a ssoc -
ia t i v~ , con \fl-!!1 t ional. 
1 U rn e an t by u t t e c in g x t h a t * $ p 1 _i s t c u e i f f 
I. u uttered x intending x to be such that anyone who a s ~ 
would think that 
( 1 ) x has f 
( 2) f is correlated in way c with ¢-*ing that p 
(3) u intends x to be suc h that anyone who ha s ~~ ~ oulJ 
think , via thinking (1) and ( 2)1 that U ~s t hat p 
( 4 ) in v iew o f (3) 1 U ~s that p; 
a nd 
II. (o~ecative only foe certain substitutends f oe "* V" ) U 
utter-ed x i ntending that should ther-e actually be a n yone who 
h 3. s (/) 1 that person would, via t hi nking {4) , ~ t h :l.t p ; 
and 
I II. It is not the case that, for some inference-eleme n t E, 
U intends x t o be such that anyone who has 9' w t l l bo th 
(1') rely onE in co min g t o tV+ t hat p , and 
{2 1 ) think that U intends x to be such that anyone who has 
~~ will come to ¢+ that p without r-elying on E. 
(N.B.: "~+"is to be read as"~" if Cl ause II is operat-
ive,and as "think that U ~s" if Clause II is non-oper-ative. 
Bo th "9'" and "\) 1 " are used, because U need n ot intend his or 
her possible audience to think of U's possible audience 
under the same descr-iption 3. 5 U does.) (See Grice, 1969: 
174ff.) 
SECTION 2: MEANING AND INTENTIONS. 
The theory of meaning which Grice has developed is both 
complex and ingenious. However, as interesting as it is, I be-
lieve that it fails, that both the f o rmulation o f the 'fundamen-
tal notion' of speaker's meaning and the derivation of timeless 
and applied timeless meaning are based on the use of crucially 
misapplied terminology and of notions which can neve r be filled 
out into usable concepts. In the previous chapters I noted a 
tendency in Austin's work to make a series of exclusions which 
seemed to add up to the operation of an unargued implicit notion 
of communication as centered in the intentionality of a subject 
which is transparent to itself and is logic all y prior to inter-
action. With Grice, the centrality of such a communicative sub-
ject is e xplicit. He takes an intuition of communicative meaning, 
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demonstrates this in terms of the presence of an intentional 
utterer, and e xp lic 3tes the intuition in teGms of th is ce~tral 
presuppos ition. In what foll ow s I shall detail so me aspec ts of 
what I see as the failure of this project, but it may be wort h 
briefly expanding on the general is;ues here. 4 
Chom sk y may be right when he brand s wha t Gr i c e does as 
behav iourist (Chomsk y , 1976: Ch. 2) , however, it is perhaps more 
interesting to note the way in which Grice ' s analysis gro unds 
itself in the notion of a spea ker which is essentially a p riori 
a nd constitutive of communicative r e ldt i o ~s. Gric e's speakers ac t 
according t o conventions of standard (timeless) meaning; bu t this 
communication is a functi o n of the 'convent lo~alizi~g' of meaning 
constituted ultimately through the private os tension of individ-
uals logically prior to language as a social entity, and t he 
actual ' communication of meaning' depends on the simultaneous 
intersubjective communication o f speakers ' intentions. The p r a g -
matic a spects of discourse, as seen through Grice's model, can 
perhaps be described as the details of a 'linguistic con tract ' : 
as the practices o f al r eady understanding, already ' meaningful' 
subjects, whose status a s discursive sub jects is presupposed. We 
shall see that the model collapses, but it should be n o ted that 
even if it did not , all the interesting questions, the questio ns 
abou t these discursive subjects, would b e left untouched. This i s 
a major p roblem surrounding much of the material discussed in 
th is thesis. 
We have seen that f o r Gr ice natural meaning involves a 
natural relation between objects (be these states o f affairs and 
their ef fects, states of afEa i cs :1nd their causes, or behav i o•Jr 
and its intentionality) , whereas non-natural meaning involves an 
intentional relation between signs and their meaning s ( t hese 
meanings being filled out in terms of the effect the •l i:tecance of 
a sign is intended to p roduce ). When e xplicating this material, I 
sug gested that natural me a ni ng seems t o b e taken 3S involvi ng 
something like a perceived causal relation between a sign a nd its 
meaning . The issue is certainl y n o t c lear-cut, however, this 
parallel relation, one of causality and the other of intentio n-
ali ty, seems to br ing ab o ut the first problem for Grice's theory. 
For Grice 's intuitio ns of d istinct types of meaning appear t o 
collap se into an identical causal relation between sign and 
meaning o nce we start dealing with human b ehaviour : the meaning 
o f naturall y meaningful behaviour is the intention b ehind it, a nd 
the meaning o f non-naturally meaningful behaviour ( 'utterance' ) 
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is the intention behind it. That is, the treatment of non-natural 
meaning slides into a representati ~):1 ,)( r1atu r_al me aning , so t ha t 
the sign- me aning relation bec omes a naturally meaningful r elat i on 
and the di stinction which Grice sets up is lost . 
That ' x means- nn p ' does not impl y p (ch~racteristi c ( 1 )) ; 
tha t we can argue from 'x means-nn t ha t p ' to wha t s om e on e me an t 
o r should have meant by p (chacacte risti c ( 3) ) , t hat synonym s of 
n on-natural l y me an ingf ul 't h i ngs' can be given (characteri s tic 
( 4 )) , and that capoct s of non-natural me a ning and thei r r estate-
ment a s reports oE natucal meaning ace not synony ms (character-
istic (5)) , s hows that there is a difference in the way we u se 
' 1nean' .5 But Gr ice t reats bot h relations a s som e how C-l•.tsal. In 
naturally meaningful re lat ions we look for the cau se be hi nd or 
the effect le ading fr om the thing we are interpreti •1g , and i n 
non-naturall y meaningful relations we look f or the effec t le~ding 
from the thing we are interpreting ( the utterance ). Intentional -
ity makes a defining differen c e up to a po i nt . Wit h non -~~ t u ra l 
meaning the relation is not naturally given , but is a functi on of 
the intentionality behind the producti on of the sign. But si nc e 
natural meaning can also involve n atural l y meaningful behaviour, 
natural meaning and non-natural meaning are not Ke pt separate, 
and the prog ram collapses. Howe ver (and t his is an equally impor-
tant point), i t is only because o f this conflati on t ha t the 
p rogram can ge t o ff the ground, for there i s no reason a nd no use 
in tal king about intentionality when talking about meani ng in it-
self. 
This conflati on comes in initially with t he second c hac-:ic -
teristic of non-natural me a ning. Grice says that we can argu~ 
from 'x means-nn t hat p ' to what is meant by x. This can be taken 
in two wa y s: that some one used x meanin g that p ; an d that s omeone 
used x intending/ wanting to bring it about that p . These ar8 very 
different. In t he f irst instance we do not refer to inten t i ons in 
talk ing about the meaning of x , but in the second we do , be cause 
what caused x i s take n t o that person's in t ending/ want ing to 
br ing i t about that p. In the first we are talk ing of a linguist-
i cally meaningful celat ion, while in the second we are talkin g of 
a natural l y meaningful relation. By run n ing together these two 
read ings of what is mea nt by x, Gr ice is able to s uggest that the 
l inguistically meaningful relation is c ausal. On page 378 of 
' Meaning', Gr ice say s that ' A means (meant ) to do s o -and-so (by 
x) ' e xemplifies natural meaning (and this is t he second way of 
reading 'what is meant by x'), and he say s that 'A means (meant ) 
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something by x ' and ' A means (m eant ) by x that .•• 'exemplif y 
non-natural meaning ( the first way o f readin~ ' what is mean t by 
~ ' ) ; and what happen s is that 'to d o s o-and-so ' and ' s om et hing' 
(o r, less eas il y , ' •.. ' ) are conflate..d, s o that the me aning o f a 
si gn ( 'something' or' .•• ' ) is treated as that whic h A in t ends / 
wa n ts to p r oduce in an aud i·~n c· ':! ('so-and-so' ). It is as a result 
o E t h i s con f 1 a t ion t h a t Grice i s ab 1 e to say ( 19 5 7 : 3 8 5 ) t h a t ' t <:> 
a s k w h a t A m e a n t i s to a s k f o r a s p e c i E i c a t i ,Jr1 o E t he i n t e n de d 
affect' . This is quite correct if we are asking what A meant t o 
do ( i t is tautologica l ) , bu t not if we are a s king Nhat A's u tter-
an c e means . 
This is the most important point in my criticism o f Gric e. 
He says ; bo t h in the 1957 paper (page 385 ) and in t he 19 69 pape r 
(page 151 ) , that the fundamental notion implies that t he meaning 
of an utteran ce is the effe c t intended by t he u tterer, and t h is 
i s the way the notion is used, yet this contradicts the fift h 
c ha racteristic o f non-natural meaning. That is, (a ) ' The fact 
tha t U ut t8 re d x means that p ' is not a r::- estatement o f (b) ' U's 
utterance, x , means that p', in the same way tha t (c ) 'The fact 
that he b ell ha s been r ung t h ree times me an s t hat t h e bus is 
full' is not a restatement of (d) 'Those three rings me an that 
the bus is full'. ' Bo t h ma y be true, but they d o not ha ve, e ver1 
approximately , the same meaning' (Grice, l957 : 378 ) . Thus, wha t I 
am c laiming is that Grice rur1s together naturally me an ingful 
intentional behaviour and non-naturall y meaningful signs (wh ich 
c an, of course, be used by people in their n aturally meaningful 
pursuits of intentional activities). We may choose to acc ept that 
what is meaningful about pe op les' intentional behav i our is the 
intentionality which 'lies behind' that beha v i our , a nd we may 
also accept that by understanding what s om eone means to achie ve 
{war"lts to achieve ) when using a sign we may be a ble to understand 
wha t that perso n means £1:. that sign ( the way they are u sing it ) -
but (a) what U 'means' / intends j wants to bring about, and (b) what 
U ' me an s' by a s i g n a r e v e r y d i E E e c ~ r1 t . ' it\ e an ' i n ( a ) c an be u se d 
in phrases like' ••. means x to b e understood in this way ••• ', 
or ' ••• means to imply by x that ••• '. 'Means' in (b ) c an b e u sed 
in phrases ha v ing the form of ' x means the same as .•. ', o r ' x 
means here that ••• '. When we use 'means' in the sec ond sense ir"l 
phrases li ke ' U means that same as A by x ', or ' U m.;an s her 8 tha t 
p ', it is crucial t o recogni z e that we are tal k ing about the 
meani r"lg o f a si gn, not about wha t U means/ intends to do. The best 
way to see this i s in th•= statement 'U means x t o mean that p '. 
Normally we would substitute an explicitly intentional verb ( 'in-
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te nds', 'wants' -at e.:.) for the f irst u se of 'mean' oc a p hra se 
lik e ' ••• have the sense ... ' for the second-u se, but in a n y 
r:: a se , t h e t w o u se s o f ' me an ' a r e c r u c i a 11 y d i f fer en t . 
I b elieve that in many way s the problem wh ic h I have been 
trying t o br ing out is the same one which 1-Jilson ( 197 0 ) and 
Wright ( 1975 ) have ca ised.r; Wilson's counter-example lies in 
the group of cases which purpor t t o show that the Grice an mechan-
ism is too narrow . The scenar io is that , in conve r s ation with 
Grice, Wilson say s, 'Sno w is white'. 
By uttering 'Snow is white ' I mean that snow is whit e. It 
follows tha t by uttering 'Sno w is white' I mean s omet hing. 
According to Grice it f o llows that I intend (1) , ( 2) and (3) 
[o f the initial Gricean mechanis m - Wilson thinks t hat t he 
case applies e qual l y to the mechanism as deve l ope d in Grice : 
1969 ]. Now I do intend to say ( report the fact ) that s now i ~ 
wh ite, but the only secondary intention I have is to avo i d 
having an y o f t he intentions Grice att ributes to me in this 
or any subsequent papers of his. If Gr ice amends h is defin-
ition, I amend my scenario. He ca n't win •.•• One migh t 
cavil a t the suggestion that o ne can intend t o avo i d intend-
ing to br ing about y, b ut it hardly matters, since one can 
c ertainl y avoid trying t o accom plish y . (W i l s on, 197 0: 296) 
It is not clear that there is any way that Grice ca n cop e with 
this case. The insertion to cope with me~ning without an audience 
will not work, for Wilson does not uttar ' Snow i s white ' a s if 
there were an audience towards which he has Gr i c e an intentinns. 
He simply refuses to have Gricean intentions; and e ven if Gric~ 
could somehow show that the utteran ce is a n illeg itimate u se of 
language, t he point still holds t hat it is quite poss i b le to mean 
something without Griceanly meaning anything.7 
I am n o t concerned to arg ue that Wilson sees Gr i c e's p r ob lem 
in exactly the sa me v¥a y t h:t t I do , how e ver, he does illuminate 
the issues I have raised, and I believe that he comes ve ry c l o se 
t o the fundamental p r oblem when he a commen t by Stam pe that 
meaning is not a doing, and goes on to say : 
There are s ome relevant things that one can do, vi z., utter 
a token o f 'Snow is white', •... But me a ni ng that sn ow is 
white is not s o mething that you can do. And I think we can 
see why. It h as a lready been done, so to speak , i n v irtue of 
the corpus o f utteranc es lying behind you and giv ing meaning 
to what you currently say . (W ilson,l970: 301 ) 
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The same s o r-t of po int is made by Wright. He concentrates on 
the non-linguistic 'utterances' offered by G~ce, and comments 
that if the c onduct o r' s t hree r-ings of the bell or the police 
officer 's hand wave to stop (another ~f Grice 's examples ) were 
not conventionalized the conductor and the officer would not be 
able to get their messages across. Just intending that a hand 
wave get a car to stop on the basis of rec ognitiol'1 of that 
intention will not get the car stopped. The hand wave has to be 
recognizable by t he driver- as meaning ' Stop your car' (and not 
'Hi ! ' or ' Make a 1 eft turn' ) . 
But note that it is the utter~n ce that is initially r-ecog-
nized, not the speaker 's intentions. At best, t he intention 
recognition is secondary. The driver stops his car- because 
he recognizes the utterance ' upturned palm' as telling h i ~ 
that the officer intends him to do just that; •••• ( Wrig h t, 
1975: 370) 
Wright also notes that if a speaker's goals are not ach ie ved it 
would mean, for Grice, that the speaker has simply not i n tended 
hard e~ough or correctly. 
But if a spea k e'C Ea ils to get h is message across t o th8 
addressee, he does not simply intend harder, or tr y to 
intend more clearly (if those things even make any sense) . 
Instead, he switches to another conventional utteran c~ th~t 
he feels that the addressee will recogni ze more readily; 
alternatively , he might repeat h is 11 t terance, f o r example, 
with mo re force , in a louder tone, and so on. (Wright , 19 75: 
371) 
A further point which Wright makes i s t hat understanding also 
depends on the utterance occurr-ing in the ap propciate circumstan-
ces (1975 : 372f.) . 
On my reading of Grice the mistaken notion of meaning de-
pends on a constant sliding between meanin g as intending and 
meaning 'proper'. What he offers is not an explicati o n o E mean-
ing-nn in terms of natural mean i t1g . I t is rather the prese ntation 
of meaning as meaningful behaviour and the refusal to deal with 
meaning as such. The correct analys is of, 'By uttering x U meant 
something', is, ' U meant/ intended to do something; and meant/ in-
tended to do this by uttering x , which meant (which had the 
conve ntional meaning) "so-and-so"', and this analysis does not 
touch on explicating how it is that ~ means something. 
Supposing, however, that we i gnore this problem with Grice 's 
p rogram , we find that his analys is of meaning still fails, since 
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it involves a soli psism wherein there can be no communication o~ 
the one hand and no meaning on t he o the r . H~re I am a dding de t ail 
to an argument u sed against Strawson in the ?Cavi ou s chapte r . 
-U's task is as f o llo ws: U signals, intending to efft~ct !\ ir1 
wa y p ( 'p' bein g filled out as per Gr ice, 1969 ) , which requires 
at least ( for it to be Gricean meaning ) U to intend t hat A 
recognize that U intends to effect A in wa y P i but to effect that 
A re cognizes that U intends to effect A in way p , U mu st si gnal 
t::> A that U intends to effect A in ""d':f p ( i 11 order tha t A knows 
what U me ans) , wh ic h requires that U intends that A recognize 
that U inte11d s to effect A in way p, which requires t ha t U 
signals to A tha t U i11tends that A recognize t hat U intends to 
effect A in way p, •.• and so-on. So signaling can never get off 
the ground. 
A's task is as follows: A mu st interpret, from the effec t U 
intends, the meaning of U's signal (x) , which is what U meansi 
b ut what x means, which is what U mea ns, is what U intends- and 
A c an never get a start. A learns what U intends by understanding 
x, but can onl y understand x by know ing what U i ntends. So unde r -
standing can never get off the ground. 
It may be true that in understanding a com municat i ve sign we 
ofte n rely on assumptions about what the utterer (o r a sup posed 
utterer) is trying t o achieve. We need to work out how the sign 
is being used, and to do this we interpret the linguistic and 
extra-linguistic context o f its u tterance. But this is a quite 
separate point. These thi ng s are an aspect of communicationi they 
are not constitutive of meaning. 
As one final way of seeing this side of Grice's mistake, we 
can consider his comment at the e nd o f the 1957 paper that 'to 
show that the criteria for judging linguistic intentions are very 
like the c riteria for judging non-linguist i c in t en tio11s is t o 
show that linguistic intentions are very li ke non-linguistic 
intentions' ( 1957: 387-8). I believe that we can 11 o w s ee that in 
fact the criteria f or judging linguistic and non-linguistic in-
te ntions will be exactly the same sect s o f cr iteria, and that n o t 
only are linguistic and non-linguistic intentions very ali ke, 
they are the same, in as much as t hey are inten t ions to do 
someth ing. The ~o i11t is that there is not a difference between 
doing as meaning and doing as acting - the difference which 
Grice's program relies on. What distinguishes linguistic o c comm-
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unic~t ive inte~tions is that we carry out these intentions by 
using signs which have meaning, and we may ~ant to argue that 
when 0 u r linguistic intentions are directed at communication it 
s eems that we try to make our inten~ion to communicate explicit -
but these differences are not the ground for a theory of meaning. 
This last point is one which Wilson ~ akes, when he claims 
t hat what does a r ise from Grice's papers is that, 
whatever else signaling is, it is of the essence of sig-
naling ••• that the signaler intend thdt th8 s i gna lae would 
recognize that the signaler is deliberatel y si gnaling and, 
moreover, that the signaler intend, or at least ta k e f or 
granted, that the signalee should rec ognize that he is 
(pcimarily) signaling this and not s o mething else. (Grice 
has bent his efforts to breaking the above circularity. ) 
This obser vdti on o n si gnaling seems to me to be true and 
interesting. It is, howeve r , ~ c ontribution to what would be 
c~lled the pure sociology of speech behaviour, not to seman-
tics or meaning theory. (Wilson,l970: 29 9) 
I believe that the circularity which Wilson mentions is an issue 
to be taken seriously, and one which orings into question the 
truth and interest of the observation, ho ~8 vec, for the moment we 
can finish by looking at Grice's attempt to explicate derivati ve 
types of meaning in terms of his fundamental notion. 
The main point to be noted in connection with the 1968 paper 
is that Grice does not explicate timeless and applied timeless 
meaning in terms of the fundamental notion. Once he brings in i:.hB 
notion of there being a procedure in U's repertoire to ~d ke ~ 
certain utterance if U wants to effect A in a certain w~y, and 
once, as Grice says, 'want' takes the place of 'M-intend', then 
the weight of making x mean that p falls onto U's 'procedure'. I 
think that a very strong reason for intention and meaning n~t 
being c onfused as obviously in the 1968 paper is that there the 
statements of meaning are no linger phrased in th~ ambiguous way 
they are in the original paper (compare; By uttering x U meant 
that p; and For u, x meant 'p'); nevertheless, the error caused 
by the origindl dmbiguity remains, and meaning is still seen as a 
doing. But the fundamental notion does not remain. It dissolves 
into a claim about the 'pure sociology of speech behaviour' (to 
use Wilson's phrase), and the 'act' of meaning is taken over by 
the procedure. 
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At this point Grice could have stopped trying to explicate 
meaning. He could have spoken of a procedure- t o u se x ~ it h ~ 
certain meaning and concentrated on e xp laini ng t he noti o n of this 
p rocedure being shared with i~ a con~~nity as part of a stu dy of 
speech behaviour. This would involve adopting a posit ion some-
thi ng like Ziff's ( see Ziff, 1967: 7). However, Gr ice still wants 
to t reat meaning as a doing, as a process. 
As we have seen, the 'resultan t p rocedure' which 'does' th is 
meaning is that o f constructing semantic units from se mantic 
element s, which are linguistic items which have been correlated 
with non-linguistic items. As it is finally set out, t his c orre l -
ation involves the ostention of tha non-linguistic items. So this 
pcocedur-e oc f>( :)cess is what lies at the basis o f the 'act' of 
meaning, and it is here that meaning-nn could perhap s b e explic-
ated i n terms o f natural m~aning as fundamental. 
But it seems impossibl ~ t o effectively fill this out. N,) t: 
even names can be defined by pure ostensive cocrela ti o 11, for to 
pick out the object t o wh ich T co rrelate the name I must b e ab le 
to identify the object as, say, a cat. But this means that saying 
' thi s a nd this a nd this are cats' depends on my knowi ng what cat s 
ar. ~, on my having a concept of what I am going to call 'cats'. If 
I was to pick out an adjective ('hairy-coated', say) by pure 
ostensio n, th is pcesupposes a concept of what aspect of things 
( their hairy-coatedness) is being picked out; and the problems 
become even greater with other parts o f speech. Of course, we can 
define words ostensively, but only because we have a g rasp of 
language already by which to carry out the definitio n . Grice, 
however, wants to explain this gr.asp o f language b y the very 
notion of ostensive correlation, and so cannot presuppose the 
language, and therefore cannot get his descciptiJ~ of language 
off the ground. So, ostension cannot be a semantic foundation. 
Finally, while I io :1 o t wi sh t o go into t he iss u e o f the 
'mystery' (a s Gr ice p uts it) of explaining implicit correlation 
by sayi ng that the utterer would make an explicit correlation if 
he or she so chose, it is worth noting that if words get their 
meaning through cor.relatio n, then people must in fact have al-
ready correlated the linguistic items from which they construct 
the sen tences with which they make explicit correlations, and 
even if we have to swallow the mystery of implicit correlation, 
we should not have to swallow the impossibilit y of any sort of 
pure correlation as a basis. 
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CONCLUSION. 
As was noted earlier, Gr i c e's theory of meaning-nn is 
probabl y relatively independent of Austin's wor k , and as such i t 
o f ~ecs an inte r8 st i.ng alt ernati ve attempt t o treat the communic-
ative use of language as primaril y a series of acts, rather than 
taki ng com munic -:lti. ;)q a s je c i v'lt i vt~ ) C a t •)c:na l syntactic-se mantic 
s ystem. As relatively independent, there is a sense in wh i ch 
Grice's approach goes much deeper than Austin's in a s s ign ing 
pragmatic features to l a nguaga - by including wi thin the general 
theory those semantic aspects which Austin bracketed-off in the 
locut iona ry act. 
On the other hand, and we saw this i n the d iscussion of 
Strawson in the second chapter, Grice's approach can be seen a s 
c a s hing-out Austin's account o f illocutionary ac ts (be this ~ 
cashing- out of a certain re v ision of Austin or a certain w~ -:-:-:;io n 
o f Austin). The force of an utte rance, i ts comm unicative meaning, 
is taken as intended force, and filled out according t o Gr i c e's 
schema. On such a view, Gr ice's work can be seen as a the o re tica l 
development of Austin's program . 
In either case , however, Grice ' s theory appears to be fund-
amentally fla wed. It begins with a conflation of meaning in the 
sense of intending and meaning as sense and reference (p lus 
force), and a description o f the former is supposed to give a 
description of the latter (though without the distinction being 
made clear). Such a view fails to account for the way in which 
meaning can exist independent and irrespe ctive of t he suppositio 11 
of intentions and it fails to account f o r the way in which ascc-
iptions of intentionality are dependent upon the interpretatio n 
of utterances (whole utterances, including naturally and non-
naturally meaningful behaviour and context) . 
Because of this, the model of communication which Grice 's 
theory involves cashes out into a situation in wh ich communic-
ation would b e impossible, leaving communicative subjects isol-
ated with their intentions, and deni ed .. ~ ~~·~:1 the language-as-
medium of a formalist account of communication. Further, when a n 
attempt is made to discuss the origin of m<2aning wi t hin the 
intending subject , the account is reduc ed to a notion of 
ostensive definiti on which in fact presupposes meaning and an 
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understanding o f language in the ve~y ac t wh ic h sup posedl y 
constitutes l a ngua ge. -
It may be worth b~iefly ~et u cning to the natur a l / n on-nat ur a l 
d istinction with which Grice's program begins. G~ i ce couche s t he 
d istinction in terms of the p rese nce o r absence o f intentions i n 
mean i ng, a nd we ha ve seen that such a n a ssum p tion, a t leas t a s he 
has de veloped it, is untenab le, bu t this does no t me an t hat we 
can make no thing o f t he oci gin a l distinc tion. 
An alternative mi gh t be to say that the non-n atu r a l meani ng 
which Gric e points t o should be described as com munic~ ti ve ~~an ­
i ng, as meaning which arises in communic ati on. This meaning c ou l d 
b e seen as cea li zed and constituted through g i ven procedures, 
which could b e filled-out in terms of something li ke Austin' s 
Eel i c i t y cofldi t i on s . As the se p ~ocedure s invoke 'noc e tha n what is 
said in a traditiona l se nse, c ommunic ati ve meaning will go be yond 
t ile s tanda rdly conventional meani ng o f the bare utterance - it 
~ou ld have t o be seen a s a f unction of the who le speech act. As 
t he 'whole speech act' is relatively indeterminate - and g i ven 
t h a t we do n o t i n v o k e i 11 t e n t i o n a 1 i t y .:t s a 1 o c u s a n d b o u n d a r: y o f 
the speech act - so communicative meaning will be relativel y 
indete r mina te, both for uttere~ and audience, dP. pending on the 
c onte xt o f utterance. Intentionality would not be e xcluded fr o m 
s u c h a m ode 1 , but i t w o u 1 d be t r e a ted a s be i n g con s t i t u t e d 
thr oug h me a ni ng , and not a s some une xplained ori g i na tin g fac to ~ 
of communic ation. 
This point brings the f o cus again onto a genera l them e o f 
this thesis. Grice's approa ch seems t o be underlain by the notion 
of a subject which has two crucial features. On the one hand, it 
is consti t uted prio r to inte~ation as a ling u i s ti c sub ject. 
Meaning resides in it a s the ostend i ng c onsciousness a nd is then 
t ransmitted i n communica tion. As such, all questions about t he 
bas i s of meaning and communicatio n are pushed, by the theory of 
meaning and commun i cation which presupposes such a subject, out 
of t he fiel d of analysis. Furthermore, this subje ct is presup-
posed a s a cer t a in t ype o f subject, as self-transparen t and 
unitary , kn o wing what it means and gi v i ng d8 te rmif'1acy t0 ~ e aning, 
because meaning is grounded i n it s conscious intef'1tionality.8 
In the next chapter we will see the notion of such a subject at 
play in a slightly different way , in Se a r:le' s theor y o f speec h 
acts. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SEARLE ON SPEECH ACTS AND INTENTIONALITY 
INTRODUCTION. 
Searle's place within pragmatics is of interest for two 
reasons. First, his theoretical position is initially developed 
through a critique and an assimilation of the work of Austin and 
G r i c e , a n d h i s work se em s to be one a t t e m p t to of f e r a f u 11 y-
fledged pragmatics within philosophy. Secondly, and perhaps 
because of this first point, Searle's work, and at least its 
basic theoretical position, has been that version of philosoph-
ical pragmatics which seems to be most influential within ling-
uistic pragmatics. 
The theory developed by Searle shares with the work of Austin 
and Grice an attempt to place emphasis on language as a system of 
acts. Like Grice, and like a certain reading of Austin, Searle 
treats language as explicable in terms of the actual intentional 
production of language tokens by language users, and is opposed 
to more formalist views, which place emphasis on language as a 
more or less abstract calculus, independent of language user's 
intentionality .1 
At first sight Searle's approach might appear promising. He 
seems not to be as susceptible to charges of psychologism as 
Grice, and he also seems not as easily accused of 'bracketing' 
meaning as Austin has been. This is because, on the one hand, he 
attempts to ground meaning in the 'constitutive rules' of speech 
acts, and the necessary and sufficient conditions for a speech 
act to be successful, rather than in speaker's intentions 
(Grice); and because, on the other hand, he focuses attention on, 
and sees meaning as being found in (or mediated through) the 
illocutionary act, in gaining understanding, rather than seeing 
meaning as aLising in the locutionary act (Austin), or as being 
expLessed in the speaker's perlocutionary intentions (as he 
claims Grice has done). 
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Unfor-tunatel y this pr-omise is not fulfi-lled. In many way s 
Sear-l e adopts most of the failings and few of the v ir- tues of the 
pr-agmatic pr-ogr-am. We gain fr- om Sear-le an appr-oac h which ha s 
ulti mately no explanato r- y power-, and which, in an attempt to 
a nal yze communication, is for-ced to postulate alr-eady-constituted 
language user-s as an explanator-y base. Basicall y , this occurs 
because Searle collapses Austin's distinction between meaning and 
for-ce, and with this move adopts Gr-ice's equivocation regarding 
the two senses of 'mean'. We thus find no analysis of meaning, 
and an analysis of illocutionar-y acts (Seacl 3 's c en tr-al concep t ) 
wh ic h is cir-cular- and descr-ibes an unwor-kab le phenomenon. 
SECTION 1: THE CRITIQUE OF AUSTIN. 
In 'Austin on Locutio nar-y and Illocutionary Ac ts' ( 1968 ) 
Searle's main concern is to attack Austin's distinct ion between 
the locutionary act and the illocutionary act and to substitut e a 
distinction between phonetic, phatic, propositional and illocut-
i ona ry acts. It will be remember-ed that for Austin the locutio n-
ary act consisted of the phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts, and 
constituted the sense and reference, or- meaning of a g i ven utter-
ance, while the illocutionary act was the uttering of that l ocut-
io n with a certain force, as a question, command, constative, o r 
whatever. The most i mportant point to remember here is that for 
Au stin meaning something by an utterance and using it with an 
illocutionary f orce are abstractable acts, and not just concept-
ual differences. 
The essence of Searle's argument against this distinction 
lies in his claim (similar to one which we have earlier seen made 
by Cohen) that Austin's examples of supposed rhetic acts invar-
iably invo l ve illocutionary verbs. That is, Searle t hin ks that a 
separable r-hetic ac t can never be picked out. He t hu s claims that 
' every sen tenc e has soma i llocutionary force potential, if only 
oE a very broad k ind, built into it'. 
[T]here are ( in the utterance of complete sentences) no 
rhetic acts as opposed to illocutionary acts at all. There 
are indeed phonetic ac ts of uttering certain noises, phatic 
acts o f utter-ing certain vocables or words (and sentences ) , 
and illocutionary acts, such as making statements, asking 
questions, giving commands, but it does not seem that t here 
are or can be acts of using those vocables ir1 sentences with 
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sense and reference which ~re not already (a t least purport-
ed) illocutionary acts •••• a rhetic ac~ is always an illoc-
utionary act of one kind or another. (Searle,l968: 412-3) 
It may seem that Searle still allows- there to be tw o separately 
abstractable acts, but he goes on to say that, 
The concepts locutionary act and illocutionary a ct 3re 
indeed different, just as the concepts terrier and dog are 
different. But the conceptual difference is not sufficient 
to establish a distinction between separate classes of acts, 
because just as every terrier is a dog, so every locutionary 
act is an illocutionary act .••• Every serio us literal 
utterance contains some indications of force as part of its 
meaning. ( Searle, 1968: 413) 
We can get a grasp of the position behind this objecti o 11 by 
considering the three linguistic principles which Searle sa ys 
underlie his case. 
First, Searle claims that the illocutionary forces of utter-
ances may be more or less specific, and that there are several 
different principles of distinction for distinguishing d iff~rent 
types o f illocutionary acts. This means that we can u se a general 
perf o rmative which still correctly describes the act (Searle's 
example is 'I asked you to do it', which may refer to a request, 
en treaty or plea, e.g.), so the de script ions may be more or less 
determinate. The more important po int for Searle is that illoc-
u ti onary acts themselves may be mo re or less defini t ~ ~ nd precise 
as to their force. Searle says of the 'I asked you to do it' 
example that' I may not at all know myself which of the specific 
possibilities I meant it as', and he goes on: 
My own intentions may have been indeterminate within this 
range (which is not to say that they can be completely 
indeterminate - that I may not know if it was a statement, 
an order, a question). (Searle, 1968 416 ) 
This point a llows Searle to show that any supposed locutionary 
act (saying that .•. , e.g.) is already a merel y less specific 
illocutionary act, rather than a diffe rent ty)e of act altogether 
(see 1968: 416-7), and it also allows him, in his own theor y of 
speech acts, to have language users 'working within a set of 
public constitutive rules without thereby having to be in an 
omniscient relation to a precisely articulated system of rules. 
The next principle is that whatever can be meant can be 
said. Searle adm its tha t we may not be able to alwa y s say what we 
mean, because the lexical and syntactical resources of languages 
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are finite, and because - especially with a second language - our 
kn ow led ge of these resources is limited. His po int is, however, 
that there are no limits, in principle, to the enrichment o f 
these resources or our knowledge of _them ( 1968: 415 ) . He c laims 
that a neglect o f this principle lies behind Austin's belief tha t 
u t t er ing a sentence with a certain meaning ( sense and referenc e ) 
and u t t ering it with a c ertain forc e are different acts, and sa ys 
t ha t o n c e we acc e p t this principle we can see that wh ile there~ 
a category distinction between the sentence and the illocutio n ary 
ac t pe r f o rmed in its utterance, the acts which can be performed 
in the utterance o f a sentenc e are a function o f its meaning, a nd 
t hus, a cco rdin g to the princ iple, it is possible with e very 
illocutionary act to utter a sentence, the literal meaning o f 
which determines that its serious literal utterance in an approp-
riate co nte x t will be a performance of that act, since it e x -
p resses its force. 'Since it is possible to mean (intend) that 
for c e it is possible to sa y that force literally' (1 968: 417). 
Force is not something separable from the meaning of the sen-
tence; it can always be a par t o f the literal meaning, and 'the 
meaning o f every sentence already contains some determiners o f 
illocutionary force' ( 1968: 4 17) . Searle does not deny that often 
the said-meaning and the meant-force come apart, that the utter-
ance often does not express its intended force, but, he claims, ' 
this is ••. a contingent fact about the way we speak and not a 
conceptual truth about the concept of illocutionary force'. 
Thus, while Austin takes the breakdowns in speech, the 
'sli p s between c up and lip' as the starting point for anal ysis, 
and as indicators of pragmatic divisions in linguistic behaviour, 
Searle, in an attitude quite characteristic o f his work, centres 
analysis on correct and successful acts, and from there explains 
'contingent' and 'parasitic' behaviour. A further, connected 
point, is that while it may seem that the principle that we can 
say what we mean contradicts the principle that the meant f o rce 
may b e indefinite, being able to sa y what we mean does not, for 
Searle, mean that what we mean has to be definite. Nonetheless, 
we will see later that the determinacy of meaning and rules raise 
an important issue, and we should at least note here the assumed 
self-transparency of t he speaking subjec t, a crucial presuppos-
ition in Searle's work. 
Searle's final principle is that the meaning of a sentence 
is determined by the meanings of all its meaningful components. 
He says that Austin's concentration, when speaking of meaning, on 
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the Freg ian terminology of sense and reference, leads to the 
assumpt i o n that words a nd word o rder are the- only e l ements which 
determine meanin g. He claims that we must include the sentence ' s 
deep s yntact i c struc ture, and t he stress and intonat i o n contour 
of its u tterance (a nd punctuation in written speech) , and sugg -
ests ( in a comment which again shares something with Cohen's 
critici sm of Aust in ) that one reason for Austin neglecting the 
e xt en t to which forc e was part of meaning wa s that he failed to 
emphasi ze some of the most co mmon elements in t he me a ning of a 
se ntenc e which determine the illocutionary force potential of t he 
sentence. (1968 : 416 -7 ) 
While Searle rejects Austin's distinction between the l ocut -
ionary (specifi c t he rhetic ) act a nd the illocutionary act, he 
does think that there is a distinction between the content or 
p ropositi o n in an illocutionary act and the fo~ce o r illocution-
a~y t ype o f the act. 
We need to distinguish the illocutionary act from t he p~op­
ositiona l act - that is, the act o f e xpressing the propos-
it ion (a phrase which is neutral as to illocutiona ry fo~ce ) . 
And the poi nt of the distinction is that the identity con-
dit i o ns of the propos itional ac t a re n o t the same as th e 
identity conditi ons of the tota l illocutionary acts. (Searle, 
1968 : 420) 
He go es o n to say ( in a f ormulatio n which echos a co mment o f 
Austin's ) that in constati ves we concentra t e o n the p~oposition , 
while in so-called pe r f ormat i ves ( 'so-called ' be cause Searle 
agrees with Austin that const a tives are perfo rmati ves anyway) we 
a ttend to the force. 
The fi ~st problem with the posit i o n p ut forward here r elates 
to the col lapsing of the locutionary -illocu tionary distinction. 
Like some othe~ critic isms of Austin's dis tinc tio n (especi a lly 
Cohen's) it is based e~roneously o n the fact that the f o r c e wit h 
wh i ch a n utterance is made can be explicit in t he utterance 
itsel f, a nd then treats illocutio nary for c e a s being dete ~mined 
by sem a ntic fe a t ures o f t he utterance ( in this ca se, 'i l locut ion-
ary force indicat ing d e vices' ) . 
A usefu l p ers pe ctive o n this probl em can b e found in the 
crit i c ism o f Se ar le's argument by Stam pe. Refe~ring to Sea rle's 
statement in the ex p licat i o n of the Princip le of Expressibility 
that 'i f it is possible t o mean (intend ) that fo~ce it is poss-
ible to say tha t fo r c e l ite~al ly ', Stampe says that 'this passage 
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very nearly defies comment', since the clause is so ungrammatical 
( 1975: 5-6). But he construes 'to mean (intend) that force' as 
'to mean ( intend ) one's utterance to have that force', and 'to 
say that force literally'2 as the claim that, 
For every illocutionary act one intends to perform, it is 
possible to utter a sentence the literal meaning of which is 
such as to determine that its serious literal utterance in 
an appropriate context will be a performance of that act. 
(Searle, 1968: 418) 
Stampe says, however, that this position involves 'mistaking 
the features of a sentence that render it unambiguous as t o f o r c e 
for t he factor that determines that its utterance has the force 
it has' • 
The proper explicit use of the performative preface has been 
taken not merely to indicate or to say what one is doing in 
saying what he say, but variously to 'constitute' his sa y ing 
of it the making of a promise, a request, or whate ver it ma y 
be- that is, to be what makes it the case that one has 
---
performed this or that speech act. (Stampe, 1975: 2 ) 
In Chapter 2 we saw this same problem in Cohen's response to 
Austin (and Stampe notes that his criticism applies as much to 
Cohen as to Searle). The elision which takes place renders the 
notion of force vacuous, and misses the whole point of Austin's 
original insight. 
Stampe says that it is nearly always possible to indicate 
what the intended force of an utterance is. 
But in doing so, what one makes explicit is neither what he 
means nor those intentions that constitute his meaning what 
he means, but, rather, certain intentions he has concerning 
what he says. He makes it clear how he intends what he says 
to be taken, e.g., whether as a promise or as a warning. And 
to do that is to say something about what one says or has 
said or will say, ~' if not to say it, otherwise to give it 
to be understood .••• But if this is so, then what he says, 
thus to make known what he intends what he says to be taken 
as, must be distinct from what he says (and what he means 
thereby) and further must pertain or refer to his saying of 
it. (Stampe, 1975: 11) 
Searle argues that the distinction which Austin developed 
between locutionary and illocutionary acts is based on the mis-
taken treatment of them as 'mutually exclusive classes of acts'. 
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He says that just as every terrier is a dog, so every locutionary 
a c t is an illocutionary act. However, as St~mpe points out ( 19 75: 
10 , n.l3 ) , Austin did not treat them as mutuall y exclusi v e cla ss-
es of acts. He said, as will be remewbered from Chapter 2, that 
t o perform a l ocutionary act is ~ ipso to perfo r m an illocution-
ary act, and he regards l ocutionary and illocutionary acts as 
acts which can be abstracted from the total speech act. Eliding 
the distinctio n altogether, as Searle wants to do by tak ing t he 
i llocutionary force as constituted by (because it can be made 
explicit in ) the rhetic act l o ses the point o f introducing t he 
n o tion in t he first place and gives no acc o unt o f t he f o rces 
utterances can have. 
The second problem arises with the introduction of t he 
n o tion of the propositional act. For when Searle collapses t he 
l ocutionary-illocutionary distinction the meaning-content of t he 
u tterance is made dependent on its illocutionary force, wh ich it 
has initially determined. Thus meaning as the propositional a ct 
becomes empty as a pragmatic concept. The study of speech acts 
becomes a study o f illocutionary force (albeit that this force 
itself is dealt with inadequately ). 
In Speech Acts Searle at o ne time comments that the 'study 
o f t h e me an in g of sen ten c e s i s not in p r inc i p l e d i s t inc t from a 
study of speech acts .... [They are] one study from different 
points of view' ( 1969: 18 ) . However, when he argues that illocut-
ionary force is or can always be part of the meaning of a sen-
tenc e he says, as we have seen, that since it is possible to 
'mean ( intend ) ' a given force it is possible to say that force 
literally. Even if we ignore Stampe's criticism of this claim, it 
was hopefully shown in the discussion of Grice that the conn-
ection between meaning-intending and meaning-content is based on 
a completely misleading equivocation. Yet Searle here reflects a 
trend in his work of equating meaning with intended force, so 
that a study of force, of the illocutionary act, entails an 
adequate study of speech acts. This point relates to an accus-
ation which is made by Harrison. In response to the passage from 
Speech Acts just quoted he says, 
If I state, for example, that Searle is a professor at 
Berkeley, the illocutionary act which I perform is, presum-
ably, stating; it is not 'stating something about Searle', 
and certainly not 'stating that Searle is a p rofessor at 
Berkeley'. (Harrison,l979: 172 ) 
While a study of speech acts need not necessarily be solely a 
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study of illocutionary acts, as Harrison seems at times to imply, 
it is important to note at this point a tendency in Searle's work 
to slide in t h is direction, leaving meaning-as-content b rac keted 
in favour of the central analytic c~tegory of the illocution. 
It is true that Searle does introduce the noti on of t he 
propositional act, which is distinguished from t he illocutionary 
act. A concept such as the propositional act seems needed by a 
semantic theory in order to take account of the meaning-content 
of an utterance. And if such a concept is to have analytic status 
within a pragmatic theory it must be of an act, otherwise it 
would have to be excluded from the conceptual armory of a prag-
matic theory. This is the role assigned to Austin's rhetic act 
and to Grice's intentions. However, Searle's problem is that he 
needs to substitute an act for Austin's rhetic act which has 
content, but no force. In this he fails. 
Searle wants to claim that expressing a proposition is 
neutral as to illocutionary force. It is merely the act supplying 
the content of a speech act, which cannot occur apart from an 
illocutionary act ( see 1969: 29 ) . In response to this we must, it 
seems, either reject his arguments against Austin's rhetic act, 
and regard this as having the same role as the rhetic act (but 
presented, note, as something like an already-constituted con-
stative )3 or deny that this is an act at all in a pragmatic 
sense. Obviously Searle does not want it as a rhetic act, but in 
that case he gives no reason why we should not read 'expressing a 
p r oposition' as a general illocutionary act in the same way as he 
reads Austin's examples of rhetic acts as more or less general 
illocutionary acts. However, if the propositional act is not to 
be equated with the illocutionary act, and if it is distinguished 
from Austin's rhetic act, Searle gives no indication how it is to 
be analyzed as an act at all. For Austin, to perform a locution-
ary act is eo ipso to perform an illocutionary act, as is the 
case with Searle's propositional act, but Searle's act must be 
p rotected fr o m the type of analysis to which he subjects the 
locutionary (rhetic) act, and only arise through the performance 
of an illocutionary act. It must arise as an independently abstr-
actable act. 
Such a cloistered act seems to drop out of a pragmatic 
theory altogether. It determines illocutionary acts, but in turn 
is dependent on them. It determines them in as much as the force-
indicating part of an utterance (the 'illocutionary force indic-
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a t ing devic e' ) constitutes the fo~ce of an utte~ance, and t h is 
mu st be ca~ried by the semantic c ontent o f tne u tte ran c e , -3 
p ~ oposition a l act. But it is dependent in as mu ch as a p ~oposi t ­
io nal act c an o nl y exist as an illocutio nary act and is no t 
abst~actable from the illo cutionary act. 
I n this light it is wo~th considering an a~gument by Kambar-
tel, who adopts the position that a ~adically p ragmatic anal ysis 
of language needs elementary acts which mediate hi gher o~der 
a c ts. He thin ks that Austin does this with loc utionary acts, bu t 
suggests that Searle denies himself this possib ility . He quo tes 
the f o llowing passage from Speech Acts: 
The expression of a proposition is a p~opositional a ct , not 
an illocutionary act. And as we say, p ropositional acts 
c annot occur alone ..•• When a propositio n is exp ressed it 
is alwa y s expressed in t he performanc e of an illocutionary 
act. (Searle,l969: 29 ) 
And Kambartel comments on this: 
[ Searle] seems to analyze the so called p~opositional a c ts 
themsel ves as mediated by the corresponding i l locu tionary 
acts •••• This leaves us with a pragmatic c i r c le: The 
propositional acts are t o be mediated by t he co~~esponding 
illocutionary acts, the s y mbolic constitution o f wh ich o n 
the other hand makes use of the respective p ropositional 
acts as p rimary acts. (Kambartel, 1976: 81-2 ) 
The alte~native is, as has been suggested, to say that b e c ause 
they cannot occur as self-sufficient acts propositio nal acts are 
not true acts, but Kambartel says that Searle can then no longe r 
be seen as doing pragmatics. 
Either a symbolic act of the form ! (p ) 'contains' a pragmat-
ically independent symbolic part p, whic h thus may be 
qualified as an act; or we simply do no k now what is the 
sense of stating that the respecti ve p 'expresses a prop-
osition', which is the same propositio n with all the diff-
erent symbolic acts ha v ing the f o rm F(p) . ( Kambartel,19 76: 8 2 ) 
This point thus ties back in with the difficulties raised b y 
Stampe. We will see later that the propositional act is ultim-
ately constituted as a pre-linguistic ac t, a positio n with enor-
mous problems o f its own. For the moment, however, and ta king the 
concept as it is presented in Searle's early work, it seems that 
given that we are dealing with a fully fledged linguistic act, 
and given that we are not simply dealing with Austin's rhetic 
act, then Searle's propositional act is tied into the pragmatic 
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circl e described by Kambartel, in which it is dependent u pon t he 
illocutionary act to which it gives content. 
SECTION 2: THE CRITIQUE OF GRICE. 
In Speech Acts Searle discusses Grice's 'Meaning', and his 
c riticism seems to come down to two basic objections. rirst, 
Searle claims that Gric e fails to account for t he e x tent to which 
meaning can b e a matter of rules or conventions. Searle objects 
that b e c ause Gric e defines meaning purel y in terms o f the spe ak -
er's intentions he thus does not show the conn e ction between 
one's meaning something by what one says, and what that whic h one 
says actually means in t he language. 
One's meaning something when one utters a sentence is more 
than j ust randoml y related to what the sentence means in the 
language o ne is speaking. ( Searle, 1969 : 45 ) 
His example to demonstrate this point (wh ich has been noted 
previ ou sly) goes b riefly as follows: An American soldier is 
captured by Italians, and at tempt s to make them think t hat he is 
a German officer by uttering in an authoritative t one the only 
German sentence he knows - ' Kennst du das land, so die Zitr8nen 
bluhen?'. On Grice's analysis in 'Meaning' the sentence means 
something like 'I am a German officer', but in fact the sentence 
means 'Do you know the land where the lemon-trees bloom'. This 
example has been criticized, and is perhaps not entirel y convinc-
ing;4 however, the point Searle seems to be trying to make is 
given, I think, much more convincingly by Ziff's cases ( 1967: 
pp.l-8). In one vers ion, for e xample, George wants to offend an 
army testing board, and answers the question, 'What would you say 
if you were asked to identify yourself' by uttering 'pi. hi. y 
pi. y' (wh ich is apparently a Hopi sentence which means 'I don't 
k now' ) . Ziff claims that George both meant something by uttering 
the Hopi sentence ( to annoy the board ) and meant something by the 
Ho p i s e n t e n c e ( ' I don' t k n ow ' ) , howe v e r, 
what [the utterance] meant had nothing whatever to do with 
what George intended to effect by uttering the utterance and 
hence had nothing whatever to do with what [the utterance] 
meant-nn [according t o the Gricean mechanism ] . ( Ziff, 1967: 
3) 
It seems, in any case, to be this sort of exam pl e which lies 
behind Searle's claim that an analysis of illoc uti onary acts 
'must capture both the intentional and the conventional aspects 
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and especiall y the r-elationship between them' ( 1969: 45 ). 
Searle's second objection is that by defining meaning in 
tec~s o f intended effects Grice in eifect confuses illocutionary 
with perlocutionary acts. He says that while Grice defines mean-
ing in tecrns of intending to perfocrn -3. perlocutionary act ( to u se 
Austin's terminology), saying something and meaning it is a 
matter of intending to perform an illocutionary , but not necess-
arily a perlocutionary, act. What is important about meaning 
something is being understood, and only at certain times do we 
want to produce a peclocutionary effect. 
He explains this point through the examples of saying 
'Hello', 'I promise' and 'Get out'. With 'Hello', he sa y s, we 
usual l y simp ly want t he hearer to know that he is being greet ed, 
to understand us, and we need intend no response o r effect be yond 
understanding (beyond the illocutionary effect). 'I promise' can 
have no perlocutionary effect which will distinguish it from , 
fo r example, firm statements of intention and emphatic predict-
i o ns. While all three mdy cceate expectations about the future, 
they have different meaning. Seacle thinks that the meaning of 
'Get out' ~ tied to an intended perlocutionacy effect, but that 
it is the only one of the examples which suits Grice's account. 
He also claims th-:1t even with th-a type of speech acts which do 
suit Grice's account, it is quite possible to say these th ings 
and mean them without intending any effect. We may, for example, 
make a statement because it is our duty, not caring whether or 
not our audience believes it (19 69: 46 ). Finally, Searle says 
that the Gricean reflexive intention does not e ven work foe all 
cases where there is an intended perlocutionary effect, for in a 
philosophy book, say, the reasons for believing the author's 
claims do not include our recognizing the author's intentions 
that we believe the claims ( 1969: 46-7).5 
Searle does not want to re j ect Grice's account wholesa l e. 
He does think that recognition by the hearer of the speaker's 
intentions is crucial in communication. However, he thinks that 
the reflexive intentions should be seen as the speaker intending 
to produce an illocutionary effect i~ the hearer ( i.e., to get 
the hearer to understand the utterance) by means of getting the 
hearer to recognize the speaker's intentio n to produce the eff-
ect. This is based on the following claim about human communic-
ation: 
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I f I am t~ying to tell some o ne something, then (assuming 
ce~tain conditions a~e satisfied ) as soon as he ~ecognizes 
that I am t~y ing to tell him something and e x a ctly what it 
i s I a m t ~ y i n g to t e 11 h i m , I h-ave su cceeded i n t e 11 i n g i t 
to him. Furthe~mo~e, unless he ~ecognizes that I am t~ying 
to tell him something and what I am t~ying to tell h im, I do 
not fully succeed in telling it to him. ( Sea~le, 1969: 47 ) 
Thus, in place of reflexive pe~locutionary intentions, 
Se a~le substitutes reflexi v e illocutionary intentio ns, plus ~ules 
governing the use of sentences and ~ules gove~ning what the 
sentences count as; and meaning is dete~mined by these rules. The 
~eflexive intentions constitute an utterance as communication, 
they do not constitute the meaning - and this point maintd ins a 
distinction with Grice. 
Sea~le, unlike Grice (who offe~s no mechanism for the ~ecog­
nition of intentions ) , seems to use meaning in explaining the 
hea~e~'s ~ecognition of the speaker's intentions. He says that 
the b~idge between the speake~'s saying something and meaning it 
( in a lite~al utte~ance ) and the heare~'s unde~standing it is 
g iven on the one hand by the fact that understanding a sentence 
is know ing its meaning - a nd this meaning is determined by ~ules 
specify ing conditions of utte~ance and what the utte~ance counts 
as, these ~ules being known by both speaker and hearer. On the 
othe~ hand, utte~ing and meaning a sentence is a matter of inten-
ding the hea~er to ~ecognize that ce~tain states of affairs 
specified by certain of the rules obtain, intending to get the 
hearer t o cecognize this through recognition of the initi~l 
intention, and finally, intending this recognition of the ficst 
intention to a~ise through a knowledge o E th e ~ules fo~ the 
sentence uttered. Sea~le claims that the sentence then prov ides a 
conventional means of achieving the intention to p~oduce the 
illocu tiona ry effect. 
If a speaker utters the sentence and means it he will have 
[the th~ee intentions]. The hea~e~'s unde~standing the utt-
e~anca will simply consist in those intentions being ach-
ieved. And the intentions will in gene~al be achieved if the 
heare~ unde~stands the sentence, i.e., knows its meaning, 
i.e., knows the rules gove~ning its elements. (Searle,l969: 
4 8) 
It may seem that the objections voiced earlie~ a~e contrad-
icted by Searle's stance against G~ice, o~ perhaps that he has 
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he r e ~dded a n aspect of his approach which was missing in the 
earlier discussion . This is especia lly suggested by h is lnsis-
tenc e on the relevance of the meaning of a sentence in the lang-
uage. However, t he situatio n is not - i n fac t improved. Force 
remains semantically determined and what is added is the n o tio n 
that the utterance is constit ut ed as communica tion by intention . 
Thu s, it remains the c ase that meaning and force are ti ed into a 
pragma tic c ircle, and in his treatment of intentions •noves no 
furthe r tha n Grice does in h is 1969 paper. 
When he speaks of 'what the sentence means in the language' 
Searle is committed by his general theoretical approach t o o nl y 
s peak about the influence of conventional. meaning on the illocut-
i onary force oE thB sentence. While the example he uses for h is 
firs t 0bj e c tion is based on the difference between the sense a nd 
reference o f the sentence as uttered and the senten c e intended to 
be thought to b e uttered, he uses it t o argue that the s peake r 
intends the recognition of the intended illocutionary effect, and 
that 'he intends this recognition t o be achieved in v irtue of the 
fact that the rules for us ing the expression he utters as s ociat e 
the e xpressio n with the p r oduction of that effect' ( 1969 : 45 ). 
'The rules for using the express ion' o nl y relate to its force, t o 
what it c ounts as, not to what it means. The communication of 
mea ning is n ot accounted for; and this is one of the ma j or prob -
lems of Searle's work. Whereas it is not at all clear that we can 
even tal k about meaning exc ept in the c ontext of its communic-
at i o n, and wherea s this thought would seem to lie behind the ve ry 
con cep t of a pragmati c v iew of language, Searle seems to leave 
meaning ti ed to the propositio nal act and locked withi n the 
linguistic subject. 
When Searle speaks of the rules which lead to understand ing , 
the o nl y rules he speaks of a re those which 'speci fy bo th c ondit-
i o ns o f utterance o f the sentence and also what the ut t eranc e 
counts as' ( 1969: 48) , and they see m t o o nl y cover t he forc e side 
o f meaning. He does say that kn o wing a sentence's meaning is 
kno wing ' the rules governing its elements' (p.48), b ut it is 
s till the c ase that they only show what the se n t ence 'means' in 
the sense o f f o rce, for they lead to the achievement of the 
in t ention of the hearer know i ng 't hat c e rtain states of afEaics 
specified by certain of the r ules obtain' (p .48 ) , and what the y 
specify are 'conditions o f utte rance o f the sentenc e a nd also 
what the sentenc e counts as' (p.4 8) , and the y determine what 
Searle is c alling 'meaning', which is force, the intended uptake 
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o f the s pee c h act ~ the i ll oc utionary act it is. 
0 n the one ha nd, then, i t re~ain::; hard t o see how force can 
be constituted by conventional ( semantic ) meaning, and even if 
this is possible, semantic :ne-3-ning remains dept~~de :lt 0'1 Eot:"c.a -l.S 
its determining factor. The introduc tion oE i 11_ ,)cu tionary ii1te:1 t -
ions me r e ly complicates t he issue. For eithet:" an uttera~ c e is 
understood a s having -3. cectain force and a certain meaning fro m 
featu re s of the u tte r -:l.nce (according to its satisfaction o f 
feli c ity conditioi1s) - with these fe a t ures (a nd thus the under-
sta nding of the utterance) possibly leading to interpretations as 
t o the intention s with whi c h the utterance is given - o r the 
r ecognition of the intentions is taken as leading to an under-
standing of the utterance. If the former position is the c ase we 
re turn to Austin, and if the latter, we are left with Grice's 
problems. But Searle c annot ret urn to Austin, as he regards 
i llocutionary force as being constitut ed by semantic convention s, 
and he needs to introduce intentionality as a constituting act 
independent o f t he semantic representation of force. 
Some of the problems here ca n be seen in Searle's own anal-
ysis (noted above) of 'Hello' (1969: 48-9). 'Hello' is in ct w?..y -3. 
'contentless' greeting, where specifying conditions of uttera nc e 
and what it counts as specifies all aspects of its me a 11ing, but 
one is left wondering how Searle would cope with, f o r example, a 
complex greeting, or a different type of greeting. The rules and 
conventions which Searle introduces may en able him t o distinguish 
a g r e e t in g f rom a p r om i se or an or de r , but we s t i 11 wan t to 
distinguish types of greetings, or promises, or orders; to dis-
t i n g •J i s h ' H e 11 o' f r om ' H i ' a n d s o o n , o r ' I w i 1 1 d o i t ' f r om ' I 
will get it'. And from a different angle, we need an explanation 
of how 'I will get it', uttered -:iS a promise, means the same 
thing (as Searle would argue ) as 'I promise that I will get it' 
(u ttered as a promise) (see Stampe, 1975: 10-14 & ff. ). 
It is important to realize that this is not just something 
'left out' by Searle. It is excluded by his whole approach. He 
collapses the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary 
acts and is denied a locution a c y act which can be uttered with 
various forces, and he reduces the content of an utterance to the 
propositional act, which, even if it makes sense as a neutral 
act, is dependent on the illocutionary intentions of the speaker. 
So, Searle's account reduces to Grice's equation of meaning with 
intention (giving no account o f meaning), plus Cohen's semantic 
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analysis of fo~c e (w hich gives no account o f f o~ce a s d is tinct 
f~om me an ing). 
SECTION 3: PROMISING. 
Th is leads into Sea~le's actual analys is o f p~omising . This 
analysis is significant in a s much as it amounts t o an attempt at 
a model fo ~ filling out the Austinian p~og~am ~ega~ding illocu t-
i ona ~y ac ts. He sets out his task he~e a s giving t he conditions 
which a~e 'nec essary and sufficient f o ~ the act o f p~omising t o 
have been successfully and non-defectively fo~med in the utte~-
a n c e o f a g i v en se n ten c e' ( 19 6 9 : 5 4 ) • He says t h a t t h i s w i 11 g i v e 
a n analysis of the illocutionary ac t. Sea~le acknowledges t ha t 
illocutionary ve~bs, li ke other n on-technica l concep t s l n <)Cdin-
ary language, lack absolutely strict rules, but say s that, 
This insight into the looseness of ou~ concept s, and its 
attendant ja~gon of 'famil y ~ese :nblances ' should :1ot lead us 
into a ~ejection of the very ente~prise o f philosophical 
anal ysis; rathe~ the conclusi on to be drawn is that ce~tain 
fo ~ms of anal ysis, especially anal ysis into necessa~y and 
sufficient conditions, a~e li kely to involve ( in va~y in g 
degrees) idealizatio n o f the concept analyzed. (Sea~le,l969: 
55) 
Displaying an attitude seen ea~lier, Sea~le thus ignores ma~g­
inal, fringe and partially defective pr o mises, and p~oposes to 
handle counte~-examples by e xp laining 'why and how they depa~t 
from t he pa~adigm cases of p~omise making' ( 1969: 55). 
The necessa~y and sufficient conditions fo~ Searle's 
paradigm p~omise can be summarized a s follows: 
1) Normal conditions of linguistic communication obtain. 
2) A speake~ S exp~esses the p~oposition p in the utte~ance 
of a sentence T. 
3) In exp~essing p, S says he will pe~fo~m some act A in t he 
future. 
4) A hea~e~ H wou ld prefe~ S's doing A to his not d o ing A, 
and S believes H would p~efe~ this. 
5) It is not obvious to S and H that S will do A in the 
ordinary c ou~se of e vents. 
6) S intends to do A. 
7) S intends that the utte~ance ofT will put him unde~ an 
obligation to do A. 
8) The appr op~iate ~eflexive illocutionary intentions 
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mentioned earlier obtain. 
9) The semantic rules of S and H's dia! ect are such that T 
is co rrect and sincere if and only if conditions l-8 obtain. 
I t is important to reali z e what Searle has done here. He has 
given an anal ysis of his intuitions of parad igm promising; and 
this involves two crucial assumptions for which he gi ves no 
justific ation. On t he one hand, he a ssumes the validity of h is 
ow n intuitions regarding promising. That is, promising is to be 
picked out by cr iteria which he has deduced from his own int uit-
i o ns o f what constitutes promising, and this initial identific -
ation can be referred to no criteria other than, perhaps, its own 
sense of correctness. It is not as if Searle is analyzing ident-
ifiable concrete acts, in the way Austin does (although t hat has 
its own problems); he is analyzing an idealization of a paradigm, 
and if this analysis is to have any for c e it needs to be grounded 
in something more than Searle's own intuitions, otherwise it is 
c ircular. That is, Searle needs to find initial criteria by which 
to pick out the co ncept which he then analyses into necessary and 
sufficient conditions. 
It might be replied that all Searle does is give us criteria 
by which to pick out what he has set up as the paradigm case of 
promising, and that there is nothing circular in that. However, 
the point is that while Searle's intuitions are no t a t issue, 
just what is the paradigm case of promising is at issue, and is 
given no justification. There is no reason why we should feel 
happier with Searle's intuitions about promising than with, say, 
Harrison's, who says that 'promising involves the acceptance by 
the promiser of c ertain goods in the shape of the reliance which 
others place on his words', which does not restrict promising to 
statements about the future (Harrison,l979: 179-80). 
Follo wing from this is t he assu mption that promisi ng can in 
any case be a nalyzed in terms of necessary and sufficient con-
di t i on s, and that it c an be discussed in terms of a paradi g m. As 
I have c ommented p c~'' i_.),tsly , this assumption reflects a stance 
·c ommon to most of Searle's work, and in this ca se it renders the 
a n-:ilysis unworka ble. For on ce ~Ye reduc ~ -:t n illocuti8'1 .1. Cy 1-:oncept 
to the necessary and sufficient conditions of an idealized para-
digm of that concept, then every use of that concept has t o be 
explained as an aberrati on of at lea st some 'necessary and suff-
icient' conditions for the use of the concept. So one is left 
wondering what these conditions given by Searle are necessary and 
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suffic ient for, given that ~ notion of promising like Harrison's 
wou l d, at least, not necessaril y share conchtions ( 3), (4 ) , ( 5 ) 
and (7 ) , which are just those conditions in Searle's list which 
pi c k out promising from other illoc~tionary concepts.6 Harr-
ison's no tion of promising would, it is true, cover the sort of 
idealized case Searle is t h i ~k ing of, but Searle's definitio n is 
o f an act p robably never perfo rmed. What we want, in tha t case, 
but do not find, is some explanati o n oE the way promisin g as 
defined by Searle relates to the 'abe r r a tions' and ' pa rasitic 
uses' which make up discourse. 
Harrison c laims that promising is a 'family resemblance' 
term, that it does not have an essential property , and that it i s 
open ended. 
We can recognize a promise as having been made even where 
some or all of the common features of formal, ceremonious 
promising are missing - ..• knowing the meaning o f the term 
'promise', we can project i t s re ference to cover new and 
unforeseen kinds of promising -and ..• similarly, we can 
recognize new sorts of ways in which promising can misfire. 
( Harriso n,l979: 177 ) 
I take it that t his is true of promising, as it is of at least a 
number oE illocutionary terms in general, and it is just this 
characteristic o E these terms which p r ecludes an analysis of them 
in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. And we return to 
the first point when noting that e van if Searle could s how that 
promising is not a family resemblance term, for this type of 
analysis to be convincing he needs to justify the arbitrary 
choice of his paradigm promise in favour of 'marginal' and 'abe r -
rant' promises, and to explain why these cases do not deserve to 
be taken on as legiti1nate illocutionary ac ts in their own right 
and be analyzed into their own necessary and suffic ient condit-
ions. Of course, if the program were to follow this line of 
reasoning it would be an unending exercise, and it would be 
denied any possibility o f developing some sort of general theory 
- we would end up simply analyzing every speech act uttered.? 
But if this is t o b e avoided there needs to be a justification of 
picking out ce r tain ideali zed cases as paradigms, and there needs 
to be some mechanism by which concrete acts are related to the 
idealized paradigm: neither of which are to be Eound in Searle's 
work. 
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SECTION 4: THE INSTITUTIONAL FACT. 
In Speech Acts (1969: 50-3 ) , Searle claims that the fa c t 
that S perfo r med a c ertain spee c h act is an 'institutional fact', 
li ke the f ac t that A and B got married, and is underlain b y a 
s y stem of rules of the form, 'X counts -1 s Y i n context C'. He 
says that it is not a 'b ru te fa c t', l ik e 'I feel p a in', 'F=MA', 
or 'This stone is next to that', and that language c annot be 
e xplained in terms of brute facts. If, he says, we tried t o 
~ ~pla in a football g ame in terms o f brute facts (describ i ng 
clustering, movement, etc.) we would h ave left out all those 
c oncepts, bac ked by constitutive rules, which make it a game of 
f o o tball. Sea rle t hi nks that the descr iption of the brute fa c ts 
c an be explained in terms of the institutional facts, but that 
these can only be e xpla ined in teems o f the c onsti tu ti ve ru les 
whi c h underlie them. 
It is foe this eeason that Searle feels that attempts to 
desceibe semantics in terms of brute facts such as regularities 
of c orrelations of stimulus and response or correlations between 
utte rances and s t ates o f affairs, cannot wor k . Fo e without reg-
arding language use as a rule-governed form of intenti o na l activ-
ity, he says, the regulaeities remain unexplained. He says that 
in explaining il l ocutionary acts they must be analyzed into 
statements containing notions such as intentions and states of 
affairs specified by these rules (which will sometimes themselves 
involve institutional facts). The intentions mentioned here a re 
not, he reminds us, Gricean 'perlocutionary ' intentions; they are 
what one must intend in order for a speech act to be an act or 
such-and-such an act. That is to say, they intentions directed 
towards producing ~eaningful utterances, and not towards produc-
ing responses. 
The notion of the institutional fact (which seems to have 
originated wit h An s combe, 1958) is an i mportant element in prag-
ma tics, and is also a significant aspect of a rejection of pos it-
ivist philosophy and social science. Searle's a doption of this 
concept i s interesting because he finds it compatible with a 
naturalism, which he develops in his theory of intentionality. 
Here intenti onality is a pra-linguistic (and pre-insti t ut i o nal) 
fact at the foundation of these facts. 
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SECTION 5: INTENTIONALITY. 
The approach which we have seen developed here is o ne whose 
mai n characteristic seems to be th~attempt to place meaning as 
sense and reference and meaning as intending on an e q ual footing. 
We communicate , accordin g to Searle, by producing utterances 
which fit into sets of constituti ve rules, which in turn r e late 
t o wo rds and word order and to o the r meaningful componen t s of 
utte rances. It is through a knowledge of the rules gove r ning 
speech acts that an audi ence will grasp our illocut i onary intent-
ions (how we want them to understand the utteranc e ), and from 
these any further perlocutionary intentions, b ut the u tterance is 
constituted as meaningful, as an illocutionary act, by illocut-
i onary intentions. It may still seem from Searle's con tinued 
reference to rules, both semantic and illocutionary, t ha t he does 
not really lock pragmatics into an isolated sub j ect, but whe~ we 
c onsider Searle's later work, in which he directly confronts the 
r elationship between intentionality and language, t h is weakness 
of his approach becomes much clearer. 
SECTION Sa. 
Searle himself acknowledges the relevance of the later work 
for t he theory o f speech acts when he says that one of the 
objectives of Intentionality is t o provide a foundation for his 
earlier work. He says that this follows from his basic assumption 
that the ph il osophy of language is a branch o f the philosophy of 
mind. 
Since speech acts are a type of human actio n, and sinc e the 
capacity of speech to represent objects and states of aff-
airs is part of a more general capacity of the mind to 
relate the organism to the world, any complete account o f 
speech and language requires an account of how the mind/ 
brain relates the organism to reality. (Searle, 1983: vii ) 
The c entral claim in this work is that the capa c ity of 
sentences to represent 'is not intrinsic but is derived from the 
Intentionality of the mind', and that this Intentio nality of the 
mind is in turn is in some sense basic. 
The Intentionality of mental states, on the other hand , is 
not deri ved from s o me more prior forms of Intentionality but 
is intrinsic t o the states the mselves. An agent uses a 
sentence to mak e a statement or ask a question, but he does 
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not in that way use his beliefs and des ir- es, he simpl y has 
t hem . (Searle, 19 83: v ii) 
When speaking of 'Intentionality', Searle is c oncerned wi t h 
' i n tentional states', which include no t o nly intentions, but a ll 
mental states 'directed at objects and states of affairs in t he 
world' ( 198 2 : 259). 
A. mental state is a n intentional state if and only if t h e 
s pe c ification of the content of that mental state req ui r es 
the s pecification o f some object o ~ s t ~te of affai~s wh i c h 
is n o t identical with that mental state. On t h is test pai n s 
and aches and at least s o ma cases of anxiety are not intent-
ional, whereas beliefs, hopes, expectations and desires are . 
(Searle, 1979a: 182 ) 
As Searle comments following this passage , this criterio n does 
not give an analysis of the notion of intentionality, and i t 
leaves the notion of a mental state very loose. 
Searle claims that the intentional state relates to t he 
intentional object by containing a representation of the intent-
ional object in the same sense that speech acts c ontain repras-
entations of objects and sta tes o f affairs ( 1979a: 18 4 ). He does 
not fill out the notion of representation, and leaves it as an 
intentional term (see l979a: 195 ) , so, because t his descrip tio n 
of intentionality is circular (see 1979a: 195-7 & 1982: 275 ) , 
Se a r l e is again not a nalyzing {ntentionality - I shall return t o 
this later. Ho wever, he does offer some explanatio n. 
He says that sentences specifying intentional states are 
inten~ional, b ecause they are at least in part about represent-
ations, and thus 'their truth conditions will someti mes de pend o n 
features o f the representati o n a nd no t entirely on fe a t ur es of -
or even the e x istence of - the objec t represented' ( 1979a: 184-
5 ) . Searle also claims tha t intentional states do not have a 
pe c uliar onto logic al sta t us. 
[T]he intentional o bject of a mental state is just the 
actual object or state of affairs represented by an intent-
ional state. I f there is no such object or state of affairs 
then the intentional state does not have an intentional 
object though it does still c onta in a r eprese n t a tion. 
(Searle, 1979a: 185 ) 
This distinction between the 'representative content' and the 
'i ntentional object' of a mental state is regarded by Searle as 
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parallel t o Frege' s distinction between sens~ .?.no ce ference. 
Just as a definite description r~fe cs co an object in v irt ua 
o f its sense, but does n o t thereby refec to its sense, s o an 
intentional state is directed ~ an object in v i ctue o f its 
represe n t ati ve con tent, but is no t thereby directed at its 
r epresentati ve content. ( Searle: 1979a: 18 5) 
So it seems that in s o me sense the i n tentional state j ust is t h e 
r ep~esenting o f an object. Searle says also that the temptati o n 
to think that because sentence s about intentional states ma y be 
intensional then somehow the states themsel ves a re intensio nal 
(not directed at objects but rather a t their own repre sentat i v e 
content ) involves a confusion o f the properties o f the state 
described, 'to confuse the "men t ion" of the mental state with its 
" use"' . 
Specificatio ns of intentional mental states are indeed ( in 
general) intensional-with-an -s . ••• But intentional men tal 
states are not about representations, they ~ represent-
ations. (S ear 1 e, 19 7 9 a: 18 7, & c f 19 8 3 : 2 2 f f.) 
He says that this leads to the picture of every intentional s t .?.te 
consisting o f a representative c ontent in a certain mode, with 
the same content possib le in different modes (I can believe tt 
will rain, hope it wi ll rain, want it to r a in, etc.). 'Intent-
ionality .•• is so to speak a ground floor property o f the mind. 
It is how the mind grasps other things' (1979a,p.l89). 
As has been noted, the c entra l thesis of this work is that 
'language does no t create intent ion ali t y ; ••. in an impo rtant 
sense intentionality provides the f o undation for linguistic acts' 
( 1979a: 190 ) , but Searle argues towards this claim by first 
showing the parallels, ana logies and connections between intent-
ional states and linguistic acts. 
The first of these parallels is that the distinction between 
propositional c ontent and illocut ionary force refe rred t o earlier 
carries over into a distinction between representati ve conten t 
and psychological mode. Searle cla ims that the d istinction, Eo c 
example, between the propositional content that you will leave 
the ~ and the illocutionary force with which that content is 
presented (a s an order, prediction, etc.) parallels the distinct-
ion between the representative content that you will leav e the 
~ and the psychological mode (belief, fear, hope, etc.) in 
which one has that representative content (1983: 6). 
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He says that while it might be bettec to use 'pcopositional 
content' for Intentional states which ace cealized lingu istic -
ally, and 'representative content' as a moce genecal teem f o e 
both linguistically cealized Intent~nal states and those t hat 
are not cealized in langua ge, he will use the notion o f p c opos -
itional content for Intentional states that take e n ti c e p c opos-
itions as contents, whethec oc not the state is (aalized ling -
u istically. By this he wants to emphasi z e that not all Intent -
ional states have an entire prop o s Ltion as Intentio nal content. 
All, however, must have s ome c e p cesen tative content, wh ic h is no t 
the case f o e speech acts, as some expressi ves, li ke ' Ouch!', 
'Hello' and ' Goodby e', can have no content. (1 983: 6-7 ) 
Secondly, Seacle thinks that the distinction between diffec-
ent directions of fit ( a notion developed in his 1979b paper ) 
caccies ovec to intentio nal states. That is, he claims that just 
as a ssertives (stat ements, etc. ) tc y to mak e the p c opositiona l 
content match the world (word-world dicection of fit ) , dicecti ves 
and commissives try to make the world match the propositional 
content (world-wocd dicectio n of fit ) , and apologies and congcat-
ulations ha ve no dicection of fit (as they assume the satisfact -
ion of the pcopos itio nal content), so with intentional states: 
belief has mind-wocld direction of fit, desice has wocld-mind 
dicectio n oE fit, and sorrow, gcatit ude and pleasuce h a ve no 
dicection of fit (1979a: 191 & 1982: 261-2). Seacle comments 
that the dicection of fit f o e ~ speech act and its sinceci ty 
conditions are the same ( 1983: 7-9, & on sincerity conditions 
see, e.g., 1969: 57-61 ) . 
This point leads into the third connection , which is that in 
genecal the expcession of an illocut ionacy act with a pcoposit-
i o nal content is also the e xpcession of an in t entional state with 
the same propos itional content, and that the intentional state is 
the sincecity condition of the speech act . Thus a stateme~ t 
expcesses belief, a pcomise e xpcesses intention, an ocde c 
expresses a wish, an apology expresses socrow, and so on, and i f 
these states a ce no t held b y the speakec, then the act is no t 
pecformed sincerely. Furthecmoce, says Searle, to pecfocm a 
s peech act and deny the c occesponding intentional state (e. g ., 
'It's caining, but I don't believe that it's raining'), while not 
self-contradictory, is logic ally odd (see 1983: 9 ). 
Searle says that this does not mean that one always ha s to 
have the Intentional state that one expcesses, ' but a lie oc 
133 
other insincere speech act consists in performing a s peech act, 
and thereby e xpr essing an Intentional state , where one does not 
have the Intentional state that one e xpresses ( 1983 : 9- 10 ) . 
The fourth co nnect i o n is that where there is a dir ecti o n o E 
fit the no tion of conditions of satisfaction applies acr os s 
intentional states as wel l as speech acts. That is, j u st a s we 
say that a statement is true or false, an o rde r obe yed o r dis-
obeyed, a promise kept o r broken, depending on the fulfill men t o f 
condit ions o f satisfaction, so too a belief is satis fied if i t is 
correct, a desire satisfied i E it is fulfilled, a n i ntenti on 
satisfied only if it i s ca ~r ied out . The c ruci dl po in t for Searl? 
is that in general the speech act will be satisfied on l y if th e 
e xpre ssed psychological state is satisfiBd , the e xcepti on being 
cases where the p s ycho l og i cal state is satisfied by way o f s ome-
thi ng independent of the achievement o f the il l ocut ionary po int 
(e.g., carrying out an order for reasons ot her t han the o r der ) 
( 1983 : 10-11 ) . 
Searle c laims that t hese connect i ons show, not that there are 
tw o things going on, the performance of t he act and the expres s-
i o n o f the p s ycho logic al state , but r.~the~ that ' the performance 
o f the act is ~ ipso an expressi on o f the corr espondin g p s ych -
olog ical state and t he p r oposi tional content of ac t d nd state are 
identical' ( 1979a : 192) . The p i c t u re o f intentional states which 
Searle sees as arising from these va rious claims is best de mo~­
strated in the fol l owing pass age from Intentionality. 
[E )very Intentional state consi sts o f a rep resentative con-
t e nt in a certain psychological mode. Intentional states 
c ~present objects a nd states of affairs in the same sense 
that speech acts represent objects and states o f affa irs 
( though, ••• th~y do it by different means a~d in a diff-
erent way). ,Just as my sta te n .~ :'lt thrtt it is ra ini n-:;1 i3 a 
representation of a certain state of affairs, so my belief 
t h a t i t i s c a in i n g i s a c e pr e sen t a t i on o f t he sa m e s t a t e o f 
~ E e ~ L c s . J u s t a s my o r de c to Sam t o 1 eave t h ~ roo •n i s abo u t 
Sam and r-epresents a ce r- tain acti on on his part, s o my 
desire that Sam should leave the ro om is about Sa m and 
represen t s a certain action on h is par t. The notion of 
representation is conveniently vague . As applied to lang-
uage, we c an use it to cove~ not only r-eference, but predic-
ation and o ther truth conditions or conditions of satis-
faction in the same sense that speech acts represent their 
conditions of sati s fac tion. (Searle,l983:11, & c f.l982: 264- 5 ) 
134 
I n Intenti onality Searle trie s to mak e- •r e presentatio n' ~ 
little clearer by distinguishing hi s use from that in t rad itiona l 
phi l osophy and in c ogn iti ve p s ychology and artificict l in telli -
gen ce. Arguin g the first distinction, he says t ha t his saying 
that a belief is a representatio n is not t o say that a beli ef is 
a kind o f p i c tu r e, o r to endorse the Tractatus account o f me an-
ing. He a lso c laims that he i s not saying that a be J. L,~E r- e-
presen t s something that has been pr-ese nted before, or that i t is 
a kind of t h ing fr om which on e reads of f its co nd itio ns of s at is-
f3cti on by sc rutinizing it . 
The sense of ' r epresentation' in q uest i on is me an t to be 
entirely e xhausted by the analogy with s peech acts: t he 
sense o f 'represent' in wh i ch a belief rep rese nts its con-
ditions o f satis f acti on is the same sense in which a s tat e-
ment represents its conditions o f satis fac tio n. To s ay that 
a b e l ief is a representati o n is simpl y to say that it has a 
pr-opositional content and a psycholog i cal mode, that its 
propositiona l content determ i nes a set o f condi t i ons o f 
satisfaction under cert a in aspects, that it s psychologic al 
mode determines a direction of fit of its p r opos itional 
content, in a way that all of these not ions ••• are e x -
plained by the theocy of speech acts. (Searle, 1983: 12) 
On the o ther hand, he c laims that hi s use of 'repr-esent-
ation ' is different from its use in artificial intelligenc e and 
CO<.J n. it i.''~ ~)sychology , because f o r- him a r-epr-esentation is defined 
by it s content and its mode, not by its fo cm a l structure ( 1983 : 
12-13) . 
Se arle sees speech a c t s a s grounded in I ntent i ona lity , but 
he th i nks that s peech acts are more than jus t expressions of 
Intentio nali ty , and in the 1979 paper he d iscusses wh at a being 
capab l e of intention a l states woul d ne~d in o r-der to per form 
illocu tionary act s. He says that f irst it would need to be ab le 
to deliberatel y expr~ss i t s In t ent i onal states f o r the purpose of 
letting o thers know it has them; i t must have some means of 
pu rposefully exter-na liz i ng its Intentiona l states . Seco ndly , 
Sear-le thinks that the be ing should b e ab le to e xpress it s in-
t entiona l states for the purpose o f achieving extra-lingu istic 
a i ms (e . g., e xpr-essi ng beli ef Eoc t he purpose of g i v ing inf ormat-
i on, expressing desire for the p urpose o f getting others to do 
t hings, e xp ressing in t entions f o ~ t he p urpose o f creating expe c t-
ations in other-s) . Thir-dl y , there would need t o be introduced 
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de v ices for c onventionalizing the co•n•nuni cati ve expression of 
inteq ti:) 'M l s t 3tes ( t he illocut i on-:tr:·y a c ts )- wh ic h c o rcP.Sp<) •1d t o 
the various extra-linguisti c aims (the perlocu tionar y a i ms ). 
( l 97 9a: 193-5, & cf. 19 83: 177-9 ) 
The task f o r- Sear-le a t this poi n t is t o ex p lain t h e way 
intentiona l s t a tes are manifested as illocutionary acts. He says 
t ha t there is nothing intrinsically intentio nal abou t t he u t t er-
an c e act, the n o ises t hat c o me out of our mo ut hs o r t he ma r- k s 
that '"e mak e o n paper, and goes o n t o say that fr om h is p o i nt nl: 
v iew the pr ob lem of meanin g i s : 
How does t he mi •1d impose Intentionality on enti t ies t hat are 
not intrinsicall y Intentional, on e n tities like sound and 
ma r ks that are, construe d in o•1e way , just p hysical p he no.n-
ena in the world like any other? (Searle, 19 8 2: 27 3) 
He thinks tha t t h is happens thr ough a dou b le level o f Inte n tio n-
ality in the performance of the speech act: t he I ntentional state 
expressed and the ordinary intention with which the ut t eranc e Ls 
made. He sees this second Intention a l state as bestowing Intent-
i o nality on the physical phenomena. 
The mind im poses Inten t i onality on entities t hat are not 
intrinsic a l ly Intenti onal by intentionally transferring t he 
c o nditions of satisfaction of the expressed p s ychologic al 
state to the externa l p hysical entity .••. [B ]y intenti on-
ally uttering something with a certain set of conditions of 
success, those specified by the essential c ondi t i ons f o r 
that speech act, I have made the utteranc e In tentional and 
thus necessarily expressed the corresponding p s ychological 
st"lte .... I i mpose Intentionality on my ut t erances by 
t~ans E~~~ ing to them c ertain conditio ns o f success which are 
the conditions of success of certain psychological states. 
( Searle, 1982: 274 ) 
He p uts this brief1y b y say ing that what ma kes the p roduction o f 
marks or sounds more than just the production o f mar ks or sounds 
is that he intends t heir production as the P ·~ r- f :)r: .n ance of a 
speech act ( 1983: 163 ) . 
This brings in again the project of analyzing meaning in 
terms of intentions, but Searle makes a basic change to both 
Grice's approach and his own earlier one. He say s that the trad-
itional discussion of problems of intention and meaning, includ-
ing his own, suffers from a failure to distinguish between the 
intention t 0 r ep r-esent and t he intention to communicate, and from 
the a ssu mption that the whole account of meaning can be gi ven in 
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lecms of communi cation intention s ( 1983: 165-6). This change is 
possibly a cespo nse to pcoble ms si milac to ~orne I have ca ised 
earlier, but it is impoctant to note t hat it is no t a cejection 
o f t h e a t t e m p t t :) a >< L) l-?. i n m e a n in g i n. t e c m s o E i n t e n t i o r1 s • I t s e t s 
up instead a hiecarchy of intentions, with intentions to cepresen t 
being price t o intentions to commur1ic ate. 
Thus, one can i ntend to cepcesent s omethi ng without inte nd-
ing to communicate, but one cannot intend to commun icd t~ Aithout 
intending to cepresent. ' I c a n 1ot, fo e e xample, intend t o i n fo rm 
you that it is caining without intending that my uttecance rep-
resents, truly or falsel y , the state of 'iffaics of the weat her' 
(1983 : 16 6) . Meaning intentions ace thus made up of th i s hi eca rchical 
p--t i. e o E intentior1s to represe :1 t and intentions to com .nun -
;. ~ ~ t:1 te . 
The key element in the analysis of meaning intentions is 
simp l y this: For most types of speech acts, meaning intent-
ions are a t l~ast in part i nte n tions to represen t , and an 
in tent i on to represent is an i nten t ion that the p hysica l 
events which constitute part ~ the conditions of satis-
facti on ( in t he sense of things required) of the intenti on 
should themselves have conditions of satisfaction ( in t he 
---- -- --- ---
sense of cequirement ) . (Searle, 1983: 167-8) 
If, for example, it has been arc":l.ng~d that my ra ising my ar m 
sign a ls to you t hat the enem y h~s r etreated, the n the condit i ons 
of satisfd c ti.o n of my intentio n are t hat my arm should go u p, a nd 
that its going up ha s c o ndit i ons of satisfaction, which are here 
truth col'ldi tions. 
The step from representation inten tio n to communication 
intention is that 'the communication intenti on consists simpl y in 
the i n tention that t he he-?.ce c sh:)11 ld recogn ize that th~ -:tc i: w -'1. :3 
performed with the representati on i n tention'. Us ing t he 3-?. •TI •:;! 
e xamp le, then, ' my intention when I signal you by raising my hand 
is t o g~i:. yoot t o re c ogni z e th-?. t I am signaling that t he enemy 
ha s re t reat ed' ( 19 83 : 168) . 
Searle says that he c an now answer the Wittgensteinian 
que stion as to t he d ifference between saying something and 
~eaning it and say ing it without meaning it. 
When I say s omething and mean it, my utterance has condi t -
ions of sati sfactio n in a way tha t it does not h-?.V t~ -?. ny s uch 
conditions it I say it without meaning it. If I sa y 'Es 
regnet' as a way of practicing German p ronunciatio n, then 
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the fact that the sun is shining when I utter thi s sentence 
is irrelevant. But if I sa y 'Es regnet.!. and mean it, then 
the fact that the sun is shining is relevant, and it becom es 
relevant because sayi n g someth~ng and meaning it is a matte r 
of saying it with t he conditions o f satisfactio n intention -
ally im posed on the utterance. (Searle, 1983: 169 ) 
It is, then, with this transferring o f an Intentional stat e 
onto the speech act that meaning is i mpo sed. Searle says that we 
ca n simply believe that p without doing anything, but that to 
~ean that p we must do somet h ing, we must sta t e that p . !?o r 
Searle, to mean that p is to believe that p , but in order to mean 
that p we must state that p. 
Stating is an act, unli ke believing and meaning .... Stating 
is an illocutionary act t ha t, at another level of descrip-
tion, is an utterance act . It is the performance o f the 
ut teranc e act with a certain set of intentions t hat converts 
the utterance act into an illocutionary act and thus i mposes 
Intenti onality on the utterance. (Searle, 1982 : 274) 
As I have noted, the notion of representation wh ich Searle 
uses in his characterization of Intentionality is itself an 
Intentional term, and thus if hi s characterization of Intention-
ality is taken a s an analysis it is circular. However, Searle 
does not see this as a problem. He thinks that this 'intentional 
circle' (1979a : 196) foll ow s from the nature of t he phenomenon. 
[I]n the way that intentio nality underlies the possibility 
o f linguistic acts there is nothin g that conceptually 
underlies intentionality. Intentionality is precisely that 
feature of mental states, human o r otherwise, that enables 
those states to represent other things. (Searle, l979a: 197) 
As he puts it elsewhere: 'there is no nonintentional standpoint 
from which we can survey the relations between I ntentional states 
and their conditions of satisfaction. Any analysis must take 
place within the circle o f Intentional concepts' ( 1983 : 79 ) . 
SECTION Sb. 
The ma jor elements of this theory are the notion of Intent-
ional states and the split within meaning intentions, and with 
these elements Searle hopes to show how language is derived from 
intentionality. However, it seems that in the end this theory is 
unable to do the job which it has been given. 
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The tceatment of meaning intentions d~es appeac to add a 
sophistication which was missing fcom .both Gcice's theocy and 
Searle's earlier theory. Foe example, with this split, Wil son's 
countec-example ( whece he says that - snow is white but cef u ses to 
have Gcicean intentions) might be dealt with, by acguing that 
while he expcesses the cepcesentation that snow is wh ite, Wilson 
does not 'fully' mean that snow is white, because he l acks the 
r equisite communication intention. There is a sense, however, in 
which such a response b e g s the question as to what meaning is, 
and we need to look more closely at the elements making up this 
't he ory , and its presuppositions. 
The first point to be made here is that the acgument that 
Intentionality as it is described undeclies and determines lang -
uage is unconvincing. What Searle does is to tcy to s how that if 
Intentional states are described through analogy with illocut-
ionacy acts we get a relatively coherent picture, and then to 
show the connections between the two (wh ich is hardly surprising, 
considering the model for the initial description ). He then 
explains language as the physical and external cealization of 
phenomena which have already been described on the analogy of 
language - so we have an explanatory/ descriptive ciccle. 
Because of this, the claim that language is derived from 
Intentionality is no stronger than the counter-claim that Intent-
ionality is a function of the pragmatic structure of language. 
Searle might object that such a position cannot account for p re-
or non-linguistic Intentionality, but the appeal of such a claim 
lies in the fact that it will always be couched (understandably) 
in linguistic metaphor, and if it is to have any force there 
needs to be a lot more evidence demonstrating that dogs have 
mental states analogous to illocutionary acts than Searle offers. 
All he does is claim that his intuition of an Intentional state 
is of something analogous to an illocutionary act; and to argue 
that because living organisms have various sensory relations with 
external object they must have Intentional states which are in 
turn analogous to Searle ' s intuitions of Intentional states is 
not in itself convincing. He claims that only someone 'in the 
grip of a philosophical theory' ( 1983: 5) could deny that animals 
and children have Intentional states, but one wants to respond 
that only someone in the g rip of a philosophical theory could 
assume without evidence or argument that animals and children 
have Intentional states which accord with Searle's intuitions of 
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Intentional states, especially as we have n o t been given a demon-
stration that linguistic humans ha ve such s~ates. 
A furthe~ concern relating t o t~e description by analogy, 
but one which ca n be dismissed, is that by being desc~ib ed by 
a nalogy with illocu tiona~y acts Intentional states t a ke on the 
p~oblems of the p~agmatic ci~cle identified by Kam ba~te l . Thus, 
we might a~gue that as a ~e p ~esentati on ca n o nl y occu~ in a given 
p s y chological mode and a psychological mode can only occu r a s a 
mode o f ~epresentation, with neither mode no~ ~ epresentation 
having anal ytic p~ iority , then an I ntentio nal state cou ld n e ve r 
get off the ground. However, the earlier problem does not occur 
he~e, because Intentional states and their elements are not acts. 
They are simply states by which the mind relates t o the e x ternal 
world, and so the 'Intenti onal circle' is not something t hat is 
'done', it just happens in the course o f relating t o the wo~ld. 
This, in fact, is why Searle can a vo id the infinite regress 
generated (as he notes ) by the need for a separate In tentional 
state which ~elates mode t o representation (cf. 19 83 : 21-2 ) . Mode 
and ~epresentation are not brought together; t he y si mply occur as 
the Intentional circle. It turns out, however, that by avoiding 
these problems Searle causes himself se veral seri ou s difficult -
ies. 
The next problem relates to the intention to communicate. 
This is an important factor, because, as has been n o ted, the 
split between intention to represent and intention to communicate 
possibly allows Searle to cope with t he weakness of t he earlier 
grounding of speech acts in intentions. But the trouble with 
picking out a separate intention to communicate, whic h follows 
conceptually the intention to represent, is that there is nothing 
that this intention actuall y does. Searle says that the communic-
ation intention is the intention that the hearer shou ld recognize 
that the speech ac t is pe~fo ~med with the representatio n intent-
ion, but hearer recognition is not something we c an intend to do, 
because it is not something we can do. Intention that is li ke 
desi~e that, and we can attempt to satisfy it by doing ( intent-
ionally ) something else, but it is n o t something wh ich we satisfy 
by actually 'doing ' it. We might say that an 'intentio n that' (or 
desire that ) the hearer ~ecognize our intention to represent 
could be satisfied by intentionally doing someth ing (e.g., pro-
ducing · a speech act ) which leads!£ this ~ecognition, and so we 
might say that an 'intention to communicate' is the intention to 
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produce such an utterance. But in t his case the 'intentio n t o 
communicate' is an attempt t o bring about bhe satisfac tio n of the 
'inte ntion that the hearer recognize t he intention to rep resent' , 
a nd we cannot say that the intention to communic a te is the in -
- ---
t ent ion that the hearer recognize the intentio n t o represent. 
A furt her point is that hearer 'recognition' of intention t o 
r e p resent is not actually d e pe ndent on the intention t o co mmun-
icate. Rather, it is dependent o n features of a speech act by 
whic h intention is inferred, and the inference may b e co rrect o r 
incorrect, and these feat ures may b e intended or unintend ed. But 
if we strengthen Searle's not ion o f the i n tention to comm unica te, 
by sayi n g that it is the in t ention to b ring about features of the 
s peech act which lead to satisfaction of the intention that the 
hear er recognize the intention t o represent, a regress is set up 
which stops the intenti o n to represent ever being fulfilled. 
If we intend to communicate (and hope thereby that hearer-
inference of intention to represent is produced), then our s peech 
act must have features which ca n lead to this inference - that 
is, which mean that we intend to represent. But in that case, the 
i ntention to represent mus t involve the intention to mean that we 
intend to r epresent, as well as the intention to fulfill the 
s at isfact ion conditions of the intention to represent. For exam-
ple, the intention to represent associated with the illocutionary 
ac t, 'It is raining', must, if there is intentio n t o c ommunicate , 
include the intention to represent associated with ' I intend t o 
represent'. But if the statement that it is raining and that th is 
is uttered with representation intentions (wh i ch make up the 
satisfaction conditions of an intentio n to represent) is uttered 
with communication intentions, then we must indicate that this is 
uttered with the intention t o represent, and this assumes a 
further level of intention to represent which includes the indic-
ation o f the previous intention to represent in its satisfac tio n 
conditions, a nd so o n. 
One way o f avoidi ng this regress wo u l d be to sa y that if the 
intention to represent is associated wit h communication intent-
ions then the satisfac tion conditions o f the intention to repres-
ent will include the indicat ion of the intention t o rep resent, so 
the intention to represent in this case is pa rtly self-referring, 
and there is no regress. But it is not clear that Searle would 
want to take this way out, for if the part of the utterance whi c h 
indicates the intention to represent is meaningful according to 
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Searle's notion of meanin g , 1f we mean that we intend to repres -
ent, it must be associated with communication intenti on s, and 
thu s there mu st b e fu rther indicati o n of that intent ion to r e-
present which is associated with the o ri g inal i ndication o f the 
intentio n t o represent, and we begin a regress . If we do no t mean 
that we intend to represent, then it is n ot clear how (o n Sear-
l e's mode l) some part of the utterance could mean to the hearer 
tha t we intend to represent, since meaning ( for Searle ) depends 
o n bo t h representation and communication intenti ons. Henc e, it 
seems that the transparency of intenti o n which Searle associates 
with meaning l eads to meaning never being achieved . 
The most serious problem with Searle's model ar ises from the 
actual notion of intenti o n to represent. He says t ha t t he intent-
ion to represent is the intenti o n that the physical e vents wh i ch 
constitute par t of the conditions o f satisfacti o n o f the intent-
ion s hould themselves have conditions o f satisfaction. So the 
i ntentio n i s satisfied by, say , words being said, a nd by those 
words having conditions of satisfaction, which are the sa me a s 
the conditions o f satisfaction of an In tentional state. But the 
q uestion immediately arises as to what it is that the intention 
is to represent. 
There seem t o be two possi b ilities here: t hat it is an 
intention to represent some state of affairs in the world, or 
that it is an intention to represent an Intentional state, and 
both seem highl y implausible. It cannot b e a state of affairs in 
the world, because t h is is already represented in the Intentional 
state (under a certain mode ) , so the intention to represent it is 
r edundant. Indeed (and leav ing aside the or i g inal I ntentiona l 
state ) , an intentio n to rep resent a state o f affairs presupposes 
(because it is itself an I ntentional state ) a representation of 
that state of affairs as its representative content. A version of 
this possibility mi ght be t o say that we intend t o represent t he 
state o f affairs in the world with physical e vents (words, e. g. ) , 
rather than through an Intentional state, but th is is e qually 
unlikely. For an illocutionary act is not necessarily a repres-
entation of things; it c an be a promise, a request o r whatever, 
and while Sear l e would argue that these invol ve a r epresentati o n 
in the propositional act, the intention to represent is supposed 
to lead to the whole il locutionary act, not just to its p r oposit-
i o nal content. 
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But if it is n ot the case that t he intentio n is to represen t 
a state of affa i rs in the world, it is e quaB.y i mplausibl e that 
it is to r e p rese nt an Inten tional state. Firs t, if we t hink o f 
the Intentional state which is t he ~ntenti on to r e present an o the r 
I ntentional state, t hat Intentional sta t e must contain t he 
r e presentat i on o f the second Intenti ona l state (as represented ) 
under the mod e o f intentio n. Therefore, we again find that t he 
intention t o represent already involves the representa tion of 
that wh i ch it is th e intention to r e p resent. We might also with 
this possibi li ty say that it i s an intention to represe nt an 
I ntentional state by me ans o f phys ical e vents, but thi s o ffers no 
help . For there is something very strang e about s ugges ting that 
t he statement 'It is raining' is n o t a representation of the 
weat her, but i s rather a representati on o f an I ntentio n al s tat e 
(conta ining a representation o f rain under the mode of be li e f ) . 
And it seems even more im pla usible if we are to acc e pt that the 
o rder ' Pick t hat up ' is n ot in fact an order to s om e one, but 
rather a representation of an Intentional state (containing a 
r epresentation o f that perso n picking i t up - as obe y ing t he 
orde r - under the mode o f desire ) . Apart fr o m anyth ing e l se, a 
supposed indirect s peech act, such as ' I wish you would pick that 
up ', would have t o b e seen as in fact a direct s peech act, and no 
s pee ch act woul d directly refer to s ta tes o f affairs. 
Even aside from t h is im p lausibility , however, illocut ionary 
acts c ann o t really be representations o f I ntentio nal states, 
b e cause they are supposed to share the conditions of satisfact i on 
of the Intentional sta te. The condition of satisfaction o f the 
Intentional state of b e l ie f that it is raining is rain, but if a n 
illocutionary act is a representation of a n Intentio nal sta t e, 
then the condition of satisfaction o f 'It is raining' is the 
be l ief that it is raining, n o t rain. 
Aside from these problems, t he supposition that there can be 
an intention to represent something seems to ignore Searle's 
quite c entral c laim that there can be n o representation in i t -
sel f, but only representatio n under a c ertain mode. 
If we are goi ng to salvag e s o me part o f this t he ory, we 
might try ignoring the term 'represent', and ju s t say t ha t an 
intention t o represent is a n intenti o n to do s om e physical t h ing 
and an intentio n that this physic al e vent has the conditio ns of 
satisfaction of a g i ven I ntentional state. 
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'Doing some physical thing' would be what Searle calls an 
act i on , a n d he says t h a t an act ion , w h i c h m a.y o r m a y no t f o 11 ow a 
pr i or intention, consists of an experience of acting (which is an 
'intention in action') plus the occurrence of an event, with the 
experience of acting causing the event. Using the example of 
r aising one's arm, he says that the representative content of the 
prior intentio n can be expressed as 'I perform the action of 
raising my arm by way o f carrying out this intention' (i.e., we 
must intend that the arm be raised intentionally). This prior 
intention then causes the action, and the 'presentational' con-
tent of the intention in action which is part o f the action can 
be e xpressed as 'M y arm goes up as a result of this intention in 
action'. Intentions in these cases are thus 'causally self-refer-
ential'. The prior intention both causes the action and repres-
ents it, and the intention in action both causes the event and 
presents it. (S ee 1983: Ch.3, esp. 91-8, & Ch.4.) 
I do not wish to criticize Searle's views on action here, 
but I do want to re-examine the notion of an intention to repres-
ent in the light of these vi ews. Given the formulation just seen, 
it seems that the intention to represent, if it is a prior in-
tention (t hough the following discussion differs little if it is 
an intention in action), involves an Intentional state with a 
representative content consisting in part of 'I do some physical 
thing by way of carrying out this intention', and we can suppose 
for the time being that this 'physical thing' is vocal sound. The 
other part of the representative content would be 'I make the 
vocal sound have the conditions of satisfaction of an Intention-
al state, and I do this by way of carrying out this intention'. 
We now have a major problem. If we cash out the' intention 
that the physical events ..• have conditions of satisfaction', as 
the intention to make these physical events have conditions of 
satisfaction, the intention seems hopeless, because we cannot 
just make events have c onditions of satisfaction unless we step 
out of the intention to represent, go over to our hearer, and 
say, for example, 'When I raise my arm, it means that the enemy's 
about to charge, O.K.?'. The problem here is that we have gone 
from an intention that, to an intention to. An intention that is 
not part of an action. It is more closely related to a desire, 
and may lead to an action. This relates to a point made earlier 
regarding communication intentions. 
A solution here might be to say that we satisfy the intent-
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ion that the physical events have the conditions of satisfactio n 
o f a gi ven Intentional state by either suitably defining t he 
p h ysical e vent as above, or, more usuall y , performing physica l 
e vents which ha ve these conditions of satisfaction b y v irtue o f 
t heir meaning. The trouble here is that we are beginning t o leave 
Searle's position way behind, as we are assuming meaning in the 
e xp lication of the very act / state which in Searle's v iew constit-
u tes meaning. 
Nonetheless, a formulati o n of the content of the intenti o n 
t o represent might now be given as' I ma k e v ocal s o u nds wh i ch 
ac c ord with an illocutionary act which has the cond i t ions of 
satisfaction of an Intentional state, and I do t h is by way o f 
c arrying out this intention'. 
The next problem here is that the question arises as t o what 
Intentional state the illocutionary act has the same conditions 
o f satisfaction as. We have seen already that it cannot b e 't he 
I ntentional state I intend to represent', but maybe we can say 
that it is 'the Intentional state I intend to express' ( wh ic h is 
a term Searle sometimes uses - cf . 1982: 163 ). Here, the content 
o f the intention to represent would be 'I perform an illocution-
ary act whi c h has the same conditions of satisfaction as the 
Intentional state I intend to express, and I do this b y way of 
carrying out this intention'. Thus, an illocutionary act is the 
intentional expression of an Intentional state, and its being an 
expression of a given Intentional state consists in its having 
the same conditions of satisfaction. 
It is not obv ious how such a v iew would b e cashed out, but 
but we might say that meaning already e x ists in t he 'language' of 
our Intentional states, and that this private language is trans-
lated or expressed as public language. I find such a view prob-
lematic. It seems to cope with questions of language by sim p l y 
positing an unanal y zable lang uage of mental states, and the 
Intentionality which does the translating or expressing appears 
to involve an already constituted linguistic consciousness such 
as that which would be involved in translating between languges, 
or in expressing something with a pre-arranged arm-wave. That is, 
it seems to involve a second order Intentional state which is 
about first order states, and, as Searle says, such a situati o n 
leads to an infinite regress ( 1983: 22 ) . In any case, it does not 
seem to be a view with which Searle would want to be identified, 
as it is perhaps quite close to the views of some cognitive 
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scientists; however, it seems that this is where we end up by 
following thr oug h and tr y ing to make sense -o f his theory. 
On the wa y , we have lost the no_t ion of meanin g being some-
th ing which is constituted by a speaker's intentions. We could 
still c laim that there are intentions to do things which mean 
something, or even that we can in tend to mean t hat p by x, 
t hr oug h dubbing, privately or publicly; but in eit her ca se, the 
meaning is constituted outside the intention to represent, and 
the intention to represent, if it makes any sense at a ll, is 
dependent on meaning. 
To summarize this argument: I have claimed first that 
Searle's description of Intentional states by analogy with illoc-
utionary states o ffers an un convincing demonstration of either 
the nature of Intentional states or their primacy in relation to 
language. I then argued that the intentio n to communicate is 
unclear as it stands, but that if it is ca shed out to any e xtent 
it seems to force the intentio n to represent associated with an 
intenti on to communicate (this being the intention to represent 
associated with full y meaning something) into an infinite re-
gress. The ne x t problem was that the notion of an intention to 
represent implies a representing which is what the intentio n is 
to do, however, there appears to be nothing which could be plaus-
ibly represented by or through the intention. Finally , I have 
suggested that the intention to represent could be construed as 
the intention to express an Intentional state as an illocution-
ary, and as I have said, whatever the plausibility of this view, 
it leaves us n owhere near a model in which meaning is constituted 
by meaning intentions. 
As a final comment here, it seems that while Searle claims 
to avoid a dualism through his treatment of Intentional states as 
that by which the mind relates to reality, in his treatment of 
the move from Intentional states to language he seems t o repro-
duce a dualism o f sorts by having meaning intentions relating the 
mind (in the form of Intentional states ) to language. The meaning 
intentions act as a bridge between Intentional states and lang-
uage, and Intentional states (prior to language and underlying 
it) are essentially isolated from language. 
It is true that meaning intentions themselves are Intent-
ional states, but they are a peculiar sort o f Intentional state, 
and not just in that they involve causally self-referential 
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intentions. They seem t o constitute a consciousness at the prag -
mat i c core of language which both knows what the s ubj e ct me ans 
and brings about meaning a t the same t ime. Whil e Intentiona l 
states a s such need t o be 'represen~ed' or e xp ressed in o rder for 
them to b e externa lized, these pa rtic ular Intentional states are 
s omehow t he 'representing' o r e xp ression of Intentio nal states, 
and Searle offers no ex planati on of this paradox . 
CONCLUSION. 
As I have commented earlier, Searle's work is e xtr eme ly 
influential within p ragmatics. It is taken as offering both the 
ba si c notion of a s peech act and the model for classifying speech 
acts, yet it appears that the i de a o f pragmatics which it sugg-
ests is deeply flawed, and this raises major doubts regarding t he 
possibility of developing a pragmatics based on this conception. 
In this chapter I have argued that the theory o f s peech act s 
fails to give an adequate account of illocutionary acts because 
it l e aves them tied into a pragmatic circle a nd because it att -
empts to e xplain meaning through a n equivoca ti on between mea ning 
as intention a nd linguistic meaning. A further problem with this 
theory wa s that the characteri zation of illocutionary acts de-
pended on an idealizatio n of acts whic h gave n o account of the 
r elation between the idealized central case and the parasitic 
r ealizat ions of the central case whic h make up the ac tuality o f 
conversation. And finally, it seems that the theory o f In tention-
ality involves a detailed filling-out of the way intentions 
constitute meaning which does not in the end avoid the or iginal 
equi voca tion. All o f this, as I have said, raises doubt s as t o 
the v i abi lity of a pragmatics based on such a v iew. 
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I NT.RODUCTION. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
In the previous chapters I have discussed some of t he main 
features of philosophical pragmatics, citing these as Austin•s 
treatment o f utterances as actions, Gric e•s em phasis on t he role 
in communication o f speaker •s intentions, and Searle•s attem p t to 
develop out of this work a theory of speech acts and intentio n-
ality. The pe r i od o f the development of these views coin c ided 
wi th, or perhaps s l i ghtly preceded, a ma jo r shift in linguis tics. 
Anglo-American linguisti cs had been dominated by the Chom-
s kian paradigm of transforma tional linguistics. This program 
involved a rejection of Bl oomf ie ldian pos itiv ism and an attem p t 
to study competence, t he linguistic intuitions of speakers in an 
abstract, homogeneous s peec h community in which e veryone s pea ks 
alike and learns the l a nguage instantly . These intuitio ns, abou t 
which sentences are gra mmatical a nd whi c h sentences mean the same 
(w ithin a small class o f abstracted or decontextualized sen ten-
ces ) are accounted for by rules which generate sen t ence s and 
which characterize the se t o f gramm atical sentences ( see Chom-
sky,l95 7 : 17 f; & 1965: 3 ) . 
However, beginning in the l960•s, and accelerat ing in the 
early 1970s , attention was g i ven to the limitations of this 
paradigm, and t o the need t o take ac count o f the actual use of 
language as an interactive, con c rete phen omenon. The mos t im por -
tant vo i c e in this period was probab l y Labov, and his essay , 1 The 
Study of Language in its Social Context • {197 2b: Ch.8 ) is central 
to recent approaches to linguistic pragmat i c s. Certainly it would 
be a mistake t o i gnore the influence of the Pra gu e School in 
Anglo- Americ a n linguistics dur ing this period, especia lly on 
Hymes• work in linguist ic ethnograp hy , a nd on Hall i day , but th is 
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ma terial is not c entral to the type of approac h I want to discu ss 
in t h is chap ter. 
The work I want to discuss I w ill call 'discour se analysis', 
however, this use of the term s hould b e im mediate ly qualified , 
since at the present state of theory it is e xtre mely ambiguous. 
Indeed, it shares much o f the ambiguity of ' pragma ti c s'. On the 
o ne hand, it can be used to cover p rogram s ra nging from s oci o -
linguistics t hr o ugh psycholinguistics and philosophical or f8r~al 
linguistics t o computatio nal linguistics ( see Br own & Yule, 19 83 : 
Preface). On the o t her ha nd, it can be defined as simply the 
analysis o f l a ng ua ge in small-scale conversational setting s ( Dow -
nes, 1984: 19 ) , o r can be used t o cover ethnography o f communic-
ation, speech act linguistics and conversation anal ysis ( Coul -
thard,l977), or perhaps just speech act lingui s t i cs and con var-
sational anal ysis (S tubbs,1983 ) . 
What I want to call 'discourse anal ysis' here is an approach 
to communication which concentrates o n language as interac t i ve 
perform anc e a nd which has as its central conceptual device the 
n o tion of a speech act o r similar basic category o r unit of 
discourse. This second aspect o ffers t he major distinction fr om 
conversation anal ysis, which will be discussed in the ne x t chap-
ter, and while, as has been noted above, conversation analy sis 
and what I am calling discourse analysis are at times pl aced 
within the one general approach, they nonetheless appear to 
involve distinct bodies of work within linguistic pragmatics and 
distinct approaches t o the study o f discourse phenomena. 
While discourse analysis c an b e represented as t he analysis 
of purely spoken communication (Downes, 1984: 19 & 30 3ff ) , it 
seems more usual to include within it work by text g rammarians 
such as Va n Dijk, who focus, at least initially and centrally, on 
written texts. Nonetheless, I shall mainly be dealing wit h e xam -
ples of that work which concentrates o n conversation. This work 
tends t o make use of models from the tradition of ph ilosophical 
pragmatics of main interest here (w hereas text grammarians follow 
more closely the textlinguistik tradition - see Edmondson, 1981: 
4f. & Ch.2), and it shares the phonocentric emphasis of t he work 
we have been looking at. 
The style of discourse analysis dealt with here s hares much 
with, and often owes much to, philosophical pragmatics, and is 
often described by its practitioners in terms of its relation t o 
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philosophy; however, it would be a mistake to ignore the extent 
to which it is an independent program governed more by the de-
mands of linguistic analysis than by some desire to fill out a 
philosophical program. In its concen~ration on performance rather 
than competence discourse analysis makes use of approaches dis-
cussed in the earlier chapters, however, as linguistics it invol-
ves an attempt to apply linguistic techniques and concepts to 
interaction, and therefore to linguistic units above that of the 
sentence (see Stubbs, 1983: 1 & Levinson: 1983: 286 ) . Having said 
that, the main focus here will be on those concepts and approach-
es taken over from philosop hy and paralleling those found in 
philosophy, and on their effect on the models of communication 
developed in discourse analysis. 
One reason why an examination if discourse analysis is 
particularly useful in the light of the work discussed in the 
previous chapters, is that we find here that issues surrounding 
the conception of linguistic subjects and what I have called the 
politics of discourse are made much clearer. Whereas in philos-
ophical pragmatics the focusing notion seems to be that of 
speech as action in a context, in linguistic pragmatics we find 
emphasis place as well on the notion of discourse as interaction. 
Because of this, the relations between linguistic subjects in 
interaction become more significant, and the influence of social 
roles and implicit assumptions regarding those roles come to be 
seen as important factors in the operation of discourse, in 
relation to both the production and interpretation of utterances. 
Further, it becomes much clearer that linguistic subjects do not 
and can not enter discourse without being taken up already in 
certain interactive and (therefore) discursive relations, relat-
ions which effect both the right and ability to assign signific-
ance or meaning, and which also govern the significance which 
arises in discourse. An important question which arises in what 
follows is the extent to which linguistic pragmatics is able to 
adequately theoretically acknowledge and account for these 
factors. 
In this chapter I shall concentrate on a detailed examin-
ation of one example of discourse analysis - Labov & Fanshel's 
analysis of therapeutic discourse - but before that it will be 
useful, in Section 1, to note in more detail some of the main 
features of this approach.l 
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SECTION 1: AN OUTLINE OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS. 
-
Even within the definition of discourse analysis given above 
we are dealing with a diverse and n6t fully unified body of work, 
and what follows is not intended to give the impression of any-
thing like a tightly structured research program. Nonetheless, it 
does seem possible to make note of aspects of the self-location 
of work in this area, as well as certain features in common 
across its diversity. 
There are three main features of discourse analysis as I 
have defined it. The first is an attempt to apply linguistic 
analysis to supra-sentential units; this leads into the aim of 
giving an account of how coherence and sequential organization in 
discourse is produced and understood; and this in turn brings 
about the theorizing of cognitive linguistic structures which are 
at play in the operation of discourse units. 
Stubbs, for example, says that the term 'discourse analysis' 
•refers to attempts to study the organization of language above 
the sentence or above the clause, and therefore to study larger 
linguistic units, such as conversational exchanges or written 
texts•. He goes on to say that discourse analysis is therefore 
concerned with 'language in use in social contexts, and in par-
ticular with interaction or dialogue between speakers• (1983: 1) 
According to Stubbs, the move from concentration on the sentence 
or clause to larger linguistic units and so to discourse pheno-
mena arose out of questions raised when transformational grammar 
tried to take account of context. 
As soon as one writes context-sensitive rules of the form 
'rewrite a as b in context c', one begins to wonder about 
the context which acts as the trigger for the rule. It is 
[sic] purely linguistic? Is it within the sentence? Or in 
the social context? Is there any important difference be-
tween these triggering contexts? 
It follows that the grammatical, structural units of 
clause or sentence are not necessarily either the most 
important units for language study, or the biggest, although 
the clause will probably remain basic as a unit of syntax, 
of propositional information, and as the potential realiz-
ation of a speech act. (Stubbs,l983: 7) 
Stubbs suggests that the upper limit of structural organization 
is given by discourse units such as lecture, conversation, speech 
and story. 
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Stubbs' own arg ument against the primacy of the sentence in 
analysis is based on his analysis of sentence-initial particles 
('well', 'now','right'), adver b s, and 'please'. He argues ( 19 83 : 
Ch.4) that traditional grammars are unable to deal adequately 
with phenomena such as these, and that this is because these 
phenomena operate within units extending beyond the sentenc e, and 
that rules constraining their use must be based on these larger 
units, which he calls 'speech acts' (see esp. Stubbs,l983: 71-
77ff.). 
As Levinson puts it, the techniques employed by discourse 
analysis to extend analysis beyond the unit of the sentence are 
essentially 'the isolation of a set of basic categories or units 
of discourse', and 'the formulation of a set of concatenation 
rules stated over those categories, delimiting well-formed sequ-
ences of categories (coherent discourses) from ill-formed sequen-
ces (incoherent discourses)' (Levinson, 1983: 286). 
Coulthard makes the point that once we confront interactive 
utterances we find that constraints operating between speakers 
cannot be expressed in grammatical terms, and that often in 
interactive utterances (he is discussing cases of enquiry and 
salutation) the linguistic form of the utterance is almost irrel-
evant. 
What is structurally important is its linguistic function 
and it is evidence of this kind which points to the exist-
ence of another level, discourse, between grammar and non-
linguistic organization. Sequences, which from a grammatical 
viewpoint are a random succession of clauses of different 
types can be seen from a functional viewpoint to be highly 
structured. (Coulthard, 1977: 7) 
In arguing that discourse does not consist simply of a string of 
grammatically well-formed utterances or sentences, Coulthard 
notes cases of discourse which are grammatically unexceptional, 
yet odd, such as, 
A: I feel hot today. 
B: No. 
He says that in cases like this 'B's contribution obviously 
breaks rules for the production of coherent discourse', and says 
that discourse analysis aims to discover these rules and, even 
more fundamentally, to discover 'the nature of the units whose 
structure and occurrence the sequencing rules will describe' 
(Coulthard, 1977: 7). 
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Coulthard quotes a comment from the introduction to Labov' s 
article on ritual insults, that the first and most important step 
in the formalization of discourse anal ysis is to d istingui s h 
'what is said from what is done' ( Labov , 1972a: 121 ) . He ta kes 
this as saying that ' discourse analysis must be concerned wi th 
the functional use of language', and says that therefore, 'fo r 
all discourse analysts the unit o f anal ysis is not t he grammatic -
ally defined "clause" or "sentence", although the unit ma y very 
fr eq uently consist o f one c lau se or sentence'. Coul t hard takes 
the fundamental unit as the s peech act. 
He says that while the relations between the basic units of 
discourse are generally agreed to depend on their respective 
functions, a problem for discourse analysis is how many fun ct i ons 
t here are. Another problem, Coulthard suggests, is the size of 
the basic unit. Commonly it is taken to be the utterance , but he, 
Sinclair, and o thers feel that it is in fact the ~, which can 
be c o-extensive with the utterance, but will often be smaller (so 
that an utterance may consist of one or more moves ) . A third 
problem which Cou lthard sees for discourse analysis is to show 
'how the functional categories are realized by formal means', f o r 
example, what the relationship is between 'request' o r 'questio n' 
and the grammatical options available to the speaker. He notes, 
a nd we shall see this in the next chapter, that writers suc h as 
Sacks and Schegloff assume that their categories are intuitively 
recognizable fr om the labe'l, whereas a discourse analyst such as 
Labov tries to write rules to explain how a given lexico- grammat-
i cal structure comes t o realize a given functi o n in a given 
situation. (Coulthard, 1977: 8) 
As Labov himself puts this in the paper on t h e st udy of 
language in its social context , 
The fundamental problem o f discourse analysis is to show how 
one utterance foll ows another in a rational, rule-governed 
manner - in o ther words, how we understand coherent 
discourse. ( Labov,1972b: 252) 
After making the point noted above about distinguishing what is 
said from what is done, Labov says in that paper ( 1972a ) that 
there is a tendency to interchange terms for t he smal l .number of 
grammatical sentence types (statements, questions and imperat -
ives) with the names for certain actions: assertions, requests 
for information, and commands. He says that there is, however, no 
such simple on-to- one relationship, since, for e xamp le, requests 
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for information can b e made with statements ,_ questions, or i mper-
at ives, and since a great many other actions are d one with word s 
and must be related by rule to the utterance, such as refu sa l s, 
c hallenges, retreats, insults, promises, threats, and so o n. 
The rules that connect what is sai d to the actions b ei ng 
performed with words are comple x ; the major task of dis-
course analysis is to analyze them, and thus t o show that 
o ne sentence foll o ws anot her in a coheren t way. (La bov , 
1972a : 1 21) 
At the stage of Labov' s work to which I have referred here he 
makes no reference to philosophical pragmatics. However, i t seems 
c 1 e a r t h a t t he so r t of p r og r am w h i c h Lab o v s e t s up h a s m u c h i n 
common with the work seen in earlier chapters (e ven aside fro m 
the remarkably Austinian language in part of the last quot ation ). 
A difference worth pointing out at this stage between Labov's 
work and philosophical pragmatics is that the analysis o f the 
speech act here places more emphasis on its stat u s as an act 
within a sequence of acts. Certainly, in the work looked at 
earlier the discursive and social context of the act is recog-
nized, but it seems that the linguistic interest in coherence 
sharpens the focus of this aspect of pragmatics, and places 
weight on the importance of the interpretation, and well as the 
production, of utterances. One implication of this is that what a 
discursive subject means is much more clearly e xposed to the 
constraints of the discourse in which she o r he is engaged. Th is 
is not just to sa y that meaning becomes someth ing which is in a 
sense negotiated through the process and relations of production 
and interpretation which constitute discourse. It is also, and in 
many ways much more importantly, constrained by t he possibilities 
of production and interpretation which are built into the dis-
cursive practices engaged in at the time. 
My points here can be seen if we look a t discourse rules 
which Labov suggests f or requests for info rmation. He takes the 
following discourse: 
A: Are you going to work tomorrow? 
B: I'm on jury duty. 
A: Couldn't you get ou t of it? 
B: We tried e verything. 
( u 1 ) 
(U 2 ) 
(U3) 
(U 4 ) 
Wh ile this is intuitivel y coherent, Labov says that there can be 
no formal basis in sentence-grammar to explicate this intuition -
other than having a grammar containing every known relation 
between persons and objects. However, discourse rules do not need 
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such detail, and once we realize that in U2 8 is asserting that 
there is a p r oposition connecting the response with t he r equest, 
we c an formulate the following rule of discourse: 
If A mak es a request for informat i o n Q-5 1 , and B makes a 
statement 52 in response that cann ot be e xpanded by r ules of 
ellipsis to the form X 51 Y, t hen 52 is heard as an 
a sse r tion that there exists a pr oposition P know n to both A 
a nd 8 : 
I f 52 , then ( E )S l 
where ( E) is an existential operato r, and from this 
proposition there is in ferred an answer to A's request : 
(E)Sl. (Labov,1972a: 122 ) 
Labov say s that this is a rule of interpretation that relates 
what is said (5 2) to what is done (the assertion of P and the 
answer t o Q-Sl), and notes that there is no direct connection 
b etween the two utterances Q- 51 and 52. So whereas Searle's r ules 
focussed o n the speaker, on the production, Labov's r ules f ocus 
more o n the hearer, o n interp retation, and . therefo re highlight 
d isc ourse a s interaction. This difference is in fact made e xpl ic-
it in Labov 's later work with Fanshel, which will b e discussed 
b e low (see Labov & Fanshel, 19 77 : 81-2 ). 
According to Labov the over-all relation of disc our se rules 
to utterances shows several levels of abstraction, and he r epre-
sents the connections between the four utterances cited above in 
the following scheme: 
Speaker A 
Dl 
1 
( D2) 
l 
D3 
1 (r 
U3 Ul 
U2 U4 
Speaker 8 1 I l I (Dl) · D2 ( D3) D4 
Labov glosses this scheme as follows: 
Speaker A be gins with the intentio n of performing the ac tio n 
Dl; by a productio n rule, he does so with the utterance Ul. 
Speaker 8 use s the inverse interpretation rule t o interpret 
Ul as A's action Dl, a n d the n applies a sequencing rule to 
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decide his ~esponse 02. He then codes 02 into the utte~ance 
U2 by a p~oduction ~ule, and Spea ke~ A- inte~p~ets this - in 
t h is case, by the ~ule cited which tells him that the state-
ment I'm on ~ duty is a ~esponse to 01 to be interp~eted 
as "I'm not going to work because I'm on jury duty ." The 
othe~ sequences follow in the same manner. ( Labov,1972a: 
1 23 , and see also 1972b: 254) ) 
The tw o types of discourse rules which operate he~e are rules of 
i nterpretatio n, UD (with their inverse ~ules of production, DU), 
a nd sequencing rules, DO, which connect actions; and the~e are, 
Labov says, other rules that connec t actions at higher levels of 
abstraction, so that the diagram may in fact ha ve a structure 
such as: 
01 02 03 04 
0 5, 0 6 and 07 can be considered as exchanges, encounters, inquir-
ies, o r even c hallenges and defenses, depending on the larger 
context of interaction and higher level rules. (1972a: 123) 
Labov says that not just any statement will do as 52. If B 
said ' De Gaulle just lost the election', and A could not find a 
proposition which could make the connection between this and 51, 
A would reject B's ~esponse. However, the operation of the rule 
is invariant, and A must inspect 52 as a possible element in a 
proposition if S2 then (E)Sl before reacting. 'Failure to locate 
such a proposition may reflect a real incompetence: younger 
members of a social group may not be able to find the proposition 
being asserted' (1972a: 123). 
The unstated proposition is p resumed to be part of the 
communal shared knowledge, and Labov says that the concept of 
'shared knowledge' is an essential element in discourse analysis. 
For example, statements are often used as requests for confirm-
atio n, requi~ing a yes-no response, and he says that these oper-
ate as requests rather than assertions because of an inva~iant 
rule of discourse which relies on the distinction between A-
events (events which A knows about but B does not), B-events 
(which B knows about) and AS-events ( known to both). In any two 
party conversation there is an understanding of these distinct~ 
ions, and thus we get the following rule of interpretation: 
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If A :nak es a s tatement about a 8-event, it is heard as a 
request for confirma t ion. 
Labov comments that as well as_ these concepts o f sha r ed and 
unshared knowledge, t here are other elements of discourse that 
are ba sed o n sociological concepts, such as notions of role, 
rights, duties and obligat ions as s ociat ed with social rules. He 
demonstrates this with the following e xamp le: 
RHODA: Well, when are you planning to come home? 
RHODA ' S 
MOTH ER : Oh, why-y? 
A first response is to sa y that here a question is answered wit h 
a question, but Labov says that questions do not answer ques-
tions, a ny more than statements do. 'Answers are given to requ-
ests; they may occasionally take the form of questions'. He says 
that on closer examinatio n Rhoda's question can be seen as a 
request for action, n o t information, and that her mother's ques-
tion is a r efusal of that request. To explain this Labov sa ys 
that the underlying rules f o r requests for action appear to have 
the form: A requests ~ to do ~ for the purpose ! under conditions 
~, and for this to be heard as a valid command, it 
for c ertain pre-conditions to hold: 8 must believe 
ves that 
---
1. X needs to be done. 
2. 8 has the ability to do X. 
3. 8 has the obligation to do X. 
4. A has the right to tell 8 to do X. 
is necessary 
that A belie-
He says that there are many ways to perform this request, and 
many ways of aggravating or mitigating the force of the command. 
One way involves statements o r questio ns referring to any of the 
pre-conditions, and this can also be used to refuse the request. 
In the case above, Rhoda's mother refuses the request by asking a 
q uestion concerning the relation of A, 8 a nd X, which is heard as 
a question about (a nd a challenge to) pre-condition 4 (Labov, 
1972a: 124-5) . We will go into this part icular example in more 
detail later, but it should already be c lear from these brief 
comments that not only the general importance of interaction and 
interpretation, but also the significance of social roles in this 
interaction and interpretation, are given much greater emphasis 
in Labov's approach than in philosophical pragmatics. 
This gives a brief idea of the main aims and principles of 
discourse analysis, and a short account of the type of approach 
which Labov adopts. In the next section I want to examine in more 
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detail the analysis which he and Fanshel make of therapeutic 
d iscourse. 
SECTION 2: LABOV AND FANSHEL ON THERAPEUTIC DISCOURSE. 
SECTION 2a. 
In Therapeutic Discourse: Psychotherapy as Conversation 
(1977) , Labov & Fanshel present an anal ysis of the first 15 
minutes of a therapeutic interview. The interviewer is described 
as an experienced therapist with 'a thorough familiarity with the 
psychoanalytic literature and viewpoint in regard to p hycho-
therapy', and the viewpoint of the agency in which she worked is 
said to focus on ego psychology (Labov & Fanshel,1977: 12). The 
interviewee is described as 'a 19-year-old Jewish girl who res-
ides in New York City' who had been diagnosed as having anorexia 
nervosa (1977:8-9). The interv iew in question is the 25th sess-
ion. 
In the introduction to the study, Labov & Fanshel say that 
the recognition of the complexity of the devices that speakers 
use to cope with each o ther led their attention to the higher-
level questions of 'coherence in discourse, the relation between 
speech and speech act, and the rules of interpretation and prod-
uction which relate speech to the actions being felt and perform-
ed'. 
To answer the question, What is taking place in this 
interview? we necessarily dealt with what speakers were 
doing to each other or felt that they were doing to each 
other: that is, with their interaction. (Labov & Fanshel, 
1977: 6) 
They go on to say that they found that sentences are not necess-
arily connected at the utterance level but that sequencing in 
conversation takes place between actions which may be far removed 
from the words as literally spoken, both in time and in degree of 
abstract ion. 
Labov & Fanshel say that they view this interview as a case 
of a relatively common and important therapeutic problem, but 
also as an e xample of human conversation in general. 'We explic-
ate the specific features so that the application of the general 
principles can be seen' (1977: 8). Thus, they place their study 
within the two perspectives under which the therapeutic interview 
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has been previously e xamined. 
First, as an element in the case hist~LY of a patient, 
illustrating the etiology and dynamics of a disorder as well 
as its treatment; second, as a _communicative event, a 
conversation in which therapist and patient interact under 
the general rules, constraints, and patterns of face-to-face 
interaction. (Labov & Fanshel,l977: 12) 
Of these previous studies, those which Labov & Fanshel find most 
useful are microanalyses, which closely examine details of rec-
orded verbal behaviour. They feel, however, that these are gen-
erall y limited by a concentration on relatively empty paraling-
uistic cues, to the exclusion of the meaning of what is being 
said (see 1977: 19-23). An exception which they cite here is The 
First Five Minutes by Pittenger, Hockett, & Danehy (1960 ). 
While the term 'speech act' is not used in the earlier work 
by Labov, he does thee seem to be working with a similar concept. 
It is therefore no surprise to find that in Therapeutic Discourse 
'speech act', or 'speech event', is a central analytic term, and 
Labov & Fanshel explicitly relate their study to work done on the 
general analysis of speech act, presuppositions, and sentence 
connection (1977: 23-4). 
They also note the influence of the work of conversational 
analysts in developing general rules of sequencing in conversa-
tion, but they object that such work cannot answer the question 
of 'why X said Y here', and cannot confront the central question 
of this study: What is taking place in the therapeutic interview? 
'We agree that .•• sequencing is a matter of considerable import-
ance for the understanding of what takes place in conversation, .•• 
but it will be helpful if we can develop a more exact character-
ization of the units that are sequenced'. 
Sequencing rules do not appear to relate words, sentences, 
and other linguistic forms, but rather form the connections 
between abstract actions such as requests, compliments, 
challenges, and defenses. Thus sequencing rules presuppose 
another set of relations, those between the words spoken and 
the actions being performed. (Labov & Fanshel,l977: 25) 
Labov & Fanshel claim that most microanalyses, dealing with 
intonation or gestures, proceed on the assumption that we must 
gain a clear understanding of the signals that communicate before 
we can analyze larger units. They suggest that we find the same 
general strategy in studies of presuppositions and implications 
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o f sentence structure, where the general aim seems to be to work 
out the possible combinations of single unit s, and so proceed 
gradually to write a g rammar o f discourse. Likewise, the y 
suggest, those studying sequencing ~ul es in conversati on also 
begin with the smallest units of organi zation at their level of 
interest, hoping to arrive e ventually at larger structures ( 1977: 
29) . 
The y say that in the course of their re search they f o und 
that a different direction is required. Whe n initially consider-
ing indi v idual signals they found that there was a gr e at d eal o f 
implicit communicat ion in the form of vocal gestures such as 
intonation, vo ice qualifiers a nd hesitations. Ho we ver, they say, 
the y gradual ly discovered that there was an e ven richer body of 
im p licit com munica tio n in the form of unexpressed social and 
psychological p r opositions. Furthermore, they found a large body 
of implicit activity which was not verbal at all and could not be 
translated into single propositions , which leads to the suggest-
ion that most utte rances can be seen as perf o rming several speech 
acts simultaneously. 
The parties to a conversatio n appear to be understanding and 
reacting to these speech acts at many levels of abstract ion. 
As we see it now, conversation is not a chain of utterances, 
but rather a matrix of utterances and actions bou nd together 
by a web of understandings and reactions. (Labov & Fanshel, 
1977 : 29-30) 
In this approach, conversation is seen, f o llowing Goffma n, 
as a form or subspecies of interaction in general. Labov & Fan-
she! say that they find that actions and utterances are regularly 
linked together in chains o f exchanges, and n ote that this is a 
fundamental p r oposit i o n for the therapy they are examining, a nd 
that one of the bas i c strategies of the therapist is to break 
down the common-sense view that actions are o ne thing and words 
another. We saw earlier that Labov wanted to make a distin c tion 
b etween what is said and what i s done. We ca n now describe this 
as a distinction between the utterance and the speech act(s) 
performed by that utterance, and we can see this present cla im as 
asserting that these speech acts (or 'speech actions') need to be 
p lac ed a nd examined within the general matrix of inter-actions. 
(1977: 30 & 26, & see Goffma n, 1975) 
In order to understand therapeutic conversation as a form of 
interaction , Labov & Fanshel say that they have looked for the 
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largest context that conditions that interaction. They say that 
the conversational details of the therapy ·~re seen and interp -
reted as they function in a series of concentric contexts, framed 
within the general definition of th~ situation' (1977 : 30 ). A 
therapeutic interview is thus defined using Hymes' notion of the 
'speech event': 'a routinized form of behavior, delineated by 
well-defined boundaries and well-defined sets of e xpected b eha v -
iors within those boundaries' ( 1977: 30 & see Hymes, 1964 ). 
The therapeutic interv iew falls within the larger cla ss of 
interviews in general, which are defined as speech e vents in 
which one person extracts info rmation from another person which 
is in that person's biography - this being information which ' has 
been experienced and absorbed by that person and will be given 
back with a certain amount of orientation and interpretation that 
is conditioned by the other person's experience and orientation' 
( 1977: 30 & 30n). In some interviews, such as surveys, journal-
istic interviews and police interrogations, the intervi ewer goes 
to the interviewee, whereas in medical, legal or therapeutic 
interviews the interviewee, as client, goes to the interviewer. 
Just as the initiation of the event varies, so does who is helped 
by it. Depending on whether it is a police interrogation, journ -
alistic interview, school examination and so on, o ne o r the 
other, and sometimes both, may b e perceived to benefit. Depending 
on the type and character of the interview, the perceived benefit 
has a strong influence upon the type of verbal interaction which 
takes place, as does the degree of compulsion surrounding the 
event. 
Labov & Fanshel claim that in cases li k e medical, legal and 
therapeutic interviews, where the interviewee goes f o r help, he 
or she is usually understood to benefit, and is u sually paying 
for the service. In a therapeutic interview, the interviewee goes 
for help and gives informatio n fr om his or her biography that 
will be used for that help. What is distinctive about the ther a -
peutic interview is that this help will be given only throu gh 
fu~ther talk, and unlike the lawyer or doctor, the therapist will 
generally not g ive the patient advice on what to do. (1977 : 31) 
The special nature of therapy leads to a number of paradoxes 
within the situation. Someone requiring p sychotherapy is stigmat-
ized as n ot fully able to care for him or herself, whereas the 
therapist is seen as some one who ca n take care of him or herself, 
and who ca n help others to take care o f themselves. 
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This asymmetry - the weakness of the patient and the 
st~ength of the therapist - is ~einforced by any direct help 
that the therapist gives. This problem gives ~ise to the 
fundamental paradox of therapy_ The most general goal of 
therapy is to bring the patient to the point at which he can 
function independently and no longer needs help; but can a 
person be taught not to need help by gi v ing him help? (Labov 
& Fanshel,l977: 32) 
In response to this paradox the patient may deny that help is 
needed o r mitigate its need, and Labov & Fanshel suggest that 
this is one of the primary forms in which resistance to therapy 
appears. 
This resistance in turn governs and is reflected in the 
discourse which occurs in therapy, as do other, secondary ~espon­
ses to the fundamental paradox. Because of the paradox, many 
areas normally and importantly unquestioned in conversation, such 
as feelings and experiences, loose their status as areas of the 
patient's personal expertise, and this leads to many of the 
conflicts in therapy. One effect of this is that the patient 
often ~etreats to narrative portrayal of everyday events relati ve-
ly safe from contradiction (1977: 34-5). 2 
I have summarized the account of therapeutic discourse as a 
speech event in some detail because an understanding of the 
contradictions and pressures that exist in the therapeutic sit-
uation is important for an understanding of the different 'fields 
of discourse', with their different vocabularies and rhetorical 
devices, which occur in the speech event. One such field is 'the 
style of everyday life, in which the patient tells about the 
events of the preceding days in a fairly neutral, objective, 
colloquial style'. This style lacks both emotionally coloured and 
therapeutically oriented language, and contains a subvariety, 
called 'narrative style', where a speaker is giving an account of 
actual events that occurred in the past, and when there is a much 
sharper contrast between the repo~ted events and the evaluation 
of them. A second field of discourse is 'interview style', which 
involves therapeutically oriented vocabulary, and in which emot-
ions and behaviour are not expressed, but rather are evaluated as 
objects in themselves. In the case under study the special vocab-
ulary of this style is mainly used by the therapist. The express-
ion of strong emotions is generally contained in a third field, 
called 'family style', which can be recognized by idiom and 
intonation patterns used in the patient's family situation. 
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Labov & Fanshel cepcesent these fields of discoucse as 
embedded accocding to the following diagcam: 
T H E R A P Y 
I N T E R V I E W 
IN A R R A T I v E I I FAMILY I 
The fields of discoucse form a natural part of the concen-
tric frames in which the patient's behaviour is embedded. 
The outermost frame is the institution of psychotherapy 
[which effects speech behaviour in the ways outlined above]. 
Within that frame we find the therapeutic interview 
marked by a type of metalanguage - [interview style]. Embed-
ded within the therapeutic interview are the narratives and 
discussions of everyday life, conveyed in [everyday style ] . 
More deeply embedded in accounts of everyday life, we find 
brief excerpts from family style, with its characteristic 
linguistic features. ( Labov & Fanshel, 19 77: 3 6-7) 
They suggest, again following Goffman, that shifts from one 
frame to another are characteristic of ordinary conversation. 
They say that for them the recognition of distinct frames is 
particularly valuable because they determine so dicectly the 
linguistic forms that they will be examining. ( 1977: 37 & 355) 
Conversations are thus studied as forming 'a complex matrix 
of utterances, propositions, and actions', which involves vert-
ical relations between surface utterances and deeper actions, 
united by rules of interpretation and production, and horizontal 
relations of sequencing between actions and utterances, united by 
sequencing rules. The identification of these relations is tested 
by 'cross-sectional analysis', in which the components of the 
small units are identified and their internal celations shown. 
These cross sections are then linked in a longitudinal study of 
the sequencing of these verbal actions. (1977: 37 & 333-4) 
This style of analysis requires the identification of units 
manageable enough to be subjected to analysis, and Labov & Fan-
shel divide the 15 minute block of conversation into five epi-
sodes. These episodes are based upon radical shifts in the overt 
topic or reference of the conversation, and they include some 
subepisodes. Within each episode, the units which are subject to 
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independent analysis in a c~oss section usually coin c ide with a 
change in speake~s and an alte~nation of sp~ech actions . 
An im po ~tant point he~e is thaLLabov & E'anshel feel that 
the~e is not any 'p~ofound theo~etical question t hat depends upon 
how small o~ la~ge a unit is selected t o be desc~ibed as t he 
basis for the speech act' (1977: 40 ). This is because t he o~ig­
inal sentences a~e not in any one-to-one ~elation ship with t he 
actions being pe~fo~med. When utte~ances a~e expanded in analysis 
t hi s e xpansion is open-ended, and cannot be te~minated in any 
non-a~bit~ary manne~, thus 'the~e alway s will be an a~bit~a~y 
aspect to the co~~elation of speech units with t he unit s of 
s pee c h acti o ns' (1977: 40). 
Each c~oss section has four component pa~ts: the text, t he 
pa~alinguistic cues, the expansion of the text with embedded 
propositions, and the speech actions. The text is a t ransc~ipt io n 
of the ~ecording of the inte~v iew which tries to capture false 
starts, hesita~ion fo~ms, self-inte~ruptions and well-~ecognized, 
socially ste~eotyped dialect alte~ations. Labov & E'an shel note 
t ha t editing the text is an open-ended process. Pa~alinguistic 
cues which a~e identified a~e tempo, vo lume, pitch, vo ice quali-
fiers (b~eathiness, glottalization, whine, etc. ) , significant 
changes in breathing (including laughter), and special idioms and 
lexical choices (w here thei~ exp~essive o~ non~efe~ential use can 
be separated easily from thei~ textual significance ) . Some soci o -
linguistic variants on the phonetic level a~e also noted, how-
eve~, they comment that most of these va~iables have attained a 
constant value in the present inte~action, and that the most 
significant of these he~e is variation between '-in" and '-ing'. 
Labov & E'anshel note the difficulty of coding pa~alinguistic 
cues, and as a way of partly ove~coming this they ma k e use of 
variable-persistence o scilloscope display s of ove~all amplitude 
and hesitation and spectrum analyzer displays of pitch contour. 
They say that this lack of agreement on the t~ansc~iption of 
p~osodic cues is not accidental, as it reflects the lack of 
clarity and discreteness of a channel of communicatio n which is 
essential because it allows speake~s a form of communication 
which is significant but deniable. (19 77: 42-6 ) 
Because o f this ambiguity, even though intonation contour 
can be easil y ~ecognized as meaningful, it is not easy to cha~ac­
terize this meaning. Thus while the Yiddish 'rise-fall' intonat-
ion used by the patient in this study can be characterized as an 
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incredulous and aggressive request for confirmation, a pattern 
such as se veral heavy s tresses in a row, wh ile of ten indicating 
heavy implica tio n, can also have a variety o f o t her me aning s 
whic h c annot easily be disambiguated. As well 'eve ry ind iv idual 
draw s d ifferently from t he repertoire o f pa rali nguistic d e v ices, 
e ven when he uses the same dialect features of vo wels and conso n-
ants' ( 1977:47 ) . In response to t hi s situation, Lab ov & Fanshel 
have restricted themsel ves to a limited set of t erms for t he 
major meanings communicated by paralingu istic cues. ' Te ns i on ', 
'tensio n release' and 'exa sperati o n' indicate ne gative emot i o nal 
states. 'Miti gation' and 'aggravat i on ' evalua te an in t eract i onal 
move on the part of the spe aker. 'Sympathy', 'derogation' and 
'neutrality' evaluate an interactional move o n the part of the 
listener. 'Formality' and 'Informality' conve y overall styli sti c 
informa tio n related to the fields of discourse. As well, a number 
of p rosodic signals g i ve 'reinforcement' by t he listener, without 
interrupting the speaker and wi thout conveying h ighly s pecifi c 
messages. ( 1977: 46-8 ) 
Labov & Fanshel comment that such meanings are o ften necess-
ary t o account for the sequence of utterances that follow and 
pr ecede a given utterance. 'If we did not a ttribute meaning to 
many o f these pa ralingu istic cues, we would find that the dis-
course was incoherent at many points' ( 1977: 48 ). The y ac know-
ledge that the assignment o f semantic values to paralinguistic 
cues is 'one of the less objective parts of the analysis', and 
say that while the labels they use are reasonably consistent 
wi thin this study, the interpretatio n o f the signal s in different 
c ontexts c an differ radically ( 1977: 356 ) The combination o f te xt 
and c ues gives the 'mode o f expression', and t he balance between 
text and cues varies between different styles o f speech, signal-
ing variations in the amount o f indirection used. Labov & Fanshel 
comment that 'there is no way of stating in advance what a "nor-
mal" b alanc e b etween text and cues would b e, since it is highly 
determined by the social contex t of t he interactio n a nd the 
amount o f s ha red knowled ge between participants' ( 1977: 40 ). 
The third element in the cross section is the ex pansion. 
Here, the text and cues, which have been separated through anal-
ysis from the c l o sely interw oven state in which they occur in 
speech, are brought together in a synthesis o f all the informat-
ion which will help an understanding of the production, interp-
retation and sequencing of the utterance in question. There are 
f our stages in this expansion: 
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1. We expand the meaning conveyed by the cues into the 
nearest equivalent in textual terms, according to our best 
understanding of it. 
2. We expand and make explicit ~he referents of p ronouns t o 
other utterances and events in other time frames. 
3. We introduce factual material that is presented before 
and after this utterance, sometimes from widely separated 
part s of the interview. 
4. We make explicit some of the shared knowledge between 
participants, which we derive from a study of the therapeu -
tic situation as a whole, other interviews, and the playback 
with the therapist. ( Labov & Fanshel, 1977: 49-5 0) 
Expansion is described as open-ended, with no limit to the 
number of explanatory facts which could be brought in from o ther 
parts of the interview. The analysis is terminated when 'it 
satisfies the needs of the particular analysis to follow' ( 1977: 
356). There is thus no fixed relation between text and expansion. 
Nevertheless, they suggest, the notion of 'mode of exp ression' 
can include the overal l proportion of text to expansion - a br ief 
text and a long expansion perhaps indicating a heavy reliance on 
implicit information and heavily loaded intonation contours. A 
further qualification is that expansions 'magnify the strains and 
tensions in the social fabric and will produce distorted interp -
retation unless we remember that the expansion loses the important 
dimension of backgrounding, which subordinates one form of social 
interaction to another' (1977: 51) . 
Each expansion contains a series of propositions, which 
Labov & Fanshel define as 'recurrent communications' . These are 
either specific to the events being talked about or general to 
family life or the therapeutic series. They may not be explicitly 
stated, but ca n usually be found in an explicit form if we study 
various reports of interaction. ' They represent the cognitive 
component of conversational transactions; in one sense, they may 
b e defined as "what we are talking ab o ut", or what is "really 
being talked about'" (1977: 51 - 2) . The way in which propositions 
are related to the text is call e d the 'mode of argument'. Usuall y 
in therapy the propositions are not argued fo r directly , but 
rather events being talked about are taken as instances of gen-
eral propositions. Also , many propositions, such as ' I am better 
than you ', are difficult to assert explicitly. One of the goal s 
of therapy, Labov & Fanshel suggest, is to extract and make 
explicit the general p ropositions that are implicit in the anec-
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d otes and e xamples gi ven by the patient. Because of this, p c opos-
itio ns may play a moce im po ctant cole in thecapy t han in most 
co n vecsation. ( 1977: 53 & 57 ) 
Th e f o uct h step in the analysis is the detecminati o n of t he 
a c tio ns being pecfo cmed. Labov & Fanshel comment that t he i n tec-
nal stcuc tuce o f speech actions is considecabl y moce complex t han 
t he i n i ti a l division between act and u ttecance seen in s peech a c t 
theocy . They say that a common chacactecistic of t he moce ph il os-
op h i ca l ap p co ach to s peech acts is t he a b sence o f a n y tceatmen t 
o f t he mo ce a b stcact t ypes of social intecaction, which go b e y o nd 
the linguistic stcuctuce. The ccucial actions in estab lishi ng 
cohe cence of sequencing in convecsation, they claim, 
a ce not such speech acts as cequests and assections, but 
cathec challenges, defenses, and cetceats, which h a ve to d o 
with the status of the pacticipants, theic ei ghts and oblig -
ations, and theic c hanging celationships in te em s of soc ial 
o cganization. (Labov & Fanshel, 1977:58-9 ) 
'Intecactio n' is defined along these lines as 'an action wh i ch 
a ffects (altecs o c maintains ) the celations of t he self and 
othecs in face-to-face communication', and these celations ace 
said to move along the dimensions of powec and solida c ity s ugg-
ested by Bco wn & Gilman ( 1960 ). ( 1977: 59 ) 
Labov & Fanshel define a speech act as an action caccied out 
by means of speech, and say that in any all-ovec v iew, 'it is 
obvious that actions ace moce impoctant than utte c ances, since it 
is actions that have c onsequences and affect people's lives'. 
In teems of meaning, the level of intecaction c an be defined 
as what is ceally meant in the deepest sense o f 'ceally', 
beacing in mind that thece will be many hieracchical levels 
of actions, and it is not always cleac whece the action 
really is. The action is what is intended in tha t it 
expresses how the speaker meant t o affect the listener, to 
move him, t o c ause him to cespond, a nd so f o rth. ( Labov & 
Fanshel, 1977: 59 ) 
For Labov & Fanshel, most utterances repcesent two or moce 
speech actions, and the relations between these actions is 'fund-
amentally hiecarchical: the more abstract actio ns are iden t ified 
and interpreted through the identification of the o t hers' ( 197 7 : 
60). The speech actions they identify are cestricted to t hose 
they see in opecation in their study, and are di v ided into fouc 
groups: 'meta-linguistic', 'repcesentations', 'requests' and 
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' challenges'. They note at one point that if a closed set of 
speech acts could be established, as has been attempted in speech 
act theory, it is not clear how they could be related to the se t 
of s yntactic op tio ns, that is, to possible realizations ( 1977 : 
358) • 
The meta-linguistic speech actions (o r 'verbal interact-
ions' ) have to do with the regulation of speec h itself, and fall 
under the headings of 'initiate', 'continue' and 'end'. 
Representations are divided into two groups. Those involving 
A-events, (as has been noted, e vents in the speaker's biography ) 
will either be actions like giving information, expressing be -
lief, uncertainty and so on, performed by A, or reinforcement o r 
acknowledgement performed by B. Those involving D-events (disput -
able events ) will be actions like assertion or evaluation by A, 
like denial or agreement by B, or like contradiction or support 
o f A's initial position by A in response to B' s response. 
Requests invo lve initially A's action of requesting X, which 
could be action, informatio n, confirmation, and so on. Then we 
have B's actions of giving or carrying out X or putting off the 
request (a nd these can be followed by further A- actions like 
acknowledgement, reinstatement or mitigation ) , or alternatively 
refusal, with or without account (a nd these can be followed by A-
act ions 1 ike renewal, acceptance or withdrawal in a 'huff' ) • 
Challenges can be direct, but are often a deeper level of 
interactive significance behind requests. They are any reference 
(a sserted or by inference) to a situation, which, if true, would 
lower the status of the other person . As initial A-actions they 
can thus be challenges or questions. The B-actions in response 
can be defense, admission o r breaking off the verbal interaction 
in a 'huff'. A's follow-up actions can be retreat, mitigation or 
aggravation. 
Across these interactions apply certain modifiers that indi-
cate how an action is performed or how actions are combined. 
Actions can be performed simultaneously, ambiguously, hesitantly 
or conf i dently, and the y can be performed indirectly . 3 
We have already seen that indirection in conversation can be 
assessed according to the mode of expression (a measure of the 
relation between text and paralinguistic cues) and the mode of 
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argu ment (a measure of the explicitness with which propositions 
a~e embedded in the expa nsion ). A third assessment can be made 
acco~ding to the mode of interaction , which ~eflects the e xtent 
to which the speake~ uses the discoutse ~ules of inte~pretation 
and p~oduction - the mo~e indirect the mode of interaction, the 
mo ~e such rules of production and inte~pretation are requi~ed. A 
d i r ect o~ indi~ect action can involve any balance of text and 
cues, and each can involve the direct expression of a p~oposit­
i o n, so t hi s mode is independent of the other two. As with the 
o the~ two modes, Labov & Fanshel comment that they ha ve no base-
line fo~ the total amount of indirection in ordina~y conve~sa t ­
ion, although is seems, they suggest, that it is ve~y great. 
(1 977: 65-7 & 68f ) 
We now have an outline of the components making up a cross 
section. This cross section has two planes. The first is the 
p lane of 'what is said'. It involves the text and cues (combined 
according to the mode of expression ) and the expansion (con-
taining loc al and general propositions embedded ac co ~ding to t he 
mode of argument). The second plane is that of 'what is done', 
and involves the interaction component. It is a multilayered 
com p 1 e x of speech act s , and i s r e 1 ate d to ' w h a t i s sa i d' , v i a 
rules of production and interpretation, according to t he mode o f 
interaction. (See diagram, 1977: 67-8 ) 
Once we have produced these static cross sections of utter-
ances, the task is to couple one utterance with another in the 
succession of cross sec tions. This involves the construction of a 
flow chart 'in which a number of .•• cross sections are linked in 
a tight matri x of action and response, centering around a single 
topic or concern' (1977: 69). We have seen earlier the basic 
model of this sort of flow chart. Combined with this there need 
to be observations about the overall structure o f an episode and 
the overall direction of an interview, and a tracing of the 
patient's and therapist's varying preoccupations with the exter-
nal world of s oc ial fact and the internal world of feeling by 
following them through several .fields of discourse, and there 
needs to be interpretation of where the therapist is going. 
However, the primary concern is with the mechanism of discourse. 
The main poi nt here is that the connections in discourse are 
not between utterances, but between actions. 
Sometimes one surface expression will predict the form of 
the next as in 'How are you?', 'I'm fine'. Yet obligatory 
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sequencing is not found between utterances but between the 
act ions which are being performed. It is not the linguistic 
form of interrogative whic h demands the linguistic form 
declarative, but rather requests for action whi ch demand 
responses - t o be complied with , put off, or refused. (L3bov 
& Fanshel, 1977: 70) 
Thus what is said and what is do ne are co nne c ted by a series of 
r ules of interpretation and production, and the coherence of 
discourse lies in the connection of these speech acts ( what is 
done ) through a ser i es of sequencing rules. 
These two groups, sequencing rules, and interpretation and 
produ c tion rules, are called 'rules of discourse', and are out-
lined by Labov & Fanshel in Chapter 3, focusing primarily on 
rules of production and interpretation, and discussing rules 
required for understanding the five episode treated in thei r 
study. I shall not go into the details of this chapter, but 
rather concentrate on the main features of these discourse rules. 
The discourse rules developed involve requests and narrat-
i ve s, which, along with sequencing, cover the groups of s peech 
acts mentioned earlier. They are described as being like the 
ru l es of syntax in their unconscious, invaria nt c haracter; and 
they are 'obligatory', meaning that 'the speaker has no choice 
but to i n t e rp r e t a g i v e n a c t ion in t he same w a y t h a t a 11 t he 
members of society would' ( 1977: 75). These rules~ be viol-
ated, but their v iolation will cause a disturbance, sometimes 
obvious (and many jokes play on these violations), and sometimes 
below the surface and only emerging in c ertain circumstances. 
The first group of rules dealt with are rules of requests. 
Requests are taken to include commands, orders, pleas, petitions, 
etc., where the relative status of A and 8, a nd so their mutual 
rights, duties and obligations, differ. The underlying rule here 
covers requests for action based on the unmarked imperati ve form, 
and is similar to the earlier rule developed by Labov and noted 
above. 
If A addresses to 8 an imperative specifying an a c tion X 
a time Tl, and 8 believes that A believes that 
la. X should be done (for a purpose Y) [need for the 
action], 
at 
b. 8 would not do X in the absence of the request [need 
for the request ] , 
2. 8 has the ability to do X (with instrument Z), 
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3. B has the obligation to do X or is willing to do it, 
4. A has the right to tell B to do X ~ 
then A is heard as making a valid r-equest for action. (Labov 
& Fanshel, 1977: 78) 
The immediate function of this rule is to distinguish valid 
r-equests foe action from jokes, insults and proverbs. 
The imperative mentioned in the r-ule will often in fact be 
substituted by a mitigating form, but Labov & Fanshel argue tha t 
these (e.g. 'Would you mind .•• ', 'Will you •.• ') do not oper-ate 
with their literal meaning, but r-ather- in the same way as 
'please'. These 'frozen' mitigating for-ms can also be dealt with 
under the Rule for Indirect Requests. Time is often not specif-
ied in the operation of the r-ule; however, it oper-ates as an 
obligator-y category because it is necessar-y in the interpretation 
of the action requested. If it is not specified, then the time 
for the action is interpreted as 'right now' oc 'at the first 
available moment', or 'always'. 
The expression 'B believes that A believes' indicates that 
what B does 'depends upon his belief about A's intentions', which 
means that A's beliefs are shared knowledge, 'social facts dir-ec-
tly accessible to both A and B' (1977: 80). The expr-ession 'valid 
r-equest foe action' is described as being equivalent to a sincer--
ity condition (the r-eference being to Gordon & Lakoff, 1971), but 
is meant to 'emphasize the objective nature of the social facts 
rather than implying something about the psychological state of 
the per-sons involved' (1977: 80). 
A point worth making about the preconditions is that some of 
them may not exist until the moment of the r-equest. Foe example, 
the r-equest itself may make the hear-er aware of the need for the 
r-equest. 
Labov & Fanshel feel that dir-ect r-equests are in the minor-
ity. The demands of face-to-face social interaction lead to 
indirection through the use of mitigating devices, as is found in 
the Rule for Indirect Requests. 
If A makes to B a request foe infor-mation oc an assertion 
about 
a. the existential status of an action X to be pecfocmed 
by 8, 
b. the consequences of perfor-ming an action X, 
c. the time Tl that an action X might be performed, or 
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d. any of the pLeconditions foL a valid req uest foL X as 
given in the Rule of Requests, 
and all e t heL preconditions aLe in effect, then A is heaLd 
as making a valid Lequest of B toL the action X. (Labov & 
ranshel, 1977: 82) 
Thu s, just as diLect Lequests can be mitigated, indiLect Lequests 
t end t o be mitigating, and Labov & ranshel no te t hat s ynt actic 
devices f o L mitigating and aggravating requests are supple me nted 
a vaLiety of intonational contours. They are not c lea r about 
this, but it seems that syntactic aggravation cannot extend 
b e yo nd a cleaL direct Lequest, etheL than by t he addit i on o f 
e xp letives. 
Once we have these two rules we can intLoduce a Ru le f o L 
Putting off Requests, where B Lesponds with an asseLtion or a 
request foL infoLmation about the existential status of X, OL a 
Lequest foL information o r a negative assertion about the time 
T1, or a request for infoLmation OL a negative asseLtio n about 
one of the fouL pLeconditions. Here, B is 'heaLd as putting off 
the Lequest until the infoLmation is supplied OL the negative 
asseLtion is contradicted. (1977 : 86-7) 
The Lules so far coveL Lequests foL action, and Labov & 
ranshel deal with requests foL info rm ation, confirmation, 
attention, and peLmission by tLeating them as Lequests foL 
specific types of action. The Rule foL a Request for InfoLmation 
is thus, 
If A addresses to B an impeLative requesting info Lmation I, 
OL an interrogative focusing on I, and B does not believe 
that A believes that 
a. A has I, 
b. B does not have I, 
then A is heard as mak ing a valid Lequest foL informati o n. 
( Labov & ranshel, 1977: 89) 
This seems to be a veLy simple Lule, but the point is t hat it is 
necessaLy to inspect each Lequest foL infoLmation t o see if it 
is governed by the Rule foL IndiLect Requests ( 1977: 90). When a 
valid Lequest f or information is issued as a response to a prev-
ious Leq uest, it is what is termed an 'embedded Lequest' (1977: 
91) • 
The interactive significance of Lequests for information and 
action in actual discouLse go far beyond the communicative funct-
ions discussed so faL. Labov & ranshel say that 'most of these 
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r e q uests are employed to accomplish other p urposes, which strong-
l y affe c t the social and emotional relations- of the persons 
involved' ( 1977: 93 ). One purpose is to challenge a person's 
c ompetence in a given role. This can - be done with a 'delayed 
r eq uest', calling attentio n to needs, abilities, obligations and 
rig h ts which hav e been valid for some time, or by 'repeated 
r e q uests' before B has responded ( 1977: 94-5 ) . In general, a 
ch a l lenge is defined as, 
!2 speech act that asserts or implies~ state of affairs 
that, if true, would weaken ~ person's claim to be c o mpetent 
in filling the role associated with ~ valued status. It 
therefore follows that a challenge, if suc cessful, ma y 
result in a person's losing his claim to hold the status 
involved. (Labov & Fanshel, 1977: 97) 
Often the response to a request for information has a gramm-
atical form quite closely connected to the grammatical form o f 
the request, or this form can be filled in by a rule of ellipsis, 
but in many cases discourse coherence is not obvious from the 
form of the sequences. We thus need a rule of implicit responses, 
whereby a statement by B in response to A's request is heard a s 
a n assertion that there exists a proposition which makes the 
sta tement a response. If such a proposition cannot be found, then 
A ma y reply with something like 'What's that got to do with the 
price of eggs?' ( 1977: 99). We also need rules which cover state-
ments by A about B-events (known to B ) which are heard as re-
quests for confirmation, and statements by A about D (disputable) 
events, which are heard as requests for evaluation (1977: 100-
10 2) • 
The rules for narratives are rather different, as they cover 
mainly the structuring and function of narrative (and the recog-
nition of this), but we can pass over this material (referring 
back to it later where need be ) , and move on to the discussion of 
sequencing. 
The first group of speech acts presented earlier concern, as 
was noted, the sequencing of conversational terms. Labov & Fan-
shel pass over them, saying that they are governed by the very 
general rules of conversational interaction explored by Sacks, 
Schegloff & Jefferson (see the following chapter on conversat-
ion analysis). They say, however, that, at another level of 
organization, requests have their own general sequencing rules. 
The most important of these is that requests must be acknowledged 
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a nd ~esponded to. If A makes a ~equest, then 8 ca n (a ) give the 
~ esponse ~equested, (b) put off the request,- o ~ (c) ~efuse the 
~equest, with o ~ without accounting. In ~esponse to (a ) , A can 
acknow ledge the compliance (e.g., 'Tf:lank s ) ( t o which 8 can poss-
ibly ~espond with a minimization, e.g., 'Don't mention it'), t o 
(b ) ~einstate the ~equest, ~edi~ect it t o othe~s, o~ ~et~e at (and 
ca n a t the same time mitigat e o~ aggravate the ~equest), a n d to 
(c) ~enew t he ~equest o~ ac c ept the ~efusal (althou gh t o an 
unaccounted refusal A ma y ~espond with a 'huff' ) . ( 1977: 11 0- 111 ) 
Labov & Fanshel n o te that as ma ny asse~tions a~d challenge s 
ca n b e fu~the~ analyzed a s ~equests o f va~ious k inds, the sequen-
c ing ~ules that gove~n them natu~ally f o llow fr o m the seq uencing 
rules for ~equests. They also mak e the impo~tant point that i n 
th is account, 'the ~ules fo~ inte~pretation and p~oduction h a ve 
abso~bed much o f the complexity that has appea~ed elsew here in 
discussions of sequencing' (1 977: 111). This c laim is significant 
when conside~ing the wo~k dealt with in the foll ow ing chapter, 
but it should also b e ~elated to the comment made in Secti o n 1 of 
t h is chapte~ about Labov's discou~se ~ules being more 'inte~­
active' in cha~acte~ than Searle's, and also to Labov & Fa nshel's 
comments (n o ted above ) that in compa~ison to Searle the y concen-
t~ate mo~e o n the heare~ t han on the speakec. 
These discou~se ~ules a~e p~esented as attempts to account 
fo~ the flow of conve~sation as it is encountered, and thei~ 
numbe~ is thus n o t limited. Labov & Fanshel sa y that the numbe~ 
of new ~ules declined as they wo~ked thei~ way th~ough the epi-
sodes, but po int o ut that if the numbe~ of disc o urse ~ules g~ew 
at the same rate as the numbe~ of conversatio ns stud ied the~e 
would be little to be gained f~om such an an alysis. ( 1977: 357) 
The final po int which Labov & Fanshel make he~e is that in 
this study they are ve~y conce~ned with the natu~e o f ~esistance 
in the~apy. They say that if the the~apist knew ju st what p reven-
ted the patient f~om following the suggestions that a~e gene~ally 
agreed to, then the p ~oblem of therapy would b e solved, and that 
they want to ~each an understanding of this hi ghe~-level sequen-
c ing by e xamining the inte~action itself. (197 7: 111 ) 
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SECTION 2b. 
I shall summarize Labov & Fanshel's analysis of one episode 
o f the interview, and then link this- briefly to the overall 
analysis. This episode, the first, has the following text: 
l.l [ a] R.[Rhoda]: I don't •. know , whether ..• I--I think I did--
the right thing, jistalittle .. situation came up •.•.•.•.. an' 
I tried to uhm ...... well, try to ....•.•. use what I--what 
I've learned here, see if it worked. 
[b ] Th. [ Therapist]: Mhm. 
[c] R.:Now, I don't know if I did the right thing. 
l.2[a] R.: Sunday •. um--my mother went to my sister's again. 
[ b] Th. : Mm-hm. 
[ c ] R. : And s he u s u' 11 y go es f or abo u t a day or so , 1 i k e i f she 
leaves on Sunday, she'll come back Tuesday morning. [H m] 
So--it's nothing. 
l.3[a] R.: But--she lef' Sunday, and she's still not home. 
[b) Th.: o --oh. 
[c] R.: And •.. I'm getting' a little nuts a'ready. 
l.4[a] R.: I's ... I haven't been doin' too much school work 
[b ] because--here this has t o be done, here that has to be 
done, 
[c] and ••••• I really--I'm getting tired. It-it's--I have 
too much to do, an' I can' con'trate on any o ne thing. 
[d ) Th.: Mhm. 
l.S[a] R.: So •.... it's in--its not that I-- ... I mean I--I--
I've proved that I can get along without my mother, it 
isn't that-- I --I can't get along without her, but it--
[b] I know that--when I don't have any school, an' she's gone 
away--she went aw ay f o r a week, an' a half an'--i' didn' 
bother me in the leas'. 
[c] Th.: Mhm. 
[d] R.: But it seem that--I have jist--a little too much 
t'do . 
l . 6 [ a ] R.: So a t f i r s t, I w a sn ' go n n a say anything. Then I 
remembered--that--if I keep it in what's bothering me 
[b) Th.: Mhm. 
[c] R.: then nobody else knows an' everybody thinks everything 
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is fine, and good 
[d) Th.: Mhm. 
[e) and I end up--hurting my self. 
[ f] Th.: Right! 
1.7 [a] R.: Which would be that if I kept letting hec stay thece 
and didn' say, "Look--uh--I mean y'been the ce long e noug h ," 
I'd j us' get ticed, an-nd I-I'm not doing my school wock 
eight, 
[b) Th.: Mhm. 
1.8 R.: An-nd scr-when--I called hec t'day, I sai d . "Wel l, when 
do you plan t'come home?" 
1.9 R.: So she said, "Oh , why?" 
1.10 R.: An-nd I said, "Well, things at:"e getting just a little t o 
much! [laugh] This is--i's jis' getting too hat:"d , 
and •..••. I--" 
1.11 R.: She s'd t'me, "Well, why don't you tell Phillis that?" 
1.12 R. : So I said, "Well, I haven't talked to her lately." 
1.13 R.: And--uh •.. I 'm just gonna tell hec. 
1. 14 R.: Now ••... I think I did the eight thing, I think t hat--
1.1[a] het:"e is the ficst thing said in the session. Thece is 
no settling-in, and the thecapist in a playback session says that 
this had become standat:"d in the therapy. She s~ys tha t s he waits 
foe Rhoda to sta rt, and that Rhoda does it because 'she know s 
what hec t:"esponsibi1ities ace' (1977: 123). 1.1 [a ) is marked by 
hesitation and difficulty in getting the words out (each pet:"iod 
indicates a half-second, a comma indicates a 'comma' intonation, 
a nd a dash indicates a sudden break or self-interruption; 'jist-
d lLt tle' indicates l:"ap id, condensed delivery). There are a number 
o f obscure t:"eferences, which need to be filled out in the expan-
sion , and also a significant ambiguity with 'right'. Two import-
ant propositions seem to be operating here: [ 1) 'I think I did 
the right t hing', and [S] 'One should express one's needs and 
emotions to t:"elevant othet:"s', which is a proposition central to 
the therapyi this leads to [ 11 being filled out as 'Rhoda carried 
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o ut [ S ] coeeectly'. Anothee undeelying peoposition seems t o be 
[ INT-TH], 'the theeapist inteepeets the emoEions of othees'. The 
field of discouese of 1.1 is inteeview style. The ceoss section 
whi c h is consteucted heee is as follows: 
l.l 
TEXT 
R.: I don't..know whethec. .. I--I 
think I did--the eight thing 
jistalittle .• situation came 
up •.••.••.. an' I t e i ed to u h m .. 
well, try to .•.••.•• u se what I--
what I've leaened heee, see if it 
worked. 
EXPANSION 
CUES 
Tension: hesitation, self-
inteeeuption; uneven tempo; 
condensation and long silences, 
3 and 4 sec. 
I am not suee, but I claim that [l] I did what y ou sa y is eight, 
or [?l] what may actually be eight, when [4] I asked my mothee to 
help me by coming home aftee she had been away from home l o ngee 
than she usuall y is, ceeating some small peoblems f o r me, an d I 
teied to use the peinciple that I've learned feom you heee, [ S] 
that I should express my needs and emotions to eelevant othees, 
and see [?S] if this peinciple worked. 
INTERACTION 
R. initiates the session in Inteeview Style [IVS] by eefeeeing 
<J[ to the previous suggestion of the therapist and an incident 
feom eveeyday life and asseetingi:> that she did eight in 
carrying out [S] thereby asseeting 1C>. She simultaneously 
expresses uncertainty about hee asseetion, ambiguously 
questioning < ?1 > that she carried out [S] correctly and 
questioning <~> that [S] is appropriate, theeeby challenging 
< ?INT-TH > the competence of the therapist. ( see Labov & 
Fanshel, 1977: 117-127) 
The interaction arrows indicate the relations of the actions 
performed here to the sequencing rules that may be operating, 
connecting one cross section with another. Reference is a back-
ward-opeeating action, not containing in itself immediate conse-
quences for the next action to be pe~formed. Assertions ae~ 
forward looking, as they do contain consequences for the next 
action. Questions contain both the act of eeference to a previous 
event or statement and the demand for a reply; and challenges are 
also double-faced. Labov & Fanshel note that this expresses the 
oveelapping character of speech actions, and that the inclusion 
of past as well as present events in the semantic interpretation 
differentiates their approach from those modes of analyses that 
177 
define speech actions by isolating individual uttecances. ( 1977: 
127 ) 
The main discoucse cule operating in this initial uttecance 
is the Rule foe Challenging Pcopositions, in which 'If A asserts 
a pcoposition that is suppocted by A's status, and B questions 
the pcoposition, then B is heacd as challenging the competence of 
A in that status'. This opecates fcom the ambiguous questioning 
of whethec Rhoda did the eight thing or whethec the thing Rhoda 
did was the eight thing to do. The second side of this ambiguity 
leads to [?S], and this, via the cule, leads to [ ? INT-TH]. Labov 
& Fanshel comment that whethec this ambiguity is conscious oc not 
is not impoctant, and that what is more cele vant is its intec-
active significance (see 1977: 126f). 
In l.l[b] the thecapist does not cespond to eithec Rhoda's 
assection that she did the eight thing (oc hec doubting of that) 
oc the implicit challenge. She simply offecs 'Mhm', which has a 
pitch contour of 231 ( see fig.9: 128), indicating neutcal cein-
foccement, and having the intecactive function of giving suppoct 
(1977: 128-9). This leads to l.l[c], which has the cues of 'ten-
sion celease: fast tempo, falling contour', and the intecactive 
function of cepeating l.l[a] with more confidence, seemingly in 
cesponse to the suppoct offered by the thecapist (1977: 129). 
In 1.2[a] Rhoda begins to recount the events cefecred to in 
1.1, using Nacrative Style, as a pact of Evecyday Style, thus 
using continuous speech without pause, which is capid and has 
level intonation, and which has an unmacked vocabulary with few 
effective or evaluative expressions (see 1977: 129-30). This is 
intecrupted at l.2[b] by the therapist's 'Mm-hm'. It has a 'level 
falling contour' distinct fcom the rise and fall of l.l[b], which 
is given the meaning 'expected sympathy'. The expansion is 'Not 
again! That's too bad', and the interactive component is 'sym-
pathetic suppoct'. This interpcetation is partly aided by Rhoda's 
continuation in l.2[c]. It begins even befoce the thecapist's 
cesponse is ended, and is macked by focmality and the use of 
'-ing', rather than '-in'. It thus seems to be at once a 
cecognition and a cejection of the thecapist's sympathy. The 
expansion of 1.2[c] is thecefoce: 
< iv <n My mothec has often gone away befoce foe only two 
days, and [-STRN] I haven't had any trouble because I am an 
adult [AD-R] >n so it's nothing foe me to be worried about 
when my mothec goes away foe only two days, and sympathy 
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isn't necessary. >i v 
(The angled brackets, <> , enclose fields of - discourse. iv stands 
for interv iew style, and n for narrative style. The proposition 
( STRN] is that 'Rhoda's obligations ~re greater than her 
capacity' (and so [..vSTRN] is its denial), and [AD-R] is ' Rhoda is 
an adult member of the household'. Both are important 
propositions in Rhoda's therapy . ) ( 1977: 13 0-136) 
The interaction component of this cross section is: 'R. gives 
evaluation of narrative thus far as not requiring s ympa thy , 
thereby asserting AD-R > her adult status and thereb y refusing 
support'. 
In 1.3 Rhoda explains, in Narrative Style, why her mother's 
absence o n this occasion is causing problems, and the therapist 
gives strong s y mpathetic support (l .3(b] ) with an e xpression 
showing a 242 pitch contour (see 1977: 138), translated as 'sur-
p rised s y mpathy' and expanded as 'Oh! It's that bad!', before 
Rhoda continues, dropping into Family Style, to e xp ress her 
frustra tion and confusion. 
Through 1.4 and 1.5 Rhoda continues her narrative, showing 
tension and exasperation as she explains that the obligations she 
is under are extreme, and mean that her inability to cope, [STRN] 
is not because she is not an adult member of the household, which 
c auses her t o tire easily (as her mother asserts) <(-v {.-vAD-R:TIREl> 
b ut because of external circumstances < X:STRN > (the colon 
indicates a causal relationship). Through this, at 1.4(d] and 
1.5(c], the therapist gives support with prosodic features o f 
'neutral reinforcement. (1977: 140-5) 
In 1.6 and 1.7 Rhoda dives an evaluation of her situation 
and her p roposal for remedying it. The interactio n in 1.6 is: 
R. continues the narrati v e with reconstructions of her 
thoughts as events, giving external evaluation in interview 
style within t he narrative of everyday life, thereby asser-
ting.I> her behaviour was governed by the suggestion [ S] 
learned in therapy, thereby requesting approval <=:> from 
the therapist. Th. gives progressively stronger support. 
And similarly in 1.7: 
R. gives further evaluation of the narrative, by role play-
ing her forthcoming request to her mother, asserting I> 
that her mother's secondary obligations have been fulfilled, 
thereby asserting =c> that her mother's primary obligat-
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ions are b eing neglected, thereby challenging ?HEAD- Mo > her 
mother's role performan c e, and thereby -re questing .I> that 
her mother com e hom e thereby asserting again <D that s h e 
wa s about to c arry out the suggestion [S] of therapy . Th . 
r einforces a t a high l e ve l. ( 1977: 14 5-15 3) 
From 1 . 8 t o 1. 13 the focus changes, as Rhoda reports the 
actual interac tion with her mother. Up until n ow we have been 
looking at what ha s been mainly narrati ve, involving r elative ly 
little interaction (which should not di sc ount the importance, fo r 
Labov & Fanshel's analysis, of t he therapist's e xpressions , or of 
the interactive tensions, between Rhoda and the therapist, invol-
ved ). But with the analys is of the narrative of the in t eraction 
between Rhoda and her mother the discourse rules come much mo re 
in to play. 
The first poin t about t he request reported by Rhoda i n 1 . 8 
is that it is more mitigating than that in 1.7 [ a] . Both u se t he 
Rule for Indirect Requests outlined earlier, but 1.7 [ a ] is a 
statement about her mother's need t o b e away fr om ho me, whil e 1.8 
i s a questio n about the time she might return, and sta tements are 
generally less mi t i gat ing than interrogatives. Whil e bo t h imply a 
challenge t o the mother's r ole as head o f household, 1.7 u ses the 
Rule o f Overdue Obl i gat i ons, in which 'If A asser t s that B has 
not performed obligations in a role R, then A is heard as chal l-
enging B's competence in R'. This is much mo re direct t han the 
Ru le of Delayed Requests used in 1.8 , in which ' If A makes a 
request for B t o take an action in r o le R, ba sed on needs, 
abilities, obligations , and r i ghts which have b een valid for some 
ti me, then A is heard as critic izing B's competence in role R'. 
The interactive component of this cross se c tio n can thus b e 
compared with that for 1.7 given above. 
R. continues the narrative, and g i ves info rmatio n to support 
her a ssertion :r:> that she carried out the s uggestion [ S]. 
R. requests info rmati o n on the time that her mother intend s 
to come home and t hereby requests indirectly :I::> that her 
mother c ome home, thereby carry ing out the suggestio n [S) , 
and thereby challenging her mother indirectly < ?HEAD-Mo > 
for not performing her role as head of the household prop -
erly, simultaneously admitting < STRN her ow n limitations 
and simul t aneousl y asserting again~ that she ca rried out 
the sug gestion [S]. (Labov & Fanshel, 1977 : 155- 162) 
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Rhoda's mother's response in 1.9 is very b rief, b ut complex. It 
shows a drama tic break in surface structure, and cannot be 
connected t o 1.8 by regular rules o f ellipsis; bu t at a dee per 
level it has a pitc h contour of 212, - defined as ' he avy implica-
ti o n' or 'there's more to this than meets the e y e'. It is ex pan-
de d by , 
R.: <n So my mot he r said to me, <f "Oh , I 'm surprised; why 
are you a skin g me when I plan to co me ho me, and do you have 
a right t o ask that? There's more to this than meets t he 
eye: I sn't it that [A.I AD-R ] you can't take care of the 
household by yourse lf a nd I shouldn't have gone away in the 
first place , as I've told you before?">f>n 
This expansion is aided by later reports on the interaction by 
Rhoda, in one o f which s he quo tes her mother as say in g ex p li ci tl y 
'See, I told yo u so'. Labov & Fanshel feel that 1.9 is probably 
more accurate, because she and her mother are rarel y this e xpl -
i c it, and because in a third retelling she just repo rts 'Oh!', 
concentrating on the intonation contour. Thus ' See, I t o ld you 
so', would seem to be Rhoda's interpretatio n of her mother's 
e xpression. On top o f this t here is a conte xt o f family p ropos-
itions about Rhoda ' s tendency to tire because of her anorexia. 
On the interact i ve plane, Rhoda's mother makes u se o f the 
Rule of Embedded Re quests, in which ' I f A makes a request for 
a c tion of B, and B responds with a request f o r information, B is 
heard as a sserting that he needs this informatio n in order to 
respond to A's request '. But while this demonstrates the coher-
e n c e of the r e s p on se , i t i s a r e q u e s t f o r in form a t i o n w h i c h i s 
already known, so we now invoke the Rule of Redundant Responses, 
in whic h 'If A makes a request for action of B, and B respo nds 
with a request for informati o n which A and B know B does not 
need, then B is heard as p r ov isi onally refusing the req ue s t'. We 
can now g i ve the interaction component o f the mother's response 
to Rhoda's challenge and admissio n as, 
Mother a sks R. for < ? further informa tion which she already 
has, thereby putting off R.'s request f o r actio n a nd for 
help <,..., 4,-vS and asserts indirectl y that she kn ows that the 
answer t o her own questio n is that R. is asking for hel p 
because she cannot perform the obligations o f household, 
thereby (,...,?AD-R > chal leng ing R.'s status a s an adult member 
of the household. (See 1977: 162-16 7 ) 
La bov & Fanshel think that Rhoda ha s three possible r esp-
onses t o 1.9. She could ignore the intonation and respond to the 
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request f o e information; she could denounce her mother's request 
for information as irrelevant and 1 nsi st on- a response t o her 
request; or she could ignoce her mother's request for info rmation 
and respond instead to the implicatjon of the intonation contour. 
Her actual response in 1.10 ('An-nd I said, "Well, things are 
getting j ust a little too much! [laugh] This is--i's j is' getting 
to o h ard, and ....•• I--"' ) shows a return to features o f tension 
seen in her Interview Sty le - hesitation, g lottali z atio n, and 
silenc e - and as well there is the nervous lau ghter. We thus get 
t he fo llowing expansion: 
R.: <nAnd then I said to my mother, <f "May be I shouldn't 
ha ve asked [ 4] you to come home, but [ STRN ] all the jo b s I 
h ave are too much for me to carry out with the strength that 
I have". >f >n 
1.10 is defensi ve. It argues that external circumstances a r e the 
cause of her immediate problem - and certainly not the behav i o ur 
o f her family. As such, Labov & Fanshel say, it is the weakest of 
the possible responses, but it avoids family conflict. The refer-
ence to e x ternal circumstances is significant, because in earlier 
cases where Rhoda asserts [ STRN] ( 1.4, 1.6 and 1.7 ) t he first 
person pro noun is involved as subject or object, whereas in 1.1 0 
Rhoda does not appear as directly involved, and impersonal circ-
umstances a re invoked - thus she indirectly asserts that while 
she is affected, the problem lies outside. This proposition is 
represented as [X:STRN]. 
By responding to the superficial request for informatio n 
('Why are you asking ... ?' ) by saying things are too much f or 
her, Rhoda has used the Rule for Reinstating Requests, in which 
'If B has responded to a request for action from A by making a 
request for information, and A gives the information requested, 
then A is heard as making the original request again'. So we get 
the following interaction component: 
R. gives the information requested by her mother by 
asserting -r-> that her obligations are greater than her 
capacity, thereby reinstating her request <=J:J that her 
mother should come home and thereby asserting indirectly 
< X:$TRN > that e x ternal circumstances are the cause of 
this, thereby responding hesitantl y to her mother's 
challenge < ?~AQ-R . ( 1977: 168-171) 
While her use of the Rule for Reinstating Requests has success-
fully returned the problem to her mother, in the course of doing 
this Rhoda has made herself vulnerable. She has had to state 
explicitly that she cannot cope, and her defense to the under-
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l y ing c hal l enge is weak and indirect. If she had responded with 
the imagined request in 1.8 she would have u sed the second a vail-
able tacti c suggested above, and would have put the blame onto 
her mother, and if she had used the third tactic of responding to 
the intonation contour (which, in a later section of the inter-
view, which is not anal y zed, Rhoda actually puts forward as a 
better possibility ) her mother would have been faced wit h a 
different k ind of challenge. 
As it is, her mother's 'Why don't you tell Phyllis that?' 
(Phyllis is Rhoda's sister, with whom her mother is stay ing ) 
enables her to p u t off the request to come home and the request 
f o r help again (Rule for Putting Off Requests) by saying that she 
should have asked her sister and implying that she ( the mother ) 
does not have the ability to do what is as ked (denying precon-
dition 2 of the Rule of Requests ) . (1977: 171-3) 
Rhoda could have responded by rejecting her mother's refusal 
in 1.11, by denying that she should have told Phyllis, or by 
asserting that her mother is the right person to as k. But instead 
she says, in 1.12, 'Well, I haven't talked to her lately'. This 
immediately falls into the Rule for Admitting Presuppos i tions: 
'If A responds to a request for information from B by giving that 
information, without specifically mentioning the presuppositions 
of the request, then B admits those presuppositions'. Her mother 
has begged the question, and Rhoda has accepted the fact. The 
interaction component here is: 
R. gives info rmation requested by her mother, thereby agree-
ing with her mother's assertion that the request should 
have been made to R.'s sister, thereby agreeing t h at her 
mother's assertion that her original request for action and 
help < ....... 4,5 were inappropriate, thereby retreating f t:"o 1n 
these requests, thereby (,.,I contradic ting her original 
a ssertion that she had carried out the therapist's sugges-
tion. ( ( 1977: 173-5) 
Labov & Fanshel present a diagram of the sequencing of 
Rhoda's narratives in 1.8 to 1.12, which captures the relation-
ship of the acts performed here. 
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1.8 1.9 1.10 l. l l 1.12 
----------------------------------------~FAILS to ASSERTION [l) suppor~ ass ' n 
CHALLENGE ,CHALLENGE >DEF ENSE 
I ~ I I REQUEST for~~UT-OFF [~S) REINSTATES )REF USES )RETREATS 
help [S) 
I 
r e quest [ S) request ["'S ) fro m r-e quest 
I I I 
REQUEST for--?P UT- OFF [-"" 4 ) REINSTATES )REFUSES---7RETREATS 
action [ 4) 
REQUEST f or 
infor-mation 
Rhoda : I 
r e quest [ 4) 
REQUEST for:-~GIVES 
i nfor-mation info r-mation 
r equest [""'4) from r-equest 
I I 
DENIES-----·}' AGREES 
ability 
I 
ASSERTS [ 4 )- -->AGREES inaprcopciate I 
REQUEST for~GIVES 
infor:-ma ti o n info r:-ma t i on 
I 
'Well, when l ' Th irigs are a I 'I haven' 
~~~~~-~~:~~~------ -----~:~~~:_:::_::::~~~-~-------::~;~;=~~~:ec 
Ot her : ' Oh, why-y?' 'Why don't you 
tell Phyllis tha t ? ' 
(Labov & Fanshel, 1977: 176) 
Rhoda's next r-emark, 'And--uh ••. I 'm j ust gonn a tell her- ' 
(1.13) displays tension a nd i s ambiguous a s to whether i t is par-t 
o f the n ar-rative or- a commen t o n it. We thu s have two possi b le 
e xpansions: 
R.: <iv I'm telling you that I'm positively going to t el l my 
mothe r ne xt t i me I com e home that I think- it's up to her 
to dec ide to co me home, in spite of what she might think or 
say. >iv 
or 
R.: <n I said to my mother-, <f I c ertainly wi ll tell Phyllis 
that [ 4) I want you to come home when I get a chanc e to talk 
to her next as you suggest. >f >n 
And this leads to the f ollowing interaction component: 
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R. ambiguously asserts that she will make her original 
r e q ue s t ~ t o he r m o t he r a g a i n and c a-r ry o u t a g a i n <It he 
suggestion of the therapist, or gives more informaticin on her 
narrative that she agreed with_ her mother that she will 
redirect her original request <.3:. to her sister. 
Labov & Fanshel comment that the ambiguity here permits Rhoda to 
blur the actual outcome of the narrative, asserting implicitl y 
that it did not make any difference. They say also that the 
ambiguity is systematic. 
In one sense, it means that it is not c lear whether Rhoda 
succeeded or not in car rying out the suggestion of the 
therapist; in the other sense, it is not e xac tl y clear that 
the suggestion did not work. On careful analysis, we can see 
that it did not, but the narr3tive manages successfully to 
obscure this point. (Labov & Fanshel, 1977: 17 8 & see 177-8) 
Rhoda's final utterance in this episode involves a restate-
ment of her initial assertion. It displays tension release, with 
fast tempo and strong articulation. In terms of Labov & Fanshel's 
analysis of narrative, it is a 'coda', bringing us back to the 
present through the repetition. The therapist shows that she 
recognizes this by interrupting Rhoda with t he comment that 
begins the next episode, and the therapist's comment, an eval-
uation of what Rhoda did, is also a response to Rhoda's utterance 
as a request. For 1.14 brings into play the Rule of Disputable 
Assertions. Here, 'If A makes an assertion about a D-event, it is 
heard as a request for B to give an evaluation of that assert-
ion'. The interaction component of 1.14 is thus: 
R. signals completion of her narrative by repeating the 
assertion <:J:> in the same words as 1.1[c], thereby giving 
information that she has completed her justification o f this 
assertion, thereby requesting indirectly the therapist to 
give evaluation. (1977: 178-9) 
SECTION 2c. 
The analysis of this first episode is the only one which 
will be presented in detail. Through it, however, a good idea can 
be gained of the style of Labov & Fanshel's cross-sectional 
analysis, and this method is repeated in the four other episodes. 
I want now to look at the way the overall session is treated, and 
at the general theoretical points which arise from the complete 
analysis. However, before doing so it may be worthwhile sketching 
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the direction which the following four episodes ta ke. 
In Episodes Two and Three the therapist takes the initiat-
ive. At the beginning of Episode Tw~ she gives the approval as ked 
for at the end of Episode One ( that is, responds to the request 
behi nd o ne side o f 'I thin k I did the eig ht thing' ) , and then 
immediatel y responds to the im p licit challenge, as k ing, with 
irritation, 'Well, what's you r question' (on the inter-pretation 
of this, see 1977: 182 -4 ) . She then, without allowing a t:"esponse, 
asserts that Rhoda has a lot of guilt, and that she does ha ve a 
full schedule a t school. Then, again without allowing a response, 
she a s k s Rhoda about getting hel p from her aunt, who li ves with 
her and her mother. The rest of this episode and the next consist 
of Rhoda explaining through narrative why asking her a unt for 
help is a waste o f time, and of the therapist reas k in g the ques-
tion and try ing to draw into the conversation the position of 
Rhoda's aunt in the household. The therapist comments dut:"ing 
playback sessions with the analysts (a nd implies in the inter-
v iew ) that Rhoda's assessment of and response to her aunt para-
llels that of her mother towards Rhoda herself ( see, 1977: 208 -
9 ) • 
In Episode Four Rhoda moves back onto her own status in the 
household, and the therapist takes this opportunity to go into 
the details of her mother's stay with her sister. The main point 
which is brought out of this material is that Rhoda continually 
blames her sister, rather than her mother, for the problem. 
Episode Five begins with the therapist drawing a parallel 
between Rhoda's family's response to her claim that she is inde-
pendent (of witholding all help) and Rhoda's response to her 
family's claim that she ate too much (of stopping eating alto-
gether). Rhoda's response to this suggestion is silence (defined 
as a complete reservation or repressio n o f speech). The therapist 
then says e xplicitly that Rhoda stopped eating 'entirely ' when 
'they said' she shouldn't be eating so much, t o whic h Rhoda makes 
a low, monotone attempt to speak ('Well, when I said I could get 
along without my mother,') which is interrupted by the therapist 
finishing her utterance ('The other--she--she's making you get 
along entirely, without her ..• '). After this Rhoda presents her 
sister as the cause o f her problems, and re j ects her sister's 
claim, but also implicitly the therapist's, that she doesn't eat 
enough. The therapist challenges Rhoda's assertion here by claim-
ing that she is not really sure herself that her weight is no t 
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the cause of her tiredness. Rhoda rejects this, but uncertainly, 
and the therapist tries to get Rhoda to recognize the emotions 
(specifically anger) she and her family feel towards each other, 
and the part of the session under analysis ends with her (the 
therapist) saying explicitly that 'So there's a lot of anger 
passing back and forth', to which Rhoda agrees hesitantly. 
Each of these five episodes is marked, on the one hand by 
concentration on a distinct topic, and on the other by the ex-
plicit initiative of the therapist's intervention (at least for 
Episodes Two to Five ) . These topics and interventions also serve 
to link the episodes, reflecting as they do Rhoda's everyday 
life, as raw material, and the therapist's therapeutic aims, as 
interventions. (see 1977: 330-332) 
SECTION 3: EVALUATING DISCOURSE ANALYSIS. 
As has been noted, Labov & Fanshel's central claim is that 
what is said should be distinguished from what is done, and that 
the fundamental coherence of conversation is reflected in connec-
tions between actions rather than connections between utterances. 
They say that in many ways speech actions can be seen as 'more 
fundamental or more central to human behaviour' than what is 
actually said (1977: 333). This claim, which they present as 
central to their approach to discourse, constitutes the most 
important link between their work and that considered in the 
earlier chapters. 
We saw in the discussion of Austin that his fundamental 
point is that we should study the things we do- the acts we 
perform - with utterances, and that we should study speech in 
its context of utterance. With Grice we found an analysis of 
meaning, not in terms of the meaning of our words, but in terms 
of the acts we intend to perform by our utterances; and Searle 
offers a criticism and a synthesis of these two views. Here, 
Austin's acts are grounded in the expression of propositions 
whose meaning is constituted by the intentionality of the sub-
ject, and the performance of speech acts is analyzed according to 
rules accounting for the shared knowledge and assumptions of 
speakers. There seem to be many connections between these app-
roaches and the work presented in this chapter, and the question 
immediately arises as to whether the approach developed by Labov 
& Fanshel suffers from the problems which I have argued beset 
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philosophical pragmatics. 
The first step in answering this question is to consider 
those ways in which Labov & Fanshel t.s approach differs, for they 
appear t o be significant. The first of these differences has 
already been noted, and lies in the nature of discourse rules. 
Whereas for Searle the success of a speech act depends on the 
s peaker getting the hearer to recognize his or her illocutionary 
intentions, Lab o v & Fanshel regard the speaker's u tterance a s 
contributing only a small part to the shared knowledge required 
for the recogn i t ion of an act. They claim that 'most o f the 
information needed to interpret actions is already t o be foun d in 
the structure of shared knowledge and not in the utterances 
themselves' ( 1977: 82). The importance of this is that it ma y 
avoid the structural isolation of subjects which seems to c ripp le 
the philosophical pragmatics we have looked at. 
A second difference, connected to the first, is that Labov & 
Fanshel construct their rules so as to confront directly the 
context of an utterance. Because the recognition of shared know-
ledge is written into the interpretation of utterances, Austin's 
injunction to deal with the context of utterance is carried out, 
something which neither he nor Searle fully succeed in doing. 
Labov & Fanshel also treat more abstract types of social 
interaction as speech acts. They claim that coherence lies more 
crucially at the level of challenges, defenses and retreats than 
at that of requests and assertions. Thi s is connected with the 
fact that they analyze utterances into a hierarchy of acts which 
cohere in a matrix ( 1977: 29 & 60), and the recognition of the 
complexity of the relation between utterances and acts seems to 
lie behind their doubts regarding the establishment of a closed 
set of speech acts (see 1977: 358). Interaction is thus analyzed 
in terms of rights, obligations, role and status, and so linked 
with the structure and structuring of social organization ( 1977: 
58-9). This again seems to overc ome serious limitations noted in 
the work discussed previously . 
A central problem in philosophical pragmatics is that the 
model of interaction which is set up relies on the notion of a 
communicative subject which underlies communication and constit-
utes meaning through its intentionality. Such a subject, oper-
ating as foundational in the explanation of language, appears to 
be isolated, in the sense that it is analytically prior to comm-
18 8 
unication and is not conditioned in any way by communication as 
inte~action. What the sub j ect means, which fs const~ued in te~ms 
of intentionality and is seen as a~ising within the p~io~ sub -
j ect, can only be linked t o the lang~age in wh i ch i t i s e xp~essed 
by intentions, which 'translate' intentionality into language. As 
we have seen with Grice and Searle, this linkage is theorized 
th~ough an equivocal use of 'meaning', and without this equ i voc -
ation no link is possible between intentio nality and l anguage, 
and communication becomes im possible. 
Labov & Fanshel's speech act does seem at fi~st not to be 
dependent on a foundational intentionality; that is, i t appea~s 
that intentionality is a~~ived at by analysis by the hea~e~, and 
that it is not t he foundation of inte~pretation . But when we look 
mo~e closel y we find that this is not the case. The action, o r 
the interaction, is ar~ived at throug h an inte~pretation of t he 
e xpansion of tex t and cues v ia ~ules of interp~etation. The 
e xpansion whi c h is inte~p~eted is constructed by bringing to-
gethe~ implicit and explicit sha~ed knowledge, in the fo~m o f 
propositions. This seems fine. But the level of inte~action, the 
meaning of t he utterance, is constituted by t he speake~'s intent-
ions, and these intentions, as with G~ice and Searle, a~e outside 
the analysis. We can anal yze the utteranc e into t he inte~action, 
b ut the interaction is unexplainable. It is simply what t he 
speaker means / intends to do. 
The problem he~e can be seen in Labov's earlie~ fo~mulation 
of the model of discourse (a model which is ca~cied into t h e wor k 
with Fanshel). We saw in Sectio n 1 tha t foe Labov discou~se 
begins with the speaker-'s intention to pe~fo~m an action ( see 
Labov, 1972a: 123), and the model which follows f~om this amounts 
t o discourse pa~ticipants' inten tion s being coded into and de-
coded fcom language ( the uttera ~ces) v ia p ~ oduction and interp-
retation rules. Such a model, which ~educes language to a medium, 
seems inadequate. 
Turning to discourse rules themselves, we find t he model 
repeated. For the basis of each is the mutual recogniti o n of 
belief and intention, and while it is an impr-ovement to wcite B's 
recognition into the rule, there is no mechanism or criterion for 
this recogniti o n. The recogn ition is the basis and p resuppositio n 
of each cule, and no argument is given as to how this prioc 
intersubjectivity could possibly arise. 
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This problem is also related to Labov & Fanshel's hierarch-
i zation o f meaning/ speech acts. An utteranc~ can be the express-
i o n of a number of acts, but these ac ts have a hierarchy, and 
what we want to get to in our analiZ-sis is what is 'reall y meant'. 
We may not be able to reach it, but it e x ists as the originating 
act, at the core of the analysis - and its foundation, t he guar-
antee of what is really meant, is the speaker's intentionality 
(and it is worth remembering here Austin's comments regarding 
t r acing a chain of acts). This is made clear in the following 
passage. 
In terms of meaning, the level of interaction can be defined 
as what is really meant in the deepest sense of 'really', 
b earing in mind that there will be many hierarchical leve ls 
of actions, and it is not always clear where the actio11 
really is. The action is what is intended in that it expr-
esses how the speaker meant to effect the listener, to move 
him, t o cause him to respond, and so f o rt h. (Labov & Fanshel 
19 7 7: 59. Emphasis their's. ) 
With this we see a c~petition of the problems we found with Grice 
and Searle. The action as the 'real' expression of what the 
speaker meant, o f how the speaker meant to effect the listener, 
becomes another surface of another depth. What is said, the 
utterance, is the expression of what is done, the action; and 
this action is the exp ression of what is meant, the intention. So 
in order to satisfy us Labov & Fanshel need t o o ffer an analysis 
of this second ' relation, of meaning and expression; but this is 
impossible, and necessarily impossible, for intentionality, while 
operating as the basis of inter action, has to operate as the 
unifying core of meaning. If it were opened up to analysis it 
would, given the approach we find here, have to lead us to yet 
another depth, as its core. 
It would be a mistake to ignore a certain ambivalence here. 
In connection with the implicit challenge in l.l[a] Labov & 
Fanshel say that 'the q uestion of speaker's conscious intentions 
(or the presence of "unintended effects") does not play a signif-
icant role in our analysis'. They suggest, by analogy with gramm-
atical studies, that awareness of verbal processing is quite 
limited ( 1977: 126-7). The point to be made in response to this 
is that this comment occurs in possibly the only section of the 
analysis where the hierarchy o f acts is not invoked in a search 
for a unitary 'real meaning'. It operates in finding the cha ll-
enge, but it does not subordinate o ne side of the ambiguity 
(Rhoda questioning herself) to the other (Rhoda questioning the 
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t he r a pi s t ) • 
I t does appear, however, that even if Labov & Fanshel' s 
d iscourse analysis relies on the unitary, isolated su bje c t as i t s 
foundat i o n they at least offer an understanding of language u se 
a s tied up in the structures of social organization, and so allow 
pragmatics to confront the politics of discourse. Because o f 
their hierarchy t he y recogni z e and analyz e cohe re~c e at the le vel 
of challenge, support, and so on, as it affects role and statu s. 
The y understand interaction as action wh ich affects the rela tio ns 
of the self and others, and they treat these relations in terms 
o f power and solidarity. This seems to offer somethin g c rucial, 
and lack ing up until now. But the hope is ~ot fulfilled. 
I f we construe politics as that aspect o f social interact i o n 
which involves (or as soc ial interaction when seen as) the invoc -
at ion and c ontestation of roles, rights, obl i ga tions and status, 
t hen an approach such as Lab ov & Fanshel's, which anal yzes speech 
in terms of action and interaction, and takes this level a s 
necessarily involving role, status, and so o n, seems to confront 
this po li tics as it operates in discourse. But because their 
analysis takes interact ion as the e xp ression of intentio n, and as 
being defined by intention, those political relations are cont in-
ually viewed as an outside, taken up through interact ion by the 
intentionality of a pre-given, unifying subject. 
The problem is that while interac tio n is seen as affecting 
r elations of power, it is treated as being outside those relat-
i o ns. Interactions or actions are done by the subject so as to 
affect these relations. Interaction, or discourse, is a tool used 
in the constructions of these relations. But it is not part o f 
these relations: crucially, it is not constituted by these relat-
ions. It is constituted instead by the intentionality of the 
subject. Interaction is the object o f analysis, in the search for 
what is really me ant ( the truth), and this meaning lies outside 
politics. So the analysis towards interac tion does not reach 
anything li ke a soc ial interactive depth, but instead the depth 
of the subject as the true foundation of intended inter-action. 
The same thing happens with the notion of implicit propos-
itions e xpanded from te x t and cues. We can see · these as a theor-
etical concept which allows the analysis of the way meaning is 
governed by the operation of propositions or a ssumptions whi c h 
inter discourse (according to the mode of argument) as an un-
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avo idable background. These might be consciously invoked by 
speakers, but also and more interestingly t"'hey (both local and 
general propos ition s ) are invoked by the discourse in wh ich 
subject s are taken up. But the propositions are also taken a s 
l y ing outside the intentionality of linguistic subjects. The 
a nalysis works through these propositions, on the p lane of what 
is said, t o interaction as what is done, and because of this, 
propositions tend to be taken as a resource, taken up in the 
satisfaction o f intentions. 
It would seem t o be more usef ul to claim instead that t h~se 
propositions, em bedded in the total speech act and operati ng as 
shared knowledge, embody definitions and explanation s of , and th~ 
possibi lities of relations among, bo t h the subjects engaged in 
di sc ourse and the soc ial facts occurring in that discourse. Seen 
in this way, t hese propositions are not so much, or not simply , a 
resource of linguistic subjects, but rather enter into (i n vary-
ing ways) the constitution of the intentionality with wh i ch the y 
engage in discourse. 
Thus, we could argue that meaning arises wi thi n t he social -
po litical relations and presuppositions which s urround a nd define 
discou rse, and that ignoring the role of these relations and 
presuppositions in the operation and construct ion of discourse 
leads both to the impossible model seen in the two preceding 
c hapters and to an inabilit y to deal with large areas of d is-
course phenomena. 
As has been noted, one of t he things which is valuable about 
Labov & Fanshel's anal ysis is that a t one level it shows us how 
discourses are tied up in politics, or relations of power. Not 
just in that they point out that t he re ldt ion of the part ici pants 
in a g iven speech event govern s to a c ertain e xt ent the nature of 
the discourse whic h takes place - although this in itself is 
important - but in that the interaction they present displays 
itself as the site o f a strugg le over status, role and rights (as 
they acknowledge ) through a struggle over the meaning of acts. 
What we see in the interactions between Rhoda and the therapist 
and Rhoda and her family is that the meaning of their acts, what 
they reall y me a n, is no t there-to-be-discovered, but rather is 
constituted, at one leve l, through the interaction and within the 
relations of the pa rticipants. Speech acts are effecti ve, but 
only given a certain meaning, and this meaning arises within the 
matrix of acts which condition that act. It does not arise in the 
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unanalyzable intentionality which constitutes the self-awareness 
of an a p riori sub j ect. 
But unless we are to be left with merely discussi n g ' t he 
polit ics of •.. the family, therapy, the classroom', and so on, 
as more or less isolated sites o f i~terpersonal contestation, it 
seems that we need to adopt a conception of the politics of 
disCOi l C S~, as em bodying, and being effective in the construction 
of, a complex matrix of general political relations, of whic h 
partic 11lar instances such as these form a part, and which also 
involve the definition and construction of the subject i v ities 
which engage in discourse. 
The point which develops from this is that the speech event 
does not just govern the language occurring and the constitution 
of meaning. It also, but because of this, is effective in the 
constitution of the subjects f o und here. At a general level this 
is to say that the speech event constitutes the therapist as 
therapist and Rhoda as client. Com~ents by Labov & Fanshel noted 
earlier appear to be an acknowledgement of this (see esp. 1977: 
32). However, they fail to follow through (and they develop a 
system of analysis wh ich e xc ludes following this thr ough) from 
the recognition of the fundamental contradiction of therapy to an 
understanding that this relation and its interactive outcome 
brings about (a nd is brought about by) a consciousness and a 
self-consciousness of the relation. That is, it occurs as a 
relation of constituted subjects. Certainly, the subjectivities 
arising in the interview occur as elements in a complex, some-
times contradictory, structuring of the self (Rhoda is not just 
the therapeutic subject), but in the situation being analyzed 
this aspect of the resulting matrix is crucial, and- we need to be 
aware of its existence. 
Part of this point is implicitly acknowledged by Labov & 
Fanshel, when they refer, in the construction of their expan-
sions, to the therap ist's assessment of meaning in playback 
sessions. The point is not, of course that it would have been 
better if they had asked Rhoda as well. 
This leads into a further relation here which has so far not 
been discussed. This is the relation of Labov & Fanshel themsel-
ves, as social scientists, to the interaction they interpret, and 
is the other level at which meaning is constituted. They present 
themselves as trying to discover what is really going on in the 
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i n te rv iew, what the s pea kers really me an , but to d o this is t o 
i nvoke a f urt he r- d isc our-se with its o wn relatio ns of powe r , t he 
d iscourse o f social science, o r t he d iscou r se o f d isc ou rse 
a nal ysis. 
Thus t he r-elatio n o f power invo ked by this d iscourse a l so 
acts to g overn the meaning o f its obj e ct , thr oug h its ' d isc ov -
ery '. I am not here referr ing to the observer's paradox (see 
1977 : 33Sn. ) , but rather t o the po int, in t he i nterpr-etation o f 
what is r-eally meant, at wh ich the i mpossible task of tak ing 
acc ount of the t o tal c onte xt o f an ut t e r an c e (see 1977: 73, 356 & 
357-8 ) is ended, and meaning is ass igned. This poin t c onstitutes 
the focus of the relations of r oles, rights and power invol ve d i n 
t he discourse, and the concern relating t o it has been at p lay 
fro m the th~ fi cs t c hapter, when Austi n fi r st invoke d t he t o tal 
speech act in the t o tal speech situation as the obj e c t o f 
analysis. 
J ust as the model wh ich we have seen devel oped so f ar tc ea t s 
meaning as unified and dete r mined by t he a prio ri a nd unitary 
subject, so the analysis o f interaction whic h uses t hi s mode l 
s upposes the possibility of interpretation as a trut h fl owi ng 
f r om the intentionality of t heir o wn theoreti c a l relatio n, as 
s ocial science, to thei r object. There is a truth, or- r-eal mean-
ing , lying within the linguistic / soc ial subject, and this can be 
r-epresented in the pure intentionality of social science. 
No ne of this is to claim that Lab ov & Fans hel deny o r dis-
tort the 'real meaning' of the interaction o r what t he partic-
ipants 'real l y mean', for t o claim this would be t o invoke a gain 
the semanti c foundation f ound in the intentionality of the p ure 
subject. It is to claim that a given text o r utterance can onl y 
ha ve mean ing g i ven a certain interac ti ve r-elation, and that t h is 
r-elation needs t o be taken into account. 
CONCLUSION. 
There are o f course o t her approac hes with in discourse a naly-
sis. I mportant amongst these is the wo r k done by t he so-called 
Birmingham group, and gi ven more space it may have been wort h-
while comparing the appro ach initiated by Labov wi th tha t found 
in Sinclair & Coulthard (1975 ) (where they anal y ze c lassroom 
interaction ) a nd its development (see Coulthard, Montgomery & 
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Braz il, 1981, and Coulthard & Brazil, 1981). 
Given these restric tions, however, such a comparison is not 
really justified. This approach does seem to share the basic 
presuppositio~s o f discourse analysis noted by Levinson ( 1983: 
286) (although there is a wariness regarding the concept of well-
formedness which Levinson does n o t ~ck nowledge - see Sinclair & 
Coulthard, 1975: 120 & Coulthard & Brazil, 19 81 : 82-6), however, 
there is a disinclin~tion to explicitly address questions of 
meaning and subjectivity. This tends to leave the approach at a 
somewhat descri pt i v~ level, and while contextual factors and 
relations of power are noted as important, they do not find their 
way into the actual system of analysis. Where the implicati on s o f 
their approach are filled out we find a repetition of the consti-
t ut ing ~ p ~ to ~i subject, so that 'each individual constructs his 
private linguistic universe, and through his utterances gives 
hint s as to its nature' (Sinclair & Coulthard, 1975: 130). Inter-
active r elations of power are then discussed with this subject 
presupposed (see Sinclair & Coulthard, 1975: 130-2). 
A similar point can be made regarding Burton (1980, 1981). 
She does develop an approach out of the work initiated in Sin-
clair & Coulthard which attempts to confront the interactive 
aspects o f discourse phenomena, a nd which also works with exam-
ples of casual conversation. This second development may have 
effected the first, since the Birmingham appco~ch ~~s developed 
with material in which the situation defines the interaction 
fairly rigorously, so that its operation as a discourse ph~110•t1-
enon is less obvious (compare Burton's comments - 1981: 61-2). 
The most significant development by Burton is that she introduces 
the notion of a 'challenging move' (a move is roughly equi v~lent 
to a speech act) based on Labov's Rule for Requests ( Burton, 
1980: 150-2, & 1981: 71-2). This allows a further dimension to 
the study of discourse, in which factors such a role .-=t nd status 
can ba i ntroduced to the analytic model. It does not, however, 
escape the presuppositions and limitations of Labov's approach. 
Nonetheless, given more space, a study of Burton's work (along 
with the other Birmingham work) would prove valuable. 
I commented in the introduction to this c hapter that diff-
erent approaches to discours~ analysis vary considerably in their 
details, and one should thus be wacy of generalizing from the 
limitations found in that approach which derives from Labov's 
work. On the other hand, other D~actitioners of discourse analy-
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~ is do not distance themsel ves fr o m the crucial positions (f r o m 
my ~oint of view ) ad opted in this ma terial : Th us Labov 's approach 
can be seen as a model o f the md j o r presuppositions of discourse 
ana l ysis. As I have said, these pre su~positions center o n the 
assumption o f an a prio ri, unitary subje c t, using lang ua ge as a 
t o ol o r me dium f o r the ex p ression of intentions, intenti o ns whi c h 
precede disc ourse and act a s a foundation for unified and determ-
inate meaning. This assumption leads, first, to an unworkable 
model o f communication, sin c e understanding a speaker's meaning 
p resupposes recogniti o n of the speaker's intentions, and t he onl y 
mecha nism for this recognition is a rule of discourse, wh i ch 
itself is g r ounded in this recognition. Secondly, this assu mption 
le ads to an inability to account for the construction o f meaning 
through interaction, and a subsequent refusal to re c ogniz e the 
role of the discourse analyst in this construction of mea ni ng. 
These p r ob lems have been noted with regard to philosophic al 
pcdgmatics, but the value of an examination of discourse analysis 
i s that the social j politic al j inter Decsonal issues surrounding 
questions of language use are brought into much sharper f ocus, 
a nd the effects o f cashing-out the assu mp tions of philosophical 
pragmatics c an be empha sized. 
Discourse d nd l ysis has also been criticized from within 
linguistic pragmatics. This c riticism, dnd d n a lternative t o 
discourse anal ysis whic h foll o ws fr om it, shall be discussed in 
the following chapter. 
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INTRODUCTION. 
CHAPTER SIX 
CONVERSATION ANALYSIS 
The work discussed in the pr evious five chapters represents 
var i ou s approaches to an attempt to develop a pragmatic account 
of language, and perhap s the c en tral characteristic of this wo rk 
lies in its concentration of what is done in saying something 
rather than simply o n what is said. Followi n g from this is an 
analysis in terms of the actions - speech acts - which are real -
ized in the surface features of discourse, and an examinatio n of 
the rules g overning the production and interpretation of these 
act i ons a nd the communicative functions they perform. In general, 
such an examination then leads to a final analysis in terms of 
the intentionality seen as lying beh ind these actions, supplying 
their foundation and defining them. 
These features o f the pragmatics so far discussed seem t o 
involve what can be characteri z ed as a depth analysis of dis-
course. That is, by taking the surface features of discourse as 
the realization of abstract acts , and by taking the coherence of 
discourse as lying, not in the relation of the surface features, 
but in the relation of the acts e xpressed by these features, 
analysis focusses o n this deeper level of action, which is 
interpreted from the surface features. Meaning is seen a s being 
found in and constituted through this second level of discourse, 
and thus meaning becomes a function, not of surface semantic 
features, but of actions performed in and expressed throu g h a 
context of utterance which is construed a s the total speech 
situation. This speech situati o n is presupposed by the rules 
according to which s p eech acts are perform ed, and it is the 
context according to which speech acts mak e sense. 
I have crit i cized this approach on tw o general levels. 
First, I have argued that as it has been developed it seems to be 
the oretically untenable. On the one hand , in as much as meaning 
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is ta ken a s being constituted through the intentionality of the 
speaking sub ject, this is theorized bot h t~cough an e qu ivocal u se 
o f ' meani ng' and by taking intentionality a s a 'language' of 
s orts, which is expressed or translated as discourse phenomena. In 
o rder f o r such an account to work, there appears t o b8 p r esupp -
osed the notion of a consciousness which does the e xp ressing and 
(par impossible ) the ~eaning, which is apart from a nd the oretic-
ally pr i o r t o the intentio nality that it expresses - and t he 
defining and translating role given t o this consci ousness pre-
supposes language at the po int at which the constitution of 
language is supposed to be explained. I n o rder to do what 1 t 
doe s, this consciousness must underst~nd already what it is 
supposedly constituting. On top of this, when meaning is defined 
in terms of intending, communicatio n itself seems i mpossible, 
since the meaning of discou rse phenomena must apparently b e 
understood from the intentio n with which they are e xp ressed, and 
an audience is g iven no way o f knowin g intenti o ns o t her t h an by 
interpreting phenomena which it cannot understand until it knows 
the intent ions. 
On the other hand, the notion of a speech act itself seems 
hig hl y problematic. Given that we do not posit separate acts for 
every example of discourse, and embark o n an endle ss and point-
less explicati on of felicity conditions (wh ich, a part from any-
thing else, would assume an unlimited knowledge of speech acts 
by speakers ) , there seem to be no criteria for p i c king out cen-
tral cases of speech acts, and there seems t o be no way of 
relating these cases to their varied r ealizations in discourse. 
The second level of my cr iticism (wh ich will be developed 
more fully in this chapter and the conclu sion) has been that 
generally in the approach we have seen there is on the one hand 
ultimately a n inability to treat meaning or consciousness as in 
a ny way constituted within the social relations which interactio n 
involves, and o n the o ther hand they display no recognition or 
account of the way analysis imposes meaning on discourse phenom-
ena, and in both cases this is because meaning is taken as a 
discoverable, objective given, lying in the consc iousness of the 
speaking subject . In brief, the political di me nsion of discourse 
is denied, and this denial is made possible by the pragmatic 
theory which has been developed. 
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I n this ch apte r T w~nt to consider an alternative approach 
to p ragmatics, which has been variously cal~ed ethnomethodology , 
con versational analysis, or as here, conversatio n analysis. Con-
versatio n analysis is interesting because it involves a rejection 
of this t ype of deductive account of disc our se phenomena in terms 
of abstract spee c h act ca tegories and intentionality , in favour 
of a n inductive analysis o f the surfac e phenomena of discourse, 
and be cause it attempts to overco me the problems arising in the 
relatio n between the analyst and the discourse to be st ud ied. 
Before d iscussing convecsation anal ysis itself I will s umma rize 
in t he f o l lowi ng sectio n some of the criticisms o f speech act 
theory from within lingui stic pragmatics which have lead to an 
interest in this alternative. 
SECTION 1: THE CRITIQUE OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS. 
Conversation analysis has been adopted in two ways. Some 
have used it to fill in what they see as a gap in the speech act 
theory adopted b y discourse analysis, but have ret ained the basic 
premises o f speech act theory, while others have attempted t o 
r eject speech act theory ( and discourse analysis) outright, and 
have replaced it with a model of inte raction based solely on 
conversation analysis. 
An example of the t yp e of criticism of s peech act theory 
which leads to the first option is found in Stubbs ( 1983 ). He 
argues that while indirection between surface linguistic forms 
and underlying meanings, functions and structures needs to be 
recognized, this should not be overemphasized. He claims that a 
discourse a nalysis must integrate an account o f what is said into 
and account of what is done, whereas we have seen previously an 
attem pt to distinguish what is said from what is done, with no 
attempt at integration. Stubbs says that without an integrated 
account we will have no realization rules or recognition criteria 
foe underlying categories, and because 'speakers themselves are 
condemned to stand by what they say, not by what they mean or 
intend' (S tubbs, 1983: 177-8). These points are the same as those 
raised in earlier chapters. We saw in particular that speakers 
forced to opecate within the scheme suggested by Grice would be 
unable to communicate because they are denied recognition criter-
ia, and on the other hand, it s~~med that some speech act app-
roaches ga ve n o account of the way that surface linguistic form 
ca n be opera tive i rrespective of communicative intentions. 
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Acc ording to Stubbs, analysts should w()rk with the general-
ization that while there may be no surface markers r elating 
utterances, and while such indices ~an be deceptive, 
at least in some discour se types, including social casual 
conversations, a large proportion of the talk com p rises 
precisel y s u ch superficial indices of underlying organiz-
ation. (Stubbs, 1983:178) 
Those parts of talk he is referring to are those parts concerned 
wi th s tructuring, repeating, emphasi z ing, mitig~ti ng 'and gener-
ally ~padding~•, rather than with expressing propositio nal c on-
tent. 
Stubbs suggests that a reason for the tendency in speech act 
theo ry and pragmatics to ignore overt surface signals of c onver-
sational organization is the relidnce on idealized invented data . 
He exempts Labov from this criticism, but says that Grice and 
Searle both rel y o n examples of discourse which are stripped of 
almost all signals of speech act category (such as indicators o f 
illocutionary force) or discourse sequence (such as ellipsis or 
discourse markers -e.g. a sentence-initial 'well'). They t hus 
represent discourse as enigmatic and incoherent at a surface 
level.l Stubbs also notes Labov & Fanshel's point th a t when inter-
action is presented without markers of mitigation it appears much 
more aggressive than the original, and says also that idealized 
data leads to ignorance of the interactive role of redundancy. 
( 1983: 179-8) 
The main point, then, seems to be that the over em p hasis of 
indirection leads to theoretical problems and that this overem-
phasis follows from a representation of discourse which denies 
just those surface features which supply recognition criteria and 
which are operative in establishing discourse cohesion. Stubbs 
says that an approach in many ways more hopeful for a naturalis-
tic study of illocutionary force than the speech act approach of 
trying to specify speakers' intentions and the sincerity con-
ditions for ac ts: t hus ce lying on unobservable psychological 
phenomena, is one which studies how speakers indicate what point 
they have grasped o r intend . 
F iest, it can provide a way of studying how participants 
display their own interpretations of discourse, in the sense 
of ho w they formulate the point of utterances they produce 
and hear, without forcing the analyst's interpretations on 
the discourse. ••• Second, it can pr ovide an analysis of one 
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pervasive way in which utterances are chained, in at least 
certain discourse types. (Stubbs, 1983: 182 ) 
Lev inson's ( 1983 & 1981) advoca€y of conversation analysis 
against discourse analysis and s peech act theo ry is p ut more 
strongly than thi s . A position such as that taken by Stubbs 
c laims that the basic program of a study o f illocutionary force 
c an be maintained, but that it needs to make use of insights and 
approaches offered by conversation analysis. Levi nson, however, 
c laims that the s o-cts oE :~.pproaches discussed so far- ar-e funda-
men tall y misconceived, and that they need to be rejected in favor 
of conver-sation analysis. Crucially, he wants to reject the 
noti on of illocutionary force in favor- of the notion o f conver-
satio nal function. 
Levinson characterizes discourse analysis as a program which 
attempts to isolate a set of basic categories or units o f dis-
course, and formulate a set o f concatenation rules stated over 
those categories, delimiting well-formed sequences of cat egori~s 
(coherent discourses) from il l -formed sequences ( incoherent dis-
courses), appealing throughout this to intuitions such as what is 
and what is not a coherent discourse (see Levinson, 19 83 :28 6). 
This program is further characteri zed as involving (explic-
itly or implicitly) models with four general properties. (i) 
There are unit acts - speech acts (or 'moves' in the Birmingham 
work) - that are performed in speaking, which belong to a spec -
ifiable, delimited set. (ii) Utterances are segmentable into unit 
parts - utterance units - each of which corresponds to (at least ) 
one unit act. (iii) There is a specif iable function, and hope-
fully a procedure, that will map utterance units onto speech acts 
and vice versa. (iv) Conversational sequences are primarily reg-
ulated by a set of sequencing rules stated over speech 1:~ t (:)(' 
move) types (Levinson, 1983: 288) . Levinso~ says that the kernel 
idea is that since sequential c onstraints are clearly not easil y 
s t a t e d on t he f o r m o r m e an i ::1 g o f w h a t i s sa i d , u t t e r a n c e s h ·'l v 8 to 
be 'translated' into the underlying actions they perform, because 
on this deeper (or more abstract) level rules of sequencing will 
be straightforwardly describable. He says that this model seems 
to capture the obvious regularities whereby answers generally 
follow questions, actions or excuses follow requests, and so on, 
and that the problems for the model are generally seen as lying 
at the level of the translation of utterances into acts (assump-
tion iii), which leads to the interest in theories of indirect 
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s peech acts. ( Levinson , 
th is characterization , 
1983: 289; and for a not her version of 
see Levinson, 1981: 473-5. ) 
Disc ourse analysis is thus characterized as an approac h in 
which a model of conversati on is bui lt up, 
from a linguistic base by u tilizing (w hile i mp r ov ing ) the 
basic notions o f speec h act theory, merel y addin g a s y n t a x 
f or the concatenation of speech act categories that will 
capture the simple regularities [of q uestion-answer and s o 
o n ] noted above. (Levinson, 1983: 289) 
Le vin son is extremely c ritical of the f our assumptions which he 
claims underlie such an appr oach . 
One p roblem with the first assumption follows from the fact 
that some single-sentence utterances ' clearl y perform mo re than 
o ne s peech act at a time' (e.g., 'Would you like another drink?' 
c an b e bo th a question and a response) . He say s that t h is ma kes 
the whole approach awkward, since the seq uen c ing rules thus ha ve 
t o cover cases where more acts are being done than c an r easonabl y 
b e responded to directly. Also , because the sources for multiple 
fun c tions often lie outside the utterance in q uestion ( in the 
sequential env ironment in which it occurs) , and as s uch env iron-
ments are n o t restricted in k ind, the assumption of a well-
defined and delimited set of speec h act t ypes is dubious. A 
further problem is that conversational responses can be directed 
not just t o the illocutio ns performed by utterances, but t o their 
perlocutions as well. The example Levinson gives is, 
A: It's getting late, Mildred . 
B: a. But I' m having such a good time. 
b . Do you want to go? 
c . Aren 't you en joy ing yourself, de ar? 
Levinson suggests that each of B's possible utterances respo nds 
not t o the illocutionary force o f A's utterance, but to possible 
perl ocutionary intents which A mi g ht have had . But b e cau se perlo-
c utions are unlimited in k ind and number, any responses ba sed on 
them will necessaril y fall outside the s cope of the model used by 
discourse a n alysis . (1983: 290) 
The requirement in the second assumpt i o n that there b e 
identifi ab le utterance-units upon which speec h acts or moves ca n 
b e mapped has p roblems, Le v inson claims, with the fact that 
sing le sentences can b e used to perform two o r mo r e s peech acts 
in different c lauses, and that eac h c lause may perfo rm more than 
one spee c h act. Also, sub-sentential uni t s which occur as utter-
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ances, non -linguistic voca liza t ions suc h a s _laughter, n on - vocal 
actions, and silen c e, can occu r app ropr iatel y in conve rsations. 
Wh ile for the functions in a ssumptio n ( iii) to b e well-fo r med 
there must be a n independently specif iable set of u tteranc e uni ts 
onto which actions can be mapped, it is im possible to s pecif y in 
advanc e what kind s of behavio r al units will carry major inter-
actional acts. Instead, t he units in questi o n ( laughter, silence 
a nd so o n ) seem to b e fun c tio nally defined by the act i ons the y 
can b e seen t o perfor m in context. ( 1983 : 191 ) 
The third a ssumption, that there can be fun ctions mappi ng 
actions onto utterance-units, requires that there b e wel l - defined 
sets of relevant actions and utterance-units, but be cause of the 
problems with the first two a ssumptions these do not exis t . A 
further p roblem here is that for t he model to be interesti ng 
there should be not merel y a n abstract function which describes 
the map ping, bu t an actual procedure o r algorithm which will 
im plement the fun ct ion. However, there is no simple form-to-
functio n corre l atio n (a poi nt Le vi nso n has made against s peech 
act theory in general ) , and Levinso n cla ims tha t attempts to 
br i dge the gap between what uttera n c es literally mean a nd what 
they actually do in the way o f actions, with theories of in d i rect 
speec h acts, have provided at best onl y pa rtial s olut i o ns. He 
says ( in a cla im simila r to o ne made in the last chapter against 
Labov & Fanshel) that bo th sequential context and e x tra-ling uis-
tic context are c rucial in the assi gnment o f utterance f un ct ion, 
a nd so there cannot be simple ' force conversion ' rules, but 
rather a very complex inferential process utilizing informat i o n 
of many different k inds - and there are n o t e ven the g eneral 
outlines of such an algor ithm. According to Levinson, s uch models 
are therefore unfalsifiable, f or if it is cla imed that given s om e 
set of speech act t ypes or moves o nl y some sequences of these 
ac ts are we ll-formed or coheren t while al l others are ill-formed, 
then it must be possib le to test inde pendently whether some 
sequence of utterances in fact corresponds t o o ne of the coheren t 
strings. Ho wever, suc h a test is o nl y poss ible if there is an 
e xp licit procedure for assigning utterances to speech act ca teg-
or ies, and as there is no such p roc edure there is n o em p i r ical 
co ntent t o the c laim that g i v en strings do n o t or s hou ld n ot 
occur in discourse. (1983: 191-2, & see 198 1: 480-2 ) 
He also questi o ns the a ssum pt i o n tha t there is a set of 
sequen c ing rules, stated ove r s peech act ca tegories , which govern 
the s e q uen t i a l orga nization of conversation. He s ays that this 
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assumption embodies a strong claim about tQe 'syntactic' nature 
o f sequential constraints in conversation, and that it is essen-
t i al to such a c laim that there b e clear ca ses of ill-f orm e d 
se q uences just as there are in sentence grammars. Howe ver, c ases 
of such im possible discourses are hard if n o t impossible t o find. 
As Levinson notes, Edmondson (1 9 81 : 12-14 ) is a useful reference 
here, and he himself s uggests reasons for the difficulty of 
fi nd ing impossible discourses. He says, referring to Grice's 
theory of implicature, that an apparent con versational violat i on 
is li kel y t o be treated on the assumpt i o n that the utterances 
involved are in fa c t interpretable, if additional inferenc es are 
made. A se cond reason is that responses can be made to pe rloc-
ut i o ns, which are n ot limited in k ind and number and are n ot 
solely predictable from the utterances involved - s o such a 
r esponse will be understood even though appearing seq uentiall y 
odd to a view which concentrates on illocutions. Finally, Levin-
s o n says that our intuitions are not reliable guides in this 
area, since sequences which we mi ght judge 'ill-formed' in isol-
ation do in fact occur frequentl y , and are coherent given the 
conversation in which they are embedded. (1983: 292) 
Levinson suggests that the sequencing rules approach is 
motivated by an initial consideration of paired utterances like 
questions and answers, o ffers and acceptances, greeting s, and so 
on. However, he claims that conversation is not basically con-
stituted by such pairs, and that in any case, the rules that bind 
such pairs are not of a quasi-syntactic nature. For example, a 
question can be followed by a number of responses (e.g., a part-
ial answer, or a denial of the relevance of the questi o n) o t her 
than a full answer. Levinson sa y s that what we should say is that 
given a question an answer is relevant, and that responses c an be 
expected to deal with this relevance. He says that such expect -
ations are more li ke Grice's maxims than the rule-bound e xpect-
ancy of an object a fter a transiti ve verb in English. (1983 : 293) 
In any c ase, he argues, seq uenc ing constraints in conver-
sation could never be captured fully in speech act terms. He says 
that what makes s o me utterance after a question constitute an 
answer is not only the nature of the utterance itself but also 
the fact ttlat it occurs after a question with a particular con-
tent. Answerhood is 'a complex p roperty composed of sequential 
location and t opical coherence a c ross two utterances, amongst 
other things'. Le v inson also notes that it is significant in th i s 
light that there is no proposed illocutionary force of answering, 
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and claims that the speech act o ~ disc ou~se analysis model s k irts 
the general issue o f cons traints on top ical c oherence, in s pite 
of their r e l e va nce in mak ing sense of appd C~l tl t ill-fo r me d 
s e que nces. ( 1983 : 193) 
Levinson also makes the general claim that in addit i o n t o 
these fundamental difficultie s d iscourse anal ysis models l e ad t o 
a nalyses wh i ch 'are often q uite superficial and disappoi n ting , 
i~ volving an intuitive mapping of unmotivated cat egories onto a 
r astr i cted range of data'. He say s that wh ile t h is is not the 
case with work su ch a s Labov & Fanshel's, these analyses can 
o f t en be shown to have obscured basic feat ures of conversa tional 
o rganization. ( 1983:294)2 
Fi nally, Le v inson say s that the basis f o r t he rejection of 
di sc ourse analysis is that the methods and t heoretical tool s 
advocated, tho se imported from mainstream theoretic al lingu is-
t i c s, a~e inappropriate t o the domain o f conve r satio n. 
Conversatio n is not a structural product in the same way 
t ha t a sen ten c e i s - i t i s r a t he r t he o u t come o f t he in t e r-
ac tion of two or more independent, goal -directed ind i v id-
uals, with of ten di vergent interests . Moving fr om the st udy 
of sentences t o the study of conversations is lik e mov ing 
from phys ics to biology: quite diffe r ent analytical proced-
ures and methods are appr op riate even though conversations 
are ( in part) composed of units that have some direct corre-
s pondence to sentences. ( Levinson, 1983: 294) 
A summary of this position is Lev inson's claim that 'dialogue has 
no s yntax' (1 981: 475). 
I have p resented Levinso n's critique of discourse anal ysis 
in s om e detail because it represents one o f the stronger attempts 
to undermine this approach, and from a perspective which d iffers 
somewhat from that adopted throughout the preceding chapters. 
For both Levinson and Stubbs the ma jor problems of disc ou rse 
anal ysis focus on the problem o f identification and translation 
of speech act categories. For Stubbs this arises from a n over-
emphasis of indirection, wherea s f o r Lev inson it is intrinsic to 
the very notion o f abstract communicative categories, a nd we 
shal l see that the q uestion o f whether:- s p eech act theor y nee d s to 
be improved o r d isc arded in the light o f conversation anal ysis is 
significant in this debate ( f o r a position more or less support-
ing Stubbs, see Coulthard, 1977, and for one closer to Levinson, 
see Brown & Yule, 1983). In any case, an important claim through-
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out these critiques is that discourse analysis and s peech act 
theory tend to ignore or distort what we can tentatively call the 
'reality' of conversation.3 
Conversation analysis is put forward as a way of g rasping 
this reality, and very generally we can say that it proposes to 
do this by giving an account of how coherence and sequential 
organization in discourse is produced and understood in terms o f 
the surface features of disc ourse. I will argue that conversation 
analysis is itself seriously flawed, ho wever, it seems worthy of 
some study, because it offers an influential alternative to the 
sty le of 'deep analysis' which I have criticized in earlier 
chapters. It therefore seems important to understand its attract -
ion , and to examine it as a counter to certain presuppositions in 
the philosophy of language. 
SECTION 2: CONVERSATION ANALYSIS. 
SECTION 2a. 
Conversation analysis developed out of attempts within soc-
i ology to develop techniques for analyzing interaction which 
c ould overcome the perceived limitations of a sociological met hod 
based on statistical counts of a pr iori content categories. Suc h 
categories were felt to be imposed on the behaviour being anal-
yzed, and instead an approach was proposed which invo l ved a 
p henomenological analysis of the actual 'practical reasoning' of 
inte ractants. 4 
This work, under the name of 'ethnomethodology' and under 
the influence of Garfinkel, involved studies of interacti ve sit-
uations which concentrated o n the strategies, management devices, 
categorizatio n and common sense reasoning of the participants. 
There is no attempt t o explain what the activity means, either in 
a social context extending b eyond the interaction or in terms of 
an intentional level extending beyond the surface of what actu-
ally takes place in the interaction. Nor are categories assigned 
to the participants or the ac tivities. The meaning of the activ-
ity and of participants' behaviour is taken as that which is 
assigned by the participants themselves, and context and psycho-
logical or cognitive depth is relevant o nly in so far as it 
arises in the displayed reasoning of those pa rticipants. Meaning, 
that is to say, is always 'situated meaning'. 
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In the Preface to his Studies in Ethnomethodology, Garfi~kel 
say s th~t, 
In contrast to certain versions of Durkheim that teach that 
the objective reality of social facts is sociology's fund-
dlnen tal principle, the lesson is taken instead, and used as 
a study policy, that t he ob jective reality of social facts 
as an ongoing accomplishment o f the concerted activities of 
daily life, with the ordinary, artful ways o f tha t accompl-
ishment being by membe rs known, used, and taken for granted, 
is, for members doing sociol ogy, a fundamental pheno menon. 
(Garfinkel, 1967b: vii) 
He goes on to say that this production of social reality is a 
reflexive activity, in whi c h practical actions, reasoning and 
knowledge are made accountable and a nalyzable as part o f the 
ongoing process. He says that by this he means that they are 
'carried on under the auspices of, and are made to happen as 
events in, the same ordinary affairs that in organizing they 
describe' (1967b: 1); and he say s t hat ethnomethodology attempts 
to discover the formal properties of commonplace, p ractical co•n-
mon sense actions 'from within' actual settings, as ongoing 
acc omplishments of those settings. 
Ethnomethodological studies analyze everyday activities ~s 
members' methods for makin g those same activities visibly-
rational-a nd-repo rtab le-fo r-all-pr act ical-p urpose s, i.e., 
'accountable', as organizations of commonplace everyday 
activities. The reflexivity of that phenomenon is a singular 
feature of practical actions, of practical circumstances, of 
common sense knowledge of social structures, a nd of practi-
cal sociological reasoning. By permitting us to locate and 
e xamine their occurrence the reflexivity of that phenomenon 
establishes their study. (Garfinkel, 1967b: vii, & see viii) 
Meaning is thus seen as being ref lexive in that any (lay or 
professional) sociol og i cal 'gloss' of what is said or done is 
itself a part o f the operation of speaking and making sense, and 
must itself be accountable and the subject of other's glossing 
practices - and this process is open-ended (see esp. Garfinkel, 
1967b: 7-10, & Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970: 362ff). And ways of 
speaking are indexical , in that their meaning will always be 
partl y dependent on their situated occurrence. Thus any ( lay or 
professional) sociologic~l rule will always require an ad hoc 
'looseness' in order to account for its situated application (see 
esp. Garfinkel, 1967b: 2-7). 
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These two central claims come together in the point that any 
pcactical activity, b e it professional sociology , working as a 
j u ro c or as a coroner, or family inte r?. c t i_ ),1, involves prac tical 
soc i o logical reasoning. The formulation of a methodology for 
dealing wi th those situations (described as •naturally organized 
ac tivities• ) , and the creation o f social reality , arises as the 
outc om~ of acting in those situations. Eth~om e thodology t hus 
b ecomes the task of displaying that methodology , which includes 
the methodology, or the ~ c ~ctical reasoning, of the sociologist. 
As Garf inkel pu ts it, 
I use t he term •ethnomethodology• to refer to the invest-
igation of the rational properties o f inde x ical e xp ressi ons 
and other practical a c tio ns ~s contingent ongoing accomp-
lishments of organized ar tful practices of everyday l i fe. 
( Ga rf ink e 1 , 19 6 7b: 11) 5 
SECTION 2b. 
The style of analysis developed by ethnomethodology implies 
the study of conversational o rganization. The central phen omena 
of reflexivity and indexicality are manifested through conversat-
ional interaction, and the more recent work o f Garfinkel, and 
also that o f Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, has developed, more 
by a change of emphasis than a change of style, into what I am 
h8re cal ling conversation analysis. The motivation for this work 
is still sociological, involving an attempt to develop what 
Schegloff & Sacks call a •naturalistic obsecva tion discipline 
tha t could deal with the details of social action(s) rigorously, 
empirically, and formally• (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973: 289-90), but 
such work and such an ~pproach has proved relevant to pragmatics 
and socioli nguistics, and according t o some, offers the poss-
ibility of overcoming many problems in these areas. As I have 
said, the strongest claim for the benefits o f conversatio n anal-
y sis is found in Levinson (1983 : Ch.6). 
The central point throughout this d iscussion is best summed 
up in Levinson•s statement that •the proper object o f sociolog-
ical study is the set of techniques that the members of a society 
themselves utilize to interpret and act within their own social 
worlds• (Levinson, 1983: 295). This principle is accompanied by 
suspicion of premature theorizing and ad hoc analytical categor-
ies: 
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As far as possible the categories of analysis should be 
those that participants themselves can -be shown to utilize 
i n making sense of interaction; unmotivated theoretical 
co~structs and unsubstantiated ~ ntuitions are all t o be 
avoided. In practice this results in a strict and parsim-
onious structuralism and a theoretical ascetic ism - the 
emphasis is on the data and the patterns recurrently dis-
played therein. (Levinson, 1983: 295) 
As has been mentioned earlier, in such an approach context is 
only g iven attention in as much as contextual categories a ~e used 
in interaction by participants. Conversation analysts thus a vo id 
the task of plotting a context by which to fill out t he inde x-
i c al aspects of an interaction. 
Levinson claims that in theiL analyses, conversation anal -
ysts attempt to show, not only that a certain aspect of con ·.;.; ;::- -
satio n can be viewed in a certain way , but that it is actually 
seen in that way by the participants producing it - so, again, 
they are trying to model the actual procedures and expectations 
of conversationalists. He says as well that a conversation anal-
yst will t r y to give a functional explanation of the interact-
ional problems that a particular conversational device is das-
igned to resolve. He presents these as two basic methods of this 
style o f investigation. 
(a) We should attempt to locate some particular conversat-
ional organization, and isola te its systematic features, by 
dem onstra t i<1<J iH ~ticipants' orientation to it 
(b) We should ask, (i) what problems does this organization 
solve, and (ii) what problems does this organization raise -
and therefore what implications does it have for the exist-
ence of further solutions tl) f qcther problems? (Levinson, 
1983: 319) 
He argues that these methods offer a way of avoiding the 'indef-
i1 lt ely extendable and unverifiable categorization and speculat-
ion about actors' intents' typical of discourse analysis. 
An important way of demonstrating that a particular fe a ture 
of conversational organization is implicitly recogni zed by par-
ticipants and not just an artifact of analysis, is to concentrata 
on hitches in conversation. When an hypo thesized organization 
does not operate in the predicted way, participants can be expec-
ted either to tr.:- y to repair the hitch or to draw inferences from 
the absence of the expected behaviour. Thus a n interruption can 
be distinguished from a legitimate overlap by sanctions and 
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r e p rim a nd in r esponse, and t he si gnificanc e o f a f ai lu r e to 
r espo nd to a summ o ns will be de mo nstrated i ~ t he re sponse o f the 
pe r son who made t he summon s . 2r o m this a s pe c t o f c onve r s a tio n, 
Le vi nso n draw s the foll ow ing po i n t. -
Conver-s r1t i. :)=1 , as op posed t o monolog ue, o ffers the a n a l yst a n 
i nvaluab le analy tic al r eso urc e: a s each tur~ i s r e s po nde d t o 
by a se cond, we f i nd d isp l ayed in that se cond a n a nalysis o f 
t he f i r st by its rec i p ient. Such an ana l ysi s i s t hus p r ov id-
ed by pa rtic i pants not on l y f or 8r1c h o ther b ut for an alysts 
too . ( Le v inson, 19 83: 32 1, & see 320-1 ) 
He q uo tes Sacks, Scheg l o ff & J efferson's comment that 'the t urn-
t a king system has, a s a b y - p r oduct of its design, a proof p roc e-
dure fo r t he a nal ys i s of t urns' ( 1978: 44 ) , and say himself t hat 
a good case c an t herefore be made for the methodol o g i c al p ri o rity 
o f t he study o f c onversat ion o ver the study o f o ther k i nd s o f 
t al k o r o ther k inds of tex t. 
The se cond of t hese methodological claims relates to t he 
f unctional anal ysi s o f the operations identif i ed by the first 
proced ure. Lev ins on demo nstra tes this b y taking t he turn-tak ing 
system a s t he fu ndamental de v ice (these va rious de v i c es will b e 
explained a little l ate r). This devi c e organiz es the e x change of 
s peake rs a nd keeps only o ne speaker spe ak ing at a time, but it 
leads to the problem of get ti ng the mechanism g o ing in the f irs t 
p l ace. This pro blem is sol ved b y t he structure of summ ons-a nswe r -
fi r st topic, which establishes a co-ordinated c o- participation, 
ass i gns speaking and recei ving r o les f o r the first three turns, 
a nd thus gets the turn-taking mac hinery going. Lev inson describes 
su mmons s e q uences as 'rational solutions t o particular o rganiz-
a tional problems', and as no t a d hoc or a rbitrary ( 19 83: 323) . We 
no w, however, have the proble m o f ho w t o suspend the turn-tak ing 
mach i ne ry so that, for example, a story c a n be to ld. A device 
whi c h sol ves this p roblem is that o f an o ffer o r bi d ( followed by 
a cceptance o r re je c t i o n ) to suspend t he tur n-taking me c hanism. 
Th i s in turn leads t o t h e prob lem of ho w t o restart the mechan-
ism, a solution for which is provided b y devices f o r making sto r y 
endings recognizable. The fi n a l t ype of problem is that of how t o 
close down a c onversation, and t h i s is p rovided by the device of 
a pre-terminal and then a terminal e xchange, whereby eac h speaker 
y ields the floor and checks that the o ther wants t o finish. 
Each of t he se devices is b o th a solution to a de scriptive 
problem for the analyst and t he r esolution of a n organizatio nal 
p r o blem for conversational partici pants, and each can b e seen as 
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demonstrated and recognized by th:~ dc t: ual responses of partici -
pants. We can now consider briefly some of the actual a na ly3is 
whi c h leads t o the identifica tion and functional e xplanation of 
these devices. 
Looking first at tu r ~ taking, it is rega rded, as Le v inson 
says, a s a fundamental feature o f conve r sation. Sac ks, Scheglof f 
& J efferson claim, in fact, that it is a significant fe ature o f 
s ocial organization in general. They s uggest that t u rn taking, 
is used for the ordering of moves in gam es, f o r allocati nc.J 
political office, f oe regu lating traffic at intersect Ll)I1S, 
for the servic ing of customers at business establishments, 
for talking in interviews, meetings, debates, c eremonies, 
conversations, etc (these last being members of the set of 
•~Jha t we shall refer to as 'speech exchange systems' ). 
(Sacks, Schegloff & J efferson, 1978: 7 ) 
They say that in sociall y o rgani z ed ac tivity t he presen c e of 
'turns' suggests an econom y , with turns for something being 
valued, and with mean s for allocating them affecti~g their r el-
ative distribution. 
Sacks, Schegloff & J effe rson say that in their r esearch on 
natural conversation 'the fact o f turn taking and that it must be 
o rgani zed, was something that the data of conversation made 
increasingly plain' ( 1978: 9). They say that 'a body o f factua l 
material accessible to rather unmotivated i~q uiry ' exposed the 
presence o f turn taking and the major face ts of its o rgani z-
ation. These facts include the facts that, 
one party talks at a time overwhelmingly, though speakers 
change, though the size of turns varies, though the ordering 
of turns change, though the size of t urns var ies, though the 
orde~ ing of turns va ries; that transitions seem finely co-
o rdinated; that there are obv iously techniques for allocat -
ing turns that are used and whose characteri zat i o~ would be 
part of any model that would descr ibe some turn-taki ng 
materials; that there are techniques for the construction of 
utterances r elevant to their turn status that bea r on the 
coordination of tr a nsfer and on the allocation of spe akec-
ship .••• (Sack s, Schegloff & J efferson, 1978:9) 
If facts such as these a re focused on, rather than )dt:" ti c ular 
o utcomes in particular settings, they say that we get an investi-
gat ion of the organization of turn taking per se, and not its 
application and consequenc e s in particular contexts - although, 
they suggest, the more f o rmal understanding of tu rn tak ing illum-
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ina tes mo re particular findin g s. 
This leads to the idea that a characteri zation o f t u rn-
t ak ing organizati o n f o r conversation- could be de vel oped t hat 
would have the important features of being conte x t-free and also 
c a pable o f extraordinary conte x t sens1t1 v ity . This t ype of o r gan-
i za tion would a void the p roblem of having to characterize t he 
's i tuation' o f every con versation which is stud1ed, by offeri ng 
t hat which can be extracted as ordered p henomena from c o n versat-
i o nal materials 'which would not turn out t o require refe r en c e t o 
o ne o r o ther aspe c t o f situatedness, identities, and parti cular-
ities o f content or context' ( 1978: 10). 
Sacks, Scheg loff & J efferson sa y that the existence of s om e 
such t ype of o rganization c an be e xpected because c onversati o n 
c an a ccommodate a wide range of situations. Thus, 'there must be 
some f o rmal apparatus that is itself c ontext-free, that by v irtue 
o f the wa y s in which it is conte x t-free can 1n local instances of 
its operations be sensiti v e to, and exhibit its sensitivity t o , 
vario us of the parameters of s o cial reality in a local conte x t' 
( 19 7 8: 10). Turn-tak ing seems to fill this role. 
They then go o n to present what they call 'a simplest syst-
ematics for the turn-taking organization o f conversation', which 
a ttempts to a c count for facts about conversation such as those 
noted earlier (f o r a fuller list, see 197 8 : 10-11 ) , a nd which can 
ac c ommodate contextual factors without itself requiring reference 
to any particular contex t. 
The turn-taking system is described first in terms of two 
'components'. The turn-constructional component c overs the var-
ious units-types with which a speaker can set out to construct a 
turn. In English these unit-types include sentential, c lausal , 
phrasal, and lexical constructions, and allow a projection of 
what it will take for an instance of that unit-t yp e to be com-
pleted. The projected c ompletion point, known as a 'transfer-
relevance place', constitutes a possible end of a speakers turn-
entitlement, and it is by reference to such transfer-relevance 
places that transfer o f speakership is coordinated. The fact that 
the end of a unit-type can be projected is a crucial fe a ture of 
conversation, as it helps explain the split-second timing and 
c oordinated overlap which occurs in c onversation (see esp. Jeff-
erson, 1973). 
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The turn-allocational component distributes turn-allocat -
ional t echniq ues into those in which next turn is allocated b y 
cu rrent speake r selecting a next speaker, and those in which a 
next t u rn is allocated by self-selection ( Eo r instances of s pea-
ker- and self-selection, see 1978 : n.l4 ) . 
Sacks, Scheg loff & J efferson then present a set of basi c 
rules which govern turn construction, providing for t he allocat-
ion of a next turn to one party and coo r d inating transfer so as 
t o mi n imize gap and overlap. 
For an y turn: 
l. At initial t urn-constructional unit's initial transition-
relevance pl ace: 
(a ) If the turn-so-far is s o construc ted as to involve the 
u se of a 'current s pea ker selects next' technique, t hen 
the party so selected has rights, and is obliged, to ta ke 
next turn to s peak, and no others have suc h rights or 
obligations, transfer occurring at that place. 
(b ) If the turn-so-far is so constructed as not to involve 
the use o f a 'current speaker selects next' technique, 
self-selection for next speakershi p may, but need not, be 
instituted, with first starter acqu i r i~g e i g hts t o a tu rn, 
transfer occurring at that place. 
(c) If the turn-so-far is so constructed as not to involve 
the use of a 'current speaker selects next' technique, 
then current speaker may, but need not, continue, unless 
another self-selects. 
2. If, at initial turn-constructional unit's initial trans-
ition-relevance place, neither 1(a ) nor 1 (b ) has operated, 
and, Eollowing the provision of l (c) , current speaker ha s 
continued, then the Rule-set (a) - (c) reapplies at next tran-
sition-relevance p lace, and recursively at each n e xt trans-
iti on-relevance place, until transfer is effected. ( Sac ks, 
Schegloff & J efferson, 1978 : 13) 
Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson now go on to de mo nstrate how 
this system accounts for (produces or is compatible with) t h e 
facts they claim to find in conversation. I am not interested in 
presenting their whole argument here, but rather in showing the 
style of analysis they use, and thus I wil l j ust summarize a few 
of these demonstrations. 
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Central to the fa c ts they have found are that s peaker c hange 
oc curs, and generally recurs, but is not auto matic, that over-
whe lm ingly one party talks at a time, and that occurrences of 
mo re than one spea ker spea k ing at a ~ime are com mon, b ut b rief. 
Sacks , Schegloff & J efferson claim that the possibi l ity of speak-
er change is built in, recurrently within any single turn's 
cons tructio n, and recurrently for each new turn, bec a use an y 
unit -t ype instance out of which a turn may be cons truc ted wi l l 
reach a transition-relevance place, at which t he fi r st t wo p rlo r-
ity opti ons, l (a ) and l (b ) , involve transfer of t ur n t o a ne xt 
speaker. The fact that speaker change and c hange r e cu rrence a ce 
not automatic is provided foe bec ause at each tra nsiti on-relev-
anc e plac e these first two options may not be e xercised , wh ile 
the third is. 
The fact of one pacty usually talking at a ti me is p rov ided 
f o e because the system a llocates single turns to single speakers, 
which turns include exclu~ive rights, and because a ll t urn tr-ans-
fer is coordinated around transition-relevance places, which are 
themsel ves determined by possible completion points for instances 
of the unit -types. (1978: 15) 
The explanation of the occurrence and brevity of overlap is 
more complex. The first point is that the system localizes over-
lap to transition relevance poin ts, and Sacks, Scheg loff & Jeff -
erson cite as an initial explanation o f the brevity of overlap 
the fact that overlap occurs at transition-relevanc e p laces, 
which are places where speakers can or should exit. But this does 
not explain the actual occurrence of overlap, and the y cite a 
number of systematic bases f o e this occurrence. 
The first is that Rul e l(b), in allocating a turn to that 
self-selector who starts first encourages competition f o e t he 
earlies t possible start. For e xample : 
Mi ke: I know who d' guy is.= 
Vic: He's ba: :d. 
= [ [ 
James: You know the gu:y? 
(Sacks, Schegloff & J efferson, 1978 : 16 ) (== indicate latc h-
e d utterances, with no gap . [[ indicates utterances be ginn-
ing together. :: indicate lengthened syllables. ) 
They note that simultaneous starts such as this testify to the 
independent-for-each-party projectability of possible completion 
poin ts. 
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Another basis o f overlap wh ich the y suggest also relates t o 
the projectability of possib l e completion or transition-relevance 
points. As they p ut it, ' var iatio n h1 t he articulation of the 
proj e cted last par t o f a projectably la st co mponent of a turn's 
talk, wh ich is in fact a conse q uential locus of arti c ula t o ry 
var iation, will expectedly produce overlap bet ween a current t ur n 
and a next'. One of the examples they offer is the f o llowing : 
A: Well if you knew my a rgu ment why did you bo t he r 
to a: s k. 
8 : Be cause I ' d li ke to defend ~ argument. 
Sacks, Schegloff & J efferson add here that the addition t o a turn 
of elements that ca n specifically go after fi r st possible comple-
t ion without intending continuatio n, such a s address o r e tique tte 
terms, will produce similarl y structured overlaps (and that their 
absence will produce similarly structured gaps ) . This is shown by 
the following examples: 
A: Uh you been down here before havenche. 
8 : Ye h. 
A: What's yer name aga in please sir. 
[ 
8: F. T . Galloway . 
A further feature of conversation identi fied by Sacks, Sche-
gloff & J efferson is that there are repair me chanisms f o r de ali ng 
with t urn-taking errors and violations. They point ou t fi r s t that 
ther-e are a number of repair devices directed to troubles in the 
o rgan i zat i on and distribution o f turns of talk. These a re said t o 
include questions such as 'who, me?', the l o ce and pract ices o f 
etiquette conc erning 'interruption' and comp laints about it, the 
use o f i n terru ption markers suc h as 'excuse me', f al se s tarts , 
rep~ats or rec yc les o f parts of a turn overlapped by o thers, and 
stopping before possible completion by par ties to simultaneous 
talk. 
Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson say that a t lea st s o me o f the 
mechanisms for turn-taking repair are intrinsi c to the very 
s ystem whose trou b les they re pa ir. The e xa mple given is the basic 
device f o r repa ir when more than o n e speaker is spea k ing at a 
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t1me, which is to stop a turn before its possible completion 
point. This 1nvolves a transformation of the use of t urn- con-
struct ional units to their next possible completion. They say 
that as well there are plac es in the -rule-set itself whi ch ar e 
desi gn ed for repair. In particular, the cyc::l~ J f options provided 
by Rules l (b) and l(c ) , whereby a current speaker continues after 
the non-occurrence of turn-transfer at a transltion-rele vance 
place, c an be seen as a r epair o f a failure of turn-tr a nsfer. 
They comment at thi.s po int that 'it is a major feature of a 
rational organization for behaviour that accommodates rea l world -
ly in terests, and is not susceptible of e xternal enforc ement, 
that it incorporates resources and procedu res for repair of its 
troubles into its fundamental organization' (1978: 39). 
The third po int which Sacks, Schegloff & Jeffe rson m~ka 
regarding repair is t ha t the turn-taking system constrai ~s c8 -
pairs of other than a turn-taking s ort. For example, they s ay , 
repairs by someone other than the current speaker (call ed 'ot he r 
than curren t speaker') are not done until a turn's completion, 
respecting the turn-taking s ystem's allocation o f rights to a 
turn e ven where repair is found necessary. 
In fact, most repair (e.g., correction of a wo rd ) is done 
within the turn in which the repairable occurs. But when 
repai c spills over the boundaries of a turn, when, Eor 
example, 'other than speaker' in itiates a repair in the turn 
following the one in which the repairable occu rred, then the 
sequence so initiated is organized by the sa me turn-taking 
system, and the repair sequences exhibit the same features 
of turn taking as we have been discussing, ... (Sacks, 
Schegloff & J efferson, 1978 : 39 ) 
Thus, on the one hand the tucn-taking system lends itself to, and 
incorporates devices f o r, repair of its troubles, ~nd on the 
other hand it is itself a basic organ i za tional device Eor the 
repair of any o ther troubles in conversation. ( For more general 
discussions o E r epair, see Jefferson, 19 72 & Schegloff, 1979 . ) 
Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson c haracteri z e this syste m as a 
'local management s ystem', in that, first, all the operations are 
'local', directed to the next turn and ne xt transition on a turn 
by turn basis, and secondly, the determination of turn size is 
also accomplished locally, in the developmental course of each 
turn, under constraints imposed by a nex t turn and an o rientation 
to a next turn in the c urrent one. They also describe it as a 
'party administered' s ystem, be cause turn order and turn size n~e 
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under the control of the parties to a conversation, and furt ha r -
more, the system is 'i'"lteractionally managed'. On the one hand, 
the party-administered, local management of turn ord~c i s ~ffect­
ed through the rule-set, whose orde~ed property prov ides a c ycle 
of options in which any party's contribution to turn order deter -
mlnation is contingent on, and oriented t o , the contributions of 
other parties. On the other hand, turn size does not arise 
through a div ision of labour in which the speaker determines tts 
bou ndaries and o ther parties have the task of recognizing them. 
Rathe r, the cons titutio n ~nd bo~nd~ ri ~s oE t urns involve a dis-
tributlon o f tasks. 
[ A J s p e a k e r c a n t a 1 k i n s u c h a w a y a s to p e r m i t p r- o j e c t i :) 11 
of possible completion to be made from his talk ( from i ts 
star-t ) , and to allow other-s to use its transition places t o 
start talk, to pass up talk, to affect directions of tal k , 
and so on, and . •• their star-ting to tal k , if properl y 
placed, can determine wher-e he ought to stop talk . (Sac ks, 
Schegloff & J efferson, 1978: 42 ) 
The principle which is applied to this, and which is des -
cribed as the most general principle particularizing convers-
ational interaction, is 'reci pient design', which means that 't he 
talk by a party in a conversation is constructed or designed in 
ways which display an or ientation and sensitivity to the partic-
ular other(s) who are the coparticipants' . Sac ks, Schegloff & 
.J1~fferson say that they have f ound that recipient design operates 
~ith regard to word select ion, topic selection, the admissibility 
and ocdecin g of sequences, and the options and obligations for 
s ta rting and ter-minating conversations, amongst other features. 
(19 78:40-2) 
It is wor th mentioning here some consequences which Sac ks, 
Schegloff & Jefferson see as followi ng fr om this mode l. The first 
point is that 'in its turn-allocational techniques , the turn-
taking system for conversati on builds in an intrinsic mot ivation 
for listening to all utterances in a convecsation, independent of 
other possible motivations, such as interest and pol iteness' 
(1978: 43 ) . This is bec ause any willing or potentially desiring 
next speaker will have t o listen for speaker-selection (and then 
for a transition place) or for a transition-relevance place at 
which to self-select. 
Second, Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson say that turn-taking 
o rganization controls, at least partially, the understanding 
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utterances get, and this is said to follow from the previous 
po int. 
A participant potentially willing to speak, if se l ected t o 
j o s o , will need t :) U st8n t::> .::l-ny u tterance to f1nd if, wit h 
it, he is being selected to s peak next. A major cla ss of 
' c urrent selects next' techniques be ing consti t ute d by 
'ficst pair pacts', that is, by type-charac te clz .ed utter-
ances such as 'greeti ng ', 'question', 'ins u lt' , and ' c:o ;n-
plaint', a willing speaker will need t o a nal yz~ ~ ttecances 
t o find if an instance of such an ut terance-type is being 
em p loyed, and is being employed in a way that possibly 
selects him a s next speaker. And a po tentiall y int-ending 
speaker will need to examine any uttecance after wh ic h he 
might want to spea k to find whether such a thing was bei ng 
done to h im or t o some o ther party. (Sacks, Sc hegloff & 
J efferson, 1978: 44 ) 
Finall y , the t ur. n-tak ing system is said to have, as a by -
product of its design, a proof procedure f o r the anal ysis of 
turns. The same point has been noted earlier with reference to 
Le v inson. When a speaker addresses a first pair-pact, s uch as a 
'questio n' or a 'complaint' to anothec, thus selecting the other 
as next s peaker to f ulfill the second p~ct oE a n adjacency pair , 
that is, 'to do an "answer", or an "apology " (among o th~ c possib-
ilities), respectively', the addressee, by 'doing ' the second 
pact, 'thereby displays (in the first place to h is copactici-
pants) his understanding of the prior turn's ta lk as a ficst 
part, as a "q uestion" o c "complaint"' (1978: 44 ) . 
In the same spirit as Levinson, Sacks, Schegloff & J efferson 
claim that this offers a central methodolog ical resour ce f o e the 
investigatio n of conversation 'by contrast with the inves tigatL ::>n 
of literary a nd other "text" materials'. They say that this 
resoucce is p r ovided by conversation's 'thoroughly interactional 
charac tec', whereby the turn-t ak ing o rganization obl i ges its 
participants t o display t o each othec their understanding of 
other turns, so that 'a turn's talk will be heard as directed t o 
a prior turn's talk, unless special techniques are used to locate 
some other talk to which it is directed'. One conseq uence of this 
is that it operates as an im portant basis for conversation's 
local self-correction mechanism, and also for the 'last as ne x t' 
turn-order bias (see 1978: 18-9 & 22-3). This is because the 
prior speakec will be mot i vated to self-select if t he understand-
ing o f the prior utterance which the current speaker displays is 
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unnacc e ptable. 
But again, these understandi ng s a~a ava ilab l e a lso t o p ro-
fes s i onal a nalysts, and afford the a~alysts a p ~ooE cci te~ i on and 
a search pr ocedure for the analysis of what a turn 's talk is 
occupi ed with. 
Since it is t he parti e s ' unders tanding s o f prio~ turn's tal k 
that is rele v?.nt to the ir constructi on o f ne xt turns, it 1s 
their underst andi ngs that are wanted for anal ysis. The dis-
p lay of those unde~st andin g s in the talk in subsequent t u~~s 
affords a r eso urce E o ~ the anal ysis of p rio r t urns, and a 
proof p roc edu ~e for professional analyses of prior turns, 
resourc es intrinsic to the data themsel ves. (Sacks, Sc he g-
loff & J efferson, 1978 : 45 ) 
One final point whi ch I want t o draw fr om t h is paper is t hat 
Sacks, Sche glof f & J efferson suggest that con ve~sation s hou ld be 
con s idered as the basic form o E s peech-e xchange s ystem, with 
ot he r s ystems, such a s debates, cerem onies, meet1ngs, and s o o~, 
r ep ~esenting a var iety of transformatio ns on conversation 's t u rn-
t a king system t o achieve othe r types of t ucn t akin g system. 
( 19 7 8 : 4 5-7) 
We can now b riefl y turn to an analysis of conversatio n 
closings. With this work t he functional explanat i on o f conversa t -
ional f_ea tu res is made more expl ic it, f or the tas k i s set up as 
outlining the solutions conversationalists adop t for addressing 
the problem of closing conversations. The problem e xi sts in the 
first place b ecau se the fundamental me chanism for turn taking 
generates an indefinitely e xt endable string o f t ur ,s to talk. For 
some household or office conve~sations, for e xample, where con-
versational ists a~e in a state o f '1 nci p Lent tal k ', th is is not a 
p r ob lem. But a telephone conversation, for e xample, needs to be 
ended at some po int , and within the mechanism j u s t presented, 
fundamental as it is to conversation , this see ms L n ~ossible. 
Just stopping talking will not work, f o r any transition-
rel e vance p l ac e, a s this would be, leads to another's turn, an 
~xt ension of t he pre sen t turn, or silenc e - ?.nd silence wi ll be 
interpreted as part o f the conversati on (as piq ue, or whate ver ) , 
a s a v i o latio n in need o f repair. The tw o c entral e l e ments o f t he 
turn tak ing system and, indeed, two basic featu res o f convers-
ation, are that a t l east, and no mo~e than, one pa rty speaks at a 
time in a single conversation, and that s peaker change recu r s. 
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Silenc e in a convecsation contcadicts both these. Schegloff & 
Sac~ 3 ( 1973: 294 - 5) thus pcese:1t the p r oble m conce rni nl] <.: l . o,..; i.r1•J3 
a s being: ' ho~ t o ocg~1 i z e the simultaneous arri val of the coco,-
ve r sationalists at a poir1t where one- s peakec's completion wil l 
not occa sion another speaker's talk, and that will no t be he a r d 
as s om e speaker's silence'. 
Sche gloff & Sacks say t hat a p roximate s olution invol ves the 
use of a 'terminal exchange' co•nL)OSed o f c onvent ion a 1 parts, s uch 
a s a n exchange o f ' good- byes'. Utterances such a s these f orm a 
type o f 'adjac ency pair ', which is defined in part a s a sequence 
hav ing two utteranc e length, adjac ent positioning of co•n[)Oil~ ' tr_ 
u t t erances, and different speakecs producing eac h ut ta c~ ~ce . 
Ad j acency pairs a lso have a celatedness between tha uttecances, 
such that they are cecogni z ed a s a pa i r , as with 'question -
a ns wer', ' greeting-greeti ng ' and ' of fer-accep t-:!nce ,l c~ fu sa l'. 
Sc hegloff & Sacks say that the recognizabilit y o f the ficst pact 
o f a pair is handled in a number o f ~~y s, including con stru c ti on -
ally , a s when syntax is used to recogni ze that a question is 
being p roduced, or through t he u se of conventional c om ponent s , ~s 
~hen ' hello' or 'hi' is •.JS8d tt) i.:1di cate partially that a g reB ::. -
i ng is be ing produced. (See Scheg lof f & Sacks 19 73 : 29 5 - 6 ) 
A basic r ule of adjacenc y pair operat i on is tha t g i ve~ the 
recognizable production of a ficst pair pa ct, on its ficst poss-
ible complet ion its speaker should stop and ~ n8xt speaker should 
start and produc e a second pa ir part fr om t he paic typ e of whic h 
the ficst is recogn i zably a member . A conse quence of this is t hat 
by an adjacently positioned second a speaker can show understand-
in g o f what a pr ior is aimed at, and willingness to g o along with 
it - and this understanding (or lack o f understanding ) is indic-
a ted to the first speaker. Schegloff & Sacks say that the s ystem-
atic p~oblem o f where transition celevance is to be lifted ca:1 be 
therefore helped by an adjacency pair be cau se, 
by p cov iding that transition relevance is to be lifted af t e r 
the second pair pact's occurrence , the occurrence o f the 
sec ond pa i r p-:1c t c an then reveal an appreciation o f, a nd 
agreement to, the intention of closing NOW which a first 
part of a terminal e xchange reveals its s peaker to propose. 
(Sack s & Schegloff, 1972: 298) 
They also say that this so lr~ t i o r1 has be come institutionalized, so 
that saying 'good- bye ' and not leaving a sl o t for a reply is a 
meaningful s o ct of activity, indicating anger perhaps, and is 
available as an alternative to leaving a slot f or the reply. 
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-However, the component parts o f terminal e xchanges, ' ol< ', 
'see yo u', 'than k yo u', a nd s o o n, c.:tn b e used i n o ther wa y s as 
wel l , s o the mere fact of their use doe s not marl< them as uneq ui-
vocal p~ ct s o f terminal e xc hanges, nor does i t alone indicate an 
e xch ange's status as a terminal e xchange. This statu s is also 
gi ven by the placement of the exchange. Schegloff & Sac ks say 
that they have f ound th-:tt pl .·" ~ e.nent considerations a re gen8ci. 1. 
Eor utterances, and t hat in fact, for e xa :np l.a, 'there do no t S·= ·~ ··1 
to be c riteria o ther than plac ement ( i.e., seque'r'lt i-:tl) :) r 1 :~,:; 
[s pe c ifically , placement after a question] that will s u ffic ien tlt 
disc rimina te t he status of a n utterance as a statement, asse r -
tion , declarative, proposition, etc., Er o m its status as an 
a nswer' ( 197 3: 299 ) . 
The pla c ement of the first part of a terminal exchange is 
no t made by reference to some 'local ' organization, say , to a 
p ri o c uttec.:ttlce, as is the ca se with the second part o f tlt~ 
t erminal pair. Rather, its placement is o r gani zed by referenc e t o 
a p ropecly initiated closing s e c tion, and this r~i s8 s t h,~ s :1b ject 
of the o r-ganizati on of topic tal k. Schegloff & Sacks refer t o 
what get talked about in a c onversatio n as 'mentionables', and 
say that the ordering and distribution of tal l< about mention abl~s 
is one consideration for conversationalists. In some convers-
at ions, for e xample, some mentionables ought not or need not be 
plac ed i n ! 1-.i.cst topi c ' position ( the Eicst t op ic bei ng the 
participant-analyzable 'reason for the conversation' ). {1973: 
300-2) 
However, there is no guacantee that a g i vet1 mentionable will 
'come up naturally' in a conversation, and it seems an important 
consideration that a closing structure should involve the p r ov -
ision for p lacement o f hitherto unmention ed mentionables. The 
first way o f initiating a c l osing section which will do this is 
o ne k ind of 'pre-cl osing', as in 'We-ell. .. ', 'Q. K ..•. ' o r 'So-
oo' {having downward into na tio n C()t1tours) when c onstitu t ing the 
entire utter.:tnc e. Such utterances occupy the flo o r Eor a speak-
er's turn without using it t o produce either a topi cally coheren t 
ut terance or the initiatio n of a new topi c , thus ' pa ssing' and 
giving a 'free' turn to a next speaker, who can then introduce a 
new topic {e.g., a hitherto unmentioned mentionable) without 
violating t opica l coherenc e. Alternatively, the next speaker can 
decline this opportunity, and reply with another 'pass', thereby 
setting up the r elevance of a closing section. 
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Such p re- c l osing ut te r~nces, can, however, be used in othe r 
::'iLHc i.ti es in conversati on, so t he occasio n of t heir u se needs to 
b a -~or1 sideced a s marking then :i S pee--c l osings, and Scheglo Ef & 
Sacks say that one wa y of d iscri~ inating their ope ration a s pre-
closings is their placement at the analyzable (agai n , to L)d ~ti.ct ­
pants ) en d of a top i c . Wh ile s om e t op i c s do not have an end, but 
rat her are 's haded ' in to a new t opic, conve r s atio nalists have a 
numb~ c of t e c hni ques for establishi ng a top ic boundary. Some 
t opic s, for e xample, can be ' c los~d dow n' (a t a t opically a pp r op-
riat e place ) , by a seque nce s uc h as ' Okay? '-' Alr i ght '. Anot he r 
way of bou nding a top i c is the utter--=tn :~ 8 o f a proverbial or 
aphoristi c l:onnu lation of conven tional wisdo m which can b .a he ard 
as th e 'mora l ' or 'lesso n' of the i: :)t) .it; ( .a.g . ' Yea h well, t hing s 
alwa ys work out f o r t he best' ). ( 1973 : 305- 8) 
If t he t op i c i .. -5 S •t:; ·'='s ~>E:Jl l y bounded, a c l osi ng section may 
consist of a se q uen c e such as, 
A: O.K . 
B: O. K. 
A: Bye Bye 
B: Bye 
Howe ver, closing sections c an include components s uch a s ' mak ing 
arrangements', reinvocati on o f material from earlier i n the con-
versation, and components g i v ing a 'signature' to the t ype of 
conversation , s uc h a s 'Thank you '. Thu s there can be closing 
sections s uch a s the f ol l owing: 
B: We l l that's why I said 'I'm n ot gonna sa y any t h ing, I' m 
not mak ing 
c: Hmh 
c: Ehyeah 
B: Yeah 
C : Ye ah 
B: Al righty . 
come down. 
C : O. K. 
B: Alrig hty 
c: O.K . 
B: We' 11 see 
C : O. K. 
B: ~ bye 
c: Bye 
any ~ments// abou t a nybody ' 
Well I'll give you a call before we d e ci d e to 
O. K. ? 
you t hen 
(Schegloff & Sacks , 1973: 318) (// indicates the point at 
which the f ol lowing line interrupts. ) 
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Sche g loff & Sac ks sa y tha t t he t wo c r u c i al c ompone n t s in a 
c losing sec t ion ( f o r ach ie vi ng prop~ c c los i n g ) ar e the t erm i nal 
e xch a nge wh i c h achie ves t he co l labor~ti ve t ermi na t i o n o f the 
transi t i ::> •l -::- •11--:! , 1 ·1 :'1 i ·. h~ p cop •~ r i nit i at i on o f t he c l osi r'lg sec tion 
wh i c h warran ts t he und e rtak i ng of the rou tine who se termina t i o n 
in the te r minal e xcha nge p r oper l y c l o ses t he c onversati o n. Also, 
at a ny po i n t be t wee n the p r oper i n i t i a tio n o f a clos in g a nd the 
t erminal e xchange (a nd al s o i n t he mo~ ents f o ll o wi ng t he e xch-
ange ) the ce ~re p r oc edures f o r r e opening the conversatio n t o 
top i c tal k ( 1973 : 318 ) . A f u r ther po i n t wor th me n tioni ng is t hat 
i n a n ot e Sch e g l o f f & S a ck s s ay t ha t th ~ y do not me an t o d e ny t he 
pos sibl~ C (~le vance of n on- verb~l b~ hnv i ouc t o conversa tiona l 
closing - they s~y that the y have not stud ied these phe n om e na . 
The y add, ho weve r , t ha t the ' p ure l y verbal' techni ques t he y ha ve 
de sc r i bed do wo r k fo r t e l e pho11e c onversations. 
SECTION 2c. 
The con trast between t his t ype of a pp r o ach a nd that o f 
discourse a nal ysis can be seen in pa rt by no ting Le v inson' s 
compa riso n of a sect i o n of Lab ov & Fans hel' s a nal ys i s wi t h h i s 
o wn c onversat i o n an a l ys i s -s t y l e a n a l ysi s o f the same mate ria l . 
The pa r ti c ular e xam p le has b e ~<~ dt ~ · · t:3 S:~ d i n de ta i l in t he pre -
v i ous c hap t ec , a nd is rep r oduc e d here using c onve r sation a nal ys is 
transc ri pt i o n c onventions ( the f i gu ces in b r ac ke t s i nd i c ate 
pauses in seconds) . 
R : Ido n ' t ( 1. 0) 
e i ght t hing , 
tc ied t o uhm 
~ 1 o w , whet he r ( 1. 5 ) 1 - I thin k I did - t he 
j istalittle s itua t ion c a me up ( 4. 5 ) a n' I 
(3 . 0 ) wi l l, t r y to ( 4.0) u se what I - what 
I' ve l e a rned here, see if it wo r ke d 
( 3 . 0 ) 
T: Mhm 
R : No w, I don' t kn o w i f I d i d the c i •] h t t hi ng . Su nda y ( 1. 0) 
urn- my mo t her we nt t o my s iste r 's aga in ... (( story 
con t inues )) 
Le vi nson de sc ribes Labov & Fa nshel ' s a nalysi s a s f ol l ows ; 
I n s e ven t een pages o f pa in s t a kin g a nalysis .•• La bov "< 
Fa nshel .•. a n a l y ze t he patient' s ... F. ir- st t urn he r e as 
co'ltdt n i.n g vac i ous speech act s i nc l ud i ·1:J 'J:t8s t ions , a sse r -
t ions a nd c h all e nge ~ . 'T\) rV~ h i ~~,, ~ -i<l und e r s tanding ln SUC h 
dept h the y l oo k f o rwa r d in t he i n t,~ c ..:~c t i on t o see what t he 
ri ght thing and j istal it tle situa ti on refer t o ; t he y t he n 
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pack back into the gloss or 'expansion' of the first turn 
these details gleaned from later on. De~pite the obv i ou s 
d iscrepancy between the informatio n thus available t o part-
i c ipants (who cann o t l ook ahead_ in a transcript ) and anal-
y sts ( who can), the authors feel this procedure is justified 
by the analysts' relative lac k of the knowledge available to 
participants about each other •.•• They furt he r argue that 
the va riou s features here, including the glottalizations and 
hesitancy, and crucially the ' vague referenc es' in thing and 
situation, can b e attributed to aspects o f 'in t e rv iew 
sty le'. (Levinson, 1983: 352) 
Levinson's anal ysis treats R's first turn as a pre-announce-
ment, whi c h is formulated to prefigure (a) the telling of some-
thing she did ('I think I did the right thin g ' ) , and ( b) the 
describing of the situation that led to the action ( ' j istalittle 
situation came up'). This serves to warn the hearer to expect a 
story with two such components. The first turn also prefigures 
the point of the story and its relevance to the here and now 
('use what I've learned here, see if it worked'). Levinson claims 
that the alleged vagueness of 'the right thing' and 'jistalittle 
situation' 'is i n fact the provision of just those variables 
t yp ical of position 1 turns in pre-announcement sequences' ( 1983: 
35 3) . 
A p osition l pre-announcement is the first par-t of a pre-
sequence to an announcement, and generally operates as a check on 
the newsworthiness of some information, announcement, story, 
etc., and also as a bid for an extended turn which suspends the 
turn taking machinery (see Le v inson, 1983: 349ff ) . In the pre-
announcement the speaker tries to prefigure the syntactic frame 
of the announcement (as 'news', a 'jo ke', a 'stor-y', e.g. ), the 
dating of reportable events, and the evaluation, so that the 
hearer has an idea what to expect and an idea whether it is 
newsworthy (as is found in, e.g., 'The two best things that 
happened to me today .•• '). Levinson says that this analysis of 
the first turn is reinforced by the fact that the therapist waits 
for each prefigured segment of the story, and receives each 
segment with forms such as 'Oh', or ' Yes, I think you did [the 
right thing]', thus acknowledging the news but abstaining from 
substantial turns throughout the story. 
Levinson claims that the original analysis 'proceeding in an 
act-by-act fashion, is not attuned to the larger sequential 
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struc tures that organize conversation; nor are such structures 
easily recognizable without a lot of comparative materia l' (1983 : 
353 ). Whereas Lev inson has used this example in order to demon-
strate the analysis of pre-sequences_ offered by conversation 
analysis, he notes that conversation analysis can also deal with 
other features of this first turn. For example, he says that the 
hesitation and glottal stops originally attributed to 'style' are 
also 'the typical markings o f self-initiated self-repa ir , which 
is characteristic of the production of first topics ' (1 983: 353 
n.2 5). 
One consequence of this type of approach is that the issue 
o f indirect speech acts does not arise for conversation anal ys1s. 
So- called indirect speech a c ts are redefined by conversation 
analysis as 'position 1 turns - pre-requests - formulated s o as 
to ex pect position 4 responses'. A pre-request sequence has four 
positions: pre-r equest (e.g., 'Do you have size C batteries?' ), 
go ahead (e. g ., ' Yes sir' ) , request (e.g., 'I'll ha ve four, 
please' ) , and response (e.g., turns to get the batteries ) ( 1983: 
357) . Of course, the go ahead here may have been a denial, and 
the r esponse could be a refusal. Also, the go ahead could inc lude 
and offer, which makes the request unnecessary, and the seco nd 
turn can be occupied by a response, as in the f ollow ing e xample: 
S: Canihave two pints of Abbot and a grapefruitand 
whisky? ((POSITION 1 )) 
H: Sure ( (turns to get)) ((POSITION 4 )) 
((later)) There you are ... 
In cases such as this, the full specification of what is wanted 
in position 1 allows a position 4 at the next turn. (See Levinson, 
1983: 160ff) 
Levinson says that questions about whether such position 1 
turns 'have "literal" or "indirect" (o r both) forces or meanings 
s imp 1 y do not , on t hi s v i e w , a r i se ' . 
Such position 1 turns mean whate ver they mean; t hat they can 
be formulated so as to project certain conversational traj-
ectories is something properly explored in the sequential 
analysis of successive turns. (Levinson, 1983: 363 ) 
In this section I have summarized only the central features 
of ·conversation anal ysis, but even from these feat ures it seems 
that this approach offers at least a plausible alternative to t he 
views discussed in earlier chapters. 
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A central feature of the relevance of the view examined here 
is summarized in Levinson's claim that conve~sation analysis has 
made important contributions to the understanding of utterance 
meaning, 'by showing how a large proQortion of the situated 
significance of utterances can be traced to their surro unding 
sequential environments' (1983: 364 ) . The boundaries of this 
'large proportion' are never made clear, and we are never really 
given the outlines of how a non-speech act approach mi g ht deal 
with those aspects of situated significance falling outside this 
proportion (see 1983: 372); nevertheless, the point to emphasi ze 
is that for Levinson conversation anal ysis need make no use of 
the techniques and theoretical construc ts of speech act theory . 
As may have been clear in the preceding discussion, the 
rules invoked by conversation analysis do not operate like con-
stitutive syntactic rules. Levinson says that they are as much 
r egulative as constitutive, and that they describe unmarked ex-
pectations rather than the set of possible well-formed sequences. 
He compar-es them, as has been noted to Grice's maxims rather than 
to linguistic rules. (1983: 367) 
In characterizing conversation analysis, Levinson draws 
parallels between it and the (Anglo-American) structuralist lin-
guistics found before the 1960s. He says that both kinds of 
approach are concerned with cor-pora of recorded materials, and 
that both have as a central methodological tool the investigation 
of how sequential or syntagmatic considerations restrict the 
class of items that may be expected to follow, and of how items 
in that class contrast with one another, or stand in paradigmatic 
relations. He also acknowledges that conversation analysis may 
share some of the limitations of structuralist linguistics. 
Just as structuralist analyses of linguistic structure have 
been shown to be theoretically inadequate as models of human 
competence, so in the long run CA analyses may perhaps be 
found deficient as rather simple reconstructions of the no 
doubt immensely complicated cognitive processes involved in 
conducting conversations. (Levinson, 1983: 367 ) 
However, he says that as yet no other kind of investigation of 
conversational organization has yielded such a rich harvest of 
insights. 
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SECTION 3: PROBLEMS WITH CONVERSATION ANALYSIS. 
Conve~sation anal ysis seems t o be g~ounded in t h~ee basi c , 
a nd linked, methodo l ogi c al claims. l he first and most impo~tant 
of these is that anal ysis must be based on a ~igorou sl y em p iric a l 
trea t ment o f data; t he second is the fore grounding o f ~eflex i v it y 
in conversat io n as a n an a l ytic resou rce; and thi~dly , we fi nd t he 
not i o n o f con versational moti vatio n. 
The em p iricist side o f c onversatio n analysis is p u t f o ~ward 
b y its exponents ex plic itly , and a s constituting a major v irtue. 
Sc henkein, f o r example, say s that conversatio n anal yses a~e 
'rooted in the close scrutiny of na t urally occurring inte~act ­
ion' . He says that they are moti vated b y 'taking seriously t he 
details of t he natural interactio ns themsel ves', without try ing 
to satisfy o r f ine-tune any theory o f 'mankind, society or comm-
unication', without any ' mo~als, personalities or politic s' in 
mind, and without try ing to manipulate the natural inte~actions 
'into scores on some test instrument, codes in some rating 
scheme, figures in some measurement plan, v otes in s o me judgement 
exercise, catego~ies in some so~ting task, or positions in s o me 
scaling devic e' ( Sc henkein, 1978: 1- 2) . Schenkein says that c on-
ve~sation anal ysts, by studying ~ecordings and transc~ipts end-
lessly, 'come to see detai l s of c onve~sational organiz atio n 
hidden by ~eal time and ordinary sensibilities' (19 78: 3), and he 
characte~izes studies within this tradition as being c ommitted to 
'building nonintuitive desc~iptions of the organi zation o f con-
versational interaction as the technical accomplishment of member 
c onversationalists' ( 1978: 5). Schenkein suppo~ts his general-
izations with quotations expressing li ke sentiments from each of 
the studies in his collection, the autho~s of which constitute 
the major writers in this area ( 1978: 3-5), and we find similar 
claims in Levinson's suppo~t of conversation anal ysis. 
Levinson presents conversatio n analysis as 'a rigo~ously 
empirical approach which a voids prematu~e theo~y construction'. 
He says that its methods are essentially inductive, and that 
'search is made for ~ecurring patterns across many ~ecords of 
naturally occurring conversatio ns'. There is, Levinson says, as 
little appeal as possible to intuitive judgements - 'they may , 
willy-nilly, guide research, but they are not explanations and 
they certainly do not circumscribe the data'. (Levinson, 1983: 
286-7) 
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The motivation for such a response is perhaps understand-
able. The difficulties in speech act theory ~nd discourse analy-
sis, those surrounding the imposition of categories onto comm-
unication, the use of constructed d~a, the analysis of context-
ual informatio n, the interpretation of intentionality, and the 
role of intuitions of correctness or cohe rence, all raise grave 
doubts regarding the viability of this approach. And conversation 
analysis attempts to overcome just these problems, whether, as 
originally conce i ved, in sociology, or, as it has been taken up , 
in discourse analysis , by adopting a radically modified relation 
to interaction itself. 
However, the first question which needs to be asked is 
whether the rather Baconian ideals which inform this response can 
offer any sort of a foundation. This response is one which sees 
that speech act categories are ultimately unworkable, and so vows 
to use no such categories in its analysis. It sees that data has 
often been restricted, and constructed so as to demonstrate pre-
formulated theories, and so vows to work with what really occurs 
in co nver sation, making inductions from large amounts of data -
and so on. But nowhere in this response is there any attempt to 
come to terms with the epistemological issues surroundin g the 
problems which were originally perceived. 
This approach assumes that by looking carefully at large 
amounts of 'actual' data the analyst will be able to make induct-
ions as to the 'real' patterns of conversation, and two ma j or 
problems immediately arise. The first problem is that the idea of 
a true relation between the analyst and a given conversation is 
extremely nebulous. In the previous chapter I n oted Labov & 
Fanshel's comment that their transcript of a conversation had to 
be modified through repeated listening, a nd that this process 
seemed unending as new translations were made of what was heard, 
and , as we might expect, similar problems arise for conversation 
analysis ( see, e. g ., Jefferson, 1978: n.24). It would be extra-
ordi nary, in fact, to claim that a completely accurate repro-
duction of what 'actually ' occurred was possible, part l y just 
because conversations have those features which speech act theor-
ists tend to ignore in their own examples of conversation, and 
so, quite reasonably, any reproduction of a conversation will 
involve ackn owledgement, emphasis a nd translation of elements and 
features of the conversation according to interpretative expect-
ations and interests imposed by the translator. 
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Certainly , s o me reproductions will be considered to be out-
rage ous trans lat i ons , and others will be considered to b e ade-
qua te, o r 'clo se enough' - and this is par tly a ques tion of the 
sociology of r esear ch p rog r am s. But ~he sor t of met hodol ogical 
pr inci p le set up by conversation analysis requires a relatio n 
between anal y st and object which is im possib ly pure. I t has to b e 
a relation which br ing s about a q ualitati ve break between d educ-
ti ve the o rizing and inductive analysis, and it is ext r emel y 
doubtful that such a relation could e xi st. 
Supposing, ho wever, tha t a true reproduction o f a conversa t -
ion could be g i ven, which involved no interpretation a nd a llowe d 
n o r o om for distortion by theoretical e xpectations and interests, 
we would still ha ve a prob lem. For if we were a ble t o achieve 
this, and come, t o use Schenkein's phrase, 't o see details of 
con versational o r ga ni z ation hidden by real time and ordinary 
sensibilities', we would then seem t o b e dealing wi th s ome thing 
qui t e a long way fr o m the original conversation. Real time and 
ordinary sensi b ilities are major factors in a con versation, and a 
methodology which wants as a basic principle to impose n o interp -
ret at i ons o n its obje ct, but r ather make inductio ns from the 
practical reasoning o f con versatio nalists, shou ld surel y avoid 
allowing its practitioners t o see a s pe c ts o f con versati o n denied 
to c onversationalists, be cau se it should o nl y see what t he y see. 
In many ways analysis could b e defined by j ust s uch a di stancing 
fr om its object, but one of the defining characteristics of 
conversation analysis is that it is o nl y interested in the the or-
i z ing or practical reasoning o f the participants in a conversat-
i o n. So j ust by looking a t its ob j e ct it undermines its princip -
les. 
One could say that a con ve r satio n analyst (o r r eally an 
ethnomethodol og ist in this ca se ) should instead study this c ase 
of p ractical r easo ning displayed by the anal yst, bu t to do that 
would be to start chasing our t a ils in very small c ircles. Such a 
regress is alm ost sug gested by Garf inkel ( 1972 : 306) as a way of 
making investigators aware of impositions they might make. But it 
sees clear that su ch a suggestion either assumes that it is 
somehow possible to halt the purification of investi gat i on at 
some point, o r would lead to a n unending regress. 
Shapiro makes a similar criticism, when he says that Gar-
finkel's approach t o meaning 'fails to address the standpoint of 
the observer and the problems of interpretatio n a ttaching there-
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to• (Shapiro, 1981: 104). Shapiro sug gests that Garfinkel's emph-
asis on the pr ocess whereby actors produce aod manag e settings of 
o rganized, everyday affairs, and in wh ich the actors• ma nagement 
is identical with their procedures for making those setting s 
accountable, •neglects an e xternal standpoint from which one 
c ould c haracterize what is happening with t hi s or that aspect of 
human conduct •. 
Ethnome thodology ends up providing an elucidation of var ious 
islands of conduct that have meaning with respect to var -
ious individual, process-oriented r ationalities. But Gar-
finkel 's no rm of ethnomethodological indifference ex pl i c itly 
rejects a standpoint on collective ratio nality that we a s 
o bservers can use to create implic it ly an archipe lago of the 
individual islands and to impute sign ificance not o nl y to 
episodes of purpose behaviour, that is , situations in which 
actors regard themselves as involved in decisions, but al s o , 
a nd more importantly , to e pi sodes o f n on choice in which 
persons are continuousl y invo l ved by v irture of t hei r affil-
iation with the symbolizing s y stem th a t constitutes their 
world of objects and situatio ns. (S hapiro , 1981: 104) 
The broader points which Shapiro makes here regarding the imput-
ation of rationality and significance will be taken up below and 
in the conclusion but for the moment it is worth noting his 
further comment that, 
Al thou gh Garfinkel's insights hel p us to unde r stand human 
decision making and emancipate us from a misleading and 
restrictive construal of rationality, t he y nevertheless fail 
to provide us with a self-understanding o f what we, as 
investigators, contribute t o what we understand. (Shapiro, 
1981 : 105) 
The more general issue behind these problems is the wider 
epis t emological question of the necessity o f structuring exper-
ience in o rder for it to be sensible- the ways in which seein g 
is seeing-as. However, rather than going into such a discussion 
we can consider the im plication of the ways conversation anal ysis 
e xplicitly structures its e xperience, at the level of its repres-
entation of data. 
The descriptions of the utterances constituting the dctt~ oE 
conversation analysis require, as will have been noted, the 
designation of those utterances as questions, replies, r e quests, 
invitations, greetings, and so on, and this involves the categor-
ization of data. This much is acknowledged by Levinson, when he 
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says that the use of categories su ch as these may appear to 
embody an implicit theory of speech acts ( Lev inson , 1983: 368 ) , 
but he denie s that this const it utes a problem for conve rsation 
anal ysis, or that it means that conv~rsation analysis need yield 
any quar ter to speech act theory. 
His argum e nt has two parts. First, he says that such categ-
ory terms are not the inventions of speech act theory, but rather 
part of a rich natural language metalanguage, and he says that, 
It does not follow from the existence of such terms either 
that there is a close connection between 'folk ' metalanguage 
and the ca tegories actually utilized in speech production, 
or that such categories are properly e xp licated by p rov iding 
sets of necessary and sufficient conditions for speech act 
cate gory membership. (Levinson, 19 83 : 368 ) 
I have no argument with thi s. It partly expresses a position I 
have adopted against speech act ca tegories. But such a position 
hardly explains why the use o f such categories does not in vol ve 
the imposition of intuitive cate gorizat i o ns o n conversat i o n. What 
it does express is that the u se of such categories (e xplicated as 
in speech act theory or not) is highly problematic . 
Often when suc h ca tegories are used in con ve rsation analysi s 
they are given 'scare quo tes', and this is presumably an indic -
ation of what Levinson goes on t o say. He says that, if pressed, 
conversation analysts would claim that the intuitive use of 
c ategories like 'request' should b e backed up by at least a full 
seq uential expli cat ion in terms of the range of expectable res-
ponses (like refusals, deferrals or compliances) and an account 
of the way that requests (or whatever) are typically formulated 
in order to obtain the desired responses (as in the treatment of 
indirect requests ). (1983: 368) 
This, however, is a puzzling statement, for what Levinson is 
sug gesting here is j ust what we saw Labov & Fanshel do with their 
categories - and their categories are speech act categories. So 
it seems that Levinson's argument on the o ne hand e xpres ses the 
p roblema tic nature of categorizations such as those used by · 
conversation analysis, and on the other hand sug gests that they 
be treated in the very way discourse analysts treat their speech 
acts. Whatever the ca se here, conversation analysis is left with 
a major methodol og ical conflict. For without such categorizations 
its analyses cannot get off the g round (that is, no sense can be 
made of its data), and with such categoriza tions it is left with 
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some of the major problems in speech act theory (ones which 
Le vi nson at least thinks cripple speech act ~heory), and is left 
with a contradict ion of its basic .n~t hodolog i c al c lai ms r egarding 
its relation to its data. 
Levinson is here rejecting the idea that conversation anal y -
sis should deal with inter-turn relationships, and leave speech 
act theory to deal with the internal characterizatio n of the 
function of turns - the idea being suggested by the s upposed 
implicit use of speech act ca tegories. In this case, a possible 
response might b e that e v en if the first part of t h e argum ent 
fails it does not really harm a large part of conversation anal y -
sis, and that a synthesis of the two approache s LS possib l e. In 
Section 4 of this chapter this possibility will be discussed in 
more detail; however, the second part of Le v inson's argument 
claims that con versation analysis c annot be relegated t o this 
pa rtial role. 
He says that in the analysis of the taking-up of turns t o 
speak (see 1983: 136-7 ) and of pre-sequences ( including 'indirect 
speech acts' ) , con versation analysis shows itself to be 'specif-
icall y interested in the relationship between intra-turn struct-
ure and inter-turn orga nization or seq uence (1983 : 368 ). That is, 
at least fr o m within conversation analysis, intra-turn and inter-
turn features are interrelated and integral to the approach. 
' Whatever this does for Levinson's argument, it seems clear that 
with regard to the problem I have been addressing, such categor-
izations, which I have argued have the same role as speech act 
categories, and the use of which I have argued contradicts the 
methodological foundations o f conversation anal ysis, are integral 
t o conversation analysis. 
A p o s s i b 1 e r e s p on se a t t h i s p o in t i s t h a t a 11 or m o s t of t he 
problems indicated above are solv ed by the sophistication given 
to conversation analysis' empiricism by the second methodolog ical 
claim noted above - namely that reflexiv ity in conversation is a 
basic analytic resource. This phenomenological ~spect of conver-
sation analysis means that it is the perceptions and reasoning of 
the participants in a conversation which count, whatever the 
'reality' of the conversation. Thus structural and functional 
categories are not imposed on a conversation by external anal y -
sis: rather, the conversation itself, as an ongoing process of 
practical reasoning, naturally involves the negotiation and anal-
ysis of the categories involved. All conversation analysis is 
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doing, the~efo~e, is describing ~egularities and pa tte r ns in this 
proc ess as they occur ac~oss conversatio ns. 
Suc h a sol u tion will not wo r k , ho we ver, and I ha v e alrea dy 
h inted at the p r oblem. Stepping b ack 1 r o m the phenomena, and 
allowing the participants in t h e interaction, b e c ause they are 
invo l ved in the same analytic / theoret i cal/ practical reason ing 
e xerc ise as the anal y st, t o d o t he wo r k of the anal yst , who is 
simpl y left with the task o f desc~iption, may seem attracti ve, 
but it merel y pushes t he p ~ob lem b ack one step. I t does n o t 
ove r c om e the p~oblem. For the task of the anal yst, unless s h e o ~ 
he is t o remain silent, still constructs a relation bet ween t he 
anal yst and the p he nom ena. I t is just that the p henomena in t h is 
c ase ac~ the displays of the practical reasoning of the pa~tici­
pants in interactions, not t he ' r e al' inte~actions t hemsel ves. 
The a d vocates of conversation anal ysis assert that what t h e y 
are invol ved in is practical re a s on ing just li k e that carried o ut 
by co n versationalists. But this mea ns that either anal ysis in vol-
ves a r egress o f studies o f displays o f p ractical reasoning ( wi t h 
eac h study being itself treated as a display of practical reason-
tf'lg ) , with no descriptive / analytic foundation ever being reac h ed; 
oc we accept that conversation analysis shares the deduc ti ve, 
f'l on-empi r i c ist theoretic al status of speech act t heory and dis-
c ourse anal ysis. In either case, the problems with the first 
methodo logic al p rir1c i p le d ee no t overcome. 
It might be replied that the response which indicates a 
request , for example, does not have to be 'discove~ed' by the 
analyst, as its~ status in the conversatio n is demonstrated by 
the ongo ing process of conversation. However , there h a s t o o e 
some point at which, given that we are studying the conve~sa tion ; 
we latch on to the conversation, and at this point the relation 
which conversation analysis needs to avo id is set up. 
The empiricism advocated by conversation anal ysis involves 
at best (and only then if we igno~e major problems with e mpiric-
ism) nothing more than a descriptivism which is forced by its own 
principles to leave c onversation at it is. And this means t hat 
conversation analysis has no ~ole - or simpl y the role ( itself 
problematic) o f ~eproducing conversation, and say ing nothing. As 
soon as conversation analysis wants to move beyond this role, and 
make sense of co n versation, indicating patterns, ~egularities 
and similarities in conversation, it is necessarily forced to 
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categor ize i t s data, and t hu s to undermine i t s founding princip -
l es. 
The third methodological feat u~e of con ve r s at i o n analysis is 
conne cted to the seco nd, b ut introduces a functional a s pe ct to 
the approach. This is the n o tio n of c onversational mot i va ti on, 
which allows referenc e t o the needs of discourse rather than to 
the needs of part i c ipants. It enables feat ures of an utterance to 
b e explained in relation to de mands imposed, t hrough a structura l 
determinatio n, by other elements in the conversa tion. That is, 
general conversational feat ures are e xp lained as resol utions o f 
proble ms posed by t he e x isten c e of other features, and part i c ular 
instances can t hu s b e represented as paradig mot i c selection s f o r 
syntagmatic sl ots. The result is t hat the concept o f illocution-
ary f o rc e can b e replaced by that of co~ ve csotional f unction ( see 
Le vi nson, 19 83 : 285), and the r e is no need t o go outside t h e 
conversatio n for inferred s pe a kers' intentions o r the context ual 
ex p lanatio n of indexical elements. Speakers' intentions and con-
t e xt are rele vant only in as much as they are expressed wit h in a 
c onve r sation a s part o f the prac tical reasoning of part ici pants . 
Once we concentrate on the structural determinatio ns of a conver-
s a tion such concepts (wh i ch, as has been claimed in the pre c eding 
chapters, o r e e x t r emel y p r oblematic) c an b e left a side. 
Again, however, the r e d ee problems. First, such a p rocedure, 
b;r i. s o la ti ng conversation from intent ion ali ty and context, leaves 
,; .):lve csation itself unmotivated. The s upposed context sensiti v i t y 
o f the rules proposed by con versation analysis work s by those 
cules being 09~cab le in a va riety of contexts. But because the y 
are also context independent, so that analysis does n ot have to 
b ring in context, conversation, as represented by conversation 
analysis, is isolated from its contexts. This may seem to b e a 
benefit, g i ven some of the problems en cou :~ter~d earl ier, howe ver, 
it ends up leading t o a repetition o f these problems. 
If we have a rule for requests, say (and we i gn ore the 
problems associated with distinguishing req •18sts Ec om o ther 
utterance t ypes ) , and this rule says that given a request a 
certain range of replies ace in order, the actual realizations 
within that range are irrelevant given t h is view o f conversation. 
And what is more, the actual realization of 'request' is irrele-
va nt. But this means that we have a v iew where t h e diversity of 
actual realizations is i gn ored. Syntagmatic slots are filled fr om 
a paradigmatic range of categories, but the reali z a t i o ns of those 
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cate gories c annot be dealt with. 
Thi s limitat i o n play s an important i mpo rtant role in Le v in-
son's cri ticism of speech a c t theory: and it has been ra ised 
before in the chapters on Gric e and Searle. There I cla imed that 
one problem with Grice's reduction of me a n ing t o in t en t i ons is 
that it l e aves us wit h no accou nt of the di verse real i zat i o ns of 
those intentions, and I clai med ( like Levinson) that the move 
from Searle's ca tego r ies to their realization is e xtremel y prob-
l e mat i c. And he re we find the s am e issue arising wi th con ver s-
ation analysis. 
If we are left with no account here, and just deal with the 
structuring of utterance types, the general account o f conversat-
ion seems se verel y limited. It seems that we would then have to 
accept that a given rea l i zat ion is an arbitrary way o f expressing 
a type, and this again leaves the diversity of actual reali z at -
i on s or tokens unm.otivated. ' Refusal', 'acceptance' and 'defe r -
ral' are t ypes o f responses to r e quests, but then, part i cular 
realizations of , say, 'refusal' are in turn different types o f 
refusals. It seems q uite unsatisfying, a nd c ertainly arbitrary, 
not to deal with this level of structure (and e ven to get this 
far we are assuming tha t the question of adequatel y c haracter-
i z ing a paradi g m a t the level of 'refusal' c an be overc ome - c f. 
the discu ssio n of Searle's characterization of promising). 
We might, o f course, try t o give a con versation anal ysis-
style description of this further level of select ion and 
structuring, but to begin this would be to return to another 
problem raised earlier, which is that we would be o n the way 
towards having a rule for every possible realization. Such a 
task, as with that of supplying a speech ac t category for all 
utteranc es, on the one hand would b e unending, and on the ot her 
would seemingly d efeat the point of such a project in the f i r st 
p lace. 
Another aspect of the limitations imposed by the notion of 
conversational mo tivation is that when an a ttempt is made to 
discuss the place of conversation in overall interactive behav-
iour conversation analysis has no analytic resourc es at its 
disposal. Thus, when Sacks attempts an analysis of a dirty joke 
(Sacks, 1978) he introduces a number of contextual generali zat-
ions which are sim p ly added to, rather than based on and j ustif-
i ed by, his o wn methodology. 
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He begins with the claim that di~ty jokes a~e, as stories, 
p~imarily concerned with transmitting information, but given a 
greater 'motive power' by being funny and given a circulation 
restriction by being obscene. He then argues that granted that 
dirty jokes a~e 'rational institutions', then the information 
component of a dirty joke cannot be its obscene content, since 
this serves to restrict its passage. (Sacks, 1978: 261-2) 
The next stage in Sacks' argument is that in the data in 
which the joke under consideration is presented (see 1978: 250-2) 
it is not considered funny. He seems to think that the reason the 
joke falls flat has nothing to do with the competitive relations 
between the conve~sationalists, in which the teller seems to be, 
vainly, trying to gain status within the group. That is, the 
relation of the conversationalists is given no conversational 
~ole. For Sacks, it is just that the joke is not funny for '17-
yea~-old boys' - and the evidence for this is that when told in 
this instance amongst this group of 17-year-old boys it falls 
flat. ( 1978: 262) 
Sacks argues that the joke, which is repeated by the teller 
as having being told to him by his 12-year-old sister, is 'a joke 
with information relevant for, and passage intendedly restricted 
to, 12-year-old girls'. He then goes on to list a number of 
aspects of the needs, interests and behaviour of '12-year-old 
gi~ls' which would attract them to the joke in question, and 
aspects of the joke which would specifically appeal to 12-yea~­
old girls. 
It may be that, judged according to some scheme or other, 
all of Sacks' speculations here turn out to be perfectly valid. 
But such validity would have little o~ nothing to do with any-
thing offered by conversation analysis. By restricting itself to 
conversational motivation, any more general motivational features 
of interaction (such as why certain topical or semantic possibil-
ities are adopted within the range allowed by conversational 
restrictions, or why, given certain relations between partici-
pants, conversational restrictions are overridden, or why, as in 
this case, certain jokes may or may not appeal to certain groups) 
have to be ignored, leaving the approach very limited (even 
assuming that we ignore the earlier problems). In the same way, 
in Levinson's re-analysis of the data from Labov & Fanshel's wo~k 
all that could be said related to the conversational motivation 
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of the inte~action, with no possible ~eference to the context or 
the situation and ~oles of the participants. The specificity of 
that interaction is reduced to an abstract (and apolitical ) 
conversation-in-gene~al. Alternatively , as in this later case, 
more general motivating structures can be dealt with by speculat-
ive generalizations about the characteristics of ill-defined 
groups of communicative subjects. 
That such speculations can occur may well be connected t o 
the possibility with which I want to end this section. This is 
the possibility that conversation analysis, in spite of claiming 
to simply make inductive generalizations from the surface phen-
omena of discourse, and while supposedly making no claims ~ega ~d ­
ing the depth of discourse, in fact shares with speech act theory 
and discourse analysis an implicit and underlying notion of an a 
prio~i and universal conversational or interactive subject. 
In previous chapters I have a~gued that behind approaches to 
interaction based on speech act theory there seems to lie the 
notion of a linguistic subject which is constituted logically 
prior to interaction and which operates as the originating locus 
of meaning. This subject appears to be at the same time both an 
unanalyzable foundati o n and that which guarantees the ultimate 
determinateness of meaning, and the model of pragmatics which is 
founded on such a subject seems to represent communicative inter-
action as the encoding and expression (by the subject) of what is 
meant, so that language seems ~ep~esented as a second order sem-
iotic system into which what is meant is translated. 
I have argued on the one hand that a model such as this, 
which makes linguistic meaning dependent on 'speaker's meaning', 
would make communic ation impossible, and that it can only salvage 
communication by assuming some sort of universality which supp-
lies the link between these isolated, a priori subjects. On the 
other hand, the model treats meaning as determinate, and as 
analyzable in terms of abstract categories, and given that the 
theoretical subject which guarantees this determinateness is 
impossible, and that the categories are arbitrarily given, anal-
ysis within this model must apparently be seen as the imposition 
of meaning according to categories imported from the framework of 
the analyst. 
It seems initially that conversation analysis cannot be 
characterized in such a way. For it gives intentionality no 
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e xplanatory fun c tion, and it does not allow external intuitions 
of correctness or category to play a r o le in its analysis. How -
e ver, if the argument so far in this sectio n is correct, this 
second claim collapses, and conversation analysis thus seems t o 
share a number of features with speech act theory . This is so t a 
the e xt en t that the concept of conversational fun c tion, wh i ch is 
supposed t o take the p lace of illocutionary force, seems to share 
ma ny of its features and limitations once the empiricist found-
ation a nd the reflexive analysis are challenged. 
Nevertheless, conversational function is not grounded in the 
intentionality of an a priori subject. It is based o n conversat-
i o nal motivation, and while I have argued that conversational 
motivation leads to major p roblems, this does seem to be an 
impo rtant difference. But the question is whether such a conce pt 
does not implicitly invol ve such a subject under a different 
guise. 
The functi o nal approach which one finds in conversation 
analysis seems to b eg the q uesti o n as to what needs are being 
expressed in the production of conversatio nal structures. They 
ar e not participant needs in precisely the way found in speech 
act theory, but the needs of conversation appear t o be the needs 
of some transcendent conversational subject. It seems that some 
such subject is operating implicitly in con versatio n analysis as 
the locus of the motivat ion which is o therwise den i ed to conver-
satio n by the adoption of this approac h. 
Support for this suspicion is given if we look back at the 
aims of conversation analysis. It is set up as a search for the 
' co mmon sense' or 'prac tica l reason' displayed in the 'orderli-
ness' of conversation. That is, perhaps the most basic assumpt-
ions of conversation analysis are that conversation is orderly 
and that this orderliness is due t o common sense. The assumption 
of orderliness can be accepted for the s ak e o f the argument-
although such an assumption is a basic contradiction of the 
empiricist methodology (while being; according to my earlier 
argument, a necessary one). But the point I want to emphasi z e is 
that just by assuming the e x istence of a common sense behind this 
o rder, conversation anal ysis has presupposed that a c ertain uni v-
ersal subject lies behind conversation. It is the subject which 
explains the fact of ordering and is expressed in the motivation 
t o wards ordering, and is the subject necessarily presupposed by a 
functional analysis. 
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It is also the subj ect which e xp lains the actual o~de~ which 
is 'found'; but given the argument so far in this section, con-
ve~sation analysis cannot cla im t o 'find' the order of conversat-
ion - rather, this order must arise ou t of the analyst-object 
relation. So, not only is a universal orde~ing s ubject assumed, 
but its character in so o~dering conve~sation is assumed - not 
only the existence o f common sense, but the nature of common 
sense. 
I do not mean by this that conversation analysis makes 
claims as to the basic structu~e o f subjectivity, nor even that 
it makes claims about the universality of the organization it 
finds in the conversations it deals with (which tend to be restr-
i ct ed to the English-speaking, white, middle-class - see Schen-
kein, 1978: 6 and Levinson, 1983: 369). I am claiming rather that 
t his approach presupposes a universalized subjecti v ity, and 
should be expected to read the organization of conversation 
according to the basic structures of subjectivity bound up in 
that presupposed subjecti v ity. 
This can be made c learer by considering Levinson's discuss-
ion of the extent to which aspects of conversational organiz-
ation are universal. He gives five reasons why thi s issue is 
central. First, if basic aspects of conversational organization 
are universal, then significant linguistic universals may be 
explainable by pointing to 'universal functional pressures exer-
ted by basic patterns of language use'. Second, in this case 
general patterns of child language acquisition may be explained 
by reference to a single basic learning situation, which is 
conversational . Third, second-language teaching can take certain 
basic pragmatic parameters for granted. Fourth, this would mean 
that there are distinct limits to the k ind of social var iati on in 
the use of language that has been explored in the ethnography of 
s pe a k i n g . F i f t h , 
such universals would throw light on a basic facet of human 
nature - perhaps humans as a species are as much character-
ized by conversational activity as they are by differing 
cultures, complex social systems and tool-making. (Levinson, 
1983: 369) 
Levinson is guarded about the actuality of such universal-
ity, which, it should be noted, he assumes would be discovered 
through the empirical methods of conversation analysis. He says 
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that a great deal of comparative work would need to b e done, but 
he says that it seems safe to say that 'local management systems' 
such as turn-taking, ad jacency pair organization and repair s ys -
tems ha ve a universal basi s, even though their present descript-
ion may be cultural l y biased. Overall structural units, such as 
the notion of a conversation are more likely t o be culturall y 
var iable, while somewhere in the middle will be intermediate 
organizations such as preference organizatio n and pre-sequences. 
(Levinson, 1983: 369, and see 3 01.) 
These are speculations by Levinson, but if my argument so 
far is correct, then we would expect that conversation analysis 
is geared towards constructing a model of interaction where such 
universal structures, to more or less this extent, are 'disc ov-
ered'. And we could also expect that the subject implic it within 
this is one naturally oriented to at least the interactive econ-
omy discussed by the ethnomethodol og ists and the local management 
s ys tems o f conversational analysis. This issue o f the specific 
nature of the subject is not c entral to my argument, and I do not 
want to go into it any further here. I merel y want to po int out 
that conversation analysis is geared towards the 'discovery' of 
some such unive rsal features, both in conversation and, implic-
itly, in the subject it presupposes . 
It is important to point out here that I am not denying that 
there needs to be a certain ' comm on sense' (and indeed a common -
ness of sense) for there to be communication or interaction. What 
I am denying is that this can be assumed as universal and as 
lying in the pre-given nature of universal subjects (a nd as 
translateable from the diversity of its realization). I am sugg-
esting instead that it needs to be seen as l y ing in the inter-
active relations of subjects , and as constituting the common 
sense of t hose subjects. 
SECTION 4: THE POSSIBILITY OF SYNTHESIS. 
Levinson claims that both speech act theory and discourse 
analysis are fundamentally flawed , and he argues that they need 
to be rejected wholesale in favour of conversation analysis. 
However, a more common response from within pragmat ics is to 
argue that the study of discourse phenomena ca n best be served by 
a synthesis of the two types of approach. 
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theory g i ve a static v iew of interaction. 
I n response to attempts t o analyze communication as di screte 
units o f discourse, Gumperz claims th-at interactio n and interp-
retation are a n o ngoing process in which status, goals and s o on 
- elements ma king up the implied context of an interact i on - are 
negotiated and de veloped, and he feels that this characteristic 
canno t b e captured when conversation is abstracted into sta tic, 
bounded units. At the same time, Gumperz' appr oach does i nclude 
t he notion o f certain abstract cogniti ve structures by which 
con ve r satio nal ists interpret wha t is going on in an inte ract i on. 
However, unlike the the schemata of the ethnography o f communic-
ation or the speech acts of discourse analysis, Gumperz ' 'speech 
activities' are not precisely labelable, are meant t o reflect 
s peaker's assessment of an interaction (ra ther than being t he 
linguist's description of what is happening) and are no t ne c ess-
aril y the same for all participants in an interaction ('what o ne 
perso n woul d i dentify as "lecturing", ano ther m.ight interpret as 
"chatting with one's child"'). Speech activities are assessments 
of an interaction by which participants, throug h past e xperience , 
identify an interaction and interpret it. This identificatio n is 
conditional, for as well as being imprecise these interp reti ve 
frames are not static, nor do they determine interpretatio n. A 
s peech activity assessment channels interpretation, a nd in t he 
course of an interaction assessments may change retrospecti vel y 
depending on the effect of responses according to a chosen path 
of interpretation, until the interaction reaches resolution -
this resolution (or breakdown) being signaled b y culturall y more 
or less specific cues. (See Gumperz, 1982: 165-7, and also Levin-
son, 1978 for the initial development of the term 'speec h activ-
ities'. ) 
In this approach three important characteristics - apart 
from t he use of examples of natural interaction - are adopted 
from conversation analysis. First, we find the idea that u tter-
ances have a 'relational' significance, that t heir si gni f i c ance 
arises ( in part, as we shall see ) through their place in a dis-
cou rse structure, and this operates to overcome the problem of 
the relation between utterances and corresponding c ogniti ve cat-
egories. Second, there is the idea that discourse is a fluid and 
cooperative process of negotiation, reevaluation and repair of 
roles, meanings and topi c s, and not the carrying out of static 
and bounded acts. 
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Such a synthesis can already be seen ~n Labov & Fanshel's 
work , where it is suggested that the sequencing of utteranc es 
should be dealt with according to the approach of the conversat-
ion analysts and combined with a speech act anal ysis of the 
production of those utterances. That work also invo lved the use 
of unconstructed data, and a treatment of data which, while not 
as avowedly empiricist, and while combined with a deductive 
approach, shares the detailed app roach of conversation anal ys i s 
(and in some ways is more detailed ). 
Coulthard (1977) also insists on the use of detailed co n ver-
sational data gathered from naturally occurring interactions (a nd 
this is typical of the Birmingham group), and he also suggests 
the use of a conversation analysis-style study of seq uencing . 
Again with Stubbs (1 983), the criticism of speech act theory 
presented at the beginning of this chapter does not lead to a 
wholesale rejection of that approach, but to a revised treatment 
of data, a wariness regarding intentions, and a recognition of 
the extent to which structural features of conversation govern 
content. Stubbs also seems to take more interest in the methodo l -
ogical innovations of conversation analysis regarding reflexi vity 
and conversational motivation. 
Another attempt t o synthesize these approaches, and one 
which I want to look at in more detail in this section, is that 
put forward by Gumperz (1982). Gumperz• criticisms of discourse 
analysis involve some of the points summarized earlier, but he 
emphasizes two aspects in particular. First, he is critical of 
the ways in which event labels (in the ethnography of communic-
ation) and discourse categories are imposed as ideotypical con-
structs on everyday verbal exchanges. He says that although event 
labels and discourse categories are part of our everyday vocab-
ulary and are regularly used when we talk about modes of speak-
ing, 'they are highly abstract in nature and on the whole poor 
descriptors of what is actually accomplished'. 
When participants report on actual verbal encounters, they 
t e n d to do so by men. t ion i n g some i t e m o f con ten t , or by 
referring to what people were getting at or what they were 
trying to do. Event names in everyday talk are most often 
used metaphorically to refer retrospectively to what was 
accomplished. (Gumperz, 198 2: 157) 
Secondly, Gumperz is critical of the way in which the abstr-
act conceptual categories of discourse analysis and speech act 
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Third , Gumperz adopts from con ve rsa tioQ analysis t he met h-
odolog ical reliance o n participant a ssessmen t a s displaye d in 
interac tions, as a way of avoiding the imposition o n an inter-
acti o n of c ategories which do not necessarily reflect either the 
fluid and changing nature of a c onversation o r t he understanding 
of part ic i pants. 
While Gu mperz adopts several important aspects of conversat-
ion analysis, he also feels that its approach has limitations 
when ta k en on its own. He complains that the work of the co n v er-
sati on anal ysts does not acc ount f o r the linguistic bases of 
conversational cooperation. Conversation analysts, he n o tes, 
r e gard the post-Chomskian concern with grammatical rules as mere-
l y another instance of the n o rmative sociological parad i gm they 
have been try ing to overcome; however, he points out that in much 
of the empirical work of conversation anal y sis, referenti a l mean-
ings that assume sharing of strategies f o r contextualizing a 
conversation, which invo lve linguistic knowledge in a sense 
ignored by this work, are taken for granted. (Gu mperz, 1982: 160 ) 
Gumperz says that conversation analysis thus has limitations 
which affect both the validity of the anal ysts' attempts to 
capture participants' interpretive processes and the social im-
port of their work. He say s that in order to account for inter-
speaker differences in background knowledge a sociolinguist needs 
to know how speake r s use verba l skills to create contextual 
conditions that reflect particular culturally realistic scenes. 
How are speakers' grammatical and phonological abilities 
employed in this? For example, if regular s peaker change is 
to take place, participants must be able to scan phrases to 
predict when an utterance is about to end. They must be able 
to distinguish between rhetorical pauses and turn relinqu-
ishing pauses. Although overlap is an integral part of 
interaction, conversational cooperation requires that inter-
actional synchrony be maintained so that speakers cannot be 
interrupted at random. To follow the thematic progression of 
an argument, moreover, and to make one's contribution rele-
vant, one must be able to recognize culturally possible 
lines of reasoning. It is therefore necessary to show how 
strategies of conversational management are integrated into 
other aspects of speakers' linguistic knowledge. (Gumperz, 
1982: 160 ) 
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This criticism leads to the other aspect of the model su mm -
arized above. The introduction of the notion of 'speech activ-
ities' supposedly removes the static and bounded nature of speech 
acts, but retains the abstract cognitive structures which Gumperz 
feels are a crucial part of communicative competence, and wh i c h 
reasserts the 'ideational' significance of utterances. As well, 
paralinguistic cues, of the sort dealt with in Labov & Fans hel's 
discourse analysis, are treated as an integral to the contextual-
i zation of interaction (see 1982: 162). Gumperz thinks that non-
vocal conversational units can be in themsel ves significant, 
while Levinson, for example, regards such units as alway s f unct-
ionally defined by the actions they perform in context. 
There is much more detail to Gumperz' approach than I have 
been able to summarize here ( including concepts from t he ethnog-
raphy of communication), but the theoretical model presented 
above constitutes the basis of this approach - and it is perhaps 
the development of such an analytic model which most clearly 
indicates his distance from the work studied in this chapter. 
Elsewhere, Gumperz & Hymes express concern that the 'universality 
and ubiquity' of methodological phenomena - the ways in which 
investigators must be involved in the same practical reasoning as 
the conversationalists they study - leaves the investigator un-
able to 'remedy or repair the presence of practical reasoning in 
investigations', that is, unable to overcome the problems of the 
analyst's relation to the data. 
One gains the impression that all the investigator can do is 
to collect and exhibit instances. Quite possibly, this pos-
ture of extreme empiricism - reminiscent of the descriptive 
linguists - is merely a passing phase, which will disappear 
with the accumulation of more properly documented case stud-
ies. ( Gu m pe r z & H y me s , 19 7 2 : 3 0 6 ) 
This response seems to in volve a lack of recognition of t h e 
extent to which this empiricism lies at the heart of conversation 
analysis, informing as it does all the significant methodological 
principles of that approach. It also fails to notice that conver-
sation analysis' empiricism is compromised in the ways indicated 
in the previous section. However, Gumperz' own later criticism 
( noted above) does point to this compromise, and what I want to 
emphasize here is that in the position he develops himself Gum-
perz rejects the empiricist's refusal to theorize in favour of a 
model of communication, but one which acknowledges participant 
a sse ssmen t. 
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One ~eason for concentrating on Gu mpe~z· synthesis of con-
versation analys is and speech act theory (o r discourse analysis) 
is that because he develops his approach as a way of conf~onting 
issues such as inte~ethnic conflict he refocuses attention on the 
ways pragmatics is cashed out as social science, and conf~onts 
po litical phenomena. 
Gumperz develops an approach to areas of social conflict 
which involves a conscientious liberal-pluralism. It is an app-
roach in which the ( linguistic and social ) integrity of codes is 
acknowledged and theoretically respected. Conversation is not 
reduced to the same, as in conversation analysis, because he 
insists that 'extra-conversational' linguistic knowledge (carry-
ing a range of specificity for each speech community), is a 
crucial aspect of communication. And he claims that part of t he 
role of such knowledge is the maintenance of linguistic (wh ich 
are social) boundaries. These boundaries will often be the site 
of conflict, and Gumperz sees a ~ole for pragmatics in unde~­
standing and helping to intervene in those conflicts which a~e 
due to communication breakdown, communication being 'the symbolic 
tip of the iceberg reflecting the forces of history' ( 1982: 201) . 
I want to note two problems with this synthesis. First, 
Gumperz t~ies to overcome the difficulties surrounding speech act 
theory's imposition of abstract categories on communication by 
not presupposing such categories and forcing interpretation onto 
a conversation, but rather discovering them in the speech behav-
iour of conversationalists; however, the problem here is that the 
limitations of this aspect of conversation analysis are not 
confronted. Given that the investigator does not simply remain 
silent (and I have argued that even to merely 'collect and exhib-
it instances' is to necessarily interpret), and given especially 
that the investigator is explicitly interpreting the diverse 
codes with which he or she is confronted, then there must always 
be translation into the code of the investigator. Without such 
translation there would be incoherence (no sense having been made 
of the data), but with such translation there is representation 
in a code with its own implicit and more or less specifi c social / 
linguistic values, expectations and practical reasoning. In the 
sort of situations Gumperz is thinking of (but also in any inves-
tigation of communicative interaction) this means that sense must 
ultimately be made in the code of the social scientist, and this 
is a code which is always in a certa in relation of power a nd 
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interest to the various conflicting codes it confronts. One mi ght 
respond that the approach suggested by Gumperz involves the 
acknowledgement of the diversity of codes and t heir social / ling-
uistic integrity; but then, this may well reflect part of t he 
social / linguistic values of liberal social science - and t h is 
leads on to the second point. 
Gumperz overcomes conversation analysis' descripti v ism and 
(perhaps not intentionally ) avoids its compromised empiricism by 
retaining abstract cognitive structures through his use of the 
notion of speech activities; but in doing this he fails to con-
front the central problem which I have associated with speech act 
theory. I have argued that when speech act categories are taken 
as an abstract paradigm of a realization it seems that no account 
is given of the relation between the realization and its para-
digm. That is, no account is given of how any given utterance is a 
realization of any particular cognitive category. The resolution 
of this problem, I have tried to show, is supplied by taking the 
categories as constituting a language of intentionality and the 
realizations as constituting translations of this intentionality. 
Such a solution is inadequate, for a number of reasons already 
mentioned; yet in a sense this solution is effective, in as much 
as it allows the presupposition of a universal and a priori 
subjectivity which, while unanalyzable in itself ( while being an 
unconditioned foundation), allows the supposedly objective as-
signment, by the analyst, of significance to the language of 
intentionality behind the surface of discourse. 
Gumperz expresses the beginning of this analysis when he 
~ays that the key notion in discourse analysis is Grice's defin-
ition of meaning as 'the effect that a sender intends to produce 
on a receiver by means of a message', and he goes on to say that 
'speech acts defined in terms of illocutionary force, i.e. utter-
ers' communicative intent, become the main unit of linguistic 
analysis' (Gumperz, 1982: 156). But the problem is that this is 
the crucial aspect of discourse analysis which Gumperz carries 
over into his own model of communication. Certainly, we find a 
relational analysis of some conversational phenomena, and we also 
find a notion of the conditional interpretation of utterances, 
but in as much as interpretation is made into categories, and in 
as much as Gumperz avoids descriptivism and himself interprets 
utterances, we are left with the ultimate reduction of communic-
ation to the language of intentionality and to an unconditioned 
or a priori universal subjectivity imposed by analysis. 
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In the approach to social s c ience which .Gumperz is propos-
ing, such a reduction involves the s~ l vaging of identity from the 
diversity of codes, attitudes, beliefs and interests with which 
the social scientist is confronted. Such social factors are seen 
as expressed in language by the communicative sub j ect, and t heir 
specificity is explained in terms of the specificity of social/ 
linguistic environments - and this is fine. But because t he 
communicative subject is seen as ultimately both constituti ve and 
a priori - the intending subject - such factors in no way const-
itute the communicative subject. They are the s ocially s pe cif ic 
translations of intentionality. And because intentionality is 
unanalyzable, but also ultimately represented in terms of the 
analyst's code (in order for it to be coherent within that code ) 
the socially specific values and reasoning found in communicative 
interaction are seen as socially specific reflections of (and are 
therefore interpreted in terms of) a universal intentionality/ 
subjectivity which reflects the values and standards of ration-
ality expressed in the analyst's code. 
CONCLUSION. 
The methods employed by conversation analysis offer an alter-
native to speech act theory and discourse analysis, with their 
explication of communication as action in terms of abstract 
cognitive categories. It is an initially attractive alternative, 
if for no other reason than the pervasiveness of the problems 
confronting that attempt to approach com munication by moving 
beyond the surface of discourse. Conversation analysis insists o n 
going no further than the actions which exist as conversation, 
and examines these actions as themselves constructing and dis-
playing social and communicative categories. 
I have argued, however, that in as much as conversation 
analysis remains true to the empiricism on which it is based it 
is left as mere (although problematic) descriptivism. In fact, in 
its analyses conversation analysis consistently undermines its 
empiricist claims and indulges in the same categorization which 
leads to many of the problems with speech act theory. Thus, 
rather than moving beyond speech act theory, conversation analy-
sis seems at times to involve merely a disguising of these p rob-
lems beneath a phenomenological gloss. 
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Finally , attempts t o s ynthesiz e conversatio n anal y s i s and 
s peec h act theory o r discourse analysis seem t o be e quall y 
doomed. They tend to involve adding a version of speech act 
c ategories to an approach which is round to be too descriptivist, 
and such a response involves adding the limitations o f the f i r st 
vi ew to those of conversation analysis' empiric ism - a con jun c t-
ion which conversatio n anal ysis in any case seems to implic itly 
make itself. 
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CONCLUSION 
THE POLITICS OF DISCOURSE 
With the discussion of conversation analysis t he p r o jec t of 
t he thesis has been c om pleted, and it remains now t o bring t o -
gether the points which have arisen in t he prec eding ch apters, 
and to offer an assessment o f the v iability of pragma tics. 
We began with a d iscussio n o f Austin's anal ysis of perf o rm-
a ti ves, a nd this has opera ted as a f ocus f o r t he present wor k i n 
t wo way s. On the one hand, it seems to be the o riginating theo r-
e t i c al locus o f muc h o f the pragmati c traditio n whi c h has been 
discussed here. The tradition finds in that discussio n the most 
impo rtant initial attempt to approach language as action, a nd t o 
d i s t in g u i s h w h a t i s sa i d f r om w h a t i s done. I t i s se en a 1 so a s 
int r oducing the c oncept o f pragmatic r ules (under the guise of 
fe l icity c ondi t ions ) and the importance of c ontextual features, 
in a displacement of the overriding authority of linguistic r ules 
and formal (syntactic and semantic ) features in determ i ni ng the 
meaning of an utterance, inasmuch as that utterance is operati ve 
in a n interactive, social environment. The anal ysis of perform-
ati ves is thus seen as tak i n g the f irst, tentati ve steps t o wards 
t he t heory of illocutio nary acts. 
But the a nal ysis o f performatives is a focus f o r another 
reason, f o r it seems possible t o find in it an appr o ach which is 
more theoretically radical than t hat which the tradition has 
discovered, and through wh i ch an interesting critiq ue of that 
tradition can be developed. The path towards this alternative 
approach lies first in not taking the early discussion at its 
face value as an initial and tentative attempt to sol ve a puzzle 
brought about by certain anomalous linguistic phenomena, but 
rather taking it as a strategic attempt t o l:lndermine, by the use 
of this puzzle, a positivist conception of the relation between 
language, linguistic subjects and reality. 
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The case o f utterances having the form of the verification-
ist's paradigmatc linguistic phenomenon (a constative which acts 
as the medium for the expression of_ a subject's relation to the 
world) but not having the function of such a pa radigm (since they 
br ing about states of affairs, rather than describe them ) leads 
to the attempt to formally characterize the anomaly. But this 
project (a standard response to such an anomaly) leads t o the 
position where all utterances, as utterance acts, and in as much 
as they are communicatively operative, involve the invocation of 
non-linguistic rules and procedures through which their communic-
ative significance arises. Thus, the original performatives are a 
special case, but a special case which brings out a general 
feature of language in communication. Significantly, the original 
performatives are more o r less ritualized, but this serves t o 
indicate the ways in which utterances in general are dependent on 
rituals (as rule-governed procedures) in their operatio n. Thus, 
while an order is not a ritual in the same way that the namin g of 
a ship is, what Austin shows is that for an order to be operative 
( for it to be understood, not just for it to be effective) there 
must exist an interactive procedure for ordering - it must make 
sense to order (as well as the words 'I order y ou ..• ' making 
sense), and so part of the meaning of an order must be non-
semantic. 
Some responses to Austin have, as we have seen, attempted to 
retain the notion of some sort of constative or propositional 
core of language. But once we read Austin in the way proposed 
above, it seems that a propositional content or its truth and 
falsity cannot be considered prior to the operation of felicity 
conditions, since this consideration depends on those felicity 
conditions - importantly, on the existence of a recognizable pro-
cedure for constating, but also on factors such as the purposes 
for which the abstracted content is being considered and the 
position of the person making the statement. 
A further point to remember here is that Austin argues that 
distinguishing force linguistically, linguistically clarifying 
the force of utterances, can be seen as resulting from the de-
mands of the sophistication and development of social forms and 
procedures, and he says that this clarification is as much a 
creative act as a discovery. From this we get the notion of 
pragmatics as involv ing the interrelation between social and 
linguistic forms. The forces of utterances are not somehow al-
ready there in language, but arise and change with the develop-
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ment or change o f in t eractive practices. At the same time, and 
because this is an interrelation, these forces are not described 
by language; rather, they are embodi~d in it as itself a part of 
interactive practice. 
From this standpoint Austin is useful, not onl y in a dis-
cussion of pragmatics, but also in an examination of the politics 
of discourse. If we take politics as that aspect of social inter-
action which involves the operation (and contestation ) of social 
r o les and relations, then once we refuse, with Austin, t he s p li t 
between language and interaction, pragmatics offers an approach 
which confronts linguistic interaction or discourse, not just as 
the expression of political relations, but as a site of their 
operation. 
As was noted earlier, the problem which arises in Austin•s 
analysis is that while he offers an approach which, in rejec ting 
a positivist view of language, treats it as a pragmatically 
oriented aspect of social interaction, he does not directl y 
address the notion of a linguistic subject, and perhaps as a 
result of that appears to make use of an implicit notion which 
should be contradicted by other aspects of his approach. This 
implicit subject appears to operate, through its intention, as 
the organizing centre of a total field of context, giving prag-
mati c meaning a determinateness guaranteed by that intention. 
Thus the introduction into analysis of the context of utterance, 
which frees the utterance from the determinations of its formal 
features, seems undermined by the notion of an intention which, 
as an organizing centre, ties the utterance back into the deter-
mination of an originating moment which logically precedes inter-
action. It seems instead that when language use is viewed in its 
pragmatic aspects, meaning takes on a certain indeterminateness. 
This may be variable, and may be tied down through the negotiat-
ive process of interaction, but cannot be grounded in an origin-
ating moment as the true meaning of an utterance. 
Connected with this is the problem that Austin appears to 
adopt, unargued, the notion of a paradigmatic •ordinary lan-
guage•. This ordinary language is not defined in terms of utter-
ance type, but rather in terms of the linguistic subject•s relat-
ion to an utterance. The relation is essentially one of serious-
ness, and is opposed to utterance as citation. The problem arises 
because on Austin•s analysis all utterances necessarily involve 
the invocation of recognizable interactive-linguistic procedures, 
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and therefore all utteranc e involves the citation o f these p rag-
ma tic pr ocedures. Hence, it seems that there cannot be a distinc -
tion d rawn in this way between seri~us and non-serious u tterance, 
and the supposed seriousness of an originating linguistic subject 
canno t be used as a criterion by which to identif y language which 
is 'ordinary'. The extent t o which these assumptio ns are central 
to Austin's project need not be finally decided here, however, 
they do seem to be a problematic feature of much of the tradition 
which follows Austin. 
The value of placing more emphasis than is usual on the 
analysis of performatives is that this c an assist our understand-
ing of the issues which arise surrounding the theory of illocut -
ionary acts . Thus, in the light o f responses (such as Cohen's ) 
which attempt to give a semanticist reading of illocutionary 
force, and explicate it in terms of the total locution, it seems 
clear that the mistake which has been made is to focus on the 
utterance-object rather than the utterance-act. While there is a 
locutionary object (the locution ) which results from the locut-
ionary act, there is no illocutionary object resulting from the 
illocutionary act and being some sort of extension of the loc-
ution; rather, the illocutionary act has illocutionary meaning , 
which is o f a different order to the semantic meaning of the 
l o cution. It is presumably to avoid just such a confusion that 
Austin insists on a distinction between meaning and force. Force 
is not a consequence of the locutionary act, but rather a con-
sequence of the existence of certain interactive practices and 
procedures, and for an utterance-act to be interactively oper-
ative is must invoke these practices and procedures. 
The reading of the analysis o f perfo rmatives which has been 
offered also helps us understand the attack on the role of extra-
linguistic conventions in the operation of illocutionary acts. 
Strawson thinks that those illocutionary acts which are not 
ritualized are not constituted by extra-linguistic conventions. 
For him, non-ritual illocutionary acts can be rendered convent-
ionally, but by being made linguistically explicit, and what this 
rendering makes explicit is the illocutionary intention of the 
speaker. Apart from the problems which c onfront a view which 
takes intention as the origin of meaning, this response fails t o 
grasp Austin 's insight that illocutionary force is necessarily 
conventional in that it involves the invocation of interactive 
procedures, and that it is therefore relati vely independent of 
both intentio ns a nd semantic meaning. An illocutionary a c t will 
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usually invo l ve, or be carri e d out by, the i ~tended p r oduction o f 
a semantically me aningf ul locu tio n, bu t its force is not a con-
s e quenc e o f, and is not constit uted, by this locution. 
Among responses to the theory o f illocutionary act s we find 
again the attempt to retain the notion of a pre-i llocu tionary 
message, as a statement-content, or propositional content, and as 
the relatively stable core of a n utterance. Again we have the 
problem that as so o n as we s ay anything about this conte n t it 
must seemingl y b e represented a s illocutionary , as a certa in act 
in c ertain circumstances; and thus the content cannot operate as 
a pure message within communica tion (as Graham wants ) , but mu s t 
b e seen as an interactively constituted aspect of communication. 
Alternati vely , it can be taken as t he act of a sub j e c t which 
exists self-suffic iently and prior to interactio n. Such a s ub-
j e ct , in which meaning ar ises through a primary and foundational 
relation to the world, may be seen a s entering into discourse and 
d iscursi ve relations, but it enters as pre-gi ven, and its own 
pre supposed cogni t ive rela tion to the worl d constit utes o ne side 
of a radical distinct ion b etween the sub j ect a nd inte r subject-
i vi ty . 
We find this type o f conception of the linguistic subject 
with Grice. If the subject as an a p rior i foundation wh i ch con-
stitutes meaning is implicit in' aspects o f Austin's approach, in 
Grice's theory of meaning i t is e xpl icitl y placed a s t he c en tral 
component. What is interesting about Gr i c e is that if p ragmatics 
is in part an attempt to account f or non-standard meaning, mean-
ing which fai ls to accord with the formal features of a n utter-
ance, and to emphasi z e the role of acting linguistic s ubj e ct s in 
communicat i o n, then he o ffers a clear p i c ture of o ne limit of 
that attempt. For Grice, meaning o riginates as a speaker's in-
tentio ns, and not o nl y does this account f or de viat ions from 
standard meaning , bu t standard meaning is itself taken as the 
con ventional i zi ng of this s peaker's meaning. We saw that the 
Gr i cean program col lap ses. The attempt ~o analyze meaning in 
terms of a s peaker's c ommunicative intentions turn out to be 
ba sed on a n inva lid c onflatio n o f meaning as intending a nd comm -
unicative meaning. Even without this problem, with intentions as 
the indicators of what is meant no understanding wou ld b e poss-
i b le, since publicly accessible indica t ors of meaning are de p end-
ent upon pr i o r intentions as indicato rs, and these are pr ivate 
a nd inaccessible until a lready meaning ful p ubli c indicators are 
available . The essential privacy of the fo unda tion o r consti tut-
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ion of meaning in this approach is furthe r uAdermined becau se t he 
private osten tion which Gr ice posits at th is basis of meani ng 
appea r s t o presuppose l anguag e and m~aning in its operation. 
Grice's approach to meaning follows from the insight t hat we 
do not alwa y s mean what we say, and he attempts to e xpla in t h is 
by taking intentions, rather than semantic features, as the 
ground of meaning. This can b e seen as an alternative t o Cohen's 
approach of widening the notion of the semantic features of the 
utterance. We ca n now say , against both these approaches, that 
what is said and what is meant can com e apart because t here are 
bo th semantic and pragmatic levels of meaning, and that communic-
ative interaction is dependent on the invocation and opera tion of 
pragmatic rules and procedures. These ru l es and procedures, and 
not wide semantic rules or s peakers' intentions, constitute p rag -
matic meaning. 
It seems from the discussion of Grice that if p ragmatics 
want s to place theoretical emphasis on the role of t he s ubj e ct in 
in t eraction, it needs t o avo id introducing this subj e ct as pre-
supposed, and constituted prior to interaction. For so con c e ived 
it appears impossible f or the sub j ect to enter into interaction. 
However, such a subject has b ecome central to pragmatics, and 
especially so in Searle's work. 
Searle's approach amounts to an interesting, alt hough unsa t -
isfac t o r y , attempt to combine the ap p roac he s of Gr i c e and Cohen. 
His r esponse to Austin is to collap se the locutionary-illocution-
ary distinction through a semantic anal ysis of f orce (similar to 
Cohen's), and to introduce instead a propositional act within the 
reconstituted illocutionary act. As we saw, the effect of this is 
to give no account of meaning other than force, and ultimately no 
adequate account o f for c e, for the propositional act (given t hat 
it is not simply a rhetic act represented as a constati ve ) is 
dependent on the illocut ionary act which it supposedl y or iginally 
semantically determined. When Searle then reworks Grice's t heory 
of meaning he develops a position which is essentially that to b e 
found in t he third of Gric e's papers, and the explic atio n of 
meaning in terms of illocutionary intentions does not overcome 
t he basic limitations of Grice's approach, repeating the equi -
voc al use of 'meaning' and the gap which is forged between in-
tentions and understanding. Finally, Searle develops a natural-
istic account of speech acts in terms of intentionality as a 
basic property of the mind, and this attempt appears to founder 
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o n the problem of bridging the gap between the linguistic subject 
as so concei ved and interaction. 
A further problem which arises with Searle is that when he 
assigns and analyzes speech act categories he is unable to g i ve 
cr iteria for picking out the paradigm cases which constitute 
these abstracted categories. Furthermore, because these cat egor-
ies are necessaril y ideali za tions, his speech act approach is 
left with the problem of explaining the relati on between s uch 
ca tegories and their variously impure realizations in discours~. 
So we find again that the attempt to impose a determinateness o n 
discourse fails. 
In many ways Searle's work is puzzling, because while all 
these difficulties arise, we find also an acknowledgement of the 
importance of what words already mean in the language, an assert-
ion o f the necessity of treating language as an institutional 
fact, and an attempt to give an account o f illocutionary acts in 
te rm s of interactive or pragmatic rules - and it seems difficult 
to reconcile these contradictory aspects. I would suggest, how -
ever, that in this contradiction lies the basic paradox of p rag -
matics. We get from it on the one hand an attempt to confront and 
account for language as interaction, but we find on the other 
hand that this a ttempt is continually undermined by a reliance o n 
just those basic theoretical assumptions which underlie the posit-
ivism to which pragmatics is supposedly opposed. 
Turning to discourse analysis, and specifically to Labov & 
Fanshel's work, many of these issues are b rought into a sharper 
focus. For on the one hand discourse analysis involves a refine-
ment and extension of philosophical pragmatics - in particular, a 
development of interpretive discourse rules and a more extended 
treatment of the relation between what is said and what is done, 
which leads to an account of discourse as dynamic process. On t he 
other hand, discourse analysis, because it approaches examples of 
extended discursive interaction, develops an actual analysis of 
the variously organized interactive relations which are operative 
in discourse. This latter development leads to the re-emergence 
of insights which had been left dormant in Austin's work concern-
ing the social construction of meaning. A p ragmatic account of 
language is here taken to involve not just an account of action 
in a context, but of interaction in a social context, which 
directs and constrains the action and meaning which can arise. To 
this, Labov & Fanshel add an account of the importance of unex-
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p~essed social and psychological p~opositions in the ope~ation of 
di scou~se. 
But in spite of an explicit account of the plac e of facto~s 
such as ~ole, status and powe~ in discourse,! Labov & Fanshel's 
work seems unde~mined by the same fundamen tal assumptions which 
a~ose within Austin's wo~k, a nd which c~ ipple philosophical p~ag­
matics as a whol e. Fo~ e xampl e, the~e appea~s to b e an ultimate 
reliance o n foundational meaning intentions, as was found with 
Gric e and Searle, and which may have been implicit in Au stin's 
app~oach. This leads to these social factors being seen as exte~­
nal to the ground of meaning, and while there is c e ~tainly with 
Labov & Fanshel the notion of intentions being interp~eted from 
what is done, this interpretation finds its dete~minateness in 
those intentions as or igin. 
This relates to a further issue. Labov & Fanshel adopt a n 
app~oach which sees a multiplicity of speech acts ~~lating to a 
g i ven s peec h unit, and this seems initially t o avoid the sea~ch 
for unita~y meaning - tied through intention t o the unita~y 
cons c iousness of the intending subject. But this multiplicity is 
(usually) an hierarchical multi plici t y, and so, while the y ~ega~d 
conversatio n as 'a matrix of utterances and actions bound to-
gethe~ by a web of understandings and reactions' (1977: 30), in 
which the pa~tic i pants unde~stand and ~eact to s peech acts at 
many levels of abst~action, meaning as the obje ct of interpret-
ation is tied into a linear hie~a~chy, anchored in the ' r ea l 
meaning' of the in t ending subjec t . 
The final point to ~estate here is that these theo~etical 
problems with prag mati cs , ~esulting in the lack of a n ade quat e 
account of the ways in which meaning a~ises, leads to the ulti-
mate inability of work within that approach to ~ecognize or 
account for the ways in which analysis itself constitutes the 
object which it discovers. Meaning is taken to arise in the 
intentionality of the speaking sub ject and to be interpreted 
within the context of utte~ance, a nd the determination of the 
or i gi nating act is taken as supplying the determination of mean-
ing. P~agmatics then takes on the ta sk of searching for and 
explicating this originating act - a n act whose purity is in no 
way touched by a discursive ~elation between it and the analyst, 
for a linguistic subject so con ce i ved , and its 'meaning', is 
independent of a ny effects of inte~action, and e xists as a pure 
object to be discove~ed. On ce we ~eject this positiv ism, the 
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relation becomes much more p r oblemat ic. The discovery of meaning 
be comes seen as the assignment o f significance and the definition 
of the subject, bo th in its nature as a priori and foundational, 
and in what it 'really means'. 
Th e problem of the role of the analyst is one of the central 
points which arose out of the discussion of conversation ana l -
ysis. Conversation analysis, as we have seen, represents a re -
sponse to these other approaches t o pragmatics wh ich adopts an 
analysis in terms of the surface of discourse, as oppose d to on e 
which works towards the depth of discourse, in the intentions of 
language users and abstract speech act categories. Conversation 
analysis attempts to overcome problems surrounding the sear ch for 
unobservable intentions and and the correlation between form and 
function by examining the ways in which speakers display, through 
the reflexi v ity of conversation, their own interpretation of what 
is happening in a conversation. Cognitive or p s ycholog ical depth 
is only relevant in so far as it arises in the displayed reason-
ing of participants, which is also a practical sociological 
reasoning; and conversation is essentially treated as the outcome 
of the interaction of independent, goal-oriented individuals, 
often with divergent interests. A crucial point here is that an 
analyst is seen as being involved in the same sort of practical 
reasoning activity as is a conversationalist. 
This approach is undermined first and forem ost by t he empir-
icist premise by which it marks its break from theories based on 
speech acts. As conversation analysis sets up its empiricism it 
appears locked into what can at very best be described as a 
descriptivism which can never assimilate the data which it coll-
ects. We find, however, that while it sets itself the goal of an 
impossibly pure relation between analyst and conversation, it in 
fact claims to see in conversation things unobserved by part ici-
pants (e ven though the perceptions of participants are the s ource 
of its data), and that it used c ategories which amount to, and 
are treated in the same way as, speech act categories. Thus, in 
as much as conversation analysis does social science, it uncon-
sciously adopts j u st those deductive categories which it wants to 
reject. 
Even more significantly , it appears that in attempting to 
account for conversational motivation conversation analysis is 
committed, like speech act theory and discourse analysis, to 
presupposing an a p riori foundational subject. This subject both 
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motivates conversation and is the bearer o f the commo n sense 
wh i c h conversation analysis cla ims t o discover in conversation. 
As with o ther forms of pragmatics, t be goal-directed individuals 
which are taken to participate in and bring about conversation 
are given no theoretical p lace within interaction. It is worth 
noting as well that the search f o r intenti ons is re j ected b ecause 
the y are unobservable, not because they operate a s foundational. 
Sociological facts are seen by conversation anal ysis as 
being constructed through interaction, and this is a valuable 
point, but they are constructed by the interaction o f indi v i d uals 
who somehow precede interaction, already constituted as subjects 
prior to interaction. It seems, on the contrary, that we should 
take the subjectivities which arise in interaction and take part 
in the ongoing process of reinforcement, negotiation and con-
struction of sociological facts, as being themselves constituted 
through this interaction - as, we might say, sociological facts, 
and also a s their own self-consciousness. With this we return to 
the q uestion of the politics of discourse. 
It seems that there ca n be put forward a weak and a strong 
argument regarding the politics of discourse. In the first, it 
would be argued that in its attempt to deal with lan gu a g e in 
relation to the users of language pragmatics necessarily comes up 
against po litical phenomena, in the shape of the relations oper-
at ing among participants in the discourse which it e xamines. 
These relations, it could then be argued, are not neutral, but 
are variously structured along dimensions of power and solidar-
ity, and we find them expressed as propositions which are embedded 
in discourse and which constrain the interpretation of discourse, 
and enter into the operation of discourse rules. By analy zi ng the 
relation between what is said and what is done, pragmatics would 
thus be in a position to make explicit these propositions, and to 
bring out the political r elations which are expressed in var ious 
interactive practices. 
From such a position it could be argued that p ragmatics as 
social science should take account of these political aspects of 
discourse, but that the politics of discourse is certainly not 
intrinsic to pragmatics, and neither is politics intrinsic t o 
discourse. It enters into discourse, because discourse is is 
bound up in interaction, and interaction ( in at least some o f its 
a spects) involves political relatio ns, b ut it in no way underlies 
discourse. 
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This approach, which could be described as combin ing the 
more radical insights o f Austin wit h.. t he dynamic-interactive 
aspects of Labov & Fanshel and the conversation analysts, is 
perhaps q uite attractive. However, as I hope will be clear from 
the arguments I have put forward so far, it has to b e signifi c -
antly e xtended, in the light of a stronger account o f the relat-
ion between pragmatics and the politic s of discourse. 
The problem with the weak account is that it does n ot come 
to terms with the central and undermining features o f the app-
roaches to pragmatics which have been discussed. I t notes and 
emphasizes the account of the politics of discourse which prag-
matics, so to speak, backs into, but it does not confront the 
ways in which pragmatics is weakened, theoretically , by what in 
fact amounts to the e xc lusion of the politics of discourse as an 
intrinsic theoretical element. This means that we could take up 
an account of the politics of discourse from a pragmatics per-
spective, but that we would carry with this perspective an acc-
ount which is theoretically troubled (no great problem, perhaps ) , 
but also, in this theoretical inadequacy , activel y depoliticizing 
discourse. However, this criticism assumes that an account of 
discourse should treat discourse as politic ized, and this must 
now be shown. 
As I have argued throughout this study, the fundamental 
weakness of pragmatics (at least in those approaches v iewed here ) 
is that it continually avails itself of the notio n of a foundat-
ional linguistic subject. This subject acts as the ground from 
which meaning arises, and analysis traces the meaning of dis-
course to its determination in the subject's intentionality. I 
hope that I have demonstrated that suc h an approach cannot work , 
but the point to emphasize and repeat here is that the u se of 
such a model has the effect of tying the discu rsive or pragmatic 
significance which pragmatics discovers, in the form of speech 
acts or in shared propositions, back into this originating deter-
mination which exists outside discourse. Language thus becomes 
once again the resource or medium of positivism, by which indi v-
iduals attempt to transmit what they mean as a primary and p ure 
· relation to the world and as the expression of their intentio ns. 
If, however, we reject this approach, we can (and in line 
with, although extending, insights t o be found in pragmatics - in 
Austin's wor k , and Labov's, for example ) develop a quite diff-
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e r ent conception of the relation between lin~u-istic subjects and 
discourse. First, we can, and by taking note of Austin's demon-
stration of the ways in which language is a constitutive phenom-
enon, reject the idea of language as simply a medium. By this we 
can take meaning as not being simply born by language, as a 
translation from its ground in the pre-discursive experience of 
the subject, but as arising instead in the constitutive rules and 
definitions of more or less specific discursive formations. 
The type of position I am suggesting here can be found in 
Shapiro's study, which is an attempt to undermine positivist 
assumptions within political science. He argues, for example, 
partly drawing on Austin's work, that, 
Language is not about objects and experience, it is constit-
utive of objects and experience. This is not the subject-
ivist position that there is nothing (no thing) in the world 
until we cognize it or speak of it. Rather, it is the posit-
ion that the world of 'things' has no meaningful structure 
e x cept in connection with the standards we employ to ascribe 
qualities to it. We therefore cannot speak about the world 
or experience without beginning with some presuppositions 
about the boundaries that distinguish one object or event 
from another. (Shapiro, 1981: 20) 
This anti-empiricist position, as Shapiro goes on to say, does 
not imply that any given speaker arbitrarily employs rules to 
suit his or her purposes, and thereby moves about in a world of 
personally constituted objects and events, but rather that 'the 
language used by a society or culture contains rules which pro-
vide boundaries around phenomena and thereby produce the objects 
and events that are the referents of our speech' (1981: 21). 
Thus, individuals do not pre-linguistically pick out objects and 
experience and then describe them, and neither do they construct 
objects and experience by their use of language; rather, they use 
a language which, more or less peculiarly (both through history 
and across cultures) constitutes these objects for them. 
The next step is to note, with Shapiro, that through lan-
guage are constituted things (e.g., children, adults, hysteria, 
workers), actions (murder, playing, working), and institutions or 
collective phenomena (education, medicine, law enforcement). For 
example, 
When we speak about children and adults, .•. we are iden t-
ifying constituents that are not (a) a matter of mere obser-
vation (as some positivists would have it), or (b) a psych-
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ological comm itmen t o n the part of persons u sing the dis-
tinct ion. A person bec omes a child o r occupies that status 
not simply by d int o f s om e physiolog i cal or chronological 
factors but be cau se o f the ap pl ication o f the constitutive 
rules of childhood. A person is thus a ch ild b ecau se of the 
rules, derive d f rom the soci al, pol itical , and administrat-
ive o r ganization of the s oc iety that identi f ies some humans 
as children. (Shapiro, 1981: 124) 
Th is position invo l ves the development o f t he intuiti o n from 
p r ag mati c s that s pe a ki n g is a form o f activity, but we need to 
p ush it furt her, as Shapiro does. For if our linguistic or inte r -
a ctive practices define and delimit the objects t hat can b e 
spoken about, and if these objects inc lude interactive subje cts, 
t hen it f ollows that the subjecti vities which arise as the self-
consciousness of indi v iduals invo l ved in d isc ourse are also con-
stituted through the disc ursive p ract i c es of a socia l formation. 
Within d iscursive p rac tic e, tha t is, sub j ects are consti tut e d, 
a nd are also constituted for themselves. 
Cla ims such as these have been made in other theore t ical 
contexts, but the y need to b e emphasized here a s a n alternative 
t o t he t ype of naturalistic essentialism which continually in-
trudes in to pragmat i cs, a nd which leads, a s ha s been seen, to 
unworkable accounts of the r elation between language and the 
users of language. Further, on c e this account is reasserted the 
limitatio ns of the initia l formulation of the relation between 
pragmatics and t he politics of discourse bec o me cleare r , for with 
that account the place of discursive subjects within discourse 
f ormat ions is not addressed, and these subjects are im pl i ctly 
ta ken o n a s the groun d of mea ning a nd as ar ising o utside dis-
course. 
If, o n the other hand, we take discursive in teract ion a s 
constitutive of me a ning , and through that constituti ve o f t he 
sub jects arising in disc ourse, our approach t o politics be com es 
quite different. For then we take the pol itical relations which 
we see e xp ressed in discourse (a nd these are no t , it should be 
remembered, simpl y - or most importantl y - those talked about i n 
disc ourse ), a s being bound up in the operation of di sc ourse and 
in the constitution of interactive p ractic es. These relations are 
political because they involve the assignment and opera tion o f 
soc ial roles, and once we t ak e Austin's and Labov's demonstrat-
i ons of the place of these roles in the operat i o n of discourse, 
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along with the con ve rsati o n analysts' understanding o f d iscourse 
as dynam i c , then the polit i cs of discourse ta kes a place at the 
c ore of a pragmat i c view of la ng uage . 
fur t herm o re, a s was said earlier, a n approach wh i ch f ail s t o 
con front the politics of discourse at this level is not o n ly 
theoretically weakened by this refusal - because it leads to and 
involves the problems associated with the subject as origin and 
language a s a medium arisin g throughout this study - but takes o n 
the political role o f denyi n g the po l it i c s of discourse. This 
role i s po li tical because, by denyi n g t he place wi thin interact -
i o n o f various structu res of dominanc e, control and e xc lusi o n / 
inclusion, pragmatics serves to mask a nd conserve these struc-
tures - structures which it initially helps us recogni z e. 
It is crucial t o n ote here that I am not criticizing prag -
matics f or being 'politic al' . Gi ven that political relations are 
operati v e in the pragmatic mechanisms of discourse, and given 
that prag mati c s (as philosophy or as social science ) is bound up 
in a g i ven d iscursi ve prac ti c e, then it is nec essari l y involved 
in the operation of politics in discourse. And give n t hat p r ag-
ma tics is located and const ituted as a discourse wi thi n and 
thr ough c erta in discursive-social struc tures, we shou l d e xpe ct it 
to be located po litically . But it is e q uall y important to note 
that along with its refusal t o acknowledge the politics o f dis-
c o urse p r agmat i c s refuses to acknowledge its own poli tical locat-
ion. 
Pragmatics opens up the field of the social context of 
l a nguage use, but then, having acknowledged this field, con-
struc ts a model which turns away, t o the r eal me an ing o f the a 
priori subject, performin g pa r ad igmat i c act s o f o rdinary language 
according to common sense. Thi s is not a c onsci ous cloaking o f 
pol iti cs, but it a mounts to the clo aking of politics. The applic-
a tio n of pragma tics, as soc i al s ci enc e, i s probably more import -
a nt in this regard , simply b e cause it is there involved in the 
study of var i o us interac ti ve phenomena, and usua lly at sites of 
social confli c t -be it family, educational, 'e thnic', racial, 
sexual o r industrial conflic t. But this application is, a s we 
have seen, in accord with the abstract theorizing which occurs as 
philosop hical pragmat i cs . 
I n its application, prag matics as liberal social scienc e is 
avowedly conc erned to take seriously the experienc e of d iscourse 
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parti c ipants, and to let subjects speak for themselves (and this 
is raised t o the level of a methodologic al p rinciple in c onver-
sati o n anal ysis ) . But just by placing subjects in this method o -
l og i c al-theoretical positio n, yet fa~ling to adequatel y overcome 
prob lems of interpretation surrounding the assignment of ac ts and 
the g round of meaning, p ragmatics sets up in ad vance t he u ltim-
ately conservati ve political role of its anal y sis. 
For with the politics of discourse (and with it the discurs-
i ve construction of meaning and sub j ectivity ) denied at a t he o r-
etical level, the task of interpretatio n turns out t o be that o f 
the assignment of meaning, and this will necessaril y be in terms 
o f pragmati c s' own conceptual-political framework - as it makes 
sense of the material it analyzes. Given also the assumption that 
this theoretical-political framework accords generally with that 
of t he dominant political institutions and structures involved 
and bound up in the discourse being anal y zed, t hen t he effect o f 
pragmatic analysis will be to legitimize the operation of these 
institutions and structures, reducing confrontation to senseless-
ness or misunderstanding. Furthermore, by denying the political 
aspect of discourse, pragmatics has the effect of deny ing the 
operation of political institutions and structures in the very 
'apolitical' discourses in which their operation is most inter-
esting, and perhaps most effective. So subjects can s peak for 
t hemselves, but pragmatics must make sense of what they say, and 
pragmatics must (and quite legitimately, given that it is invol-
ved in analysis as social science) have the last word. If it did 
not interpret, pragmatics would itself be reduced to silence, but 
given that it does, and that it does in this way, pragmatics is 
politi c ally located as a legitimizing intervention in discourse. 
Again, while analysis could be carried out within this 
framework that pointed to the operation of political structures 
within discourse, by searching for determinate meaning in the 
intentionality o f a priori sub j ects, and by not taking meaning 
and subjects as c onstituted through discourse, the politics of 
discourse will alway s remain an outside, an epiphenomenon o f 
discourse, and the interesting issues regarding its place in the 
very operation of discourse c annot be raised. 
This discussion, and issues raised by it, could be taken 
much further, but that would be to go beyond the boundaries of 
the present project.2 Here I have been concerned to show how 
the politics of discourse is opened as a field of study within 
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the mainstream of Anglo-American pragmatics, and how it is 
c losed, and to show how this closure is tied- t o the introducti o n 
of elements which theoretically undermine pragmatics. 
That which has been ac complished here raises a major p roblem 
r egarding the v iability of pragmatics. For in the preceding 
discussion there has arisen no wa y of salvaging pragmatics as an 
objective representation of discourse while at the same time 
rejecting those theoretical elements by which it as p reviousl y 
pretended its objectivity. Once we understand discourse as a 
phenomenon which is as much c onstituting as mediating, and see 
analysis as itself bound up in discourse and the political and 
discursive relations of discourse, then a position which tran-
scends these relations seems as impossible as that of the a 
priori subject - and for the same reasons. Consequently, the pure 
theoretical relation which pragmatics as so~ial science demands 
of itself becomes impossible. 
This, however, does not mean that mainstream pragmatics 
l o ses viability as a project. On the contrary, if my arguments 
are correct as to the place it occupies in the politics of dis-
course by assuming that such a relation ~ possible, then there 
are good institutional-political reasons why as a project it is 
e x tremely v iable - it is just that its legitimacy is brought into 
question. The possibilities for a pragmatics which does not 
demand of itself this relation, and does not pretend it, can be 
left open at this stage, and await further discussion of the 
issues which have arisen in this study. 
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NOTES 
INTRODUCTION. 
[1] These definitions are discussed in detail by Le v inson (198 1: 
Ch.l ) . Levinson also, in that chapter , gives an account of the 
orig ins of the term ' pragmat ics' with Morris and Carnap . See also 
Stalnaker (1972). 
[ 2 ] This standard division between Continental and analytic or 
Anglo-American pragmatics is adequate as a generalization, but 
needs to be qualified. On the one hand, some Anglo-American 
sociolinguists (Gumperz, 1982, e .g.) seem to regard their work as 
falling with a general p ragmatics. On the other hand, ' Continen-
tal' philosophers such as Lyotard and Habermas should probably 
not be described as being interested in pragmatics in the wider 
sense. 
[3] A significant issue arises regarding the distinction between 
speech and writing and the appropriateness and theoretical conse-
quences o f ta k ing speech as the paradigm of language use- as is 
the case in the wor k t o be dealt with here. The debate surround-
ing this issue (mainly associated with the work of Derrida) will 
not be taken up here. 
[ 4] We shall see, howe ver, that conversatio n analysis r e j ects the 
notion of a speech act as developed in Austin's and Searle's work 
(see Chapter Six). 
[5] I am referring here to the context of this thesis. Wittgen-
stein's work is also important in this regard, but is not as 
influential in the pragmatic tradition covered by this study, and 
shall n ot be dealt with here. 
[6] For a detailed account of this relation between analytic 
philosophy and anti-positivism in the social sciences, see Shap-
iro (1981). Shapiro also g i ves an account o f Wittgenstein's sig-
nificance in this regard. 
CHAPTER ONE. 
[1] On this issue, see Strawson (1973: 56). 
[2] Compare Furberg's approach. He restrict s performatives to 
'classic explic it performatives', such as ' c eremonial formulae 
employed in the instituti onal procedures o f acquitting, convict-
ing, appointing, demoting, ex communica ting, baptizing, and nam -
ing', and excludes acts like promising, warning, etc., whi ch 
'demand supplementation', and where the 'I promise ... ', 'I 
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warn ..• ', ' I advise •.. ', etc. indicates how the su pple me nt is 
to be taken. He s ay s that these act s 'm ust have a content ; other-
wise n o thing would b e promi sed, warn e d or advi sed'. True or 
'archetypal ' perfo rmat ives, on the other hand, are 'se lf-suff-
icient; I can acquit you (perio d ) or - demo te you (period ) or 
excommunica te you (period ). These acts stand on their own fe e t' . 
( 1969: 452-3 & ff. ) 
[3] On th is issue Le vin son sa y s that perfo rmati ves ( including 
warn ings &c. , as we ll a s 'ritual' o nes ) 'are not u se d j ust to~ 
things, i.e., describe states of affairs, but rather acti ve l y to 
do things' ( 1983: 228 ) . Yet he also writes of illocutionary acts, 
Tc)f which the va riou s perfo rmati ves and constati ves are just 
special s ub - ca ses' ( 1983: 231 ) . 
[4 ) Forgu s on comments that Black himself recognizes that perform -
atives and constatives c annot be distinguished becau se t he r e are 
not in the r e l e va nt sense two c lasses at all, ' b u t apparently 
fails to see both that Austin realized it, a nd that it was Aus-
tin's main reason for abandoning the pe rfo rmative-c o ns tative 
disti n ct i o n'. ( 1966: 419,n.l ) 
[5) Schiffer claim s that while in uttering an e xp lici t perform-
at ive he is n ot constati ng that he is pe rfo rmin g a n act o f the 
kind nam e d by the verb , exp lic i t performat ive sentenc es are 
nonetheless constative. He says that the d if feren c e is that 
explicit performat i ve sentences are n o t uttered 'with t hei r full 
convention al force' ( 1972: 107ff . ) . 
[6] Some com mentato rs do, however, deal with this materia l . See 
Le vinson (1983 : 233) , a nd Cohen ( 196 4 ) , in an article di scus sed 
in Part Two of this chapter. 
(7] For further discussion of Derrida's reading of Au s t in, see 
Cul ler ( 19 83 : 110-3 4 ), Norris (1983 : Ch.3 ) and Maclean ( 1985 ) . 
CHAPTER TWO. 
[1) Note that at this po int Austin resurrects the performative-
constative di stinct i o n, which he has previously collapsed. 
[ 2] Cohen' s response to Austin is in many wa y s similar to 
Searle's, which shal l be discussed in Chapte r Four. 
[3] T his does n ot mean that a perfo rmati ve-seeming formula which 
lacks accompanying illocutionary con ventio ns will not be commun-
i cat i v e. It is jus t (a s was n o ted in Ch.l ) that ' I insult y o u' is 
the illocutionary ac t of stati ng (pe rhap s ) , n ot that of insult-
ing. If, however, such an utterance was made in such a way that 
it seemed clear that it wa s bein g used as a performative, then 
ou r re s ponse would be puzzlement - we would not know what the 
speaker was trying to do . 
(4 ] I want to avoid opening the Pandora's Box of conventio nality, 
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as it is not ne c essary f o r t he ar g ument he r e, be y ond wh at has 
b een said. A discussion of con ventionality in t he li g ht o f t he 
issues raised here would most usefully being wit h an e xa minati o n 
o f Lewis ( 1969 ) Bennett ( 1976 ) and Davidson ( 1984 ). 
[ 5] Schiffer adopts an approach similar to that of St r a ws o n ( see 
1972 : 9lff ). Whi l e he thinks the Strawson-Grice positio n regard-
in g meaning ha s d rawbacks he thinks that if we di v ide ill ocution-
ary acts into two j ointly exhaustive and mutually exclu sive 
subclasses of asserti ves and imperatives they can be kept sep-
arate fr o m locutionary acts and defined in terms of speaker's 
meaning ( 1972: 95ff ) . It is also worth noting that he does not 
share Strawson's worry regarding speech acts belonging to h ighly 
conventionalized institu tions, say ing that they are ' o f marg ina l 
interest only' to the theory of language and communicatio n ( 19 72 : 
93 ). Ferguson's approach to these issues is also in many ways 
quite similar t o that of Strawson here (cf.l969: esp.l60- 171 ). 
[6) See also Levinson's interesting discussion of a version of 
this type of argument ( 1983: 246ff ). Probably the most well- known 
verson of this type of argument is that gi ven by Searle (e g. 19 6 5 
& 1968 ) , howe ver I shall discuss that material in detail in t he 
chapter devoted to Searle's work. 
[7] Graham's approach does also allow for unintended illocution-
ary acts, and this seems to allow the act to be broug h t apart 
from intentionality (cf.esp.Graham, 198lb: 131-2 ). However, he 
does not then follow this through and develop an account of these 
acts as constituted outside subjectivity. Furthermore, he retains 
a scale of acts, with convention-governed acts at one end, and no 
account is given of the conditions by which illocutionary acts, 
whether 'highly conventionalized' or not, exist. 
[8] A similar point is taken up in Austin's earlier paper ' Other 
Minds' ( 1946 ) . 
[9] This comment by Austin relates to one of Graham's objections 
noted earlier. 
[10] Throughout this chapter I have focussed attention on those 
aspects of Austin's theory which have raised most response from 
commentators, and which have had most influence within p rag-
matics. This has meant that a more detailed discussion of the 
locutionary act itself has been left out (but see Ch.4 below ) . 
This has also meant that I have not gone into the illocution-
perlocution distinction. It is not generally discussed in detail 
(but see Davis, 1979), however, it is the distinction with which 
Austin finds most trouble and has gained relevance in the light 
of recent action theory (as Davis notes). 
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CHAPTER THREE. 
[ 1) It should b e emp hasize d that these theocies do n o t constitute 
the onl y altecnative. The wock of Mi chael Dummet t, especially , 
should be noted - see, e.g., his Fcege: Philosophy of Language 
(Duckwocth, 1973 ) . 
[2] Foe fucthec discussion of distinctions amongst so-called 
'communication-intention' theocies, see Hacrison ( 1979 : 63-5 & 
165-7 ) , Stcawson (1970) and Chom sky (1975 : Ch.2 ) . 
[3] In cepocting the definitions offeced in the 1968 pape c, I a m 
pacaphras ing, and to a certain extent si mpl ifying , Grice's focm-
ulations. Also, the use of the terms, 'propositional a t titude' 
and 'A thinks that U thinks' will b e e xp lained in relation to the 
1969 paper. Their use is not important in celation to the 1968 
paper. 
(4] I shall not b e dealing with the many counter-examples offered 
against Grice's formulation. A usef u l summary and d iscu ssi on of 
these can be f ound in Schiffer, who a lso offers a deta iled e x -
plication of Gr ice's vi ews (1972: Ch.1 & 2 ) . 
[5] I have accepted the validity of these intuitio ns for the s ake 
of the argument. Wright, howe ver, ha s attacked their validity as 
generalizations, claiming that speakers of American English tend 
not to share Grice's intuitions here (1975: 367, n.10 ). Wright has 
also criticized Grice's use of 'utterance'. Especially, he notes 
that by defining 'utterance' as 'a neutral word to apply to any 
candidate for meaning-nn' (Grice, 1957: 380), Grice 'leaves us 
with our fundamental concepts vacuously interdefined', 'meaning-
no' is supposed to be explicated by analyzing 'utterances' (1 975: 
365 -6). Again, I will accept Grice's terminology f o r the sak e of 
the argument. 
[6] In fact, I have found the problem I have raised here also 
n oted explicitly by Stampe (1975) . In a comment directed at 
Cohen's and Searle's approaches (but with reference t o Grice) he 
notes 'pe cfectly transparent equivocations on the term mean,' 
which involve 'resolutel y confusing and conflating the matter o f 
what one means to do (i .e., intends to do) with the mat ter of 
what one means £i something, e.g. by s omething he says' (1 975: 
~-
[ 7] It might be c laimed that Wilson is not invol ved in true 
communication. But this claim cannot be based on the fact that he 
does not have the appropriate Gricean intentions (for this would 
beg the question), and it seems indisputable that what Wilson 
says is meaningful. His utterance is meaningful without being 
Gricean. If it is at all possible to defend an intention theory 
of meaning from counter-examples, this can only be done with 
something like Searle's later theory of Intentionality, where he 
separates cepresentation intentions from communication intent-
ions. We could then claim that Wilson represents, but does not 
communicate, and so does not 'fully' mean (see Ch.4). 
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[8] It is worth noting that this same im pl ic i t self-transparen t 
subject occurs in Grice's theory of conversational implicature. 
In that theory, non-conventional im plicatures are sa id to be 
calculated from apparent violations of certain conversational 
ma xi ms (which are basic to conversation ) under the assumption 
that the s peaker is at a deeper level being conversationally 
cooperative. For example, an apparently irrelevant comment can 
lead to the c alculation of an implied premise according t o which 
the comment is relevan t . The problem with this is that implic-
ations of which the speaker is unaware (and so not intending ) or 
only vaguely aware are denied a place in interacti on - the y 
cannot, it seems, even be treated as derivative. Commun ic atio n is 
taken to presuppose speakers who are completely conscious of 
their (communicati ve) actions and the meaning which those actions 
ha ve. So again, meaning is taken as being constituted by and 
coo rdinate with intentionality. (For Grice's theory of conver-
sa t ional implicature, see Grice, 1975 & 1978. For a detailed 
discussion, see Levinson, 1983.) 
CHAPTER FOUR. 
[ 1 ] For further discussio n of Searle's place within pragmatics, 
see Harrison, 19 79 : 165-7. 
[2] In a footnote, Stampe comments that 'the fact is that the 
force of an utterance is not something that could be ~meant~, 
11 intended~, ~expressed~, or ~said~. It is the wrong kind of thing 
for any of these predicates' (Stampe, 1975: 6, n.5). We might add 
that what o ne can do is mean or intend an utterance to have a 
certain force,-or say that an utteranc e has a certain force (see 
bel ow). 
[3] See Ch. 4 & 5 of Speech Acts, where Searle discusses 
reference and predicat1on 1n~ propositional act. 
[4] For discussion of this counter-example, see Schiffer, 1972: 
27-30. 
[5] We have seen Grice's attempts to avoid these sorts of critic-
isms, and I will not spend t ime evaluating them. I am more inter-
ested in the position Searle devel op s from these arguments. 
[6] Note also Stampe's c omment that Searle's conditions e xclude 
promising someone a punch in the mouth (Stampe, 1975: 12). 
[7] This possibility would also appear to threaten Austin's 
o r i g i n a 1 p r og r am , a n d w e w i 11 s e e t h a t i t i s a m a j o r p r o b 1 e m f o r 
discourse analysis. 
269 
CHAPTER FIVE. 
[ 1 ) Du e to t he u s e of da t a by 1 i n g u i s t i c p r a g m m a t i c s , a n d t he 
complexity of the analytical model which is applied to this data, 
this chapter especially, and the nex t , will be considerabl y 
longer than the previous chapters. 
[2] A problem with the term 'speech e vent' is that Labov & Fan-
shel are not always consistent in its use ( see 1977: 104, e. g.) , 
and it is important to recognize and maintain the distinction 
between a speech act or action and a speech event. 
[3] For the details of Labov & Fanshel's account o f speech act-
ions, see 1977: 60-5. 
CHAPTER SIX. 
[ 1 ] This c riticism is no doubt valid concerning Searle's treat-
ment of indirect speech acts, but we have seen that illocutionary 
force indicating devices are in fact g iven an im po rtant place in 
his general theory. 
[2 ] See Levinson ( 19 83: 352 ) for a re-analysis of a section of 
Labov & Fanshel's data. This re-anal ysis is also discussed b elow. 
(3] The question of just how the notion of the 'reality ' of 
conversation operates in the framework of conversation analysis 
will be discussed below. 
[4] The development of conversation anal ysis (or ethnomethod-
ology) by Garfinkel was influenced by phenomenology, mainly from 
Husserl, and from Schutz's phenomenological approach to social 
theory. In a more extended study than this, or one presented in a 
larger scale, the relation of conversation analysis to phenomen-
ology would be dealt with in parallel to the relati o n of dis-
course analysis to speech act theory. This would be similar to 
Shapiro's analysis of political science (see esp. 1981: 100-7 on 
Garfinkel and Schutz). It might be noted that even Garfinkel, and 
certainly his followers, make little or no reference to the 
philosophical background of their work, and this would make 
including such a discussion correspondingly harder than with 
discourse analysis, although no less interesting for that. 
[5] The best short account of ethnomethodology is Ch.1 of Gar-
finkel (1967b), a different version of which occurs as Garfinkel 
(1972). See also Garfinkel & Sacks (1970), Ch.2 of Garfinkel 
(1967b), Turner (1974) and Garfinkel (1968). For examples of 
analysis, see esp. Garfinkel (1967b). See also the collections in 
Turner (1974) and Sudnow (1972). 
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CONCLUSION. 
[ 1] It should b e noted that while such factors arise in discourse 
analysis generally, Labov & Fanshel recognize and incorporate 
these factors to a much greate r exten~ than most othe r work in 
that tradition. 
[2] This extended discussion could involve, for e xample, an 
examination of Foucault's approach to discourse and po litics 
(some of whose terminology has already informed this discussion) . 
An e xampl e of su ch an examination in the context of some of the 
issues raised here can be found in the work of Shapiro alread y 
mentioned ( 1981 , esp. Ch s S-7 ). The approaches to pragmatic s by 
Lyotard and Habermas would also be relevant, as would the work o f 
Trevor Pateman, Fredric Jameson, and that of Kress, Hodge and 
others working within the framework of Halliday's functional 
linguistics. 
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